



## **INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM**



# **INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM**

**Being a plea for saving Rs. 28 Crores a year  
by immediate Indianization etc.**

**OF**

**British rank and file only**

**A message of hope for the Indian Tax-payer**

## **A STUDY**

*For Statesmen, Publicists, Politicians and Military  
experts, both Indian and British*

**BY**

**CAPT. G. V. MODAK**



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**AN  
INDIAN SOLDIER'S STUDY PRESENTED  
TO  
ALL CHAMPIONS OF INDIA'S CASE  
FOR  
ECONOMY IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE  
WITHOUT  
PREJUDICE TO EFFICIENCY**



## FOREWORD

Captain Modak is evidently putting his leisure in retirement to good use. He has spent many years in active military service in an important Indian State. He has written books in Marathi on the subject of Military history and the battle-fields of the Maratha period. He has studied the facts and figures about the present organisation of the Army in India, both British and Indian. And he has given much thought to the problem of the defence of India by her own sons, as a part of the greater problem of responsible Self-Government in India at the hands of Indians themselves. In this way Captain Modak has qualified himself to be regarded as a kind of an expert, by which word I only mean one who knows much more of any particular subject than the average man of his own generation.

It is natural, therefore, that Captain Modak should succeed in engaging the attention of the reader, who cares to dip into his present book on the Indian Defence Problem. The problem has two important aspects, political and financial. But both have a common background in the political domination of India by England. Remove this domination; replace it by an equitable arrangement in which India may guide and work out her own destiny by her own hands; and India will certainly be able to solve the problem of her Military defence; so that her sons should have the proud privilege of defending their hearths and homes against any internal or external foe, and yet save quite a lot of money to be more usefully spent on some real Nation-Building

**Departments.** This domination of India by England, this denial to her sons of the right to shape their own administrative policy, that is at the bottom of her woes, not the least of which are the emasculation of Indian people, the humiliation of foreign mercenaries domineering over Indian's brave and warlike sons, and the financial ruin involved in maintaining a costly military establishment.

Captain Modak's book deals with all these topics in varying proportions of space and detail. There are not many striking or new points in his treatment of the topic of the Military policy of the British Imperial Government as it affects India. But his readers will feel particularly thankful to Captain Modak for his well informed constructive criticism on the topics of replacement of British by Indian soldiers as well as officers, and the great economy in finance that may be effected by this replacement, in almost all the departments of the Army in India. The wealth of quotation, in which he indulges in proving his theme, is equalled by the instructive tabular statements which he marshals for the same purpose. And so long as no champion of the Imperial cause comes forward to dispute the truth of those quotations and tables, Captain Modak could legitimately claim that he has made out an unanswerable case for a National policy in Military administration in India.

This whole question becomes necessarily invested with absorbing public attention and interest, in view of the fact that the question of dominion status for India is made out to be interlocked with the question of India wielding responsibility for her own defence. The interest deepens, as it were, owing to the conspiracy of comparative silence on the part of British

representatives on this topic in the deliberations of the three Round Table Conferences. Consequently Captain Modak's book has a great chance of being appreciated when the Joint Select Committee, set up by the Parliament, will be discussing the White Paper, embodying the Cabinet's deliberate conclusions on the subject of the immediate political reforms in India.

There is much food for thought in what Captain Modak writes in Chapters VII and VIII about the Military inefficiency and the Economic inefficiency of the British soldier and Officer in India. The Military inefficiency is due to many causes, physical as well as geographical. During the period of his short service in India, the British soldier spends a good deal of time in adapting himself to the Indian climate and making himself familiar with his geographical surroundings. Even when the Government spends quite a good lot on the comforts and conveniences of the British troops, they cannot keep themselves up to the normal standard of health and fitness. At page 175, Captain Modak gives a statement about the incidence of diseases among British and Indian soldiers, which should prove very instructive. Then, again, British troops cannot be so useful in mountain warfare as the Indian troops. Statistics relating to the use of British and Indian troops in campaigns on the Frontier, show that the ratio of British troops to Indian troops employed in such campaigns has varied from 1:6 to 1:50. Captain Modak calculates the total rate of the inefficiency of the British troops at 43 p. c. due to sickness, invalidation, mortality etc. The British soldier is economically inefficient in the sense that he costs to India much more than an Indian soldier, whether it be peace-time or war-time. This double inefficiency of

British troops is an additional argument for Indianisation of the Army in India, both officers and men. Captain Modak says that a saving of about 30 crores will be effected by the substitution of British by Indian troops! At pages 200 and 201 he goes into the figures of possible reduction of cost in various Military departments, and it would be interesting to see if anybody could contradict his view in this matter. In fact the whole of chapter VIII is highly interesting reading from this point of view. In chapter IX again the author practically covers the same ground, giving a number of tables of comparative cost as between the British and Indian soldier in India, and also as between the Military Department in England and in India.

By far the most important topic dealt with by Captain Modak is that in Chapter XIV, in which he maintains that the crux of the whole position lies in the amalgamation scheme and the partnership scheme, in which India is made to borrow British troops for her defence from England, and in which all manner of legitimate and illegitimate, equitable and inequitable financial burdens are imposed upon India under an Imperial authority, which cannot be called to account under the present condition of India as a dependency. The scheme is summarised in the familiar name of Capitation Charges; and all the three safe-guards, *viz.* safe-guards relating to Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance, have a direct bearing upon the continuance of the present system of India's military dependence upon England, for which England is fighting.

This capitation charges business has a very long and painful history; and it can be proved by chapter and verse, quoted from the criticisms offered thereon not only by non-official experts, but by the Government of India

itself, which from time to time has felt qualms of conscience, as a Government entrusted with responsibility of safeguarding India's interest in the first instance. In that task the Indian Government, however, has always failed; because its occasional instincts as a National Government were summarily suppressed by the Home authorities. The question has been considered from time to time on the representations of the Indian Government itself, by *ad hoc* Committees, such as Tulloch Committee of 1860-61, Northbrook Committee, Welbey Commission etc. And the latest is the Committee, which was sitting in England side by side with the third Round Table Conference, and on which sat two eminent Indian Judges—Justice Sir Shadilal and Justice Sir Suleman. It is useless to anticipate what the result of the deliberations of this last Committee will be, though Dame Rumour says that the Committee is going to give some relief to India. It is too much to hope, however, that it will be either a real or a great relief, or that it will solve the complicated knot of amalgamated military authority, shared by the Indian Government and the British Government at Home, and in which the latter necessarily enjoys a whip hand.

I will leave this topic with only two quotations. The first is an extract from the representation made by the Government of India in 1878, and the second is an extract of remarks made by Colonel Buchanan, a member of the Welbey Commission. (1) "Placed as it was under the serious responsibility of so administering the affairs of the greatest dependency of the British Crown, that while British supremacy is strictly guarded, the means of securing that end shall not unduly weigh on the people of the country, it was constrained to represent to her Majesty's Government that the burden



thrown upon India on account of the British troops is excessive, and beyond what an impartial judgment would assign, in considering the relative material wealth of the two countries, and the mutual obligations that subsist between them. All that we can do is to appeal to the British Government for an impartial view of the relative financial capacity of the two countries to bear the charges, that arise from the maintenance of the army of Great Britain, and for a generous consideration of the share assigned by the wealthiest nation in the world to a dependancy so comparatively poor and so little advanced as India."

(2) Says Mr. Buchanan, "In order to justify the purpose, various conflicting theories are brought forward for the supposed relation of India to the Home Government. Sometimes she is treated as an independent power; at other times as in a position of strict administrative and legitimate dependency. Sometimes she is spoken of as partner in a joint concern, and at other times as a more or less unwilling purchaser in a limited market."

In trying to solve this muddle, one naturally feels inclined to ask the question, viz. which of the two will come first? Responsible Self-Government in India by Indians, or the removal of the present inequitable Financial and Military arrangements? One feels no comfort in the declaration made on this topic by the Rt. Hon. Mr. Thomas, who presided over the Defence Committee of the R. T. C. viz. that "Whilst we would all agree that the Indianization of the army is a desirable end and something to work for, it is not one which need necessarily precede Responsible Government." This means that the Responsible Government that we shall get will be so safe-guarded and

limited in power, that even in that 'Responsible Government' the present inequitable arrangements about Defence will continue for as long as we know not how long. But let us hope that we get at least the Responsible Government, so that we may work that lever for what it may be worth, in destroying the present inequitable amalgamation and partnership system.

The last point Captain Modak deals with in his book, is the position of *non-possumus* taken by Sir Samuel Hoare at the R. T. C., and the conundrums he has proposed as difficulties in the way of India getting full responsible Self-Government in Military matters. Capt. Modak has supplied answers to those conundrums point by point; but the subject is bound to reappear in a contestable form in the "White Paper," and I believe Capt. Modak will then be able to devote some time exclusively to this one topic and bring out a supplement to his present book.

Nothing can be more interesting than the constructive programme which Capt. Modak has designed and proposed at the end of his book. A part of that may possibly be in the hands of Indians themselves to carry out; but even in that respect limits of success are sure to be soon reached because they are very narrow. Military training and Military habits cannot be successfully fostered in the youth of any country, unless there is clearly before its eyes assured hope of a proud and glorious career in Military service. A Rifle Club and U. T. C. organization in a University cannot thrive and prosper, if it can be looked upon only as a sport and no necessary avenue to a Military career. But something is better than nothing; and it is upto the leaders of the coming generations to start even these clubs and

organizations, in the hope that a time may soon come, when all their accumulated service and spirit can be devoted and used at the proper time and in its proper place and when we may have something like freedom to adjust our own affairs.

I shall conclude with the expression of hope that the idea of an "All-India Defence League", put forward specifically by Capt. Modak, will be taken up by persons who are competent for the purpose, and enthusiastic in their temperament. Such leagues have done wonders in other countries, and there is no reason why similar results should not be achieved even in India in course of time.

POONA }  
13-3-33 }

N. C. Kelkar

## PREFACE

I have great pleasure in presenting to the public this study of the 'Indian Defence Problem.' The study by its very nature is not an intensive detailed study of annas and pies, but it merely records the general state of affairs in the language of figures. The remedy suggested is the British soldier's immediate replacement.

I may say, that I am presenting in the following pages, the results of a continuous study of over a score of years. My material was not always easy to obtain. The difficulties of satisfactorily deciphering the tangle of concealed screens were not few. I claim no high literary or journalistic abilities, and I am not sorry for that, as it was never my purpose to present a literary piece to divert the easy going elite of the "gentleman critic class", we meet in our life. My study is of a serious subject and seriously it is to be studied. Truth will bear presentation in any form, or even without one. I may assure, that the facts presented herein are based on first-rate authorities and will bear scrutiny even by the most unsympathetic critic. I hope, this attempt of mine induces more students (our I. B. Os) from Sandhurst to come forth, with their studies on this most vital and important question.

If there is anything more, that characterises the educated or the *intelligentsia* of the country and distinguishes them from classes elsewhere in the world, it is then utter ignorance in military matters. All this is due to that British policy of keeping the Indian *intelligentsia* out of the Army, by stamping them as Non-martial. The Army department never felt, that it existed in the

interests of the country (India), whom they pretend to serve, only with their lip-sympathy.

The result of all this policy has been to emasculate the population.

I have found it very convenient and helpful in my study—the Book—to adopt the ‘out of their mouths’ easy and safe method of presenting my arguments. It may perhaps be not quite appreciated by some, perhaps it may even act on some readers’ nerves; but my difficulties were so peculiar, and I felt that under these circumstances, in which I was unhappily placed, I could not have better expressed or even expressed equally so well, what the extracts by themselves do.

It is also probable that readers, who generally are not used to British frankness etc., may perhaps interpret many of the extracts to be too harsh, contemptuous, indecent or full of hatred and many other things; but my long association with the British officers have changed my angle of vision, and made me realize, that in those statements at least, the Britisher is the most frank, honest and candid person. Some statements may have a tinge of hypocrisy, a few may have a double meaning for the sake of policy, some may show the diplomatic skill of the British writers, and yet, the majority of the extracts are nothing but the most perfectly frank, honest and candid opinions of Britishers. It is possible, that the frankness at times may be found to be a shade deeper. The readers who have been under a demoralizing process of administration may perhaps think that, some of the extracts are indecent, but let them not think so. I again assure them, that the extracts, if they leave any mark at all on one, only convey an idea that the Britishers, whose extracts I

have taken are quite honest and frank in those statements at least—whatever those statements may be.

Similarly, I would request all readers not to misunderstand and misinterpret my frank and candid statements as disrespectful or anti-British. It is far from me and my mind. I certainly am an admirer of some of those British methods and ways, which even after our long continuous association with Britishers, have not been completely copied and learnt by us. I would therefore wish, that they do not misunderstand me or stamp me as anti-British, although in my zeal, I may have shown myself as Pro-Indian; just as a Britisher always unmistakably imprints upon you the fact of his being Pro-British. It is just natural for every one to think so.

Readers should kindly bear the fact in mind that all this compilation and printing etc., has been done in such a short time as ten to twelve weeks. They also have to remember that I had to do all this with many handicaps, as we say in the Army, Men, Money and Munitions,—so was it with me, in this attempt of mine.

I, therefore, would wish that, this volume is looked upon, only as an informative mass of material, which I wanted to give them at the present moment when the country is so seriously considering the question of Defence—The Control of the Army and the Indianization—and the three safeguards.

It is common knowledge that certain reports of certain committees of British experts such as the Rawlinson MacMunn-Committee, were suppressed for years and years. Similarly, other reports such as the Skeen Committee's Subcommittee report also was suppressed; even the R. T. C. members could not get a copy; and

why? The question is natural. The answer is plain. The experts, though majority of them were British and the highest authorities on Army and Army policies, were at that stage unable to suppress certain facts and information.

But the civil authorities—the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India—who were not the Military experts, but who could wield their power like the great Moguls of White-hall, not only could suppress the report and recommendations, but could even throttle the very suggestions of these recommendations. It is exactly on this account, that we insist on having the control of the Army, the Defence Minister responsible to the legislatures and ultimately getting the 'Governor General's powers of Defence' transferred through the Defence Minister to a Defence Committee and legislatures.

The reader can thus easily imagine the very appalling reserve and secrecy that one meets everywhere, from places where one can naturally go in search of information. It appears, that it is not in the British interest,—let me state frankly—that my countrymen be educated in such subjects.

The study would reveal to the politician the ghastly inner side of the so-called fair army budgets of India. Their word, if it carries the weight of representative responsibility, let it also be weighty with the true knowledge of facts which may not otherwise be quite clear to them.

Let them think, how the British Army part of the Indian Army, is but an Army of occupation. The Indian Army is not a national army at all. Let them deeply ponder, how the present army situation in India tells adversely upon the character, man-hood etc.,

of the aspiring Indian youths. Let them digest the cumulative result of such a demoralising system.

A saving of 32 crores will be effected by Indianising the army without reducing its efficiency. A paltry sum of about 2 crores may be reserved for developing territorials, reserves and all other methods of securing cheap and economic Defence. Full 30 crores will thus be released for a number of Nation-building activities. All this could only be done, if the Indianization of the Army—the replacement of the British soldiers, as well as the officers—takes place.

Since, Defence is the concern of Indians, we ought to be prepared for Defence, and as such an 'All-India National Defence League,' similar to 'the National Defence League' in England, should be established to work up a General Programme to prepare ourselves adequately for the Defence of our country, in a larger measure and to a greater extent.

The present volume may perhaps claim to be the first attempt at a discussion of such a great National Question on the solid ground of political and historical facts. It is necessary that at the present juncture, when India is expecting to pass from one stage to another, when the *White Paper*—that is talked of, not so much by the majority of the Indian public, as by the Government block and others—we wish that our own people in trying to come to any conclusions on the Defence Question or the other safeguards question, should not ignore certain incontrovertible historical and political facts. It is, therefore, that all this material has been put before them in such a hurry. Many mistakes in spelling, corrections etc., have crept in, due to this haste. The co-operation of friends has reduced the number of mistakes, but it is also possible, that others have



escaped detection. I will be thankful, therefore, if my readers will bring to my notice the errors they come across.

I desire to acknowledge with deep gratitude the most valuable assistance given by my young friends and Brothers without which the book would not have seen the light of the day at all in such a short time as 10 to 12 weeks.

I am indebted to all those Authorities quoted in the book.

I am indebted to the members of the 'Servants of India Society' and the library staff, for the kindness shown to me by according me an opportunity and all other facilities to carry on my studies in the Society, and its splendid library, where I was greatly helped by everybody. I am particularly indebted to all those members of the society and all other friends, who helped me in going through my notes—manuscript—and making me some helpful suggestions.

I am deeply indebted to Mr. S. R. Sardesai, my printer, for all the valuable help given. I cannot adequately express my feelings. I feel it is entirely due to his personal and brotherly help and feelings, that I was enabled to print this study of mine; otherwise I am doubtful whether it would have seen the light of day.

The workers in the press, who in spite of badly typed manuscript and the corrections at every stage of printing, have given me their willing help and co-operation, deserve my thanks.

My thanks are also due to numerous other friends who helped directly or indirectly in bringing out this volume.

There are also some friends, who would not permit me to acknowledge their help and express my gratefulness for all sorts of help rendered. I only, therefore, record my gratefulness to every one of them.

Servants of India  
Society, Poona 4. }  
21-3-33

G. V. Modak.





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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- A. Branch**—Adjutant General's Branch.
- Adjt.**—Adjutant.
- Admi.**—Administration.
- A. & O.**—Administration and organization.
- A. H. Q.**—Army Head Quarters.
- B. Os.**—British Officers.
- B. O. Rs.**—British other ranks.
- Br.**—British.
- Cav.**—Cavalry.
- C-in-C.**—Commander in Chief.
- Col.**—Colonel.
- Genl.**—General
- G. Branch**—General Staff Branch.
- G. G.**—Governor General.
- I. A. S. C.**—Indian Army Supply Corps.
- I. B. Os.**—Indian British officer.
- I. C. C.**—Indian corps of clerks.
- I. D. S. M.**—Indian Distinguished Service.
- I. H. C.**—Indian Hospital corps.
- Ind.**—Indian.
- Inf.**—Infantry.
- I. O.**—Indian Officer.
- I. O. Rs.**—Indian other ranks.
- K. Cs.**—King's commissions.
- L/Naik.**—Lance Naik.
- Med.**—Medical.
- Med. Art.**—Medium Artillery.
- M. E. S.**—Military Engineering Service.
- M. H.**—Main Head.
- M. T.**—Mechanical transport.
- O. R.**—Other ranks.
- Ord.**—Ordnance.
- Orga.**—Organization.
- O. T. Cs.**—Officers' training corps.
- P. S. C.**—Passed Staff College.



- Q. Branch**—Quarter-master General Branch.  
**Qr.**—Quarter-master.  
**Q. M. G.**—Quarter-master General.  
**R. A. F.**—Royal Air Force.  
**R. F. A.**—Royal Field Artillery.  
**R. H. A.**—Royal Horse Artillery.  
**R. M. A.**—Royal Military Academy.  
**R. M. C.**—Royal Military College.  
**Rmt. Depot.**—Remount Depot.  
**R. Q. M. S.**—Regimental Quarter-master Sergeant.  
**R. S. M.**—Regimental Sergeant Major.  
**R. T. C. Ahmednagar.**—Royal Tank corps—  
**S. A. S.**—Small Arms Training School; Sub-assistant surgeon.  
**U. T. C.**—University Training Corps.  
**N. C. Os.**—Non-commissioned officers.  
**W. O.**—Warrant officers.  
**V. Cs.**—Viceroy's commission.

## ERRATA

### Page

201. Read, married soldier's allowance as 8 lacs.
209. Pay of ranks requires correction.
217. According to changes in new rates, some figures may change a little.
246. The Aux. and Terri. figure of 409 is not the personnel of clerks, but B. O. Rs. for training purposes. In the Auxiliary it is more than 350, and in Territorials about 35, and the rest in A. H. Q. Dist. and Commands etc.
247. Includes all B. O. R. Personnel in general; in the medical services, this figure cannot be included in this training table.
253. Figures in table—shown against Frontier Brigade, should be taken as Training and Depot Head figures, except the figure of 49 of 1926-27 in 1st column.
259. Ref. (a) is for the column (England 1926).
325. Table I, Read Soldier's Military Education Est. Cost.
335. Table VII, figure to item 6 has to be added, the same will have to be added in general total also.
337. Table VIII, read Education after children.
343. Table III, read the cost of Nurses in 1926 (India) as 8'73 Laes; Read cost of medicine in 1926 as 54'05 instead of 54'5 Laes; Read ' Other Items ' cost in 1931-32 as lacs 61'70 instead of 74'53 Laes.
345. Table V, Heading; read medical, after soldier.
359. Figures of Payment made to England, read 2,07,57,926, instead of 22,77,92,467; and read 48,66,75,000 for 48,67,50,000. Read 15,58,992 for unemployment Insurance and 5,32,267 for National Health Insurance.
384. 4th line from bottom, read 63'45 crores instead of 62'45.



**PART I**

**BRITISH TROOPS NECESSARY?**



## CHAPTER I

### INDIAN DEFENCE CONSIDERATIONS

The world has been changing rapidly. League of Nations, Dis-armament propaganda, Principle of self-determination, Mussolini's Italy and Soviet Russia, Recognition of the rights of smaller and weaker nations to self-government, Talk of Swaraj for India and China and the like indicate the tendency of the present age. And both in India and England the question of 'Swaraj for India' is being seriously discussed. Barring the left-wingers of the Conservatives, such as Churchill and others, the saner section of the English statesmen have agreed in words only so far that India ought to have self-government when some difficulties in the way of their self-rule disappear. One of such difficulties is, it is said, that Indians have no National Army as such, able to take care of her 'Defence.' The object of this brochure is to show that such a difficulty does not really exist at all.

It has been assumed that the British are sincere in their desire to see India self-governed as early as possible. It is also assumed that they are prepared to give up their policy of administering India's affairs primarily in the interests of England or the British Nation or the British Empire. It is also assumed that they are prepared to revise their present Army policy based on "Mistrust of the Indian," "Divide and rule," "Keeping India with the sword that won it for the British," "Racial supremacy," "Exploitation of India for the purposes of the British Nation and British Colonies," and the like. These assumptions have to be

made in order that the question of Indian Defence difficulty may admit of discussion at all.

The defence difficulty is based on the assumption that if the British element in the present Indian Army be withdrawn, India will be helpless to defend herself, "that British element in the Indian Army is necessary, is indispensable perhaps for all time to come." The present brochure attempts to show not only the hollowness of this imaginary difficulty but to show how the elimination of British element from the Indian Army is utterly necessary from the point of view of defence itself, apart from the question of economy as well as from that of the moral, physical and intellectual elevation and gain of the Indian people. It attempts to show how a larger part of the British element, namely nearly 58,000 British troops ( called the British Other Ranks ) can be immediately replaced without any the least harm within a year or two, ( even the King's Commissioned officers can be replaced within a comparatively short period of the next 16 years from to day without the least harm to the desired and required efficiency of the Indian Army ). The object of this brochure is also to attempt to show the national importance of the cheap and efficient method of the Defence of India by Indian Nationals. It also shows how the Indian National Army under Indian control consisting of the standing army, the territorials etc., may serve the Empire much more and much better than the present Indian Army.

#### **Replacement of British Troops by Indians**

This is divided into three chapters : (1) External Defence, (2) Internal Defence, and (3) Imperial Defence.

It is discussed in the 2nd and 3rd chapters of Part I, as to how British troops are not necessary

for the external and internal defence of India, an argument which is usually trotted out by the Britisher in support of the maintenance of British troops in India.

In the 4th and 5th chapters we show how Imperial defence and National defence of England are one and the same. In the 5th chapter we give a note and a summary of various extracts from the different Committees' reports and the like throwing light on many questions of the Army policy and the Army administration.

In Part II we deal with the 'Replacement' plea, after having established in Part I that British troops are unnecessary. We further show therein how the British soldier is unfit to do any soldiering worth the name, or any soldiering which could not be done by Indians themselves. We also deal therein and prove how the British soldier in India is a heavy drain on the Indian exchequer, and we also prove and show how he was never of much use to us in our frontier warfare. In short, in two separate chapters we prove his Military and Physical inefficiency and the great cost.

In Part III, we show by a number of general and nearly correct statements how extravagant expenditure is generally incurred on British soldiers and the Army administration in general, in the various branches and departments of the Army, *viz.* the A. Q. and G. branches and their sub-branches, such as those concerned with administration and organization, movements and quartering, military training and education, medical, provisioning and supplies, etc. We also give in the end a short note on capitation, and also examine Sir Samuel Hoare's latest statement and arguments in connection with the 'Army Problem' and in the end we give our conclusions.



We shall present in another book a scheme of Indianisation of the Officer class in the Army in sixteen years from to-day.

In this 'Replacement' chapter we have not taken into account the British officer but we mean mainly to restrict our suggestions to the British Other Ranks of the British Army only.

We can raise an equal strength of Indian troops calculated to replace the British soldiery by raising unit for unit. Presuming the annual recruitment of the Indian Army to be twenty-five thousand, we can say that it will not at all be very difficult to replace fifty-eight thousand British troops, which is roughly double the number of annual Indian recruitment. The figure fifty-eight thousand is arrived at by making an allowance for British officers in these regiments. Within one year's time these newly raised units would be able to finish their training. Another year's period would make these trained units still more thorough and reliable. During the Great War, recruits were trained and units were raised within four months and were even drafted overseas to take their place in the front-line to fight the most civilised and scientific armies equipped with the most modern weapons of warfare. It is much easier and safer, therefore, to rely on our two years' trained army as against the short-trained army of England or India during the Great War, and that, too, to fight an enemy on our border who is not equipped with the most modern weapons and methods of warfare.

Thus it would be seen that the complete replacement of the present British troops of the British Army in all units would not take more than a year or so at the

most. In carrying out this replacement scheme it would not only be desirable but quite necessary that new units should not be composed of entirely new recruits, but long-service soldiers of other Indian units should be transferred to the new units, in certain proportion, say, 5 or 10 per cent.

It is not unlikely that some other difficulties may be raised in the way of replacement or the disbandment of the British soldier in India, or his assimilation in the British Army in England or discontinuing British recruitment in England immediately, both for the Indian British Army in India and the British Army in England. If in the meanwhile a small number of British soldiers remain who are not assimilated in the British Army in England, care should be taken to assimilate only those in the army in England, who are engaged only for a long term with the colours, thus utilising an opportunity for demobbing the short-service term people. Thus practically the whole number of the British soldiers in India would not be a burden either to India or to England.

### India's Army of Defence

"A completely self-governing India must be in a position to provide herself with armed forces, fit to undertake the tasks which armed forces in India have to discharge," just as armed forces have to undertake their tasks in other countries.

The Simon Commission has said the above. It means, therefore, that India should work a programme to evolve an armed force or a 'Defence Force' which will be able to take up the duty it is required to perform. What is the task, then, which that force will have to undertake?

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### The Task of the Army

The task of that army from the British view-point is three-fold and is described in the expressions, (1) *External Defence*, (2) *Internal ( Defence ) Security*, (3) *Imperial Defence*.

The Army in India to-day consists of about 60,000 British and 1,50,000 Indian troops commanded by British officers. The Army to-day has three main features, the Indian soldier, the British soldier and the British officer.

Since it has been conceded that like all other self-governing Dominions, India also must be able to evolve an Indian Army that is at once fit to take up the duties for which an armed force is maintained, we must see that we do it quickly and equally efficiently. For this then we shall have to replace the British soldier and the British officer; then only would the Indian Army-machine be truly Indian or National.

The army means two main things, firstly, the physique or power or quantity, and, secondly, the brain or quality; *i. e.* the soldier and the officer. We shall be able to easily supply the former at any time and in any numbers, and the latter in its full quota in a period of 16 years.

The number of the British soldiers is 60,000 and it would not be very difficult to raise that number of Indians from India's "fighting races with a strength of 5 crores," as stated by the Government of India ( see Wedgewoods's Note of dissent in *Mesopotamia Report*, 1917, Page 129, Para 35 ).

This very important point is not fully understood either by the Simon Commission or the other Britisher

of the die-hard class, who has in his head only the idea that "they have conquered India by sword and by sword will they maintain it." ( Field-Martial Brownslow, Sir Johnson Hicks and many others. )

The Simon Commission also says that, "It will be impossible, for a very long time to come, to dispense with a very considerable British element including, in that term, British troops of all arms, a considerable proportion of the regimental officers of the Indian Army and the British personnel in the Higher Command," the reason given being that, "the effective Defence of India is an Imperial question."

The Simon Commission has, without giving any reasons, only said that, "*It will be impossible for a very long time to come to dispense with British troops of all arms.*"

Of course they could not have given any reasons as to why and how the British troops were necessary for 'External Defence,' because none exist.

The best British military brains now living in England and even in the world cannot support this silly, unreasonable and untenable statement made by the Simon Commission. No technical or military argument could possibly be put forth, although the Britisher tries to fool and make the world believe by putting forth that the British troops are necessary for 'Internal Defence,' on account of the Racial Animosity among Hindoos and Mahomedans in India. No plausible reason could ever be hoped to be given or even attempted by any British militarist or any other militarist of any other country in the world, unless it is said that the Indian soldier is not as good a soldier as a British soldier; one can daresay, that such a statement, if

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made, with full knowledge of the capabilities of the Indian soldier, is nothing but a piece of sheer impertinence.

The soldier's qualities in general are physique, bravery, courage, hardihood, power of endurance, discipline, weapon-training and the like. None in the world can make himself bold enough to say that the Indian soldier stands second to any other soldier in the world. The Indian soldier in fact will beat the best soldier in the world. What of the British soldier then? The Indian soldier has given his *rice ration* in many old wars to the British soldier and he took water alone and in spite of this fact has fought better and more than the British soldier. This fact speaks for itself. History abounds in examples of this kind.

Even to-day the Indian soldier, compared to the British soldier, is certainly ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-armed, ill-paid, ill-trained and all that; still the Indian soldier was and is never second to the British soldier.

What are the soldier's technical qualities? He is required to reconnoitre and spot an enemy and shoot him straight and well. For this, there is no better soldier than the Indian. The British soldier on whom the best Indian money is so extravagantly spent for military education is only the Indian soldier's second, in spite of the adverse conditions of the Indian, and if with all these difficulties, the Indian stands better or superior—or even as a matter of that the British soldier's equal,—it is certainly not the fault of the British policy but the result and the outcome of the natural merit and inborn quality and capacity of the Indian soldier, that is responsible for this superiority.

In scouting, reconnaissance or patrolling work, in rifle fire and competitions, in tracking a country, in field work in the hills and mountains, in grenade work,

and bomb throwing, in the use of other automatic weapons such as the Lewis gun or the Machine gun and all such other things the *Indian soldier stands second to NONE*. Even the best British soldier will have to take his hat off to the Indian if the Britisher is really honest and a sport.

This physical and mechanical work is the real soldier's work. Of course the officer's work—the brain work—is quite different; but we are not concerned with the officer's replacement in this question of External Defence, as we have conceded for the sake of argument, for the time being, that the British officer may even be supposed to be necessary. But as far as the soldier's question goes, it can never be dreamt nor can it be ever reasonably and justly said and proved that because the Indian soldier is incapable and unfit for External Defence, the British soldier is a necessity for the External Defence of India.

The Britisher usually mixes and muddles up the question by bringing the 'officer's leading' point. But the point in question is not that of the officers but one of 'British soldiers' only, and as such the argument of officer's leading is unsuitable and irrelevant.

Therefore, the question of replacement or Indianization is split up clearly and squarely like this in two separate questions, *viz. firstly, the question of the British soldier's replacement and, secondly, the question of the British officer's replacement or Indianization.*

It will be found that the Britisher will have no argument against the first, *viz.* he cannot reasonably prove that the British soldier is a necessity for External Defence, because he cannot prove that the Indian is incapable. He may be, however, right to a certain extent in the officer's replacement argument only.

But we say to him that let the British officer remain for some time, till our Indian lad takes up his place; but our main question is whether the British soldier's necessity for External Defence is true. To this the Britisher has in reality no supporting and tenable argument.

We want, therefore, the British soldier to be immediately replaced by the Indian soldier, who alone as a National can understand and undertake the External Defence of his country in particular and the other defence in general, more adequately and more truly than any other mercenary or hired soldier.

Again the Simon Commission's argument of the difficulty of "recruitment, reorganization, organization and control" is simply ridiculous. Perhaps it has been made for effect only, or perhaps to silence the political leaders in the country *i. e.* the *intelligentsia*; but the *intelligentsia* of the country has been kept out of the Army for so long as about 100 years and more by a consistent piece of policy, mostly by stamping them as '*a non-martial class*.' If unhappily, therefore, he misses the point and does not find out and hit at the hollowness of the irrelevant argument, he at least cannot be much blamed. The soldier class, the so-called martial class by rotation, being illiterate and kept under pressure by various methods of policy, cannot of course much understand the above argument; and even if he does understand it, he cannot refute it by expressing his real opinion. Thus the hollowness of the argument cannot be so clearly seen through by both the sections—the Politicals and the Soldiers—with a view to refute the incorrect argument made by the Britisher.

**Recruiting:**—Out of 5 crores of the fighting strength of India any amount of recruiting is possible, but only

for a real National Army. Yet it is equally too true that recruiting in numbers may not be a possibility for the 'Mercenary Indian Army'-as stated by many British field-martials such as Field-Martial Brownslow and others.

The hollowness or flimsiness of the argument then, could be easily seen through again by the following.

Meredith Townshend who lived in India and made a special life-long study of Indian conditions in his book '*Asia and Europe*' (page 83) says, "The fighting people of India, whose males are as big as ourselves and more regardless of death than ourselves number at least 120 millions."

We can have any amount of recruiting from this huge hoard of fighting stuff and the armies thus recruited can even subdue the whole world. Townshend again says (on page 84) "If the Prussian conscription were applied in India, we should without counting reserves or Landwehr or any force not summoned in times of peace, have two and a half millions of soldiers actually in barracks with 8,00,000 (8 lakhs) recruits coming every year, a force with which not only Asia but the world might be subdued."

It can be easily seen, therefore, that the recruiting difficulty is only a sham, misleading, hollow and irrelevant argument. Again the remaining part of the argument of reorganization and organization has to be looked into. The Indian Army at present has an organization already. There is no necessity of breaking up the organization. Let it continue. The question of organization does not arise at all. Similarly, there is no question of re-organization, either because we are not having any new force of different organization, but we



are only adding more units to the existing organization, and hence the question of organization or reorganization does not affect the main question at all.

The British troops are to be sent home by and by. Further British recruitment in England is immediately to be stopped. British soldiers retiring from India, after completing their service and contract, are to be replaced by Indian personnel, instead of British recruitment from England. Indian recruitment is to be begun immediately. In fact, the present organization is all the more helpful in this scheme of replacement. Much less then is there any question of any change in the present organization or reorganization, at all. In short, it is so smooth and easy, if only there is a genuine will and an honest desire to do it.

The silliness and non-technical nature of the above argument can be seen only by noting the fact that both the words 'organization' and 'reorganization' are grouped together. Perhaps Sir John Simon and others mean nothing by the argument; it is possible that it might have been used only for an effect and that is to frighten the non-technical Indian political leaders' class. Any word or words usually used in army reforms and the army technical talk, have been perhaps designedly put in for some expected effect. Excepting this, we cannot attach any the least importance to the 're-organization and organization' argument.

No argument could be ever more non-technical, untrue and irrelevant than the above one.

The last part is the 'Control' argument. It does not affect our *scheme and suggestion of British soldiers' replacement*; although it may, to a certain extent, affect the British officers' replacement problem. By conceding that British officers may remain during the transitory

period of British officers' Indianization, the control problem in the British soldier's replacement or Indianization scheme does not arise at all.

But if there be any other hidden meaning under the word 'control,' then of course we have to halt. Does it suggest and mean the British disagreement or reluctance to making the Army Budget votable? If so, then we again maintain and maintain strongly that the Army Budget must be sanctioned by the Legislature, as it is done in England. It is the tax-payers' money that feeds their Indian Army, and as such, there is no earthly real reason to believe that the tax-payer through his representatives should not accord his sanction to the expenditure on the Army—the Army for which he pays and maintains for the defence of his country.

Again, if the disagreement is on account of the Defence Minister's powers, that disagreement also is most unreasonable. We shall deal with this point in detail again later.

In any case the question of 'control' even does not in any way arise or interfere with our question of the purely '*British soldier's replacement*.'

Thus then it is easily seen, how the excuses and reasons put forth as 'difficulties in re-organization, recruitment, organization and control' do not in reality exist at all.

Again the next argument brought forth by the Simon Commission is that "*Even if the Indian Army is sufficient it must be efficient.*" We can only say that since the Indian soldier has been proved and shown as 'efficient' and even more efficient, in spite of his various handicaps, the question of 'efficiency' does not arise. ( See pp. 8 to 11 ).

On the other hand, if the efficiency of the Army as a fighting machine means the leading of the Army by British officers, then, since we have already conceded that point in the brochure, that question also does not arise. Thus, the efficiency question does not hold good nor does it ever arise at all.

They knew full well that the sufficiency ( of Indian soldiers ) argument would not stand, and so they have admitted it by saying, " even if the Indian Army is sufficient; " but they wanted to put together such lame arguments to swell the text, and so something else equally high sounding had to be put in and so to complete the rhyme, the words 'efficiency' and 'sufficiency' are put together. It appears that the Simon Commission and the like were and are in a poetic mood. They wanted effect—a rhyme—and hence they put in the words 'sufficiency' and 'efficiency' and made the line and rhyme complete, just as we say in Hindi 'Tuk me Tuk Mila Diya' or in Marathi 'Ri La Ri Jodli'—it was perhaps a good joke after all—was not it ?

Again the next argument brought forward by the Britishers ( the Simon Commission ) is that " The N. W. F. of India is the one land frontier of India in the Empire which is open to attack by a Great Power. Its Defence, therefore, cannot be left to an Indian Army, administered and directed by a popularly elected Government. "

Canada, another self-governing Dominion of the Empire, has a land frontier too. Yet, the above argument was, and is never applied to Canada, and why ? Perhaps the interests of Canada and England are more or less identical on account of their racial-credal interests or the common British nationality.

Canada is also open to attack by a great power—the United States—any time; and yet Canada's defence can safely be entrusted to Canadians, whose government is administered and directed by a popularly elected government there, and yet it is urged that the same cannot be done in India; and why? Not because there is any tangible or real reason, but because the Britishers say so—and the Indians have to take the verdict right or wrong, just or unjust, because of the difference that exists between rulers and the ruled.

Again, India is a part of the Empire, and it has also been proved that it is quite fit and capable of managing her 'External Defence.' It is also definite that when an enemy tries to penetrate and force the Indian Frontier (call it the Empire's Frontier, in this case, if you like) the Indian Army (be it officered by British officers to-day or the Indian officers of to-morrow), will as a matter of course certainly fight and stop the onrush and ingress of the enemy. In fact the Empire Frontier plea and argument does not suitably apply in this case at all, since the Frontier is the same—call it the Indian Frontier or the Empire Frontier, whatever you will. The fact remains that India defends and defends herself adequately and efficiently.

We fail to see how it makes any difference in the situation only when the frontier is styled as the 'Empire Frontier' instead of the 'Indian Frontier,' the N. W. F. being the same—from Baluchistan—Quetta—Peshawar to Noushera etc. in both the expressions and terms.

This Empire Frontier argument then even falls flat.

In fact Sir John Simon or the Britishers have no argument to support their contention of the necessity of maintaining British soldiers (for the Defence

Army ) in India, excepting perhaps the same old reason 'maintaining India by sword' and that too for England's interest.

There is another way of viewing the arguments. It is said that because "India is a part of the Empire and because N. W. F. of India is included in the Empire, therefore, the Empire's or India's defence cannot be left to the Indian Army."

By applying the same argument it can also be stated in the very same strain that because England's or Canada's Frontiers means Empire's Frontiers, its defence cannot be left to England or Canada but must be undertaken by India alone. The reader, we believe, has seen through the flimsy statement and argument of the British. It does not stand to reason at all. There is no sense in the argument, it is only the argument of one who happens to be a member of that "Corporation" (or the Empire) as Meredith Townshend says, or a member of the "Ruling Race in India, excepting this, one may say that, it has no sense in it, excepting the sense of Power and Might."

Another argument is that, the position as regards 'internal security,' is not so simple. In other words, the implication and suggestion is that the British Army to a certain extent at least is essential for the "Internal Security." We have dealt with this in the "Internal Security" chapter and as it does not concern the "External Security" argument, we leave it at that for the present.

Again the last argument brought forward is, that the Defence of India is an Imperial responsibility, and *Imperial Defence necessitates British Army in India.*

When we have proved above that India is fit to look after her own Defence (External and Internal),

very little remains to be argued or explained to convince that India can as well satisfy the third requisite, *i. e.* its competency to undertake Imperial Defence, any moment like Canada or any other Dominion in the Empire.

### The British Soldier

Any scheme of Defence of India presupposes the idea that the Indian Army of defence has got to be wholly and purely national, *i. e.* it should be composed of Indian soldiers alone.

The population of England is even less than the population of the fighting races alone in India. Further, about fifty to seventy per cent of the population of England, consisting of women, old men above sixty, children and boys below fourteen are militarily 'inefficient and ineffective' for her defence. Thus it could be seen that India possesses recruiting ground which is more than twice as strong as that of England. Therefore want of soldiers of the so-called fighting races or martial class also cannot be raised as a difficulty in the solution of the problem of Indian Defence.

We restrict ourselves here to the question of external defence only; and that too so far as the replacement of the British soldier only is concerned.

To sum up all the arguments in short, it is evident that all the above chain of arguments then reduces itself to a proposition that so far as the question of the number or sufficiency or the quality or the efficiency of Indian soldiers is concerned, India has plenty of material and even more, for Indian Defence. It is beside the point whether it is led by British officers or Indian officers. We shall deal with this point in another volume. We may for the sake of argument even concede for the

time being that the British officer may be necessary, but the other part remains unanswered. What about the British soldier? Where is the necessity of maintaining him here when an Indian soldier of equal merit is available in numbers?

The term 'British Army' is a vague term and may mean 'British soldiers' or Indian soldiers led by British officers. And when the necessity of the British Army for external defence is urged, all that is meant is that soldiers, whether Indian or British, must be led by British officers.

It will be seen that the 'British troops' necessity' urged is not that of the British soldier but of the British officer or his lead only. But even this may be proved to be untrue. Lord Ellenborough has said. "Great actions were achieved by Native troops alone." (Peel Com. Report, p. 5.) The above extract will suffice to convince the reader that there is no need even of the lead of British officers for the purposes of external defence.

It follows then that the argument that the British soldier and officer is a necessity in any scheme of external defence, is disposed of, and proves to be untrue and untenable.

### **The British Soldiers—A Necessity in Internal Defence**

The first and prominent argument which is brought forward in asserting the necessity of the maintenance of the British soldier in any internal defence scheme is the *racial and communal feeling and disturbances*.

It is urged that Indian troops cannot get over these racial and communal prejudices, and the spirit of neutrality and impartiality would be wanting in a purely Indian force for purposes of internal security.

We maintain that these racial and communal prejudices are the creation and the result of a consistent policy of 'DIVIDE ET IMPERA'. This policy was followed even in military matters; for example, in dividing races and classes in units in the Army, with a design "to use one race against another."

We see the result of such a policy very clearly in the heterogeneous composition and recruiting of the Army. It is also seen in the artificial creation of further invidious and unnatural divisions of races and classes as martial and non-martial. (See chapter V.)

When the policy of creating racial animosity between the different classes and races of India, is discontinued, there is no reason to expect that racial animosity would even then prevail amongst Indian races. Because if we look to the Canadian situation we will see that with all the differences of 'races and creeds', language, traditions, nationality, intellectual outlook and calibre, stock origin, and birth, Canada is a self-governing country and all the differences mentioned above have not been found as obstacles in the progress of Canada and the other Dominions that are supposed to be fit for self-government or to maintain a purely national army for 'internal defence' and many other things, concerning the external or even Imperial defence.

It is clearly seen from the above that a purely Canadian Army composed and recruited of Canadians possessing all the 'racial-creedal' and other differences shown above is still considered and supposed to be quite adequate and efficient to manage their own 'internal security' problem, but under the very set of circumstances, India alone without any reason whatsoever is summarily stamped as unfit to maintain or



*possess any National Indian Army, capable of being useful and efficient for purposes of internal security.*

The reasons are but too obvious to need any mention. There is no wonder then if anybody were to infer that it is in the interests of the Britisher, not to let go his hold on India, which means England's very life and existence. From the number of extracts appended, it may be clearly seen how a consistent and continuous policy of creating racial animosity, resulting naturally in communal disturbances, has been scrupulously observed with a view to set the races and classes against each other.

Therefore, if only the cause of this policy were to be removed, the 'racial animosity,' if any, would automatically disappear, and there would be no further occasion and opportunities to raise such a false cry and plead such flimsy and 'got-up' excuses and arguments.

From all the above it might be easily gathered that in reality there is no obstacle in having a purely Indian Army, for internal security as well. It is now clear that the Indian soldier is quite fit and capable to form an army of defence even for the purposes of internal security and be still adequately useful, effective and efficient, for all purposes connected with the problem of internal as well as external and Imperial purposes.

Thus then the plea of the necessity of British soldiers in the 'internal defence' ('security') scheme has no ground to stand upon and does not hold good.

The Indian soldier can, therefore, very easily, conveniently and effectively take his place and play his role in the defence army by replacing the British soldier.

Again it is urged that the British soldier is a necessity in the defence scheme, because in times of distur-

bance the British soldier is "indifferent to threats," "does not panic," "will not be cajoled," "will not be bribed," "is a representative of the power which has given India a security from dangers both within and without which she was never known before," "is a son of a dominant race," and "has in his favour many things not easy to explain." (General Sir George De S. Barrow, on "The Army in India and Constitutional Reform," *Asiatic Review*, 1931 ).

Let us examine and analyse the validity or otherwise of the above reasons and arguments.

*"Indifference to threat"*

The statement made regarding the quality of the British soldier's "indifference to threat" is most inappropriate, because on the few occasions whenever there was any need of Indian soldiers being required to work in the so-called 'internal security' affair, it could be seen that he has never failed, nor has he given cause to show and prove that he was in the least affected by a threat, as no threat ever was or could be given. On all these occasions he has evinced the same amount and even more of the spirit of 'indifference to threat' than his British colleague, even though he is an Indian by birth and lives and acts, conducts and behaves not under very good and true conditions.

Besides it can even be stated, proved and supported by facts that on almost all the occasions of the so-called internal disturbances it was the Indian soldier who was used in a majority of cases, and thus there was rarely any occasion for the British soldier to display that spirit of 'indifference to threat.' For instance, during the 'Mopla' rebellion he was in fact slightly or never used and the Indian soldier alone as usual

has been mainly responsible for quelling the internal disturbance, but when 'order' is secured the Indian troops are sent back to their cantonments, and small British units are purposely kept to patrol the area only for their eventual mention in despatches.

It needs no mention, therefore, and no convincing either, to prove that the question or factor of 'indifference to threat' does not arise at all.

*"Panic"*

As far as the factor of '*Panic*' is concerned we only regret to note an allegation of this sort against an Indian soldier. Nothing could be more unjust and unnecessary. Nothing could be more untrue and undeserved. Nothing could be more impertinent and brazen-faced.

The Indian soldier who has fought in every corner of the world, never for India but always for Britain, in Java, in Egypt, Soudan, the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia, Africa and France, in fact everywhere, has never shown that he ever was possessed of '*panic*'. It is an insult to the Indian soldiery. We challenge any British General or Commander to prove the statement made by General Barrow. It alleges and suggests that the Indian soldier is apt to '*panic*'. We can only say that it is most ungrateful and untrue, after all that the Indian soldier has achieved for the Britisher so long.

So then it is evident that even the factor of '*panic*' is not real but a concocted or an imaginary one.

*"Bribery"*

To evince doubts and make an indirect allegation that the Indian soldier is susceptible to bribery is nothing but a piece of sheer impertinence. Indian or British, or any other national, as a matter of that, is equally

capable of being a victim to this inherent human weakness, which is found in every human being to a lesser or greater extent. But this is only applicable to other civil departments or semi-military departments and not the Army proper.

General Macmunn, the Quartermaster General in India, states that "work done in the Royal Army Service Corps by officers was done in India by warrant officers (British).....only, when dishonesty and bribery were often prevalent." (Page 341, *Behind the Scence*—MacMunn.)

In the first place the above question of bribery does not arise in any part—in the question of quelling internal disturbances. Conceding that it does, though not in the ranks of the Army but in the other civil departments or semi-military offices, many examples may be found wherein high British officers of high rank and office have been tempted to be victims to the above mentioned weakness. It needs no further argument, therefore, to understand that this weakness is invariably common to all human beings, and hence that argument also does not stand.

*"Representative of power"*

It is also again urged by such eminent British Commanders like General Barrow that because the British soldier is a representative of British power, and because he is a member of that dominant race, therefore, he is a necessary factor for the internal security or the internal defence of India. We only say that the above facts will continue to remain, so long as the domination of England is a continuous, unceasing and existing fact. Does it convey the idea that the dominant race membership continues even when India

were to have her own army according to the recommendations of the Commission?

It may be perhaps a very common fault in the representatives of a ruling power to take pride in believing that they alone belong to the dominant race only because of a chance that they happened to be in power. Those that are not in power themselves to-day but who once were a mighty power themselves, cannot forget the fact that they are the descendants of the same old race that once was a mighty power; it is no use, therefore, in arguing that the British soldier is pleased to be vain over the idea that he is the *member of the dominant race*. Even to state this in an argument suggests that the pride of a conqueror and the glory of subjugating an equally proud race has not yet cleared off the Englishman's heart. This only leads us to believe then, that when he admits the right of Indians to self-government and consequently the right and the necessity of India of maintaining a purely Indian Army for defence, his expression and his admission is not genuine and frank but superficial. It appears that there is something behind the back of his head when he unknowingly commits himself to such a statement. When the Indian Army ceases to be a 'mercenary Army' (said by Brownslow and many a British Commander-in-Chief in India), then those Indian soldiers of that truly National Indian Army may also, perhaps like all other human beings, indulge themselves in the very same feeling of vain pride and glory, howsoever undesirable it may be.

The factor then, in no way, has any the least bearing on the issue in hand. Therefore, this irrelevant talk and argument of "Representative of Power" and "member of the Dominant Race" is only put

forth perhaps to mislead Indians from the real and main issue.

This also is convincing enough and as such the replacement of British soldiers by Indian soldiers would in no way be a difficulty at all.

Last but not the least. It is also expressed in many quarters and by many eminent Englishmen like General Barrow and the like, that besides all the above arguments there are "*many things not easy to explain.*" If the above expression means anything for all that it is worth, it would mean only the fact that India is the ruled "and the British the rulers." India is the conquered and subjugated race and Britons the conquerors, —who inwardly perhaps think or wish to maintain their hold on India even by sword if need be for all time to come. If the Englishman is revelling in that vain glory of a conqueror, he may please himself in doing his best and Indians, if they cared and could, may also do whatever would be convenient and possible for them.

If then there is a real and genuine desire, wish and the feeling of doing good to themselves and also to India, of keeping up their pledges as English gentlemen, we hope that Englishmen would not deceive themselves, by dreaming.

### Territorial Army's Paucity

Again another argument usually brought forth is the paucity of recruits for the territorial army. No argument could be more silly, fantastic and untrue. In making this argument, figures and percentages regarding recruitment and enlistment for the territorial army are put forth. To a casual observer, due to his ignorance as to the real state of affairs, it may sound and appear as a real case; but if he knows the full facts, he would

not fail to realize the futility and unsoundness of the argument thrown out to prove the 'Territorial Army's Paucity.'

In the *first* place it is to be remembered that there lurks a fear in the minds of the people at large that the territorial force may even be utilized against their own countrymen, and as such they do not care to join it. The fear has, therefore, to be removed. *Secondly*, the number of the territorial force is so negligibly small and the conditions of enlistment and the time regarding entry and training periods are so inconvenient that the people do not attach any value or importance to the very idea of such a territorial force. *Thirdly*, the limitation imposed by restricting the entry only to certain so-called martial races, again makes the public more suspicious about the genuineness of the motives and intentions of the Government. *Fourthly*, there is no wonder if a systematic and consistent programme and policy of demartializing Indians by the rigid and rigorous application of the Arms Act has lessened the average Indian's zeal. *Fifthly*, to promote the growth of that healthy and national spirit he has not been helped or encouraged since his childhood, in his boyhood and in his advanced age by systems analogous to those prevailing in England like the Rifle Clubs, the junior O. T. Cs., the senior O. T. Cs., the subjects of military science and military history in Universities, the expansion of the territorial system, and the extension of the reserves into the supplementary reserves and tradesmen battalions etc., even though all this has been recommended by committees after committees that were conducted by persons like General Skeene and General Shea. But nothing has been done so far even after such a long time as ten or twelve years. It is no wonder, therefore,

if Indians were to infer that the Government is not very genuine in their utterances. *Sixthly*, economic conditions in England and India are different. There every man and woman knows that his or her country will provide bread for him or her not by alms houses but by providing work. If he becomes old and if he cannot earn, he is given old age pension. *Seventhly*, when the Government admits that there are five crores of population of fighting races in India, we question why this large population of this so-called martial class at least could not come forward and fill the territorial cadres. This is a paradox which only the Government may be able to answer. Having five crores of fighting men, not even 16,500 ( the full limited number ) should come forward to enroll themselves in the territorials ! This fact can only be interpreted in a particular manner. It may only mean that there is something in the working that is at once very defective and destructive in the present policy of Government which alone could be held responsible for such paucity of recruitment in the territorials. Could there be any other reasonable and valid ground ? *Eighthly*, the difference between the auxiliaries and the territorials is most unnatural and unwarranted. I mean the difference in their training, arms, organizations, payments, treatment, favour, facilities, weapons and many more things.

Lastly, besides the above there are many more difficulties in the way of Indians taking any lively interest in that scheme of territorials which on account of the reasons given above may even be thought as bogus.

After all that we have said above, it could be easily seen that any amount of arguments such as the above, i. e. of "Bribery," "Panic," "Threat," "Representative of power," "Members of a dominant race,"



"Many things not easy to explain," "Paucity of territorials" etc. are simply lame and untenable.

From all this it could be gathered then that replacement of the British soldier by his comrade the Indian soldier would in no way affect the question of internal defence or security and it cannot be maintained on any reasonable ground, that the Indian soldier would be incapable to meet any situation such as quelling an internal disturbance, if at all the occasion arises.

### **Imperial Defence and the Indian Soldier**

We cannot understand what the Simon Commission means by stating "that it will be impossible for a very long time to come, to dispense with a very considerable British element including in that term British troops of all arms, the considerable proportion of the regimental officers of the Indian Army and the British personnel in the Higher Command."

No reasons are given and no arguments are ever set forth proving the necessity of the maintenance of these British soldiers.

There is no reason to believe why a full-fledged Indian Army comprised of all different arms of an army should not be able to take up the defence of India immediately. ( We restrict to the British element of soldiers only in this discussion. )

Granting for the sake of argument that the British officer, the regimental officer and the British officer in the higher personnel of the command, does remain, it can at once be seen that there is no propriety or reason either, in maintaining that the British soldier in all the arms cannot be dispensed with for all the time or some time to come.

**As we have already proved in detail that the British soldier is not a necessity for the defence of India, either for external or internal defence, therefore, from the same line of argument we maintain that no Indian Army, whether it be for offence or defence or whether it be for the purposes of external, internal, and imperial defence, should be in any way deemed necessary to include a British soldier in place of his Indian comrade, the Indian soldier.**

The Indian soldier has fought side by side with his British comrade in every nook and corner of the world, where the Empire's forces fought. He fought in Sudan. Abyssinia, Egypt, Java, Macao. Manila, China and during the Great War in France, the Dardanelles, Egypt. Mesopotamia, Iraq, and South Africa. In fact he has fought under most extraordinary conditions and in varying theatres full of varied physical features, whereas, the Canadian or the Australian or the national of any other Dominion has never helped and fought for the Empire as the Indian did, and to that extent. Where then is the utility, importance, truth and validity of the argument that the Indian soldier cannot take his place in any of the schemes of Imperial Defence? The British argument is simply irrelevant. The question does not rise at all, since he has already fought for the Empire, and for the Imperial Army in the Defence of the Empire.

In spite of this above fact if the argument "that the British soldiers of all arms cannot be dispensed with for a long time for the effective Defence of the Empire" is put forth, we can only say that it is no argument but simply a flimsy, untenable and irrelevant talk.

Again, India, an equal partner in the 'Empire,' is entitled to have the same rights, privileges and

concessions which are common to the different Dominions of the Empire. Canada, Australia and other Dominions can maintain purely Dominion armies of their own nationals such as the Canadians and Australians, without the inclusion of a British soldier. Why then should India not have the same right? Why should India be deemed and stamped incapable of maintaining an Indian Army for Imperial Defence consisting of Indians alone?

This is all the more ridiculous when the fact is taken into account that Canada and Australia have not even fought for the Empire as many times and on as many occasions as India has done. But to-day, only when the question of self-government comes in, the same Indian Army is stamped as inefficient for purposes of Imperial Defence, when it was quite efficient before. Could anything be more problematic?

The above discussion sufficiently proves how the argument of "It will be impossible for a very long time to come to dispense with a very considerable British element including in that term British troops of all arms etc." is irrelevant.

We have proved, therefore, that the plea of the necessity "of a British soldier in the Indian Army of defence for imperial purposes" is more a fiction than a fact.

Thus then, we have clearly argued and satisfied all honest doubts of all honest Englishmen regarding the question of the necessity of a British soldier or the replacement by the Indian of his comrade the Britisher.

Since we have strictly limited the discussion to the personnel of the British soldier alone in the scheme on replacement we have not taken into account the other arguments of the necessity or otherwise of the Br or

officer in the Indian Army of defence. For the time being we concede that the British officer may continue to lead the Indian soldier as before, which he does in this replacement scheme, as our scheme of replacement of the British soldier by the Indian soldier is not affected thereby at all.

## CHAPTER II

### BRITISH TROOPS NOT NECESSARY FOR EXTERNAL DEFENCE

In this chapter we only consider the external defence on the N. W. F. and N. E. Land Frontier and other land frontiers, only because the British Army in India (60,000) is a part of the Indian land forces only, and, therefore, the sea-coast (or the British Navy) of India is not to be taken into consideration.

#### *Replacement ( Defence )*

We deal in this chapter with the dire necessity of replacing the costly British troops (the British Other Ranks) immediately.

#### *Factors affecting the Maintenance of British Troops*

(1) It is urged by our rulers that the maintenance and presence of British troops in India is a necessity for the External (as well as the internal) defence of India, and perhaps for Imperial defence as well.

(2) It is also urged that the British troops should be in a certain proportion to the Native strength of the Indian Army, such as 1 British to 2 Indians, although previously the proportion was 1 British to 3 Indians, or 1 British to 4 Indians.

(2a) The question of the proportion and ratio of British troops and Indian troops is more or less concerned with the 'Internal security' plea. We shall, therefore, deal with this point in the 'Internal Security Problem', in chapter III. It is proved therein that the 'external defence' and the question of proportion

of British and Indian troops argument does not hold good at all.

(3) The British troops are argued as necessary for external defence, but the hidden meaning and interpretation of the word 'external defence' is Imperial Defence. We shall deal with this point in chapter IV in the Imperial Defence argument.

(4) The 'British troops necessary' argument means the theory of the three safeguards *viz.* 'Control of the Army' (one of the three safeguards), Finance and Foreign relations.

We have to first examine the validity of these above statements or mis-statements, whatever they may be.

We then have to know what the defence of India is and consists in; similarly we ought to know the means and methods, cost and efficiency etc., of this defensive force; we also ought to find out then, whether any other more adequate, efficient, economical, national and suitable defence force could be evolved.

One may concede even, primarily to humour the Britisher and secondarily for the sake of argument, that the external defence may be discussed, but we cannot see eye to eye with the Britisher when he talks of internal defence so strongly, and gives such unnecessary importance to that term in Indian defence considerations. This is, in our opinion, an affront to Indian national aspirations and honour, because in no other country does this necessity arise or the expression 'Internal Defence Army' is ever used. Internal peace is another matter. In fact it is the main work of the Civil Police.

At present for purposes of discussion we assume that the defence of India means (excepting the sea coast) the land and the air forces of India only, consisting of Indian as well as British units.

We have also to deal with the means and methods which are costly and inefficient to-day, and also have to study those methods wherewith we can make the Army less costly and at the same time equally or perhaps even more efficient nationally.

The external defence of India is the question which one may discuss. But the Britisher's internal defence argument is one which only helps him in dividing India with a view "to hold India by sword." The contention of the Britisher is that on these two grounds *i. e.* 'external and internal defence,' the defence force of India must contain a certain proportion of British element. It could be deduced from this assumption—necessity of maintenance of a British force in India—that either the Indian troops of the Indian Army are incapable of defending India or if Indians are proved capable, it can only be said that it suits the policy and interests of the Britisher in India to include a British force in the defence force of India. A purely and wholly Indian Army is not supposed to be perhaps politically desirable for the defence of India. The correctness of the above principle and its supplementary axioms and corollaries are not only open to doubt, but it is shown before to be a positively incorrect assumption. This principle is adopted for the guidance of the British administrators in India. The theory of the necessity of British troops for the Indian defence has been evolved and worked by those who were and are actually engaged in the administration of India so long,

and they have laid down the above principle—the necessity of British troops—as a definite policy.

In order to attain this end, various cardinal principles have been laid down and followed in the administration and organisation of the Indian Army.

The principles on which it is contended that the British Army is necessary for the external (and internal) defence of India could be seen from the basic principles adopted in settling policy regarding the question of the necessity of British troops in India. These principles are given in chapters III, IV and V supported by a number of extracts.

*"We have to find a European garrison for India both for internal and for external defence."*

"The self-governing Dominions and India have accepted the responsibility for their own defence, but in the event of a serious war they will require reinforcements to be sent to them from elsewhere".

(Article by Lt-General Sir A. A. Montgomery Massingberd, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., "The Role of the Army in Imperial Defence" in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1928, page 246).

Considering the above there is no wonder if one were to agree with Field-Marshal Brownslow, Commander-in-Chief, India, and say that the inner and the more closely guarded and secret reason of the 'British troops necessary for external defence' argument is nothing but "holding India by sword." Brownslow says in his stray notes, page 14, "India deserves and commands our fullest sympathy and good-will, but we must subdue any sentimental weakness with regard to that country (India), as indeed of any other country that we hold by the sword, when it comes to a



**question of letting the sword out of our own hands, or trusting to any sword but our own."**

*From the above one can see that the argument of 'British troops necessary for external defence' is not real and, therefore, it does not stand at all.*

We shall see now whether the British troops are really necessary for the 'external defence' of India. We maintain that the British troops are unnecessary for the external defence of India. This can be very easily seen through from the following.

The British soldier is unnecessary on military, economic, moral and national grounds.

**Military Grounds:—**Let us see on what military grounds it is supposed and argued that the British troops are necessary for the defence of India. The military grounds advanced or likely to be advanced are various although untenable and lame, the main arguments being, firstly, the 'insufficiency and inefficiency' of the Indian soldier; secondly, the 'inefficiency of the Indian officer's class' to lead the Indian Army. The physical power and the brains then, make up the army of defence or of offence.

After all the contributions made by India in manpower during the Great War, one can easily understand that this excuse of paucity of recruits and soldiers for a comparatively small force which is required for the Defence Army of India would and could not be brought forth by anybody excepting idiots and unreasonable people. India, with its teeming multi-millions of fighting man-power, with all the martial traditions, instincts and character of the old fighting classes of the old Sikh, Bengal, Punjab, Oude, Bombay, Madras and other

**Armies, can at a flick raise many times more of the Force that is really required for its Defence.**

*This could be very easily proved when we read what Commander J. C. Wedgewood (D. B. (I.), M. P.) has to say in that connection in his separate report (of the Mesopotamian Commission) of 1917.*

*"In spite of being ill-equipped, ill-trained, and resting on paper reserves the Regimental officers and the rank and file of the Indian Army have fought in a manner to show that if properly drafted, trained and equipped they (the Indian soldiers) would have few or no superiors."*<sup>1</sup>

The superiority or in fact the efficiency of Indian soldiers for defence can be very easily seen from the above. Commander Wedgewood's just tribute to the Indian soldiery and to the Indian nation reveals the real inner motives of those Britishers who persistently evince doubts,—perhaps against their conscience—and feel like stamping Indians as unfit and incapable for defence, whether external, imperial or otherwise. The Britisher may be required to do this to satisfy the policy laid down of "holding India by sword" and "maintaining it by sword."

The above then clearly proves the efficiency, capability, capacity and quality of the Indians to undertake the defence.

Again, the 'sufficiency or the quantity' argument might be met by knowing what Meredith Townshend and others have to say, "*India alone can recruit 8 lakhs of men annually, if the conscription system was applied to India.*" He also says that with this huge force *not only Asia but the whole world would be subdued.*<sup>2</sup>

The above proves both the '*sufficiency and the efficiency*' of the Indian soldier for India's defence. If only there were a wordy battle, thousands of such quotations might be thrown out, to silence and defeat the little band of unreasonable and Imperialistic British advocates who urge the necessity of British troops for India's defence.

This has been admitted by those British Commanders who led the Indian Armies across the frontier in many a good frontier fight and campaign.

The Government of India's opinion on this point made in 1879 before the Army Re-organisation (Eden) Commission is as follows:—

*" Our Native soldiers are fully fitted both in physique and bravery to cope with any of the tribes on the border to whom they are by a long course of national tradition and feud hostile."* <sup>3</sup>

To fight our probable enemies on the frontier, is not a new thing to us. The Sikh alone by himself was doing it continuously before the advent of the British in India. Thus then there is no fear of 'External defence' question suffering for want of adequate material for the Indian Army. It is inconceivably easy, not for the 'Mercenary Indian Army' but for the really National Indian Army (of to-morrow) composed of Sikhs and men from Oude, Bombay, Madras and all other parts of India, to defend their country on the N. W. F. and N. E. F. etc. against any foreign aggression.

We have already established in the first chapter that India can very easily raise the necessary manpower and material as the first factor in the defence of India, out of her 12 crores of fighting people.

It but follows, therefore, that any argument or any attempt made to reason out the justification of the necessity and maintenance of the British soldier in India on the ground of external defence of India, at once falls flat when the above explanation is understood. There is no wonder if one were to think that the argument is made only to bluff Indians, one would easily see the fallacy of the reasoning.

In one word Britons cannot say that Indians are wanting in 'quality and quantity,' viz. efficient and sufficient man-power for the defence of India.

In England there existed the veiled conscription system for many years before the War, and this helped England to expand the 'territorials' and the reserve, for the new armies. India was handicapped by the long, continuous and consistent British policy of 'demoralization' and demartialization. The Britishers tried their level best "*to crush the spirit of the people,*" yet without any army reserves or any territorial army to fall back upon, India forged a fighting machine of ten lacs and more to her credit. Without this Indian force, the Allies would have been defeated in the last Great War. Considering the enormous advantage which the Britishers had in the way of their preliminary training in peace time through their rifle-clubs, in childhood; territorials, reserves, supplementary reserves, (county associations) in their middle and advanced age; cadet corps, officers' training corps, the subjects of military science and military history in the universities in boyhood; it could be seen that the strength that was raised in England and the time taken to raise it, was inconceivably long as compared to India, with her numerous handicaps.

The Indian was greatly handicapped on account of his spirit being crushed by the rigorous Arms Act and its demoralizing and demartializing effect. An alien Government withheld the facilities and denied him the means to prepare himself like an Englishman militarily in his childhood, boyhood or advanced age. Rifle clubs, cadet corps, or officers' training corps etc. were not developed though these measures and methods were recommended by various committees (Shea Committee specially) as measures to be adopted.

Indians, though heavily handicapped as mentioned above and with their spirits crushed, still showed to the world that in spite of all this they could forge a machine of ten lacs for the Great War in a comparatively short time and in a most marvellous way India stood by England, and yet to-day her legitimate and natural claims to defend herself are set at naught by those in power, on whose sweet will the decision hangs. From the above it can be easily seen that British troops are not a necessity at all, as is usually argued; but they should be at once replaced by Indian troops.

Let us now look at the other factor of 'Brains.' To begin with we do not insist that the British officer may be immediately replaced by an inefficient Indian officer, raised from the ranks. So the British officer can stick on during the maximum transitory period of the Indianization of the Army (officers), which we believe to be a period of sixteen years from to-day, and which we think to be quite a sufficient period for Indianization of the Indian Army (officers), consistent with efficiency with a view to the defence of our country.

Since the Indian British officers have begun to appear—although in smaller numbers—they could.

certainly be expected to fulfil the scheme with excellent results, if only admission of efficient and an adequate number of candidates for the R. M. A. (now at Dehradun) be effected, which alone would complete the efficient process of Indianization within the stated period of sixteen years. The number of entries in R. M. A. to-day is extremely small.

We have proved above that India can defend herself without the British troops in India. The real and the only reason why the British troops are required in India is not as a matter of fact the defence of the country, not the inefficiency of the Indian soldier, not the paucity of Indian officers to lead their armies and defend their country, but in reality it is in the interest of Britain to maintain the British Army in India, though India herself may not need the army any more. The above may be seen from what Field-Marshal Brownslow says, "Each (India, South Africa and Egypt) in its turn has tried to shake off our yoke. It is vain to suppose that we can get rid of the cares of conquest by good government alone. Magistrates are of no avail *without soldiers too of the ruling nationality and complexion.*"<sup>4</sup>

India means the Britishers' commerce, their food-stuffs, raw stuff and material for manufacture and a market for their manufactured commodities. It means their very existence. As Lord Rothermere expresses, out of every pound that the Britisher earns the major portion comes from India, and, therefore, India has to be maintained and held even at the point of the bayonet.<sup>5</sup>

The causes mentioned above are too true in a sense. If India were free, if India were not forced against her will to maintain costly British troops in India to

support the British power, if India were prospering and developing like other countries, then perhaps Britain may not be able to reap the full benefit of her power, prestige and morale, as she is otherwise able to achieve, with an India that is not free, with an India that is repressed by uncalled-for ordinances and laws, with an India that is poverty-stricken, with an India with stifled aspirations, with an India wantonly divided for British policy, with an India demartialized and denationalized.

This condition of India to-day is due chiefly to the heavy expenditure that she has to incur in maintaining a top-heavy and costly British Army entirely against her will, and without any real need.

In fact India means the very bread and life of Britons. Its loss would materially affect them to a great extent. It might tell upon their economic condition, as it would directly tell upon the present average income of every Britisher of £108 per year.

This is certainly not a very desirable condition at all. But looking at the other side of the picture as a consequential and necessary effect of this, we would see that Indians would have their condition improved in general, although the Indian's average income could not be compared even then with the Britisher's decreased average income; it would not be even one-sixth or one-fifth of that of the Britisher's decreased income even a couple of years after, although the Britisher's condition and the average Britisher's average income may be affected by his loss of India. We would suggest that Britain should not entertain any fears of losing a sure market for her goods and we hasten to assure the Britisher that he may still keep on and we would

not sever our connections with Britain in commerce, if only it is convenient and economical to us.

The question of her economic condition then is the truth and the plain truth and the naked truth. For this alone Britain will not, till the last moment, agree to replace and remove the British troops from India. The saner and liberal-minded Englishmen should, therefore, see the situation from a human point of view and urge on their countrymen to save the situation a little, rather than lose an opportunity for ever.

The following quotations would suggest clearly what the British troops in India really are for:—

Sir Naville Chamberlain with many others has given out :

(A) "Our Eastern Empire has been acquired and must be maintained by the sword."<sup>6</sup>

(B) "It is, therefore, to the Army of India (British army) *we must look for the means we possess not only for maintaining our power.....*"<sup>7</sup>

(C) "No consideration should ever induce us to forget for one moment the paramount and vital importance of our military power."<sup>8</sup>

(D) H. E. Sir Naville Chamberlain says, "No doubt the establishment of an efficient and inexpensive reserve which could be relied on to suppress the internal disorder or take the field whenever required would be advantageous."

"But the position of the Government of India is dissimilar to that of any European Government."

(E) "Here the Government is *alien*. It consists of a body of British officers, whose authority is upheld by British troops, supported by a Mercenary Native Army."<sup>9</sup>



General Jacob has said, " We hold India as foreign superiors only." <sup>10</sup>

" Except in the event of general rising of the native population or of foreign invasion, the weakness of European and Eurasian population is not such as to cause anxiety....." <sup>11</sup>

Sir T. Lawrence, Chief Commissioner, the Punjab, says, " Profiting by the experience of the past year ( of the Mutiny ) a small European force with a powerful Artillery should be irresistible and no mutiny of a native army without guns should hope to be successful." <sup>12</sup>

It is almost safe to presume that British statesmen will even assume a very sympathetic attitude, showing that they really wish to do good to India. But this is a very old tale and we are tired of hearing the same old tune. Like the true diplomats that they are, there is no wonder if they will engage themselves with persistent and vigorous efforts in a campaign against Indian aspirations with compounded and unceasing energy and resources. They would not like to mitigate in the least their strong-hold on India. They might even agree to the Indianization scheme of the British force in India. These representatives of vested interests will even go to the length of acquiescing that the British force may be withdrawn, though not to-day but at some distant future period, " a period of which the duration cannot be foreseen. " <sup>13</sup> ( General Barrow )

To replace the British troops is only just possible when British statesmen will feel themselves cornered by reasons and arguments and also by circumstances and a general situation too weighty to push back. But all these are only possibilities. Till that time comes, they will try their level best and stand to their guns

till the last shred of hope—of continuing to force British troops on India—disappears. Prior to this they may even try the bait of a compromise of a financial nature, they may even agree to bear all the cost of the British troops in India (both in England and India) to the extent of about thirty to thirty-five crores, rather than agree to evacuate the British troops from India.

There is bound to be a very stern and vigorous fight to a finish on the settlement of this question, *viz.* 'the British troops' evacuation.' Since human nature is what it is and will be so for all time to come, there will be many in power in the Government and many public bodies who, each in turn fearing that their interests are likely to suffer, or as a matter of fact, even the average Britisher, who only feels that there may be even a chance of his average income being affected, resulting in a lower standard of life, cannot fail to oppose tooth and nail this action of Englishmen, barring the small section only of those liberally-minded Englishmen who only would perhaps not oppose the move.

The Britisher's opposition may even be fatal and as such will have an importance of a very unique kind with a far reaching effect. Only one question—'the replacement and evacuation of the British troops from India.' What a grave question to decide! The least mistake may result in sorrow and unhappiness. It may even affect the world weal.

The Britisher in general would raise very strong and staunch opposition to the Indian demand for the British soldier's replacement. It is but no wonder if Indians also mobilize themselves with strong public opinion and united effort and work to leave no stone unturned to secure their legitimate demand and privileges—"The replacement of the costly inefficient

**British soldier by an Indian for the Defence of India, which is the birth-right of every citizen."**

When the arguments of the exploits of the great Indian Army and other similar records during the Great War is put forward, it is usually admitted by the Britisher that the Indian soldier as such is very brave, and he is certainly quite a suitable material for any army in Europe or for any war in Europe. But in spite of all that he still maintains without any the least reason that for the Internal security or Defence of India the British soldier must remain.

### **External Defence**

British troops are not only unnecessary but even unfit for military purposes on account of their 'military' and 'physical inefficiency.' For this argument of military and physical inefficiency see chap. VI and VII.

From that it would be clearly seen that British troops are not only unnecessary but are utterly useless for the purposes of Indian Defence, (be it External or Internal) for which they are said to be maintained.

(1) They may not be bad soldiers, but the factor of climate and health makes all the difference, and thus he proves himself to be unfit, of course for no fault of his. Militarily, therefore, he is a non-effective in India and, therefore, deserves to be replaced by Indian soldiers.

Being thus found useless, it can be said that the money spent on British soldiers is uselessly spent without getting any adequate return therefrom. And this has been so strongly stated by no less a person than the chief person who was responsible for the British soldiers' health in India and he is Surgeon-General Gordon,

( Principal Medical Officer, British Forces, Madras ).  
He says—

**“ A large proportion of young lads—who are physically unequal to the strain of service.....receive pay for work that they do not and cannot perform.”<sup>14</sup>**

From the above it could be clearly seen that the British troops are simply useless physically in India. Therefore, it follows that they are nothing but a burden on the Indian exchequer, because physically and therefore militarily they are inadequate and unfit for fighting purposes on the Indian frontier, on N. W. F. etc.,—be the fighting of a defensive nature or of an offensive nature—and since they are unfit for fighting purposes ( External Defence ) how could it be said with reason that the British soldier is a necessity for the defence ( external ) of India ?

Again the Britisher may even concede for the sake of argument that the Indian soldier may be quite good for the defence—external even—of his country against any foreign aggression or invasion, say the Afghan or the Gurkha, even the Russian or the Turk or any other European or Asiatic power.

The Britisher puts forth another misleading argument and so persistently asserts his honest feeling that for internal security the Indian in general is not fit to keep ‘ peace and order ’ in the country, as there are chances—not a certainty though—that in the communal strives the Indian Army could not be effectively and adequately controlled even by Indian British officers of the Indian Army from Sandhurst, only on account of their racial prejudices.

But he believes that only the Britisher who graduates from the same academy along with the Indian lad

is the only fit officer who would be able to control and lead Indian regiments to secure the necessary 'peace and order.' The reason given for this is that though both Indian and British lads come from the same academy equipped with the same training and the same principles of guidance, leadership, character, and science, still from the very fact that the Indian belongs to one of the classes *i. e.* either a Hindu or Muhammadan, he cannot control his troops, because the Britisher thinks that racial prejudices may come in.

But so far as the replacement of the British soldier only is concerned, the above question does not rise at all, because the British officers who would be in the country for a further period of sixteen years would still lead the Indian units which replace the British units. The officer argument then also fails.

### CHAPTER III

## BRITISH TROOPS NOT NECESSARY FOR 'INTERNAL DEFENCE'

The Defence of India, unlike every other country is rather a very amusing question. It is amusing because it is most easy in one sense and at the same time most complicated in another. It is easy if India—fettered as she is—would have her own way; she would have all those institutions and organizations—like the rifleclubs, territorials, reserves, supplementary reserves, officers' training corps, military subjects such as military science and military history in universities,—ultimately merging into the veiled conscription systems like other countries—enabling a country to bottle up all the militarily trained personnel through the above in peace times—with a view to enable the nation to use all the military trained personnel in times of national emergency.

It is most complicated because, she is powerless, although she has all the necessary men, material, ground, resources and means to train her people and to raise the country to the level of 'Nation in Arms,' like all other nations of the West. But she is demartialized, disarmed and demoralized by an alien government. Nothing could be more surprising and complicated because of the fact that her population is 35 crores, of which 12 crores belong to Martial Races.

Whatever the causes, the fact remains that the question of defence is both easy and difficult, and therefore, we say that the question is rather amusing.

The general idea of all nations regarding defence is that of 'external defence' only. The so-called 'internal defence' is in reality only the protection of the people by the civil police. In fact for all practical purposes, the army does not usually come in, in any 'internal defence' question.

The assumption—but not a fact—of the Britisher is that India is not a country at all. It is a 'country of various countries,' and it is full of different races, languages, castes, etc. This view suits him for the purposes of his policy in administering India, and, therefore, he sings this tiresome and melancholy tune repeatedly; though India, the 'country of various countries,' has shown in her solid and united demand that she is one to the core in so far as her national and political demands and aspirations go. The Britisher on account of his own selfish interest very conveniently assumes that the various provinces of India are as it were various countries, *i. e.* composed of different races, languages and traditions; but the fact is conveniently forgotten that the majority of Indians are either Hindus or Mahomedans. The other minorities though of different faiths do not count much in this question, as they go with the majority. This solidarity of India has been shown clearly by the Hindus and Moslems and all others in their various united demands, at the R. T. C. and after, specially in the Indianization and the 'defence' question. With all that the Britisher cannot yet bring himself to believe in that decision of India's united demand, as he thinks that Indians are unfit to judge for themselves on this Army question and it is he on whom, fortunately for him and unfortunately for us, falls the burden of discriminating what is good and what is bad for us. It is he who has to solve that problem

for us. India's defence is from the Britisher's viewpoint mainly *his* duty and consideration, since he is her '*trustee*'—of course a *self-appointed trustee*.

The arguments, though generally flimsy and got-up but usually brought in to prove the necessity of the maintenance of British troops in India, in the so-called 'Internal security question of India,' are nothing but assumptions. The assumptions are:—(1) The racial animosity of Hindus and Mahomedans and their racio-credal differences in general; (2) India as a country of many countries, languages, castes etc.; (3) The differences in languages in the personnel of the army recruitment; (4) The British trusteeship and guardianship etc.

There are no differences worth mention although there are races and creeds in India, just as they are found in all other countries in one form or another. But these differences and distinctions, if at all they exist, are not only maintained and preserved but were most carefully fostered and allowed to grow by a policy of 'preserving distinctiveness,' 'Divide et Impera', etc. The following extracts will reveal the policy clearly.

### (1) Racial Animosity

"It is found that different races mixed together do not long preserve their distinctiveness; their corners and angles, and feeling and prejudice get rubbed off, till at last they assimilate and the object of their association to a considerable extent is lost."<sup>1</sup>

"The experience of the last few years convinces me that the native armies of the three presidencies should be kept as separate and distinct as possible; and there cannot be a doubt that the suppression of the



fearful mutiny from which we are now recovering, may, in a great measure, be attributed to the totally distinct character and feeling of the native armies of each presidency." <sup>2</sup>

"As we cannot do without a large native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe, and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force, comes the counterpoise of natives against natives." <sup>3</sup>

"To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable and which while it lasts makes the Mahomedans of one country (province) despise, fear, or dislike the Mahomedans of another." <sup>4</sup>

"Having thus created distinctive regiments let us keep them so against the hour of need." <sup>5</sup>

"By the system (of distinctive regiments) thus indicated two great evils are avoided, firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces, and secondly, that through discontent and alienation from the service." <sup>6</sup>

"Unfortunately we have tried too much hitherto to purchase the contentment of our native armies by increased pay and batta." (By Lt. Col. H. M. Durand, C. B., on special duty with the Governor-General.) <sup>7</sup>

"There would be five armies, each of which would in its native element be nearly homogeneous and in the event of mutiny one of these armies could be safely pitted against another." <sup>8</sup>

### Language Differences in the Army

The fact is conveniently forgotten by the Britisher that there are many nations like Italy, Germany, Austria-

lia, Canada, Russia and others, where their defensive forces contain many races, dialects etc. and yet it is urged by the Britisher that an army wherein people of various languages and races are enlisted, cannot possibly be expected to look after the 'defence' (of their country) adequately and efficiently. But this is not true at all. In the first place the army language at present is Hindi. The language differences do not exist in the Army. Hindi, being common, is the official army language. It has even been so admitted by British Army Commanders in India that there is no difference in the language question, too, in the Indian Army.

"From the character of the native army and the similarity of habits and language of a great proportion of these military classes of whom it is composed, no inconvenience or embarrassment could result from making the three armies of India three divisions of one army." <sup>9</sup>

"No essential difference (exists) either in language, habits, or character of the native troops of our establishment etc." <sup>10</sup>

In fact future India may be able to solve the question—if at all it really exists—not only of the national language but also its script, and this settles the question of the language difficulty in the Army, and in the country.

Secondly, just as linguistic Italy had to be evolved, before Italy could rebuild herself as a nation, similarly would India consolidate herself as a linguistic India by a national language and script—The HINDI.

One may say that only the attempts of a policy of Anglacing and Romanising are solely responsible for disabling us to solve the question more fully. (See chapter XI.)

## INDIAN-DEFENCE PROBLEM

Besides, in the Italian army the soldiery consisted of various different races (as many as 20 to 30) of people speaking as many different languages or dialects with narrow prejudices—many times multiplied—and still Italy could not only create a most efficient national defensive force but its offensive power as a nation is a factor which mainly affects the balance of power in Europe to-day.

Capt. G. J. Grant says, "Though Italy became a nation in 1861 the task of the Government was to make Italians. There were Venetians, Genoese, Milanese, Tuscans, Neapolitans and many others, speaking their own dialects, with their own customs, and their own narrow prejudices." <sup>11</sup>

But looking to Italy, Canada and other countries we can very safely say that the argument of racial differences, language differences etc. is nothing but a sham one. Thus we can definitely say that the Indian Army is quite capable of looking after the defence of India.

The following will in a different way help to assure any one how British troops are not essential to control the Hindus and Mahomedans for this so-called 'racial animosity.' The present Hindu-Mahomedan pact at Allahabad clearly shows that Hindus and Mahomedans and other minorities have nothing but a united demand. This ought to be able to make the Britisher understand that the lame and untenable excuse that 'Hindus and Mahomedans would fight with each other' would not now stand. So far as the question goes, no such differences worth the name ever existed or exist in spite of the Britishers' ardent efforts in that direction. But assuming for the sake of argument that it does exist,

then it can be shown that the perpetrator of that crime was none else but the Britisher himself. The following will show the veracity of our statement.

" This question involves issues of the greatest moment demanding the most careful considerations. It appears to me to be of vital importance to the safety of the Empire that we should maintain and encourage the distinction of race feelings and habits which have heretofore kept the various great sections of the people of this country from coalescing and becoming a homogenous race to whom national feeling and national cohesion would be natural and possible. " <sup>12</sup>

" The more diversity that can be introduced into the constitution of the different corps the better, so that in any case of any future attempt at combination the heterogeneous character of the various regiments may present an effective bar to it, and be a source of information to commanding officers. " <sup>13</sup>

His Excellency Naville Chamberlain, C-in-C., considers " Each army corps...should be distinct in race, religion and language. " <sup>14</sup>

Lord Elphinstone ( G. G. ) says, " I have long considered this subject, and I am convinced that the exact converse of this policy of assimilation is our only safe military policy in India. ' Divide et impera ' was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours. The safety of the great iron steamers which are adding so much to our military power and which are probably destined to add still more to our commercial superiority is greatly increased by building them in compartments. " <sup>15</sup>

" The local association here is one of race only, engendering and maintaining community of feeling between the inhabitant of the country and the sepoy

placed near him, nominally for his control. The soldier, the cultivator and the royat have *a certain amount of homogeneity*, the ruling race alone being alien. *This is not a wholesome state of things and is totally unlike the military situation of any European nation.* " 16

Brigadier Coke would have each corps of one tribe or caste and his reasons are :—" That in a rising of the Mussalmans, you would always have Sikhs, Dogras, Goorkhas, and Hindu corps to defend or *vice versa*. By mixing the castes in one corps they become amalgamated and make common cause, which they never do if they are kept in separate corps. The result of mixing them in one corps has been to make them all join against Government and not only the soldiers but through them the Hindu and Musalman Zamindars were incited to make common cause which they never would have done, had the races been kept in distant corps. *Our endeavours should be to uphold in full force the ( for us fortunately ) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them. 'DIVIDE ET IMPERA should be the principle of the Indian Government.* " 17

### Internal Defence ( Security ) and the Army

The Britisher thinks that the Indian Army composed of various races and castes cannot be useful in maintaining 'Internal Defence,' and, therefore, he thinks that British troops are necessary. As a matter of fact in other countries it is the civil police that try to keep peace and order, but here the Britisher does not think that the case is similar. He thinks that not only the Indian police but even the Indian Army would not be able to secure peace; yet in Ireland in the roughest of times, more known as the 'black and tan'

period, the police alone could control the situation. Why should not similar control be expected from the Indian police and the Indian National Army.

If and where the police force is not sufficient or it could not secure peace, then perhaps, on such a very rare occasion, the question of help of a few soldiers may come in. Then out of the huge Indian Army a little personnel may be called and thus the situation may be handled, as is done in all other countries to get the required 'peace and order' in the country.

But the Englishman is more concerned and anxious about it. He says that he honestly feels that the Indian Army, being a combination of Hindus and Moslems, would not be able to secure that needed peace although he knows and thinks that in Europe, say in England, the British Army, itself comprised of varied interests, differences whether racial, political or otherwise, and classes such as the Irish and English, Scotch or the labour class, the Socialists or Communists, can still as a body be relied upon to handle the situation there, and yet keep peace in spite of their varied interests and differences. The present Lancashire riots in England and the Nazi riots in Germany, though a similar situation in point, conveniently escape the Britisher's notice, if the point is pressed. There, it is said that they are a nation having a feeling of nationality, and here in India it is said that Indians do not possess that feeling and singleness of nationality. The Britisher would be obstinate in still maintaining that India is a 'country of countries.' Thus howsoever we argue, *the Englishman is indifferent to others' view-point, though the view-point be full of reason and logic.* He perhaps has to do it because it does not suit him. Thus the cycle of arguments is complete.

## **INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM**

**Though all ideas and principles of moral justice and equity are on the side of the united Indians, still the Britisher cannot ever be convinced on the point.**

Then it may even mean perhaps that so long as all Hindus do not become converts as Muslims, or all Muslims as Hindus and thus the population of India does not represent one Nationality in religion and class to a Britisher, he is not prepared to remove the British Army from India. It means then that the British Army stays and occupies the country perhaps waiting till the day of deluge, and the Britisher means all this *in good and honest faith*, in this 'honest belief' of his.

There is a single nationality of race and religion in England, Germany and all over Europe. They are all Christians, but still it is seen that the basic and economic interests arising out of class distinctions—the high class and the low class,—the capitalist and labour, the Conservatives and Liberals, the Socialists and the Communists and all others—have many a time created a situation, when public peace was broken; the soldiery even was freely used along with the police in such times, only when the police happened to be in a smaller number. It is seen then from the above that even the argument of one race, class and nationality is not in fact the real or main question that counts. The Britisher is thus neatly answered, only by drawing his attention to a fact, which he had so conveniently forgotten.

It is beyond the conception of any human being but the Britisher how this song of racial differences—without sense, harmony and music—could still be sung, when it has been repeatedly urged by both Moslems and Hindus unitedly that the 'Indianization of the Army'

is a dire necessity. Perhaps the Britisher thinks in his own way. He believes and believes honestly that this Indianization demand—right or wrong—does not in any sense mean the disposing of the British force in India and replacing it by an adequate number of a purely Indian force for the defence of India.

In his own way, perhaps, defence means mainly 'internal defence.' To be precise, it is very difficult to know the enemy against whom the Englishman is going to defend the united India under his 'internal defence plea.' Perhaps against Indians themselves? This is simply anomalous. To be plain or to put the diplomatic expression of 'Internal Defence' more plainly, the Englishman has sufficiently and clearly expressed the dire need and necessity of British troops in India *for the need of keeping India by sword, as said by Sir William Joyson Hicks (Ex-Home Secretary), Field-Marshal Brownslow (Commander-in-Chief, India) and others.*

As we said before, '*the internal defence of India*' is more or less a term which only an alien Government is capable of understanding. It perhaps only means the defence of India, in the interest of the Britisher as against the legitimate and natural interests of Indians themselves. The problem then from the Britisher's view-point reduces itself to the proposition *that the defence of India means the defence by the Britisher of his own interests, of his field of exploitation against any attempt by Indians to defend their rights.* The form of the argument is only twisted and made up as the 'Imperial Defence' argument.

The following extract supports our inference. Field-Marshal Brownslow says, "Should war break



out in Europe, there can be no doubt that it will add to the unrest in India, and that these troops ( **White Soldiers** ) will be more wanted here ( **India** ) than in Europe, where our few soldiers can be of little account, among the legions of our neighbours, whether as allies or as adversaries." <sup>18</sup>

In Germany to-day, we find the established German Government itself using its National Army against its own nationals, whether they are Nazis or others. Even though there are differences amongst them which have on many occasions meant even blood-shed, do they or have they ever requisitioned British troops from England or French troops from France ?

When the case in England, Germany and other countries in Europe is the same as in India, how then could an exactly similar case in India alone require different treatment ? How and where does the 'British troops' argument come in ?

In the first place we have no cause to fear on that ground. We can never agree with the incorrect British statement that the Hindus and Moslems would fight between themselves and the Government will be compelled to interfere. The Hindus and Mahomedans and all others have now seen through the Britisher's policy of *divide et impera*, they have found out their common interest and also danger, and as such there would be no mistake because of the common advancement of themselves and of their country.

This at once brings us face to face with the question of the maintenance of the British troops in India. The expression 'The British troops' means only the British Other Ranks.

It is unnecessarily and irrelevantly but usually argued by the Britisher, that in all the Indian wars the Indian troops were led and officered by British officers. This is again an old silly argument which has not only been disproved many times; but in fact the argument is irrelevant and beside the point, as the British officers do not come in, in any scheme of 'British soldiers' replacement' only.

We only ask the Britisher in return, what about the real question of the replacement of the British troops? i. e. the British Other Ranks or soldiers? It can no more be maintained that the British troops only can fight and the Indian soldiers cannot. The Great War has sent the argument to the grave. Besides, it can be seen that British soldiers are militarily non-effective and hence unfit for service in India due to the climate. ( See chapters VI and VII ).

There is no ground, therefore, on which it could be argued that the British Other Ranks is a necessity for the so-called 'Internal Defence of India.'

India has got the potentialities of raising millions of men for the new Indian units to-day for the defence of the country from any enemy just as she did during the Great War. But the Government on account of its settled policy of withholding huge militarily trained personnel from being spread and thrown in the country, has kept us out of it and denied us the opportunity of ever being useful and fit for the defence of our country; *because there lurks a fear perhaps* in the British heart that such trained personnel, if thrown into the population of the districts and villages would again be the cause of *reviving* that martial spirit, when in fact the policy of the Government was and still is to demartialize and

denationalize them. The following from Lord Ellenborough, Governor of Bombay, would bear out the truth of the above statement in its entirety.

"The effect of forming 'Reserves for either short service' or limited service is to pass a number of the civil population through the military ranks; the shorter the service the larger the number passes through. In many civilized countries, especially in a country like England, this is a justly considered collateral advantage of the reserve system. *But in India the case is quite opposite because, there an alien race governs subject races under a benevolent despotism. In India under British rule the former martial tendencies of the native population gradually become lessened till they almost disappear and this circumstance is considered to be one of the safeguards of our rule. So conscious has the Government been of this that within the present generation the native population has been generally 'disarmed,' that is the people have been enjoined to give up their arms. The Government has never passed its Indian subjects through the ranks, nor sent them to their homes in vigour of life.*"<sup>19</sup>

**Police.** Internal defence means peace and order. In every country the duty of the police is to maintain peace and order, or to maintain security and protection of its people.

The civil police are meant to keep order and peace in the country against civil offenders. But here in the country, they are used against all those who are engaged in political but constitutional work. The number of the latter, that is the politically engaged class, is immeasurably million times more than the civil offenders,—in fact the whole country to-day.

The strength of the civil police and the military police in India is roughly about 2,22,000 at an exorbitant annual cost of Rs. 12,38,00,000 (They are not the latest figures. But for general purposes, these figures also may do).

### Statement of Police Strength

	I.G. & D.I.G.	S.P. & D.S.P.	Inspectors, Sub-inspectors, Sergeants,	Mty. Police	Mtd. Police	Constables	Total
Civil ...	62	1,087	13,745	24,903	2,256	1,56,212	1,98,165
Military..	22	68	712	2,236	3,334	20,978	24,016
Total ...	84	1,155	14,457	27,139	5,590	1,77,190	2,22,181

The above statement would show the details of more than 2 lakhs and more police. The 2nd and 3rd columns are nearly British personnel and a part of the 4th and 5th columns also. The reasons for these are but too apparent to need any further mention.

In addition to such a force it is maintained that British troops are necessary for 'Internal defence' (security). Could anything be more absurd and untrue?

The very term internal defence is rather *anomalous*. Defence against whom? and in whose interest? These are the two prominent questions.

It is not Internal defence, but like all other countries, it is security and protection of its populace and their life and property from the evil-minded people

of those countries. No army is ever required to meet the above situation. The civil police is effectively and adequately engaged for the work.

When in any free country, the national government divides itself over the policies of administration, and as human nature is what it was and will be so, for all time to come, occasions—though rare—will occur, when different parties of political thoughts and particular political line of action, go to the extreme of rowdism. Then perhaps the National Government may use a few soldiers if the police force on the spot is not sufficient, on those almost rare occasions; but such an occurrence is only an exception. This does not mean or show that huge armies have to be maintained for the 'Internal security' and so called 'Internal defence' alone. This work of Internal Security or Peace and Order is better and easily done by the Civil Police. "The most patriotic population always includes some members who are 'evilly' disposed to the best interest of a nation; this factor is common to each and every nation. So, it is obviously undesirable to describe these preventive measures in detail." Aston says, "It will be enough to mention, as a personal opinion, that the " Police are much better than troops for this branch of national defence. " <sup>20</sup>

It is only an alien government, therefore, who have ingeniously evolved this theory of an 'Internal defence'—(security).

The Nazis in Germany to-day have, on many occasions, paraded against their national government's policy, and perhaps may have thus caused an occasion, where the national government may have called a few soldiers—not more than a platoon or two, to disperse

the staunch but unarmed and peaceful mob. Even in England to-day the labour strikes have created and always will create such a situation.

On such occasions one or the other section of the populace may make demonstrations to insist on their government to adopt a particular line of policy in administration, but then that wordy fight and even blows on rare occasions may be only between the very same nationals but only of a different school of thought, wishing to adopt different lines of policy in the interest of their national government.

But here in India the situation is exactly the reverse. The people of the country are in the first place not engaging themselves in this kind of fight. They are unitedly and conjointly asking for a particular change in the constitution of an *Alien* (not a national) government and as such the conditions in Europe and India are quite dissimilar.

It is said that only British troops can be used in such times and not the nationals of the country, because the Britisher has no faith in him. It has been said by Brownslow, "The Sepoy, if he is of a warlike race, fights for manhood's sake, and has shed his blood in our cause on many fields, though he is a mercenary, and we have no claim on his patriotism."<sup>22</sup>

"India can, admittedly, only be held by force; to count on the love and loyalty of the masses would be fanciful and fatal to the continuance of our existence here. Diminution of British cadres, concentration of troops and reduction of single battalion stations mean widening the meshes of our military net-work to such an extent as to vivify the dangerous element, it is intended to keep suppressed. As centralization is

necessary to meet a foreign enemy, so dispersion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied." <sup>23</sup>

"This national determination is wholly absent in the Indian Army. It is a mercenary and professional army whose only incentive to action is pay and artificially fostered military arrogance." <sup>24</sup>

"It must always be borne in mind that the Native Army in India is purely an Army of mercenaries, animated by no feelings of love for British rule, but by religion and by tradition hateful of our presence, and antagonistic to our government. Natives give only that amount of allegiance we pay for and that amount of service we buy." <sup>25</sup>

The very fact that Indian troops are not supposed to be able to control such a situation, (Internal security) shows that the Britisher does not keep enough faith and confidence in him, as shown above. Therefore, according to the above policy the British troops are always supposed to be necessary and hence the British troops are maintained in India.

It may be argued by our alien rulers that the term 'Internal defence' means security against the 'communal element factor,' and, therefore, it means the protection of one race or religion against another. But this argument does not now stand to reason, because of the united and conjoint demand made by the entire nation.

There may or even may not likely be some rare occasions—as elsewhere in other countries—to take the help of a few soldiers, where civil police are not available in numbers at the eleventh hour at a particular place, but after all it is the same situation all over

and in all other countries even under any national government. Such occasions are more an exception than a rule, and no generalization, therefore, could possibly be made over this question *to necessitate the making of laws.*

*The fundamental differences between the enacting of laws* under these two conditions are very great and unnatural. In the former *viz.* in countries with a national government, the people in power enact the laws in the interest of their nationals and country in general, and in the latter the alien government who has got the power to enact or veto laws and ordinances, without the moral and legal sanction of the people, enact them for somebody's interests but certainly not in the interest of the people; rather, more probably against the interest of the people. The laws must be in somebody's interest, to be sure, and whether those laws and ordinances are really in the interest of the people or the alien government itself is a question which could be understood by all.

The huge police force in the country is more than enough to maintain Internal security or the peace and order, or the so-called twisted term of 'Internal defence' in the country. There is, therefore, no necessity of the maintenance of British troops in India. The question of peace and order when twisted and stretched and then used in its new wonderful role as 'Internal defence,' is simply absurd.

There is no army that is being maintained in any country, which has its main task and roll the 'Internal defence.' Why then should that silly argument be unnecessarily brought forward? Only because there is no other argument, proper or improper, to justify the



morality of the principle of maintaining British troops in India? To maintain their point, the alien government may bring any view, though it may not be necessarily based on principles of equitable rights and justice and thus can afford to be indifferent to others' (Indians') views.

A Britisher of the Die-hard School, with the Empire fad of the 'Firm hand rule in India' type, has adopted this attitude; one may as well call it an impertinent attitude. One may also call it unjust and immoral attitude, perhaps compelled to be adopted only on economic and political rather than on any moral grounds. An interested man on occasions naturally would never agree to others' view, though he may be fully convinced. The Britisher is no exception to this. He has owned it. Aston has said, "As a nation we are not very amenable to regulations and as individuals, I am afraid that we are somewhat forgetful of (I nearly wrote *somewhat indifferent to*) the point of view of other people."<sup>26</sup>

The internal security (defence) or the peace and order has to be maintained by the civil national police only. No armies are required for that, much less any Foreign Mercenary Army, or the British troops. This has been the practice in every country except India, where the people have no voice in the army administration,—as it is a non-votable subject and item. It suits an alien government politically to keep it as a reserved subject and, therefore, they can afford to say that British troops are necessary for Internal defence.

We leave our readers to judge the motives and interest involved therein. There is still another point to think over. In other countries, the government and

the police are both nationals and not alien, here the government is alien. The police are not the true nationals but *alien in body* due to their service conditions. Therefore, the Britisher, cannot perhaps "count on his love and loyalty." <sup>27</sup>

Or perhaps, as said by Field-Marshal Brownslow, he is only supposed to be a mercenary. The Britisher feels that he has no claim on his 'patriotism'. Therefore, British troops are necessary.

The Nind Commission of 1930 says, "It is impossible to differentiate in military expenditure in India between purposes of external defence and purposes of 'internal security'." <sup>28</sup>

We do not understand how the Army authorities could give the above explanation and reason to the 'Nind Committee.' Lord Kitchner had submitted to the Viceroy a scheme in 1903. Its essence was the substitution of two armies for existing commands—its main object was to reduce the garrison troops to the minimum essential for the country's 'Internal security,' so as to set free the maximum force for service in the Field.

The following will reveal a good many things worth noting and finding out. "Internal and External Defence Interdependent:—The question of distribution has split itself into two main problems:—(1) The maintenance of the Internal security of the country, and (2) its Protection from external invasion. These two matters were interdependent and any scheme for the reorganisation and redistribution of the Army must pay equal regard to both."

**“Kitchner had first to determine under what system and on what scale the forces in India could be organised for field service. Without this as a standard no military problem could be satisfactorily solved, no military requirement accurately calculated. In the absence of a definite aim or a fixed policy, all true military reform would be held up and until a well considered and comprehensive scheme were adopted, there must be loss of power and much waste of money on fitful military expenditure.”**

**“Accordingly, in November 1903, at the close of his frontier tours, the Commander-in-Chief submitted to the Viceroy in Council his scheme for the reorganisation and redistribution of the army in India. Its main objects were three—(1) To reduce the garrison troops to the minimum essential for the country's internal security, so as to set free the maximum force for service in the field; (2) to introduce a war organisation in which every unit should have its allotted place and be ready for an immediate start on the signal for war; (3) to make the peace formations correspond as closely as circumstances permitted, with war organisation, so that mobilisation should be smooth and easy.”**

**“The question of Internal defence was treated in personal consultation, and in complete harmony, with all the Local Governments concerned. It was determined by three main considerations, the protection of the chief arteries of communication, the power and resources of a possible armed rebellion, and the amount of help to be expected from the Volunteers, Imperial Service Troops, Frontier Militia and police. Due allowance was made for the more modern advantages of railways and telegraphs, and for the**

unarmed state of the bulk of the population; although the fact was not blinked that certain native states might require watching. An estimate was made of the respective values of the auxiliary forces named, the roll of the police being specially taken into account.” 29

It is simply amusing to note that in spite of the existence of the scheme of internal security with its detail, the Nind Committee was not given the smallest information such as strength and cost of that ‘Internal Security Force.’ What does it reveal? Does it not give one the correct idea why British troops are said to be necessary for the ‘internal security’ or internal defence problem?

The special mention of the factor of “the power and resources of a possible armed rebellion” considered in Lord Kitchner’s scheme clearly indicates the true spirit and policy in connection with the maintenance of the British troops. Similarly all other factors which are given along with “the armed rebellion” factor are also worth careful thought and consideration.

From what we find in Lord Kitchner’s scheme above it does not appear that the army authorities were not able to give the cost of the ‘Internal defence force.’ But perhaps they did not like to give out the figure which perhaps would have been the major portion of the total army cost (about 28 to 32 crores) being the cost of the 60,000 British troops; Indian troops being 2½ times more than the British.

The inability or the refusal by the army authorities is simply ridiculous. It may show either their incompetency or their wanton unwillingness to give the correct cost of the internal defence force.

Sound economics require that without demand there should be no production. Sound and perfect organization entails that no economy in men, material and resources should be neglected by incurring uncalled for and unnecessary expenditure. If these sound principles are not understood or are ignored by those who happen to be in power, then it only follows that they are totally unfit to administer the country efficiently.

No department of any government could be maintained without some justification and need. The extent, scope and needs of the justified demands require to be established before the department could be financed by the tax-payer. Here the tax-payer has no voice in such an all-important matter as 'Defence.' Perhaps some grave constitutional difficulty must have hindered the alien government in making the army budget a votable item. For the very reason, perhaps, the Government could not give the separate figures of expenditure incurred on the internal and external defence troops, even though the strength of these is settled after due considerations and calculations with regard both to its internal and external military requirements. This has been admitted by Lord Kitchner in his scheme. It certainly cannot be said, therefore—we hope—that the Government does not wish to disclose the organization of the army (specially the strength and cost of the Internal defence troops). If it does, then from whom and in whose interest is the secret guarded? Certainly not in the Indian interest, we believe!

**The Question of Proportion of British Troops for Internal Defence**, though quite irrelevant, is usually put forth. The question of the proportion of British troops does not arise at all when in fact it has already

been proved that there is no necessity of British troops. Putting forth the argument of 'proportion of the British troops,' the Britisher perhaps tries to keep us away from the main and real issue.

It will be seen from the accompanying statement that there is a considerable and steady rise and fall in the proportion in the strengths of the British and the Indian personnel of the Indian Army.

The statement will show that it is only in certain years immediately before and after a war (internal, external or imperial) that the rise and fall is very much noticeable. To make our point more clear we would suggest the reader to divide the period from 1835 in to various groups. We suggest ten periods or groups; they may even be divided into more.

(1) The First Afgan War period. (2) The operations in Sindh period. (3) The Central India War period (war with Gwalior). (4) The 1857 period. (5) The after-1857 period. (6) Second Afgan War period. (7) South African War period. (8) Russo-Japanese War period. (9) Great War period. (10) Post-War period.

Many more divisions or periods may be added and included to make the statement more complete and accurate, but our purpose would be sufficiently served by the proposed division into ten periods. The point in question is just to find out the probable causes of the rise and fall in the strengths of the British and Indian troops.

Originally the British troops in India were about 30 thousand, as could be seen from the statement. At the Afgan War period the number rose and it has been steadily increasing at every period of the next war in

India or the N. W. F. or the so-called internal defence and also the external defence.

During the first Afgan War period to keep the lines of communications in the Punjab safe in the rear of the Army, from the Sikh, the strength of the British troops was raised and this is in fact what the term Internal defence or security of India means. Again at the time of the Sindh war period, the 'British troops' strength rose of course for 'Internal Defence;' the same with the third period and the 1857 period. Thus, the British troops steadily rose to 46 thousand and then there was a sudden rise from 46 to 78 thousand immediately after 1857. Perhaps this precaution was taken to meet another possible eventuality similar to 1857 and all this increase of British troops is again for the internal defence of India mentioned above.

It might also be seen that just as there is a steady increase in the strength of British troops, there is a clear corresponding fall in the strength of the Indian troops. And all this had to be done for providing effectually for the safety of the Empire or for the so-called 'internal defence reason.' The following extracts will reveal the necessity of the question of "*Proportion of British troops to Indian.*" *India for local reasons requires a slight increase in the numbers of battalians in its garrison.*"<sup>30</sup>

"From what has been already said it is obvious that the army which we maintain at home has its numbers actually fixed by the necessity for keeping up adequate supply of men for the Indian army and for that of the Colonies."<sup>31</sup>

"The case of Indian small wars is provided for by the condition in which the Indian (British) battalions are maintained."<sup>32</sup>

General Grant says, "I am of opinion that there is in the heart of every black man an inherent dislike of the white man, which will always lead him to sympathize with those of his own colour, however they may differ in race, creed or country."

"To provide effectually for the safety of our Indian Empire, never let us have less than the proportion of our own countrymen indicated in my replies." <sup>33</sup>

The question of the proportion of British troops is raised and pressed by the Britishers too often, the result of which is to miss the main and real issue, of the very 'Necessity of the British troops for defence-internal and external-of India.'

We believe one gathers from all the above that in fact there is no necessity of British troops.

**Statement showing comparative British and Indian strength, total cost, total strength army and cost of British troops incurred in England**

	Year	Total strength Ind. army	British troops in India	Indian troops	Total (army) cost crores	Cost in Eng-land for British troops (included in total) crores
1. Afghan	1835	1,83,760	30,822	1,52,938	7,04,11,620	
	1839	2,07,140	31,132	1,76,008	7,60,75,140	
2. Sindh	1841	2,51,022	38,406	2,12,616	9,00,64,330	
3. C. I. Gwalior	1843	2,67,673	46,726	2,20,947	9,56,25,240	
	1855	2,37,091	46,093			
4. 1857	1856-57	2,35,221	45,104	2,59,913	12,83,88,970	
	1858-59	1,96,243	46,415		23 64,53 060	



5. After 1857 period	1862	2,04,087	78,124	1,25,915		
	1866	1,84,609	66,814	1,17,095		2,42,94,610
6	1868	1,81,066	61,397	1,19,169		3,49,98,290
	1873-76	1,90,264	60,613	1,23,470	14.45 crores	3,58,31,960
7. 2nd Afgan. period	1878-79				18.32 ..	4,82,92,310
	1880		64,509	1,26,088	27.59 ..	5,15,67,770
	1881				16.98 ..	
8.	1884		63,065	1,26,019	17.99 ..	6,17,15,260
	1895-96		73,109	1,45,683	25.39 ..	7,35,76,780
	1896-97		73,112	1,45,565	24.56 ..	4,25,50,030
9. R. J. War	1904-5		74,311	1,55,240	31.04 ..	6,16,22,300
10. Great War	1912-13				29.33 ..	
	1918-19				66.72 ..	
11.	1919-20				86.97 ..	
12.	1929-30		61,742	1,56,723	58.58 ..	13,86,10,000
			7,031	4,732		
	1931-32	2,21,464	61,881	1,49,762	57.07 ..	13,22,69,000
	exclud ing					
		38,737	7,097	4,794		
	followers					
		10,237				
	clerks					

The above figures are collected from the three sets of references, noted below:—

- (1) Statistical abstracts relating to British India, all Vols., specially 31, 4, 21, 11, 41.
- (2) Annals of Indian Administration, Volume XI and others.
- (3) Army budgets, specially 1929-30, 31-32.

From the statement it would be clearly found out that the main cause of the rise of the British troops and the fall in the strength of the Indian troops at a certain period, immediately before and after any war, is mainly due "to keep the Indian army safe" or "the possibilities of an armed rebellion,"—of course by the Indian Army only, because the people in the country in general are all disarmed, or "to use it as a counterpoise to the Indian Army."<sup>34</sup> This precaution and safety means internal defence.

The net results of these precautions till to-day are that the British troops' strength was increased from 30,000 to 78,000 and the Indian unit's strength decreased from 2,59,913 to 1,49,762. All this had to be done in the interest of Indians themselves for 'Internal defence' viz., against the possibilities of an 'Armed rebellion' by the Indian troops.

After 1857 there would appear a marked rise in the strength of the British troops by 16,000 and a marked fall in the Indian strength by 1,34,000 (compare the figures of 1856-57 and 1862) to keep the safety of the so-called "Empire," or to maintain the 'Internal defence,' or to guard against "the possibilities of an armed rebellion." The British troops had to be naturally increased.

Whenever any external defence operations or war was probable or took place, the 'Internal defence' had to be made because the British troops' lines of communications may not be cut off, or there should be no obstacle in the way of supplies, so naturally lines of supplies also had to be kept intact from any local interruption,—and this is what is meant by 'Internal defence.'

### **Effect on Indian Finance**

This increase of British troops naturally had an effect on Indian finance. It meant more expenditure in England on these extra British troops. It also meant more capitation charges to England. It also meant other and more non-effective expenditure in England. It also meant more money on British transport, and it also meant more cost for their pay, allowances and many other things in India.

### **Effect on Capitation Money**

The capitation money alone paid to England from 1859 onwards only amounts to roughly about 80 to 100 crores and more.

### **Effect on Expenditure in England**

All the money spent in England till to-day would amount to roughly about 500 to 600 crores. The money spent in India on British troops only would amount to roughly 1,100 to 1,200 crores, and all this from the Britisher's view-point had to be done for the so-called 'Internal defence' or as proved before, for the possibilities of an armed rebellion, and that too only in the interest of India and Indians; because the Britisher is her trustee and guardian, though a self-appointed one.

From the above it may be clearly proved that the British view of maintaining the British troops as a most necessary part of the Indian Army for the so-called Internal defence is absolutely wrong, and the arguments usually made by the Britishers—such as the racial animosity and differences between Hindus and Mohamedans, 'language differences,' 'India a country of countries,' 'the British trusteeship,' and all other arguments equally flimsy do not appear to be reason-

able and correct, and this has already been proved before. There is also another view.

It is seen by the most frank statements made and information given by responsible and highly placed Britishers like Field-Marshal Lord Kitchner (late C-in-C., India), Commander Wedgewood, M. P., Sir Joynson Hicks, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts (C-in-C., India) and others, that the real reasons are different.

The following extracts bear out the interpretation and prove the other set of real reasons for the necessity of the British troops in India.

**Probable Real Reasons And Objects :—**(1) To maintain and hold India at the point of the sword. (2) To keep the Indian Army safe. (3) To watch armies of some of the native states etc. (4) To solve or to keep safe their food problem. (5) To keep safe British commerce and interest. (6) To enable England to utilise India as a training ground. (7) To save cost of training army in England. (8) To swell England's reserve at India's cost. (9) For Empire defence.

**British Soldier Necessary Argument :—**Field-Marshal Brownslow says:—"Those who know India, are equally insistent upon more British soldiers to keep the peace in that country." <sup>35</sup>

"If we are ready to send a fully trained army corps to Bombay (of British soldiers from England) at a week's notice, we shall hold our own, even against the 303 Rifle which will soon be in the hands of every man who has ten rupees to buy one, and the spirit to use it, either as a rebel or a patriot." <sup>36</sup>

"P. S. We may wrangle over policies, and experiment with systems but whether the guardians of the

## INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM

Frontier are to be tribesmen or Sepoys, the question will remain, " Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, " and to this the answer must always be the **British soldier.**" <sup>37</sup>

" Unless these mild measures are supplemented by the moral effect, throughout India, of the arrival of four or five ship-loads of **White soldiers** at our two most seditious seaports....."

" A timely display of the ' **Imperial fist** ' need not lead to bloodshed. Blank cartridges will suffice to quiet Bengal and Bombay." <sup>38</sup>

" India cannot be unduly alarmed at the sight of a few more **British bayonets**, in answer to the revolutionary spirit indicated by the use of bombs." <sup>39</sup>

" We may not require very highly trained infantry to protect or police India, but we may require numbers and of the **ruling complexion.**" <sup>40</sup>

" India deserves and commands our fullest sympathy and goodwill, but we must subdue any sentimental weakness with regard to that country, as indeed of any other country that we hold by the sword, when it comes to a question of letting the sword out of our own hands, or trusting to any sword but our own." <sup>41</sup>

### Sword

" We held India, South Africa and Egypt by the sword." Each, India, South Africa and Egypt in its turn has tried to shake off our yoke. It is vain to suppose that we can get rid of the cares of conquest by good government alone. The most abject races accept the blessings of civilisation at the point of the bayonet, and not from choice. Magistrates are of no avail without our soldiers, and soldiers too of the ruling nationality

and complexion.”<sup>42</sup> (South Africa's and Egypt's condition is changed but not that of India as yet.)

“India can, admittedly, only be held by force.”<sup>43</sup>

“Diminution of British cadres means widening the meshes of our military net-work to such an extent as to vivify the dangerous element it is intended to keep suppressed. As centralization is necessary to meet a foreign enemy, so diffusion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied.”<sup>44</sup>

### Indian Army Safe

“As we cannot do without a large native army in India our main object is to make that army safe and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force.....”<sup>45</sup>

### State Armies

“We are now passing through an emotional stage with regard to the spontaneous and universal outburst of loyalty on the part of the Princes and people of India, in face of the aggressive attitude of Russia. I believe that expression of feeling to have been thoroughly genuine, but we must not forget that a rush to arms at such a time implies not only the desire to help us, but also to strengthen the *raison de etre* of the oft-threatened forces of our feudatories, to obtain breech loaders from our arsenals, and to prepare themselves for any eventualities, offensive or defensive, that war and disaffection may give rise to.

“The feeling, therefore, is not one altogether devoid of self-interest, and in respect of the army as well as the aristocracy of India, we ought not to allow our emotions to blind us to the fact that a servant, however loyal, is never unwilling to become a master.”<sup>46</sup>

**The armed rabbles of our feudatory Indian Chiefs have been greatly reduced, and now constitute 'The Imperial Service Troops,'<sup>47</sup> under the superintendence of British officers—1907.**

"It is claimed by enthusiastic Rajamaniacs that we should provide an outlet for the military aspirations of the Princes, and in addition to rank and honours should give them commands in peace and war, in fact should train them to succeed us in India, when we give the country Home-rule.

"The native states, as at present constituted and ruled, relieve us of the administration of one-third of British India and strengthen the Empire.

"To add to their troops, and to encourage their martial ardour, would make them an anxiety, and possibly a danger, notwithstanding the perplexing march of time and events. We cannot disregard historical precedents, or the question of colour."<sup>48</sup>

**Imperial Service Troops:—**Field-Marshal Brownlow says, "If at the end of that time we have...drawn the teeth of some of our great Indian feudatories, India will have no cause to fear the results of either intrigue or invasion from the north."<sup>49</sup>

**The Food Problem:—**General Maurice says, "Since the necessary food of our population comes by sea; since the work which furnishes the means of buying bread for our working population finds its market over the sea; since our wealth is on the sea, while, of all the wealth of the world that on any day of the year is on the sea, by far the greater part is ours,—it is not quite safe to drop out of account these simple facts."<sup>50</sup>

## **British Interests**

### **British Army to hold India for British Interests**

"We are less than honest in our talk about our trusteeship for the 'voiceless millions' of India. India, certainly no longer 'Voiceless' and far from its being a question of 'trusteeship,' our hold on India is chiefly in our interest and frankly imperialistic. Sir William Joynson Hicks, the present Home Secretary, with greater frankness, if less discretion, than other members of the Government, stated his views in the following words. 'We did not conquer India for the benefit of Indians. We conquered it as an outlet for the goods of Great Britain.' " <sup>51</sup>

## **Military Training**

Field-Marshal Brownslow says, "Our warlike neighbours act on us as a tonic—they keep us on the alert, and teach us to fight, as the Zulus taught the Boers. Moreover their tribal feuds keep down their numbers, much to our advantage, and their own." <sup>52</sup>

"An Indian Army could be trained for, at an infinitely less expense. *The fact is that the British Army in India is the best training ground for our troops.* If our army were removed from India the cost which has always been borne entirely by India *would fall on the British tax-payer* or alternatively the British army would have to be reduced." <sup>53</sup>

## **Ground**

General Maurice says :—

"We still also require the *most expensive thing in Britain next to men, ground—ground that shall enable us properly to manoeuvre and to train, and ground that shall make us an effective army organically kept together in the parts and in the functions that will be required for war.*" <sup>54</sup>



### **Commerce and British Interest**

"We did not conquer India for the benefit of Indians. I know, it is said in missionary meetings that we conquered India to raise the level of Indians. That is CANT." <sup>55</sup>

**British Troops to keep British Commerce and British Interest Safe:**—"We conquered India as an outlet for the goods of Britain. I am not such a hypocrite as to say we hold India for the Indians, we hold it as the finest outlet for British goods in general and for Lancashire goods in particular." <sup>56</sup>

**British troops not for Indian Defence but for England's or the Empire's Defence**

"Even our army in India is not there primarily for India's needs." <sup>57</sup>

General Maurice says, "I am most anxious not for a moment to admit the notion that national defence can be restricted to these islands." <sup>58</sup>

### **Attitude adopted by Indian Government**

General Sir Edward Barrow, being asked, said, "It's no use to suggest to us that we should take further risks in India." (When asked next) "Does not that indicate a rather curious spirit in connection with this European War? Do they put India first and England second?" "Yes, it will really read so." <sup>59</sup>

### **Real Reasons of the Necessity of British Troops**

General Maurice says, "Whatever may be needed for the defence of our possessions beyond the sea, the difficulty and the danger of defending them are nothing like so great as would be the difficulty of defending this appalling commerce if the politics of little Pedlington prevail, if Britain shrink into herself and, careless of her great Indian Empire and her Colonies,

dwindle into the nut from which she sprang. The mighty genius towering to the skies, once coaxed by the fisherman into returning to the box from which he had arisen was, according to the charming tale of Grimm, easily locked up again and was lost for ever in the seas. It is a true fable of the fate of Britain if she shrinks from her glorious destiny and tries to make her giant limb's fit into her cradle." <sup>61</sup>

"Far be it from me to blame these bold methods by which we retain our hold on such a dominion as the world has never seen. They are most economical and wisely economical methods by which we employ only a representative force that may be strengthened at our pleasure, as and when we require it." <sup>62</sup>

### Internal and External Defence Interdependent

"Its main advantages seem to me that it (the question of internal and external defence interdependence) gives us a war organisation and a peace organisation in the same scheme. The two of course not being identical, but the latter being as closely assimilated to the former as circumstances permit; and that it provides for the coordination, in the task of Imperial defence, of all the various armed forces which we possess in India, from the Regular Army to the armed civil police." <sup>62</sup>

Sir Aston says, "In the east as in the west of Africa, reliance is placed entirely upon local troops.... On the other hand our territorial responsibilities in India call for a military effort far exceeding any other such effort in the Empire. The bulk of the British army abroad, nearly the whole of it, is stationed in India." <sup>63</sup>

**British Troops in India—Real Necessity—for England or the Empire, not for India's Defence.**

Lord Curzon in his book *The Indian Corps in France* put the matter quite clearly and truthfully with regard to the portion of the Imperial Army stationed in India. "The Indian Army in fact has always possessed and has been proud of possessing a triple function. The preservation of internal peace in India itself; the defence of the Indian frontiers; and 'preparedness' to embark at a moment's notice for Imperial service in other parts of the globe. In this third aspect India has for long been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial defence, providing the British Government with a striking force always ready of admirable efficiency and assured valour." <sup>64</sup>

#### **British Troops Necessary for Imperial Defence** (Not for India's defence, internal or external)

"Lord Birkenhead is not less appreciative than was Lord Curzon of the value of the army in India as an Imperial asset. (British troops necessary to keep open Indian Market to England). Moreover, he is keenly alive to the value to Great Britain of India's markets. 'The loss of the Indian market would be a staggering blow to the prosperity of Lancashire. Almost all the manufacturing centres in Great Britain share in the trade and find in India an outlet for their manufactures. In the fabric of our great Empire India is a vital part.' " <sup>65</sup>

**Training Ground**—"The fact is of course, although it is not usually so candidly admitted, that India is the chief training ground for the British Army. All of these are kept perpetually on a war footing." <sup>66</sup>

#### **The Indian Army Situation to-day:—**

"The Indian Army consists of about one-third European and two-thirds Indian troops. In the latter practically all the King's commissioned officers are at

present mostly Europeans. Some, but very few King's Commissions in the Infantry and Cavalry have been given, beginning about six years (*12 years*) ago, to Indians but so far Indian officers are in the junior ranks only.

**"Enlistment in the Indian Army is voluntary and is usually confined to a few so-called martial races. Indian troops can be used abroad, though in these cases the cost is as a rule paid by the British Exchequer."** <sup>67</sup>

In the Great War, Indian troops were brought to fight in France, East Africa, Mesopotamia etc. They were the first troops to be sent into China in the recent crisis there, against the wishes of Indians, and in spite of protest meetings held in every principal Indian town.

The process of Indianization, especially in the army, is very slow. Even to-day no Indian yet holds commissioned rank in the Artillery Engineers, Air Force or in any of the special branches of the Army. Following on the Indian Sandhurst Committee Report, the Government intimated that they intended to throw open a certain number of these to Indians.

**"Yet the fact that they must necessarily rely on the British Army for their defence is one of the chief arguments used against any early grant of real self-government to Indians."** <sup>68</sup> From all that is said above, it does not require any more proof or argument to show that British troops are not only unnecessary but positively meant to "hold India by sword" for England's interest.

The British claim for the trusteeship and defence of India arises in our opinion not from a fact but a conception or rather from an assumed misconception of the nature of the duties of a self-appointed trustee, which they have, to their advantage and interest,

imposed on themselves. The Britishers would serve their own interests better, if only were they to remove that unhappy misconception of a trustee and a guardian. The misconception arises not from the fact, but from the assumption that India's millions are not fit to manage their own affairs and defence. It is on this basis that he claims the right. But then this right may be as much his or, as a matter of that, of any other dominions or the other self-governing countries in the world. It is clear that his sole claim is based on the assumption, which in itself is absolutely wrong, because Indian soldiers have proved not only their fitness, but even their superiority to any other soldier in the world. Where is the moral justification of bleating the same old sound and song of 'unfitness' of its soldiery then? It is an affront to the Indian soldier and his country that did so much to win the War and keep the 'Empire's' existence.

It cuts to the quick our national pride and the new consciousness. It derives its impetus from the unavoidable economic situation created by an alien rule of exploitation so long. A wide gulf in the way of that crooked and interested policy of setting the races and classes against each other, may have divided the masses for some time from the classes. But now a united India has a different tale to tell. It needs no telling that the times have changed so quickly, the question of cost, of economic stress, affects directly the masses more than the intelligentsia who form the classes in this country as in every other country and, therefore, the argument of 'difference in the classes' and the masses also, does not hold good. The classes and the masses both are now united for a common economic interest.

## The Real Reasons

British statesmen should think over what Ramsay Macdonald, Major Graham Pole and other Britishers have to say. It is said that—

“Indian Nationalism proves its claim to be a national renaissance and gives a plain warning that it is much more than the agitation of political coteries. It is a revival of a historical tradition, the liberation of the soul of a people.

“These words of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald written in his book *The Government of India* ring true to every unbiassed student of India to-day. ‘Too late’ is the epitaph that can be written over most of Britain’s great concessions. We held Ireland by the sword until all that was best in that country was estranged from us and then surrendered to force what we would not concede to reason.

Is India to be another Ireland, but on an immensely greater scale? Every year that we put off yielding to her legitimate and natural demands, still greater demands are being made and more and more estrangement follows,—estrangement that may never be overcome in the life-time of any of us now on the scenes.”<sup>(1)</sup>

All these above set of reasons have, we believe, sufficiently proved that British Troops are necessary “to hold India by sword” for England’s commerce, interest, food or economic interests. To achieve that the Empire had, India’s defence—both internal and external—and all other set of reasons equally misleading and untrue are usually put forth.

In one word, to say that the British soldiers are necessary for internal defence is absolutely false.

## CHAPTER IV

### BRITISH TROOPS NOT NECESSARY FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE

We discuss in this chapter the British argument of the necessity of British troops as a part of the Indian Army for the purposes of 'Imperial Defence.' In considering this question we will have to know various important but allied questions regarding the 'Empire and Empire policy.' We cannot, however, hope to deal with them in length, as we are restricted by space and time both. The allied questions which have to be understood before dealing with our main question are as follows :—

What is Defence ? British national defence ? what is meant by Imperial defence ? The British argument of 'defence of territories and land frontiers for the maintenance and necessity of British troops in India'—the unreasonableness of the argument—based only on imperialism or Imperial policy—what is Imperial policy ? Its real objects and otherwise—natural fears of such a one-sided Imperial policy, Empire problem—India's grievances and problems, Forced British troops, want of a complete and purely native army; small number of the Indian Army; the huge cost for British troops affects them financially and economically; loss of morale—dishonour—Mistrust—Canada compared with India—Empire difficulties.

India's help and sacrifice—Empire without India—Empire's objects and varied problems.

**Solution of our problem. 'The necessity of British troops for the Imperial defence.'**

In fact the crux of the whole is the three safeguards i.e. the Army, Finance and Foreign relations. These three questions of safeguards are so interlinked and interdependent that one cannot sever the one from the other.

Clauswitz has said that "war is simply a continuation of policy."

In fact foreign relations are ultimately meant either to avert a war or to undertake it. The two factors of foreign relation and army then are inseparable. Similarly army and war means nothing but finance in peace and war, and to-day this question of finance or cost means the costly British troops in India.

*What is the Empire?*

The Britisher lays a great stress on the word 'Empire' whenever he argues for the necessity and maintenance of British troops in India, of course at India's cost. We then must know what the 'Empire' really is. It will help us to understand clearly how the necessity of British troops in India arises.

Many of our people perhaps very seriously believe in the reality of 'Empire.' The majority of us have not even thought of the expression 'Empire' at all. To them specially and to all generally, I would refer to what Meredith Townsend, an eminent Britisher who lived long in India, studied Indian conditions, and who has presented his conclusions formed by him during his long stay and life in India, in his book *Asia and Europe*, says, "If the brown men struck for a weak, the "Empire" would collapse like a house of cards, and every ruling man would be a starving prisoner



in his own house. He could not move or feed himself or get water." <sup>1</sup>

*"The Empire hangs in air, supported by nothing but the minute white garrison and the unproved assumption that people of India desire it to continue to exist."* <sup>1</sup>

"Above this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, practising all, taxing all, rises what we call here **"The Empire,"** a corporation of less than fifteen hundred men, part chosen by examination, part by co-optation, who are set to govern, and who protect themselves in governing by finding pay for a minute white garrison of 65,000 men.....*That corporation and that garrison constitute the "Indian Empire."*" <sup>2</sup>

"There is nothing else. **Banish those fifteen hundred men in black,** defeat that slender garrison in red, and the *Empire has ended*, the structure disappears, and brown India emerges unchanged and unchangeable." <sup>3</sup>

From the above if one were to fall in with the idea of 'The Right of Indians to secede from the Empire,' if and when she so decides, there is no wonder.

So then, it is for this *Empire* and its needs, that the British troops are said to be necessary. One might as well question that if the Empire means a 'Corporation and the White Garrison,' how then does it stand to reason that British troops or a white garrison are necessary for a corporation of a few British officials or a White Garrison? Yes, it may look anomalous a little. But in fact, perhaps it reads thus—that British troops are necessary to guard the interests of England 'by holding India' with British bayonets and not to guard Indian interests, as is usually given out and dinned into our ears.

If and when these two interests clash, then it is but certain that India may truly think of getting away from the so-called ' Empire '. These fears are entertained very strongly by many British diplomats.

To be brief then, so far as it affects India's interests it may be understood from the above *that England means the ' Empire ' and the Empire means England.* Maurice says, "Trade follows the flag,"<sup>4</sup> but in India's case to-day the flag follows the British trade.

**What is Defence?**—To fight effectively and efficiently with an aggressive enemy and check him in his efforts of aggression, only with a view to defend one's country.

### **Defence of a Country by its Own Nationals**

The best Defence of a country is only that which is done by the nationals of that country. Hired or mercenary soldiers, naturally not having any stake in the country, although they may have their nation's interest at heart except the pay and allowances they receive, cannot and are not expected to defend the country as effectively as its own nationals would do.

Ramsay Macdonald says, "A nation's military policy will always be determined primarily by *considerations of self-defence.*"<sup>5</sup> I am perfectly sure that the argument would be accepted by every rationally minded man in the country.

"The people of a state will always be moved by the desire to be self-contained in their means of defence, because an essential characteristic of the military idea is that *no state can really trust another*, but must always be prepared to stand alone or seek new friends."<sup>6</sup>

"Jaur's book contains an extra-ordinarily fresh exposition of military tactics and organization based

upon three propositions, the third being that only when the army is a citizen force can the policy be defensive." 7

It is clear from all the above that national defence of India can only be undertaken by her Indian citizens and not by alien British soldiers from England. By forcing the British troops on India, England in the name of the Empire or perhaps under the pretext of the 'peace move' is doing an injustice to us.

**National and Imperial Defence:—**External and Imperial Defence is the same. Defence means to fight with one's enemy if he is aggressive, whether one fights for oneself or for one's allies is immaterial. It is the same, fighting or defending for the external or for the Imperial Defence. The fighting or defending is the same *i. e.* fighting with an enemy for defence. The Indian soldier has been proved to be more fit for fighting purposes or for defence (in chaps. II and III) both for external and also the internal defence. The question, therefore, whether he is fit for fighting and defending is the only test and he has been proved and has stood the test in many an Imperial war. When his fighting or defending capacity and powers are proved, the question of Imperial defence does not in fact arise at all; as the action of defence is the same in both external and imperial defence. Therefore, the British soldier is not a necessary factor in India, even under the plea of Imperial Defence.

However, we may examine *the British argument*. The argument is that the defence of the *Land Frontier of India* or the defence of territory cannot be left to the Indian Army. And why? No reasons could be given by British militarists, except they say so or they

think so or they rule so. This is just like the great Mughal at White-hall and is most unreasonable and unfair. The sum total of this unreasonableness is an indirect admission that on no grounds could the Britishers maintain their pet theory of 'British Troops necessary' outwardly for the Defence of India or Imperial Defence. This unreasonableness is another form of admission. It also indirectly admits their real object, as Sir Joynson Hicks says, "We conquered India by sword and we will maintain it by sword. We hold it as a finest outlet for British goods in general and for Lancashire goods in particular." <sup>8</sup>

**National and Imperial Defence:**—National and Imperial defence has been defined by the Imperial Defence Sub-committee, 1923, as "*Defence of Territory and Defence of Communications.*" <sup>9</sup>

India can easily defend her territory by her 12 crores of fighting population. Indians are militarily and physically more fit for the defence of (Indian) territory viz. the land frontier defence, in this climate than the British soldiers. The British soldier is militarily a non-effective for the frontier campaigns due to physique and climate. The Britisher does not want to remove the British troops from India only to keep his hold on India, and, therefore, he does not wish to replace the British troops by raising new Indian units in its place. To justify his interested policy he gives the lame reason of 'British troops necessary for land frontiers.' We have shown before, how the Indian soldier is superior for any land frontier campaign viz. external or internal and therefore imperial.

Fighting on land is the work of the land forces. India not having her navy—under British rule—has

## INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM

naturally done fighting only on land. Land and Land Frontier being the same, and the fighting capacity and capability of Indians being proved, the question of the inability of his fighting on land frontier does not remain at all. It is simply silly. Does the Britisher think that the land forces then can fight on the sea ? What does he mean by the Land Frontier Argument ?

The Indian Army—viz., the land forces—is meant for land campaigns alone, just as other land forces or Armies of other nations are. The propriety or relevancy of this argument could only be understood by a Britisher. It is rather difficult for reasonable people to see the reason about it.

Another recommendation made by the Defence Sub-Committee is as follows:—

“The British Army was also responsible for the provision of reinforcements for India in certain eventualities, for the defence of certain land frontiers.”<sup>10</sup>

We do not see how any Indian could admit such an unreasonable and humiliating statement without indignation. But since there is no reason about it, we can only see that there is the marked mentality of an imperialist and the natural results and policy of Imperialism.

**What is Imperialism ?**

“Imperialism is control”—control of a people by an alien power. The struggle for domination of the backward regions of the earth was an inevitable result of the kind of nationalism which prevailed during the century prior to 1914 and was a primary cause of the World War. There were two varieties of imperialism—political and economic. On the one hand prevailed rivalry for new colonies and on the other, competition for control of economic resources. Desire for gain,

craving for prestige, fear, duty: these were the dynamics of Imperialism." <sup>11</sup>

John Ruskin in his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1870 said, "This is what England must do—by teaching her colonists that their first *aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and by sea.*" <sup>12</sup>

The intrepid British Publicist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt outlines it, in these words:—"England led the way in the white scramble for Africa....England was the chief sinner among the white Empires in their dealings with the weak nations of the African world... *Germany's plunder of the weak has been small in act compared to ours, or even to that of France during the past half of a century....The only difference between Berlin morality and ours in Downing Street had been that we had been careful to preserve our outward attitude of forbearance and respect for moral right, while Berlin had been shameless in its anti-human logic. Also that as an Empire we were already seated like a lion surrounded with the carcasses of its prey, while Germany was alert and hungry.*" <sup>13</sup>

The *real object* of Imperialism is *FOOD*, commerce, granary, raw stuff, market for finished goods, in short better *economic conditions*.

The lame excuse—the excuse of the necessity of British troops in India for purposes of Imperial defence—is the product of Imperialistic character. This Imperialism under the garb of 'world peace,' conveniently helps England to guard her economic interests.

Kirby says, "Industrial countries are fatally dependent upon other regions for *raw materials, food, markets and fields of investment*. If the territories containing rich resources are controlled by rival powers,

doors may be closed or inequitable restrictions imposed upon trade. The peace-time risks are great and the war-time dangers are terrifying. To be denied access to food or basic raw materials means starvation or defeat." <sup>14</sup>

*"Economic and political controversies are obviously accentuated by racial antagonism. Economic rivalry between citizens of different nations becomes far more explosive when conducted in the atmosphere of bitterness and enmity engendered by racial discrimination and exploitation."* <sup>15</sup>

Stephen Kinghall says, "There is no other Power (but England) in the world, whose economic and military resources are so widely scattered. There is no other power in the world, which has only a *few weeks' food supply* within its most important territory; a supply of food which can only be increased from overseas by being brought to Great Britain, in ships normally scattered all over the world." <sup>16</sup>

In order to secure the food supply war is possible and to be prepared for that, British troops and British preparedness are perhaps necessary, as said by Sir Joynson Hicks. "We did not conquer India for the benefit of Indians. That is cant. We conquered India as an outlet for the goods of Great Britain; we conquered it by the sword and by the sword we hold it. I am not such a hypocrite as to say, 'we hold India for the Indians'." <sup>17</sup>

### Necessity to Guard One's Economic Interests

As human nature is constant and unchanging, there is no wonder, if there is a bloody war under the pretext of civilization, between the parts of the Empire, only to guard one's own economic interests or the problem of

food. Kirby says, "The civilized states have a claim upon the uncivilized populations, as well as a duty towards them, and that claim is that they shall become civilized. If the barbaric populations resist the same, the civilized state may clear the territory of their presence and make it the abode of civilized men. *It should not be troubled about the morality of this policy when it becomes manifestly necessary.*"<sup>18</sup>

All have to be prepared for that war. It is no surprise, therefore, if from the above, one deduces that the British soldier in India is necessary only to guard England's economic interest—food, commerce, granaries, raw produce, market for manufactured goods etc., and in order to achieve this, it is necessary to 'hold India by sword' at any cost and risk. Principles of justice and morality, as said by Kirby, perhaps do not count.

Conflicting interests or the clashing of economic interests of the different parts of the Empire is the *Empire problem*.

We do not expect or wish that both Britain and India would go to the extent of war—we cannot say one way or the other about the other Dominions—and lose their object of achieving world peace—the underlying sweet idea of the expression of 'Empire'. It is undesirable to have war; besides the difficulties are many. Stephen Kinghall says, "Nowadays it is difficult even to imagine 'armed rebellion'...because warfare demands special weapons over whose manufacture and distribution the Government have ample control."<sup>19</sup> Yet the difficulties of the Empire, the Dominions as well as India remain.

**Doubtful Working of the Empire Scheme**

He again says, "I am unable to see how a system can work *which seems to contemplate the possibility that Great Britain can be at war as a member of one of these*



subsidiary arrangements of nations—an arrangement of nations which is interested only in the European continent—while the members of the British Empire in other continents are to remain indifferent and neutral, neither contributing to the result nor bearing the burdens. You cannot work the British Empire on those principles ....”<sup>20</sup>

“Quite apart from the question of internal security in its relation to the maintenance of parliamentary Government is that of preserving order amongst the non-white people in the Empire.”<sup>21</sup>

“This procedure may pass muster on an occasion, but it is evident that it reveals a falling away from the unity of policy and action which was displayed to the world by the British Empire delegation at Paris in 1919. It also reveals a situation which must appear inexplicable to foreigners, since it can be argued that at the present time *it is possible for one part of the Empire to be waging war whilst the other parts are at peace.* Legally that is impossible and practically it is an absurd proposition, yet it is, in fact, a statement describing the consequences of the practical application of the theory of complete self-government on the part of the Dominions.”<sup>22</sup>

Although India is a partner of the Empire, yet she has no equal rights in the subjects of Army, Finance, and Foreign Relations. They are reserved subjects. They are the so-called safe-guards, and this is India's difficulty.

Kinghall says, : “Although the *Dominions bear a varying share of Imperial Expenditure*, they have all stated clearly that in future, *they cannot agree to being committed by the London Government to any foreign*

policy unless it is also approved of by the Dominion Parliaments." <sup>23</sup>

"This state of affairs is reflected by Article 9 of the Locarno Pact, which expressly asserts that Great Britain only signed for herself, and that the *Dominions* are not bound by the treaty until they sign it for themselves." <sup>24</sup> Yet India alone is an exception.

The best way to get over this most difficult question would be for Britain to realise the Indian problem in its fundamentals and remove their grievances.

Kinghall says, "Every Government should, as an elementary precaution of security, satisfy itself that the fighting services are devoid of justifiable grievances." <sup>25</sup>

### India's Grievances

The Indian Problem or the set of grievances are that India is a partner in the Empire in name only, possessing no equal rights and privileges enjoyed by other Dominions or member-nations of the Empire, like Canada, Australia etc.

**Forced British Army :—**India is burdened with British soldiers for the Indian Army against her will and at her cost, for Imperial purposes.

**Army Schools and Character:—**It means depriving her of opportunities of developing character and her military training, by giving her own field to British soldiers (including British officers) in India at the cost of the Indian to defend his country. Lord Curzon says, "Just as the Indian Army is to the young subaltern the finest available *school of a manhood and arms*, so also the Indian Civil Service is a training-ground for *British character* that is not without its effect both upon the Empire and the race." <sup>26</sup>

**National Army :—**It means depriving her of her privilege of maintaining a full National Army like other Dominions, only on account of the inclusion of 60,000 British troops in the Indian Army. The inclusion of the British troops in the Indian Army has lessened and minimized their chances and field in the Indian Army, even though her fighting population is so large.

Lord Curzon says, "As a matter of fact, in relation to the population of India, *the Indian Army is by far the smallest in the world.*" <sup>27</sup>

**Cost:—**It means undeserved unnecessary extra cost for the maintenance of the British Army, which, if spared, would certainly help India financially at this juncture.

Graham Pole says, "If our army were removed from India the cost, which has always been borne by India, would fall on the British taxpayer; or, alternatively, the British Army would have to be reduced." <sup>28</sup>

"An Indian Army could be trained for that at infinitely less expense." <sup>29</sup>

Sir S. W. Dilke says, "The payment of this sum (consisting of "Pensions, Miscellaneous charges for Aux. services, ordnance and clothing, officers on furlough, pay of regiments on voyage out and home, sea transport charges, payment to Imperial Government etc.") by India to England is remarkable, for the amount is the largest item in the whole of the Indian accounts. It exceeds the total cost of the British force in India, together with the expense of its command and administration. It far exceeds the total cost of the native force." <sup>30</sup> The sum paid and stated as expenditure in England is 13.86 crores in the Army Budget of 1929-30.

**“This is the price that India pays for its British recruits, in addition to the cost of their sea-voyage out and home, and of their pay while on passage. It is a monstrous price to pay.”** <sup>31</sup>

**“The £ 7,50,000 is simply a tribute paid by India to the War Office for the privilege of receiving British regiments on loan at India’s expense.”** <sup>32</sup>

To-day the price that we pay is something like 2 crores and more. In 1929–30 we find that the payment made to the War Office is nearly as follows:—

1. Payments to War Office for British troops serving in India	... crore	1·86
2. National Health Insurance, British troops in India	... .. „	·06
3. Unemployment Insurance Charges	„	·15
		<hr/>
		crores 2·07

(See appropriation account of the Army for 1929–30, pages 119–120.)

**“If the tribute were remitted, the Indian Government could afford for a fraction of it to keep recruiting offices in the United Kingdom and in Canada, which would be able to supply all the men required.”** <sup>33</sup>

**“India, therefore, by the freedom to provide its supply of British soldiers in its own way, would gain to the amount of £7,50,000 a year, (to-day about 2 crores and more), no small matter to an administration whose revenues have little capacity of expansion.”** <sup>34</sup>

**Loss of Morale:—**Again it means loss of prestige and *Morale*. With other nations, the question of prestige would have even meant war. But we cannot think of that on account of our long association with England, and on account of our peace-loving nature.

But still the fact remains that the low estimation in which other nations will hold us, makes us rather demoralized. Besides considering the policy that the British troops in India are meant to check 'the Native Army's rising,' or the rebellion of the people, the demoralisation is all the more.

We wonder how the Britisher could even to-day mistrust us in spite of all the help and sacrifice we rendered him or his Empire. In fact, it is we who created and built the Empire and we who in fact saved the Empire.

The Indian Army was the 1st Imperial Army that went to Malta 57 years before for Imperial purposes. There was no Canadian or Australian or any other army then. Lord Curzon says, "Nearly 40 (57 from to-day) years earlier, when Lord Beaconsfield had brought 7000 Indian troops to Malta, as an evidence of Imperial unity and purpose, had an Indian Military Contingent been seen to the West of the Suez Canal." <sup>35</sup> We hope, the Britisher puts himself in the same boat and realizes the demoralization.

### **Dishonour and Insult**

Again, it is the greatest insult and dishonour of the Indian soldiery, but for whose help, sacrifice and valour the Empire would have been only a dream.

In fairness, therefore, to all the sacrifice and help in men, money, and material that India gave, it would be only just if her legitimate grievances were removed, because it was not her battles that she fought but the battles of the Empire or rather England's battles.

"They were consoled by none of the amenities or alleviations, or even the associations, of home. They

*were not fighting for their own country or people. They were not even engaged in a quarrel of their own making. They were plunged in surroundings which must have been intensely depressing to the spirit of man. Almost from the start they suffered shattering losses."*<sup>36</sup>

The Britisher ought to be just, at least to a comrade who fought for him these 150 years and more, even against his own people, for the so-called internal defence. Otherwise it appears nothing less than selfish and ungrateful behaviour.

*The help which India rendered is immeasurable, in short, it created the Empire.*

The Indian soldier naturally feels the injustice all the more keenly, when he thinks of the great help he rendered and the sacrifices made for England.

**Food Problem:**—He helps England in solving her Food problem. Lord Curzon says, "One-tenth of the entire trade of the British Empire passes through the seaports of India; and this seaborne trade is more than one-third of the trade of the Empire outside the United Kingdom. It is greater than that of Australia and Canada combined, and within the Empire Indian seaborne trade is second only to that of the United Kingdom. India has become the largest producer of food and raw material in the Empire and the principal granary of Great Britain.

"The imports into the United Kingdom of wheat, meal, and flour from India exceeding those of Canada, and being double those of Australia.

"At the same time India is the largest purchaser of British produce and manufactures, and notably of cotton goods."<sup>37</sup>

“ Moreover, it must be remembered that under the existing system English cotton manufactures imported into India pay a duty only of 3½ per cent., a counter-vailing excise duty of equivalent amount being at the same time levied on Indian manufactures. Contrast this with the heavy tariffs which British goods have to pay in the ports of our own Colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.” <sup>38</sup>

**Finance :—**India has helped England in finance. The help is unparalleled. Not only does India pay for British troops in India but also their expenditure in England. Annually the expenditure incurred on Indian Army British troops in England alone is 13·22 crores (see Army Budget, 1931-32, Page 4, column 2 of figures). In 1929-30 it was 13·86 crores (see Army Budget of 1929-30, Page 4.)

In addition India has borne the cost of many Imperial wars. Lord Curzon says, “ Until 1900 India bore the whole of the military charges for Aden.” <sup>39</sup>

In fact, financially, India is crippled—nay ruined—on account of this drain and yet the British statesman thinks that the argument is lame.

**India's help in creating or building the Empire** cannot be measured. Without this help the Empire would not have existed. Lord Curzon says, “ The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. *Had it not been for India, we should never have seized the Cape or begun that career of South African expansion that has lately entered upon so remarkable and pregnant a phase. But for India, we should not have been able to incarcerate*

*the mighty spirit of Napoleon in the rocky prison of St. Helena; Mauritius would not now be ours; nor should we have acquired a predominant position in Mesopotamia, or have controlled the Persian Gulf. India compelled us to lay hold of Aden, a position of incomparable importance, and to establish a protectorate over the neighbouring part of Arabia.*

*"India started us on that career of territorial conquest which was only arrested by the snowy ramparts of the Himalayas, and which converted us from a small island with trading and maritime interests into the greatest land Power of the world. It was through India that we established those connections with the Straits Settlements (formerly under the rule of the Governor-General of India), and with China and Japan, that were the foundation of our once unchallenged and still powerful position in the Far East. India took us to the foolishly-surrendered possession of Java."* <sup>40</sup>

*"We should never have been able to exploit our South American colony of British Guiana without Indian labour."* <sup>41</sup>

### **The Middle East Question**

Lord Curzon says, "But once we had planted ourselves in India, the Eastern Question, though it revolved round Constantinople, was in reality directed by considerations of the security of our Indian possessions." <sup>42</sup>

### **Influence in Asia**

Again he says, "Our influence in Asia would quickly disappear; we should not long retain the posts and coaling-stations which dot the ocean highways with the British flag; Australia would be much more open to attack." <sup>43</sup>



## India Means the Empire

"India has for long been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial defence, providing the British Government with a striking force always ready, of admirable efficiency, and assured valour." <sup>44</sup>

"The Empire was saved by an alternation of shifts and expedients, each of which just succeeded because of the deathless valour and devotion of the human beings who were associated with each endeavour." <sup>45</sup>

Without this help and sacrifices of India, the Empire would not have been ever built or created nor existed. England would have been a mere third-rate power, shred of all its glory.

There appears to be a misconception in the terms "National and Imperial" Defence. Its effect is deception, its result is heavy cost and bondage.

It is quite necessary to remember the exact difference between the expressions and terms of National and Imperial defence. It is also necessary to note how the Britishers manage to twist the term 'National Defence' into 'Imperial Defence'. *As a matter of fact National and Imperial Defence are quite different questions.* National defence means the local defence of the land or the country or other territorial acquisitions of that Nation by its own nationals only. The Britisher's out-look is quite one-sided, for his own ends and interests. He interpretes national defence as Imperial Defence. But when he talks to Indians, he says a different thing. He perhaps believes that his nation includes his possessions over the sea, especially India and Aden, although he does not include

Canada and Australia in that category. This one-sided interpretation of the word is greatly responsible for the unjust treatment which India is receiving, and it is only, therefore, that we are made to pay against our will, for the heavy cost of the Imperial Army—*viz.* the British troops in India—while the other Dominions of the Empire, such as Canada and Australia, have never paid nor pay the cost of the British Army.

The truth of the above statement could be seen from the fact that Britain maintained the British Army stationed in Canada, Australia and all Colonies and British possessions at the British Tax-payer's own cost. India alone was and is an exception. Not only did the Indian Tax-payer pay, and still pays, the heavy cost of British troops in India, such as payment for their services and necessities, but also in addition to that a number of fantastic and imaginary charges—such as that of capitation, non-effective's payments etc.—are also borne by the Indian tax-payer.

Why did England so long pay for the Canadian and Australian defence then? Canada and Australia ought to have maintained British armies for their own defence, at their own cost, just as India did and is still forced to do. The reasons of this different treatment to Canada and India will make us realise our position.

**Canada:**—The Canadian population could be divided mainly into the French Canadians and British Canadians. Canada has that 'racial rancour' problem; it has that clash of 'creed and culture;' there is the question of 'conflict of interests' and yet with all this they were supposed to be fit for self-government, and also fit to have their own Canadian Army. But India alone is stamped as unfit. The arguments of racial

rancour etc., are put forth in deciding India's same question of *self-government and a National or purely Indian Army*, when the same *factors* that existed in Canada did not affect in the least the settlement of the Canadian problem of Government *viz.*, its National Army, its Foreign Relations, and Finance.

The main reason for all this difference in the Canadian and Indian treatment is the fact that the population of Canada is more or less a British Majority. The Canadian population consists of various races and creeds, such as the Britons, the French, the Swiss, the Irish, the Germans, the Indians, the Italians and many others.

The population of Canada is about 97 lakhs. Stephens Kinghall gives it as 9½ millions *i. e.* about 92 lakhs out of which about 55, or more roughly 60 lakhs, is that of Britons *i. e.* about 55-60 per cent is the British population alone. The next rival race is the French, whose population is roughly about 25 to 28 lakhs and the remaining 15 to 18 lakhs is the population of all other nationalities mentioned above, such as the Swiss, the Germans, the Italians etc. The two main races then, the British and the French, are, 55 to 60 lakhs British and 25-28 lakhs French, *viz.* British roughly 55-60 per cent and the French about 25-28 per cent and the rest about 15 to 16 per cent.

The total Annual British emigration to Canada is about 1½ lakhs, out of which half a lakh and more alone is British. Every year then, the percentage of British nationality is greatly increasing. Therefore, for general purposes we can safely assume, that Canada is more British than Canadian and it is going to be entirely a part of Britain overseas, some years

after, due to the larger British emigration annually, as compared to the French, the Swiss, the Germans etc.

This is the fundamental difference in the treatment given to Canada and India, though both are member-nations of the Empire. Canada on account of its major British population can be relied upon and thus she is allowed to maintain her own Canadian Army. But India on account of that 'mistrust policy' due to the lame and false excuse of race and creed is not, and perhaps can never be, trusted with her own Indian Army, and, therefore, British troops are supposed and argued as necessary. But the Britisher does not openly say so; he naturally has to find out an excuse, which he advances 'as the land frontier' excuse and says that on account of 'the land Frontier' of India British troops are necessary for Imperial Defence, though the same are not necessary in case of Canada. This is the main difference between Canada and India; and this is responsible for the different treatment.

But unfortunately, Canada even has a land-frontier, and, therefore, that excuse also does not stand. In short on account of the difference in race of the Britons and Indians, and the mistrust policy, Indians would not be allowed to maintain their own National Army, while Canada being more British than Indian can certainly be allowed a Canadian Army.

The racio-credal problem and the language problem—the Britisher's argument in the case of India—are also the difficulties in that Dominion on account of the many races, creeds and languages in Canada.

Business of state is conducted both in French and English, but the Germans, the Swiss, the Indians and the Italians have not and could not have objected to the

procedure, as they were in a negligible minority, nor was the point pressed.

Every one of these races possess correctly or incorrectly their own 'sense of superiority,' howsoever they try to hide it. It refuses to be hidden. It finds expression in their deportment, talk, writings etc.

Outside Quebec the difficulties of the minorities could be seen specially in education. The French Canadians are even refused ordinary facilities and many difficulties are thrown in their way to give education to their children—of French extraction—in public schools in French through the medium of their vernacular.

The division of the Federal loaves and fishes is another source of inter-racial rivalries and quibbles.

Even in Canada then, there were and still are more difficulties and much hostile spirit bred by differences of race, creed, culture, intellectual outlook, languages, mistrust of each other, clash of economic interests, than even in India; but with all that Canada is a self-governed Dominion, even though all the Canadians are not a homogeneous race and people. (St. Nihalsing ).

It is because the greater part or majority of them are British Canadians that Canada was thought fit to have self-government. The British Army was maintained in Canada for a very long time at the British taxpayers' expense and cost. Excepting the other negligible minorities and the French Canadians, Canada was and is purely a British acquisition with British interest, due to its British (Canadian) majority. Therefore, Canada's Defence was in fact the Defence of the British acquisition of territory, and Canada's defence, on account of British interest and British majority, was in fact Britons', national defence or England's defence.

Britons not only, therefore, did not mind, but rather as a duty felt it necessary to maintain a British force there, as a counterpoise to the French Canadians. The same conditions and facts apply to all other British Dominions, acquisitions and colonies, with a British element and majority.

India's case is entirely different. Here the British element is a microscopic minority; in fact it may even be said that out of her vast population of 35 crores the British strength and population including British troops do not count more than 1 or 2 lakhs and besides they are not the nationals of India, as they are of Canada.

Racial love and spirit, culture, calibre, language, similarity of religion, intellectual outlook, and economic interests of the British Canadians are all one and the same in Canada and other Dominions, because of a British population majority but are diametrically opposite here in India. It was deemed, therefore, but quite necessary to use the British Army in India to maintain the Britisher's hold on India for British interest.

The British Government never asked Canadians to pay for the British troops, although large sums (coming from the pockets of the British tax-payer) were expended on British soldiers in Canada. Similar conditions and similar sequence of events followed in Australia, New Zealand and in South Africa, from which countries the last British troops were withdrawn about ten years ago. Sir George Aston says, "Reference to the records shows that in those days *Britain provided soldiers for local defence, and also paid local forces, such as the Canadian Rifles and the Cape Mounted Rifles, to defend their countries and to keep order therein.*"<sup>46</sup>

The above facts show how the defence of Canada, Australia, New Zealand is in fact Britain's National defence or in other words the so-called Imperial defence, only because of their common interest. The difference between India and Canada is that Canada etc., are a part of Britain on account of their British race and British nationality, whereas Indians are not and cannot be so, for the simple fact that India is a country of 35 crores of Indians composed of Hindus and Mahomedans and others—not Britishers. Therefore, India has had to pay for the British troops in India, and Canada had never to pay.

India, though unwilling, is yet compelled to pay the cost of maintaining an alien army not in her interest, but in Britains' interest, under the apparently reasonable excuse of Imperial Defence of the land-frontiers of India. Where does the Empire plea for India remain? In fact, we have to pay for our hangman's pay for the shot and shell that would wipe us off, the moment we show signs of getting out of that hold to guard and secure our Economic interests.

From the above it has been as clear as day-light, that the conditions governing the question of Canada or other British colonies in being member-nations of the Empire, is quite inapplicable to the conditions of India, because, what is ' Empire Defence ' to Canada, Australia or England, whose people come from the same British race and stock, possess the same British nationality, language, interest, pride etc., cannot be the same ' Empire Defence ' to India whose people are of quite a different race, stock creed, nationality, language, interests and pride.

**Another Misconception**—It has been usually stated that the so-called 'Naval Defence of India' is so generously undertaken by England. This also is not true.

Britain by giving the right of raising local Dominion Forces to Canada, Australia etc., excepting India, has not any way given anything to the dominions but in fact has gained and saved her own money and in addition at the same time, she has ensured the protection of her own British interests in Canada at Canada's cost and of the 'Empire Bogey' only, against any aggression of France or any other foreign power.

We will examine the situations under peace and war conditions, both in Canada and India.

We must assume, therefore, that both India and Canada are self-governing nations or dominions and then try to study the result. Again two different aspects have to be examined. Firstly, a self-governing dominion within the Empire with its own Local or National or Dominion army and, secondly, a self-governing dominion but with no National army but a Foreign Army of British troops.

Canada within the Empire with a national government and a National army, comprising of a majority of British Canadians, shall certainly, as a matter of course, be inclined to concede more facilities and privileges to England than to France (French Canadians being in a minority), in all questions affecting its trade, finance and foreign policy. The reason is that Canada, as a separate Canadian national government, has no possibility of any greater national interest being served by making favourable concessions to the French than to the British. The Canadians thus look to



the British *i. e.* to themselves to indirectly serve and help their own interests against that of any other, say French, German, Italian or Canadian citizens who are in the minority.

*Firstly*, if during peace, there is any problem affecting their own economic interest they may even be required to deny to the British (or England) any rights or help or co-operation mainly because it may affect their own *i. e.* British Canadians' personal economic interest. They would oppose and fight the British in such cases to their maximum capacity to the last. In this opposition they are sure to get the co-operation of all Canadians, whether Swiss, German, Irish, Italian, French or British.

*Secondly*, again when their own personal economic interests do not clash, and if a war is declared, the Canadian Government, on account of their racial interest and pride, shall decidedly and certainly side with England as an ally rather than with France, Germany, Italy, etc.

And all this is possible because of the same racial interests. The same is the case with other Dominions also to a lesser or greater extent, since the majority of the population of these colonies is of British race, creed, language, religion and traditions.

But India's case is quite different. India, unlike Canada, teeming in multi-millions of a purely Indian population and nationality whose races, religion, creed, language, culture and economic interests are all not only dissimilar to Britain, but diametrically opposite, cannot naturally see eye to eye with the British in all matters and questions of policies said to affect the interests of the so-called "Empire."

Let us, as before, divide the problem into two different phases. Problems that may arise in peace conditions and those that may arise only in the eventuality of war.

India, therefore, consistent with her interests, cannot conveniently and certainly lend herself as a party to any such Empire alliance, which will not allow her the opportunities to have her own interest safeguarded as well as she would otherwise do.

In a self-governing India, even within the Empire, the Indian Government and Indian army would have to be truly national and Indian, and not alien in spirit or its roll of action. In Canada the situation is different. Its national government (always composed of a majority of British Canadians) is not in reality Canadian, as no such separate race of Canada or Canadians does, in fact, exist, because the Government and the Dominion is constituted more or less of the towering majority of Britishers, and, therefore, the British element and consequently British interest alone is always more predominant. Here in India, the British element is and shall ever be absolutely non-existent as Britishers are not the nationals of India but of England.

In peace time India may be expected to face and solve different problems in the following manner.

*Firstly*, those problems where India's local and Indian or national interest suffers, she, like Canada, will oppose or refuse to help or co-operate with the Empire and if the need arises and if her interests are at stake and are in the balance, may even in all likelihood like Canada oppose Britain.

• *Secondly*, in peace-time, certain other Empire problems affecting generally every member of the Empire

group conjointly, may crop up. Then India, like Canada, may, for common interest, help and co-operate with Britain; thus satisfying and fulfilling her moral part of the duty which all member-nations of the Empire group owe to each other or the Empire.

If any problem arises that affects the economic or other interests of India or Canada then, as an individual member-nation of the Empire, India (or Canada) retains and reserves the natural territorial right of siding with a party (another member-nation), whether that party sides with the Empire or otherwise. A situation may arise and is not unlikely when Canada, India or any other member-nation of the 'Empire' may perhaps have to side with France, Italy, Germany, or America, though non-members of the Empire, or even against England or Canada or India or other individual member-nations of the Empire, only to preserve and guard their own local, national or territorial and economic interests. If this is carried too far, they may even have to help other nations—non-members of the Empire, or even nation-members of the Empire—in a war against England. The situation only depends, therefore, on the economic interests, local, national or territorial, of those respective units of the Empire. In short, when the interests do not clash, the units, individually or conjointly as member-nations may co-operate with the Empire, but where the interests clash, the units not only cease to co-operate, but even work against any member or members of the Empire.

This eventuality has already arisen before; it is not only an inference, but a fact. The case in point is the question between South Africa and India; both of them are the member-nations of the 'Empire group'. India's

*economic and political interests clashed and would still clash with the South African economic and political interests, and none agrees; and the so-called Empire or the remaining units of the 'Empire group' were not and are not able to interfere,—rather were not disposed to interfere. Why? Because, firstly, they may not choose to do it, and secondly, they cannot; simply because the question indirectly affects their own interests i. e., the British interests; the end-all and sum-all of all the energy, time and money, spent on those precious conferences and meetings was a perfect waste. None is the better and wiser for it still. But if India were a free power to manage her own foreign relations and affairs, perhaps she may have challenged this attitude of the South African or any other Government and might have decided the issues squarely, by having recourse even to force of arms, the last recourse in the hands of nations in settling questions of policy. When diplomacy fails the war element begins to peep in.*

### **South Africa, India and the Empire**

India, at present being handicapped by the fact that the British are more interested in South Africa for political reasons than in India, could not bring to bear her powers of persuasion, to effect a happy solution. Our spokesman Sir Tej Bahadur, though nominated, espoused the cause of the Indian nation very ably. But his powers of persuasion and argument, delivery though delightful and sweet, his arguments though impressive, convincing and reasonable, balanced and weighty, still fell flat against a pre-determined set of members of the conference, who were out to be deaf right through. None the less, it can certainly be said

to the credit of the representatives of other colonies excepting South Africa that they were at least admirably courteous and patient enough to hear our spokesman in full. It only displayed at the full, their mastery in polished, machiavelian standard, ways, and manner of conduct and speech. The South African delegate, General Smuts, the Prime Minister, in his speech at the very start summarily disposed of the very question which our representative Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru so ably briefed. General Smuts says :—"The proposal which has been made by Sir Tej Sapru, does not concern South Africa, and, therefore, I do not think it necessary for me to detain the conference at any length."<sup>47</sup>

"In South Africa undoubtedly, it has become worse (in the two years). That is due partly to the visit of Mr. Sastri, and his speeches in various parts of the Empire. That was one of the reasons why I thought it might not be wise for Mr. Sastri to come to South Africa."<sup>48</sup>

"It is a question not of colour but of economic competition."<sup>49</sup>

It is quite evident from the above reply given, and the attitude taken by the other colonies concerned, that such a situation may arise where a particular 'nation-member' on any excuse of economic interest can set at naught the unity or the Imperial unity bond and even go to the length of settling the whole affair by arms, if necessary. It is simply inevitable; and yet, the Empire—the remaining member-nations of the Empire group—may not be disposed either singly or conjointly to take any action one way or the other. This is also a fact and it has been fully established by the Imperial Conference of 1923 on the Indian question.

If only India were self-governed and if only she had control over her national and not 'mercenary' army, she would have certainly avenged the dishonour inflicted on her by a sister-nation of the Empire. But as she stands, she is simply helpless. Sheer diplomacy has never in the world's history solved such questions, avenged such dishonour and righted such wrongs. But.....?

As a matter of fact, the very fundamental basis on which the 'Empire' is built, is an assumption. The basis is quite shaky and contradictory and stands on no common grounds.

### **The Basis of the Empire**

The basis of the 'Empire' or 'federation of nations' is, to quote the Duke of Devonshire (the Secretary of State for the Colonies), the principle of British nationality. He says, "At the core lies the vital principle of *common British nationality...*" and then he follows, "*Imperial nationality is one and indivisible; local citizenship and the rights and privileges attached thereto may be diverse.*" <sup>53</sup>

The above division and interpretation will show that the essentials of the basic principle are most inconsistent.

The Empire idea is really helpful and advantageous, but only to those dominions, who have a British nationality and race.

It is rather inconvenient for India to be a member-nation of the Empire, as she cannot even fulfill the first fundamental and essential condition and qualification of having a British nationality, however she may wish to do it.

Because India whose *mother country* is not England but India herself, whose stock and origin is not British but Indian (mainly only Hindus and Mahomedans) whose religion is not Christianity but Hinduism or Islam and whose language is not English but Hindi, whose traditions and economic interests are also extremely varied, is not or could not be expected to be benefitted by playing the role of a member of the 'Empire' and as such her needs and wants affecting national and Imperial defences would conflict with each other, while that is not the case with other 'British majority' dominions like Canada, Australia, and others. India may not be able, therefore, to be a member, under certain conditions.

All the other dominions—partners in the 'Empire'—have British nationality-majority in their respective governments in power. It is quite easy to see from the above that their interests may be—nay are—identical to an extent and thus they may be able to play their expected and desired role of a partner in the 'Empire' i. e. the Empire policy-programme.

Defence means guarding one's Economic interest specially.

Therefore, if we really want to define National defence and Imperial defence, we cannot afford to forget the subtle differences of economic interests, that may arise in the case of each dominion, and these differences are the main factors in deciding them. An Empire defence plea and action may likely be obnoxious to the interests of some dominions or member-nations in some cases and on certain questions.

The difference is so subtle, and the line, if at all it could be drawn, is so fine between the two *viz.*

the National defence and Imperial defence, that the slightest mistake may result in danger to the one and gain to another.

It is obvious, therefore, that both National defence and Empire defence are, in fact, the same as far as England is concerned and so far as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other dominions of pure British nationality and element go. The defence of each is more or less the same on account of their common race, stock, origin, pride, interest, language etc. But India's case is quite dissimilar. It would be very difficult for her to be a member of the Empire, unless these racial differences which exist between the two nationalities—Britons and Indians—could be removed; but that seems to be very far off.

**Three Safe-guards:**—It is a grave injustice to India to be led by a string in the nose only forcibly and under pressure. It is certainly not the sign of her being an equal partner. That is what India today is with the three safeguards.

The three questions of Army, Finance and Foreign Relations do not affect England or even Canada. But they greatly affect only India.

So far as Imperial policy goes, the interests of England and Canada and other dominions, on account of British nationality and British interests, being invariably common, they do not mind if England leads their Imperial policy, provided their dominion finance and territorial economic interests do not suffer.

It is only in the case of India that the situation is absolutely different, as Indians have an Indian nationality and not the common British nationality, because of the fact that in a self-governing India, the Indian



Government may not be wholly British, but will be quite the contrary; it may consist of even purely Indian personnel and as such, unlike Canada, Australia etc. India has lesser chances to support that 'Empire policy' which may be against her own economic or national interests.

*The three important factors of Army, Finance and Foreign Relations, will greatly affect India, unlike Canada and Australia, in chalking out suitable and adequate policies, to guard her own national and economic interest.*

**Army Control:**—If a self-governing India, which at present exports only raw materials to other countries, were to develop her own resources, trade and industries, it would greatly affect England's trade and her *economic interests*. Her sources of profit and her labour conditions would naturally be crippled. This would create a very serious situation which cannot be thought of.

A self-governing India would always chalk out her own foreign policy regarding her import and export, her trade and commerce in general. This also would affect and clash with the so-called 'Empire policy.' In order to guard her interest, then, India must have the control of her Army.

**Control of British Troops** means the 'Army safe-guard.' It has been specially kept to secure the control of the Army and to deny the control of the Indian Army to Indians. The theory of the Army safe-guard is brought in, under the pretext that the British troops in India cannot conveniently be controlled by Indian officers; but this argument has no grounds at all, and does not stand because, if they

cannot be controlled by Indians, they should be replaced by Indians, who could be controlled by Indians.

The argument is made perhaps to misguide us or only to jumble and mix up the real issue with a view to keep it safe.

The Army control is the very basis and life of any constitution; without that nothing is achieved; all else that could be supposed as an achievement, is nothing better than shadow; or in other words, the Army control is the 'British troops counterpoise,' 'to keep the (national) Indian Army safe.'

A self-governing India without this Army safeguard would be able to maintain her own Army, at a much less cost and with greater efficiency. Thus she might raise herself financially, morally and nationally. With that gain she might start her industrial programme on a nation-wide scale, which would create a great economic and political revolution throughout the world, and all this means India's finance and Army control.

### **Imperial Partnership Costly**

The Army in India—the whole of the British and Indian army in India—and its administration is flooded with heavy and unnecessary items of expenditure. Just as an individual adjusts expenditure, so also is a public body or a Government supposed to adjust its expenditure according to its income. The British troops of the Indian army are maintained for purely Imperial purposes and not in the least for Indian purposes. Naturally, therefore, it would be quite just and appropriate that the expenditure incurred on that part of the Army should be borne by England and not by India. It has been even accepted that the cost of the Imperial

**Army in India should be met from the Imperial treasury and not from Indian funds.**

**Cost :—**It is an established principle that the cost of National defence must be adjusted to national means. Stephen Kinghall says, "It will not be denied that in every branch of defence the nation must cut its coat according to its cloth."<sup>51</sup>

### **India and the Empire**

Similarly the Imperial defence and the Empire league-scheme is only one-sided. Participation of India as a partner in the Empire league, under present circumstances and handicaps, is most dangerous to India and her economic interests, and, therefore, every Indian naturally dislikes the idea. We do not think that the idea of an Empire with all its one-sided implications and undertakings would be acceptable to Indians who have the best interest of their country at heart.

### **Empire and Dominion Problem**

There are certain difficulties which have to be faced separately by each member-nation of the Empire including England, besides the other problems which the Empire as a unit will have to face and solve, if the Empire object of 'World Peace' is to be carried through and realised.

### **General Difficulties of the 'Empire'**

*Economic rivalry, economic alliances, foreign rule, and its effects* are some of the few things which shall greatly influence the settling of the Empire policy. Again *equal rights, privileges and status* are some of the factors which would affect the whole question on which alone the satisfactory and desired results of the 'Empire' Policy mainly depend. Equal representation in the Imperial Councils is again a bone of contention, and a discor-

dant element; these and the like are in short the difficulties of the Empire and the dominions concerned. All these difficulties mean the economic interests of each dominion or partner in the Empire. If they are affected, it may even mean war. Empire, therefore, means an economic alliance, but if the economic interests are not identical the result is a clash and a war.

Ramsay MacDonald says "In this new diplomacy Great Britain will appear as a military power, and British interests will have to be defended by a British Army."<sup>52</sup>

"An economic war will follow.....Whether an economic alliance is good political business or not I do not discuss here. I believe it is a very bad political and military business. *Its difficulties have been shown in our own Empire, and they will not be minimized when foreign States come in. The economic market and the channels of economic exchange cannot be coerced to suit the conveniences of military plans or of political unions, except at heavy cost and with much irritation. Neither the dangers nor the practical problems of an economic war after the War have been worked out. We are acting on a mere aggressive emotion.*"<sup>53</sup>

On account of their common British nationality Canada and other Dominions may afford to be within the Empire, but India on account of her natural racial and other differences with Britain cannot conveniently do so. Because, as Kirby says, "Economic and political controversies are obviously accentuated by racial antagonism. Economic rivalry between citizens of different nations becomes far more explosive when conducted in the atmosphere of bitterness and enmity engendered by racial discrimination and exploitation. Racial egotism and racial vituperation...they reach wider

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dimensions. They tend to transform the units of combat into more and more titanic belligerents. That excessive racial pride and extreme racial contempt are commonplace, may easily be demonstrated by numerous citations." <sup>54</sup>

Besides the racial difference and the economic rivalries a third factor of 'fixed ideas of nationalism' also impedes the progress of the 'Empire' and its praiseworthy and noble object of 'World peace' is lost; that is the history of mankind.

Kirby says, "No, it is not economic competition by itself that leads to war between great powers, but economic competition *plus the passions and fixed ideas of nationalism*. Under the sway of nationalism, commercial quarrels between individuals are transformed into political controversies between governments." <sup>55</sup>

It will be seen from the above, how the economic factor, the important question of a nation would be a difficulty with the Empire and also the other dominions. Similarly it must have also been observed that economic rivalries between different nations, with different interests are bound to clash. Thus there exists a possibility of war between the different parts of the Empire having different interests and different ideas of nationalism. The member-nations of the Empire are no exception to this.

It is also seen that the Empire itself has got its own set of difficulties and problems, and as the Empire problems are England's problems, it is very difficult for other dominions to accommodate themselves with a view to arrive at a common accepted decision, because helping the Empire may mean helping England's interest alone, at the cost of their own interest.

Stephen Kinghall says, "This difficult task is made no easier by the fact that the Imperial Government has first to solve its own problem of looking upon itself as a unit, a fact which involves a compromise between the points of view of the Dominions and Great Britain."<sup>56</sup>

Therefore, it becomes a question of arbitration on honour and not on other trivial things. This is a dilemma. These ideas of honour do clash, and then honour is vindicated by having recourse to arms.

Ramsay Macdonald says, "We can arbitrate on non-essentials, but we cannot arbitrate on honour. Here is the dilemma. *Honour compels us to make war*; we make it successfully, and our military victory forces the other side, which of course cannot accept a defeat on a point of honour, to devise how to make another appeal to the sword. That is the *reductio ad absurdum* of war as an incident, as well as a determining factor, in national policy.

"That *reductio ad absurdum* is, however, accepted by the militarists as 'the inherent weakness of human nature;' but a weakness which is seen, exposed, and can be provided against is not 'inherent.'" <sup>57</sup>

Thus the Empire and the dominion problem becomes still more difficult. A few suggestions could still be made to tide over the acute corner. The means of solution suggested are—to remove inimical feeling and to help India in being contented.

Ramsay Macdonald, the Prime Minister, in his book *National Defence* says, "The ground we hold is that the problem of defence is not how to protect ourselves by force against enmity, but how to remove enmity."<sup>58</sup>

"The contented incorporation of India in the Empire depends upon her feeling that the Empire is impartial

as well as strong, and that she herself profits by the bargain.”<sup>59</sup>

The best way of doing it is to give financial and moral relief to India by replacing the British troops by Indian troops immediately and also the solution of the two other questions,—foreign relations and finance, which have an indirect bearing on the Army question.

Our R. T. C. Knights, although the whole ‘show’ of R. T. C. is now over, should remember what Field-Marshal Brownslow has said in 1908.

He says, “We may wrangle over policies, and experiment with systems, but whether the guardians of the frontier are to be tribesmen or Sepoys, the question will remain ‘Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes’, and to that the answer must always be—‘*The British Soldier*’.”<sup>60</sup> So far as the Army question is concerned, and so long as the ‘White Paper’ is not out, we for argument’s sake concede that England may even climb down and give up one of her principles, although it appears rather unlikely and presents very serious and grave doubts. The principle of maintenance of the British Army in India at India’s cost still exists. She may meet the Indian demand only a little, not very willingly though, and may even agree although most reluctantly to lessen the burden of the British troops’ cost on India by engaging herself to pay it for her; thus far only and not further. She may pay 30 or 32 crores or whatever the cost be of the British Army in India. But still she would insist and insist strongly on maintaining the British hold on India by maintaining the British troops even at her own cost.

We are inclined to believe that the British troops remain and will remain in the country. Even though we expect the above decision only, still something may turn

up in the near future though not immediately to-day, by which some change in the British views may be possible. It may be anything—when all sources are tapped, all ways and means tried, all resources utilised, and all power of argument and reason fails. Then, we have to depend on '*luck*'—perhaps the last thing to rely on—what the Mahomedans call '*takdir*', the Hindoos call '*nasib*', or some call '*providence*,' but which the Militarist interprets as '*chances of war*' and the Christian calls '*providence*.' We hope it will help India too.

Yet with all this, the saner-minded Englishmen and their counsels would still be expected to prevail, and without being too late we may yet be able to tide over a '*rotten corner*' at the present juncture. We appeal to the Englishman in the interest of humanity, on grounds of justice and equity and we hope that, misguided, misled and misinformed as he is, he should still know the truth about India, and then he will find out that justice is on the side of Indians. Thus perhaps he may be able to prove that the British statesmanship still remains.

Empire League's object is '*World peace*', but it is a delusion and a dream unless India's grievances are removed. The cause of all these difficulties of the problem is the most ambitious and unnatural effort of the Britisher to work out the '*Empire programme*' with a view to secure '*World peace*.' The programme and aims are certainly very laudable, praiseworthy, and philanthropic inasmuch as they aim at '*World peace*.' But think as one may, with all its noble aim, the constant factor of '*Human nature*' makes it appear only a pretentious and hypocritical programme. The economic interests of England—or as a matter of that



of any other country—would simply frustrate the noble ideal of 'World peace' plan, howsoever honest it may be.

The Britisher, it appears, is simply unmindful of the great factor of human nature and delights himself in living in a fool's paradise. Nationalist India is a powerful factor. The Britisher may laugh at it or may ignore it only when reason forsakes him, but if in his saner moments and in his innermost heart he were to ponder and look over the situation a little, we feel confident that he would not be so unwise as not to bend a little. We believe that he remembers that it is wisdom to give way to extra force, but a folly and suicide to oppose it.

We hope that the Britisher is guided by reason, and thus tries to help India and also himself by removing India's grievances. We again refer the Britisher to Lord Curzon, who says, "The contented incorporation of India in the Empire depends upon her feeling that the Empire is impartial as well as strong and that she herself profits by the bargain." <sup>61</sup>

In short, Indians in general feel with just pride what Sir Tej Bahadur expressed, "I can say with pride that it is my country that makes the Empire Imperial." <sup>62</sup>

Without India England is only a tenth-rate Power with crippled means, commerce and power. Lord Curzon has rightly said that "our colonies would cut themselves off from a dying trunk; and we should sink into a third-rate Power, an object of shame to ourselves and of derision to the rest of mankind." <sup>63</sup>

Colonel Buchanan in his note of dissent in Welby Commission report says, : "The military strength of India is the main factor in the strength of our Empire  
and the Empire is the main factor in the strength of India." <sup>64</sup>

Again he says, "In order to justify these charges, various (and sometimes conflicting) theories are brought forward of the supposed relation of India to the Home Government. Sometimes she is treated as an independent power, at other times as in a position of strict administrative and legislative dependence. Sometimes she is spoken of as a partner in a joint concern, at other times as a more or less unwilling purchaser in a limited market."

"The theory frequently put forward that the United Kingdom and India are 'partners having an equal interest in respect of a joint undertaking' appears to be untenable, and the arguments adduced by Lord Cromer (then Finance Minister) in his Despatch of March 2, 1883 ( Vol. II, App., pp. 365-6 ) unanswerable. 'The Indian authorities,' he says, 'are so far from having an equal voice in the decision on' such matters, that it may be said without exaggeration they have scarcely any 'voice at all.' The Indian Government, however strongly it may protest, must always in the end agree to the terms imposed on her. India is a dependency of the United Kingdom, and her government strictly dependent on that of the United Kingdom." <sup>65</sup>

These are the grievances of India.

Therefore, the legitimate and just grievances of Indian soldiers mentioned before in connection with the Army problem, at least the first difficulty should be immediately removed by replacing the British soldier by an Indian. This means that the direct safe-guard of 'Army control' and the indirect ones in the form of foreign relations and finance also should be immediately removed.

Then perhaps, India may be one with the Empire.

## CHAPTER V

### ARMY POLICY

The Defence of India is the concern of Indians alone. "It must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people, and not of the British Government alone." This was the conclusion arrived at by the Defence Sub-committee of the first Round Table Conference. If this be true, we have to prepare ourselves to shoulder our responsibility. Therefore, India must take her Defence question seriously. She must study the past and the present 'Army Policy' to enable her to spot the defects in that system with a view to remove them and thus improve.

The theory of maintaining the British troops in India is based on an assumption, which, on the very face of it, is most inconsistent and self-contradictory. The reason, which is given out to Indians *viz.* that of 'doing good to India', is merely the political way of expression. The truth behind it can only be seen when the above basis is analysed, examined and seen through. A policy was and is, therefore, adopted for the last 100 years and more which could only help to **hold down** the Indians by any means and methods of policy, consistent or inconsistent, moral or immoral, just or unjust. The means employed mattered not; but it is only the objective that mattered. That objective, namely 'to hold India by sword,' or 'ruling India with the British Army, is not for India's good, but for the Britisher's advantage, to keep in hand the field of

exploitation of India to solve Britain's problem of 'food and bread'.

'We conquered India by the sword, and by the sword will we maintain it' is one of the basic principles underlying the policy of keeping British Army in India. It is their boast. What a happy boast for the man in the Englishman!!

An analysis and examination of such fundamental principles on which the policy is chalked out, and so scrupulously and consistently followed and observed by a ruling race,—generation after generation—would certainly be most interesting, instructive, illuminating and thought-provoking. It cannot be denied that it will immensely help us to realise our difficulties and mistakes. It will clear our ignorance in many matters of vital importance to the country. It will cure our weak, *unhealthy and unsound* frame of mind and stir us in the right direction.

To sum up, I would expect that it would give us a definite objective, for which we will have to evolve a plan based on co-operation, cohesion, co-ordination of efforts, concentration of energy and strength, of our resources, our policy, our man-power—the intelligentsia—, our sacrificing spirit and other qualities equally necessary. These are some of the important and necessary factors expected to help us in our economic difficulties, advancement and progress.

I believe that every one deduces his own lessons. The one that I have learnt is, that man is a fighting animal by nature; and this will be clear enough from what Stephen Kinghall has to say. "A disarmament conference or, to be more exact, a conference to reduce armaments implies that there probably will be another

war and the business of the conference is that of arriving at an understanding, which will lessen the economic strain now endured by civilised men keeping themselves prepared for the next war." <sup>1a</sup>

Human nature to-day is what it was before; and it will continue to be so, till the deluge. You do not expect the whole world to be nothing but saints, howsoever you may wish it as an idealist. If wishes were horses, some of us only would be able to ride them. The instinct of self-preservation and self-interest is the inherent quality in man. He goes to any length, he takes recourse to any means—fair or foul, just or unjust, legal or illegal, moral or immoral—to get his object fulfilled and his 'interest' secured. As Sir Frederick Sykes once wrote, (in an article in the *Army Quarterly*, April 1926).—"Membership of the League of Nations does not change national interests, remove national interests or eliminate racial pride and traditions." Since it is so, there is neither reason nor propriety in expecting the Englishman, as a class or as a nation, to be a 'saintly' exception. He is *honest in his belief*, and there is no reason why Indians should not be *honest in theirs*, too.

The following extracts in this chapter have been taken from various reports of different committees that sat to work on the 'Army Problem' of India, and considered questions relating to its organization, administration, provisions and supplies, composition, recruiting, clothing, British soldier's recruitment for India, Army finance, non-effective charges, capitation and various other important questions.

Recommendations of British experts, both military and civil, were set at naught by Britain. The

experts have shown their angle of vision in their deliberations and also their opinions and policy, relating to the different personnel of the Indian Army, both British and Indian.

Besides the committees, certain other eminent statesmen and renowned British commanders of the Indian Army have been very frank and candid in their expressions and opinions in their volumes on the question of policy laid down for the Indian Army. Some of these extracts are given only to illustrate the spirit and the policy behind the administration of the Army affairs in India.

For the sake of convenience, I attach the extracts at the end of this chapter. I think it would be better, if every one deduces his own lessons therefrom. So that Indians may not miss the gist of the spirit and policy lurking behind the affairs of the Army, for whose maintenance they, as tax-payers, have to pay and that too so heavily; since the 'Army Budget is a NON-Votable item', It only means that you engage a servant—the Army—on payment, who instead of obeying you and serving your interests, may obey your proxy even if he wished to engage him against you and your interests, under his reason of 'internal defence.' If ever you think of discontinuing the proxy, the latter refuses to end the relation. I would advise every one, therefore, to study these facts and figures relating to the Army on which his—the tax-payer's—best money is most lavishly, extravagantly and uselessly spent; only because the Army budget is a non-votable item. It is only for the above reason, therefore, that he has no voice even to cry 'halt.' In fact, you engage a servant—the Army—you pay for the service

which is more for others' use viz., for the so-called Empire or the 'Imperial Defence' but certainly not for your country's 'defence.'

Some fourteen years back a mofussil friend of mine was asked by a German internee as to what use India made of the red earth that was found in abundance in the locality. "None" was the reply. The German twitted, "You certainly deserve to remain under foreign yoke." He was told in reply, "Yes, in a way that is true. But you would have spared us the taunt if you, Germans, had been under the British or any foreign rule only for 50 years instead of 150 years like us." The friend was right. *Foreign rule cuts at the very source of the life of a subject-nation. It is human nature that makes it so.*

A people wishing to dominate over another people will stick at nothing to acquire power, to consolidate it and to retain it. We see it done in America in the 17th century, and in Africa and Australia in 18th and 19th centuries respectively. We see it done over the world all along even to-day by Japan in the land of the Manchus. It is a greed of wealth and power, instinctive in the human nature that leads to acquisition, consolidation and retention of such domination by one people over another. It is this selfish motive that actuates them, however they may try to conceal it under high sounding names of 'humanising the world,' 'bringing under civilizing influence' the nook and corner of the world, and the like. Britishers like their European colleagues,—the Portugese, the Dutch, the French etc., came to India for acquisition of wealth; happened to acquire power also; have consolidated it in every way they could; and will not part with any the least of it,

unless they find it to be, in the long run, to their own advantage.

Indians need not complain about this which is the natural outcome of human nature. Every Indian ought to carefully study the Britishers' policy as regards the Army as well as the general administration with a cool head without allowing 'passion' to dominate 'reason', and see what can be done to achieve for India her proper position among the Nations in the world. Perhaps the recent Great War has really opened the eyes of the whole world and the Britishers also have come to realise that it was in their interest in the long run, to lead India to Swaraj. Let Indians hope so and also hope that the Britisher's talks of India's self-rule are sincere and not a mere eye-wash. But that should not prevent us from correctly and minutely studying the British policy followed so far, both in military and general matters.

The present brochure attempts such a study of that policy.....in military matters.

"Keep by sword what the sword has won," "Place no trust in the subject people," "*Divide and rule*," "Destroy the morale of the subject people and increase that of the ruling race," "Emasculate a subject people: physically, mentally, and morally that the domination and exploitation may last longer," such and the like are the lessons taught by the history of empires especially in Europe. And the Britishers seem to have most carefully and minutely mastered the teachings and used them with great tact and intelligence.

Up to 1857 the Britishers employed a large number of Indians and border tribesmen in the Army as mercenaries. The Indian Army numbered, at different times,



between 130 to 250 thousand; while the strength of the European element in the army numbered somewhere between 30 to 78 thousand. But the rising of the so-called 'mercenaries' (in 1857) made the Britishers very cautious and since then the ratio of the British to the Indian element in the Army has been one to two all along as against the old ratio of one to six or even one to seven, and it has not been lowered even in the most peaceful times.

**Training Denied to Indians:—**The Britishers decided that the artillery, which was the backbone of the Indian Army as of any other army, should consist of the British personnel only, both men and officers. On the N. W. F. and other frontiers alone, where artillery was most necessary and white soldiers could not bear the climate, the Britishers were compelled to enlist natives even in the artillery.

**Arms and Ammunition:—**Again such was the difference between the arms and weapons supplied to the British and the Indian artillery that the superior armed British soldier only equalled the inferior armed Indian soldier; the Indians received much less ammunition, and fewer opportunities to cultivate his skill as a gunner. Everything humanly possible was done to keep the Indian at a great disadvantage as compared with the Britisher. If, in spite of all this, the Indians proved better soldiers it was at least not the fault of the British policy.

**British Control:—**Again the Indian part of the Army has been under *exclusive British control*. Side by side, the public also *were totally disarmed*: holding merely swords or matchlock guns even for the purposes of the protection of crops or hunting purposes was disallowed.

**British Soldiers and Officers in Civil Departments:**—Again British soldiers and officers, whether with short or long service, whether retired or about to retire, were scattered in every branch of *Civil Departments*: Soldiers mainly as officers in the civil, as well as even clerks, store-keepers, supervisors, fitters, chequers and the like in the military departments. The officers were engaged as political officers, medical officers, engineers etc., thus adding to the number of the British element in the regular army indirectly.

**Auxiliary and the Territorials:**—An auxiliary force was raised by enrolling and training a large number of volunteers from about fifty thousand and odd Europeans,—whether British subjects or not,—as well as a large number of Anglo-Indians and Eurasians. They were armed with weapons equal to those of the British element in the Indian Army; besides this, they formed units in all the different and various arms,—such as the artillery *i. e.* R. F. A., R. H. A., heavy howitzers, pack, etc., whereas the small number of Indian territorials formed exclusively infantry battalions. No such voluntary army of other arms and services such as the artillery, cavalry, engineers etc., was and is raised from among the Indians. Thus the government could look to the retention of their power on the strength of the auxiliary force and the British element in the Army which together was almost equal in numbers to the Indian element in the Army and better equipped with superior arms of precision, larger and unstinted supply of ammunition and better training.

The Britisher did not trust so far even the ‘mercenary’ Indian element in the Army, although he tried to keep the ‘mercenary’ contented and loyal to him in

various ways. The Army of every country ought to be composed of its own nationals, without which no real defence of any country can be ever assured.

**Non-Indian Element :—**The British rulers of India have taken care to include in the Indian element of the Army in India as large a number of non-Indians such as the Afridis, Pathans, Wajirees, Baluchees and others as they could, apart from the non-Indian element of the costly British troops (see Simon Report for strength). In fact, every thing possible has been done so far to facilitate the retention of Britishers' authority by 'sword'.

**Mistrust Policy:—**The above policy of the Britisher clearly shows the 'mistrust' which a foreign government has for the nationals. But such a foreign government does not stop there. It tries to put down everything that is likely to help to make the people strong, and does many a thing which goes to emasculate them physically, mentally and morally. The alien British Government in India is no exception.

**Short-Service System—**In many countries, there is a short service system which enables those countries to train a very large number of their citizens as soldiers' so that in times of need they may form a trained army. The minimum service expected from a British soldier is 5 to 7 years with the colours and 7 to 5 with the reserves. An Indian soldier serves for that period and much longer before he can earn his pension. He, then, retires from service—another taking his place; but he is bound, however, as a reserve to return to service for a month or so in each year for the remaining number of years immediately following his retirement, and thereafter he is bound to serve only when called upon on special occasions such as war or so. In place of

one man, in the regular army many men undergo the training as soldiers in the Reserve and can serve the military needs of the country whenever required. This system of Reserve would have given India 10 to 12 times the number of trained soldiers at present serving in the Indian Army and at probably no appreciable increase in the present cost. But the Britishers fear that they are aliens in India and such a large number of trained Indian soldiers may rise against their rule. So the short-service system or a similar system of reserves or territorials is turned down by the Britishers as *unsuitable* to Indian conditions. The talk of necessity of British troops in India is the outcome of this very mistrust though various unreal and vague reasons have been trotted out, such as their being required for external defence which is said to be an 'Imperial concern.' Again the whole people were disarmed through fear lest they might rise again against the foreign rule. But it is alleged that this disarmament was *only for 'Internal defence'*.

### Divide and Rule

Again this very mistrust has led to the policy of "Divide and Rule." Various experiments have been made in the formation of different units of the Indian Army. At times the companies were composed of men of different races and creeds with preponderance of one race or another in each, but no one race was allowed to exceed in strength half the number of the company. At other times a company was made homogeneous but the regiments were formed of companies having men of different races and creeds. At still other times each presidency had its Army Command composed of the provincial men but divided into

heterogeneous formation of companies or regiments. Experiments were also made by transferring portions of a presidential command to another presidency. All these experiments have been made with the sole purpose of putting one race or creed against the other and 'setting soldiers of one province as against the others.' These experiments become necessary as there was difference of opinion, as regards the composition of the units and corps, among the distinguished army administrators themselves; some saying, for example, that the amalgamation of men of different races and creeds may ultimately end in the disappearance of their mutual jealousies and the object of the Britishers to profit by the mutual differences would be frustrated, while others held opinions the other way.

Apart from taking advantage of these racial and credal differences, the Britishers have also created a new division, for their own ends, of Indians into martial and non-martial races.

**Martial and Non-Martial Distinction:**—The Britishers wanted mercenary soldiers, probably such as would leave thinking to their masters and obey their orders like machines. So they hit upon classes which were hard pressed to earn their living and were least likely to think of anything beyond their personal interest.

These classes they dubbed as martial and others as non-martial by rotation. From time to time communities passed from one category to the other according to the sweet pleasure and needs of the British masters. The Britishers naturally excluded from the 'Martial' category such classes of people as were on an average competent to stand on equal terms with the British officers in the army. These Indian soldiers have

gradually come to form a class by themselves and consider themselves superior to their neighbours. They are in a way segregated from the rest of their nationals and are trained to think and act as their ruler-masters want them to do. No class of people has been included in the 'Martial' category that was not likely to accept easily the superiority of the Britishers themselves.

**Morale:**—Raising of the morale of the British officer and a British soldier as well, formed an important part of the Britisher's policy regarding the Indian Army. Higher pay, a number of unnecessary allowances, superior housing, superior clothing, superior arms, insolence tolerated, differentiation in every respect against an Indian—all these helped the 'colour' of the British soldier to impress the Indian soldier and the Indian public in general that a British Tommy was a superior being. This is the raising of the British Troop's morale which is already there by the fact that he is a member of the ruling race.

**Morale and Military Training:**—It was considered injudicious to instruct alike the British and Indian soldier, lest the Indian soldier may prove more competent and cease to feel the respect and awe in which he held his British comrade. Vocational training was and is given to every British soldier to the exclusion of his Indian colleague, that the former may look superior to the Indian eyes, and also serve the Empire immigration scheme.

**Association and Awe:**—The Indian and the British soldier were not even allowed to associate except in the field as it was but unavoidable, lest the Indian may cease to feel the respect and awe on seeing his British colleague drunk and disorderly. False

praises' were sung in and out of season of the high qualities, superior vigour, morale, intellect, physique, 'undoubted resources,' honesty, impartiality creating a sense of security by his very presence, while his Indian colleague was run down as a weakling, keeping himself in discipline through fear. "India as a nation is not martial," Indians are absolutely unfit for self-government, "Indian soldier is the physical power and European gentleman is the brain, and if the brain is healthy then alone it will render the physical power obedient and strong, only to do the brain's bidding," "Commissioned native officers are far inferior to British Corporals, Lances and Sergeants"—all such opinions have been spoken and written to bring about psychologically the effect of increasing the morale of the British and destroying that of the Indian soldier.

**Indianization:**—The Britisher may be laughing in his sleeves on finding these opinions repeated by some of our so-called Indian politicians parrot-like. But that has been the British policy. Just as general disarmament of the whole people has resulted in the emasculation of the Indian people, the faculty, education, want of opportunity in any vocation, suppression of noble instincts in the struggle for life and the like have led to the so-called mental and moral emasculation. The term 'emasculation' itself affects psychologically a good deal. It is likely to lead Indians to feel that they are 'emasculated' and they can recover with great difficulty. But that is really not the case. If the circumstances improve or rather if the difficulties are made to disappear the Indian will immediately regain his natural physique, his mental and moral vigour for which he has no proper opportunity and scope at present to express. We have all heard of the effects

of mesmerism. Similar is the effect of these talks of Britishers so often dinned into the Indian ears. Even some of the nationalist Indian leaders labour under such an effect. For instance, when they are told by the interested British Army experts that a number of Indian King's Commissioned Officers found themselves unable to continue and resigned during the last thirteen or fourteen years, these Indians believe them. They do not try to ascertain who those officers were, why they really resigned, how and why they were elected. It will be found that they were selected not by open competition but more by nomination because perhaps they were the sons of, or connected with some Chiefs or Zamindars or some Jo-hukumwallas, Ex-Indian officers of the so-called martial class. The same is the case in the civil administration. Under the selection system, persons of mercenary mentality with average abilities are preferred to those with greater abilities but with independent mentality.

The Britishers' policy so far has been to oppose the Indianization of the Army in India. It is interesting to follow, how the question of Indianization was handled by the Britishers and Indian leaders also. Properly speaking Indianization is the replacement of the British element—both soldiers and officers. But the Britishers talk only of the replacement of British officers of the Indian regiments when they talk of Indianization, and the British soldiers' question is left out.

Field-Marshal Rawlinson's (and MacMunn) Committee gave out a scheme of complete Indianization of officers within 28 years. But as this report went against the interest of the Britishers it was suppressed. It was not made public and was not even shown to anybody.



Their own experts like Field-Marshal Rawlinson and General MacMunn were run down because the diehard class of Britishers, on account of their interest, believed that these honest people were stupidly honest and they did not understand the 'interests' of the 'Britishers.'

Thus, this 28 years' scheme was shelved.

The Skeene Committee in 1926-27 evolved a scheme to effect a partial Indianization in about 25 years—because the Skeene Committee Report of 1927 says, "By 1952 half the total cadre of officers in the Indian Army are Indians (Report page 24)—by establishing an Army College in India for admission of an adequate number of cadets every year. This also was turned down. Again when the question came before the Round Table Conference, 1930-31, the Government of India hastily appointed the Chetwood Committee (Sandhurst Committee) instead of appointing a Defence Committee first, as suggested by the 1st R. T. C., which hastened to evolve a scheme to train only 60 cadets in an Army College in India, each cadet undergoing training for 3 years instead of 18 months' training in an Army College in England; and out of these cadets about 20 are to be taken from the Indian States and about 30 were to be selected from the ranks in the units, leaving in fact very few cadetships open for competition on merits. The Indian personnel who were on the Committee have practically acquiesced in the majority scheme excepting Dr. Moonje, Sir Shivswamy Iyer and General Rajwade. This scheme of Indianization is only for one division *i. e.* one-eighth of the Indian Army. So the British policy has manipulated the question of Indianization in a way that suited their own policy laid down so far.

**Reduction of Indian Army:—**When Indians demand the reduction of army expenditure, they naturally mean reduction of the excessive expenditure on the British units and personnel of the Indian Army. But reduction is made in the Indian units and personnel instead of the British part of the Indian Army. We read that some of the Indian units are disbanded from time to time. This is just the opposite of what the Indians really demanded. This is a fresh example of how the Government carries its policy of maintaining British troops, when as a matter of fact, as has already been proved, they are quite unnecessary.

This Britishers' policy regarding the Indian Army has its peculiar financial aspect. Want of money will never deter the Britisher from carrying out his (England's) army policy in India.

A number of extracts have been quoted below to bear out the above points of the Britisher's Army policy in India. It is hoped that the reader will find them interesting. The policy is the outcome of the Britisher's mentality till now, towards the idea of self-governing India. If that mentality has really changed, as the British statesmen assert, their above policy with regard to the Indian Army also is bound to change. Indians have to wait, see and judge the sincerity or otherwise of the British intentions towards Indian Swaraj. Let us hope the sincerity is proved in spite of the adverse indications and the blunt and undiplomatic expressions and talk of responsible Britishers.

Lord Elphinstone says, "Our safety consists in forming our regiments of the most discordant materials." ..... "Divide et Impera was old Roman motto, and it should be ours." <sup>1</sup>

General Mansfield says, "The motto of the regimental Commander, and, therefore, of the Commander-in-Chief must be for the future 'Divide et Impera'." <sup>2</sup>

Colonel Durand says, "Divide et Impera should be the principle of Indian 'Government'." <sup>3</sup>

"It will naturally be asked why the numbers employed in England are so much larger than those employed by continental powers; and the answer is to be found in the fact that the whole military administration of this country has been *organised upon a system of want of trust*, which has created double establishments for the transaction of the same business."

"We are satisfied that the effect of the present system has been unsatisfactory, whether regarded from an economical or from an administrative point of view." <sup>4</sup>

Sir P. Grant says, "I am of opinion that there is in the heart of every black man, an inherent dislike of the white man, which will always lead him to sympathise with those of his own colour, however they may differ in race, creed or country."

"To provide effectually for the safety of our Indian Empire, never let us have less than the proportion of our own countrymen indicated in my replies to Questions 7 and 8." <sup>5</sup>

"(Major-General Hancock)—You stated yesterday, I think, that in your opinion it would be advisable to divide the Bengal native army into two; upon what ground do you rest that opinion ?

"Upon the ground which I hold, and which a good many others hold, that in future it would be very desirable and necessary to keep the presidential armies

separate; so likewise with that great army which belongs to the Bengal Presidency. That presidency may be divided into two or three great areas, in which the people are very distinct, and in which there is a very considerable degree of that sort of *jealousy and animosity* which always exist between conterminous people. It is advisable for us to take advantage of that sort of feelings.”<sup>6</sup>

“It has always been maintained that *for high political reasons*, ..... it is necessary to *keep the armies of India distinct* in race and creed; and I am not aware that of late years any sufficient reason has been brought forward to weaken this conviction.”<sup>7</sup>

“In arranging our peace garrisons, His Excellency ...is strongly of opinion that both for political and military reasons our three Native Armies should be kept distinct.”<sup>8</sup>

There is one point that should never be lost sight of, *viz., the relative proportion of British to native infantry*; this should not be allowed to remain below the established scale, *i. e.*, one-third of the former to two-thirds of the latter;.....”<sup>9</sup>

“Whatever may be the appellation of the several divisions of the one army, each army corps should be territorial and localized.....so as to *keep the several armies distinct in race, religion, and language*, but so organized that every army may be in a state of thorough efficiency and readiness for action in any direction in which the army of India may be called upon to undertake separate or combined operations under the one Commander-in-Chief of the Army of India.”<sup>10</sup>

“I think a close and intimate association of natives with the European soldiery, except in the field, should

be avoided as much as possible; the closer the association with the lower class of our countrymen, the less *respect* is inspired by the latter; the closer the association with officers and educated Englishmen, on the contrary, greater is the *respect* secured. I am of opinion with the Governor-General, that all the native artillery of the Bengal Army should be abolished, with the exception of the few guns required at certain frontier posts, and in positions where Europeans could not live." <sup>11</sup>

".....India's *reserve* should be found in the separate and distinct armies of the several presidencies, so that, from whichever side the danger threatens, and whether it threatens from the insubordination of one of its mercenary armies, or from the exuberant growth of the armies of the native independent States, or from external and foreign enemies, the neighbouring army corps of a different race and religion can at once be called upon to support the Empress' supremacy, and form a reserve to the troops engaged, far better than that which, of necessity, must be hastily summoned from a state of semi-pastoral existence..... the Southern Mahrattas have proved themselves in former days, and are still, equal to any other race in India as a fighting people. Their *power has been broken and their military ardour quenched by an almost total disarmament*, but they are still a hardy people, in a mountainous district, innured to toil, and especially *good at tracing* their steps over the rough and impracticable ghats. *What more can be required to make soldiers ?*" <sup>12</sup>

"It may be here remarked that it does not appear to be judicious to introduce to the knowledge and practice of our Native Indian soldiery, all the scientific and professional improvements of European armies.

These we should use and employ to maintain, in the hands of our national troops, our national superiority." <sup>13</sup>

"But we feel that any such change would seriously disturb the military system of the parent country, and would deprive a great part of the British Army of the valuable training which Indian service now furnishes." <sup>14</sup>

"While, therefore, we concur in the conclusions which were arrived at by the Parliamentary Commission to maintain a local European Army for India, we think that the portion of the army employed in this country should be organized and administered with due regard to the interests of the people of India, and not for the purpose of supplying defects in the system of home defence, and, above all, that it should not be made the means of obtaining, at the cost of India, advantages for the army at home which do not directly affect the interests of this ..... ." <sup>15</sup>

"If this principle be not recognised and enforced in a liberal and even generous spirit it is possible that the advantages which India may hope to derive from the present system may be too dearly purchased and may become a burden which the country will be unable to bear." <sup>16</sup>

"The Committee wish the peculiarly responsible position of Her Majesty's Viceroy in India to be prominently borne in mind. The normal condition of our rule in that country is and must remain that of millions of Asiatics controlled by a small force at the disposal of one will—the will of Her Majesty's Viceroy. In times of danger to that distant Empire it is impossible to predict how much may hang upon the ability, the energy, the authority, and the influence of the Governor General." <sup>17</sup>

We still also require the most expensive thing in Britain next to men, *ground*, that shall enable us properly to *manoeuvre and to train*, and for war ground and that shall make us an effective army organically kept together in the parts and in the functions that will be required."<sup>17a</sup>

"Profiting by the experience of the last year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of native to those of European gunners. The value of artillery is perhaps greater in Asia than in any other part in the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and for that reason become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian gunner. A small European force with a powerful artillery should be irresistible, and *no mutiny of a native army without guns could hope to be successful*. Many officers would, for these reasons, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives, but in practice, it is not expedient to go to this extreme."<sup>18</sup>

"Question :—*How should the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force be armed ?*

Answer :—The frontier and hill regiments should all have light two-grooved rifles, so as to be superior to the mountain tribes, *but inferior to our own European troops*, who should, of course, always have the most effective weapon known. The regiments in the interior of the Punjab should have a light musket and bayonet."<sup>19</sup>

"The rule should be to have as few native artillery as possible and in those few *to secure as many native Christians and low caste natives*, as can be got. It is true that the native Christians would be liable to be

overpowered in a mutiny, but their destruction would leave the guns unmanned.”<sup>20</sup>

“ Britain should follow this example, and teach the English language throughout her Indian empire. The maintenance of that awe of *European troops which is an element of strength*, can only be upheld hereafter by having everywhere a sufficient European force ready and armed with authority, to put down at once any rising either of the native army or of the native population.”<sup>22</sup>

The purpose for which the army of India must be maintained may be stated to be :—

(1) Preventing or repelling attacks or threatened aggressions, from foreign enemies beyond our border;

(2) Making unsuccessful armed disturbancy or rebellion with British India, or its feudatory states impossible;

(3) ‘.....Watching and overawing the armies of feudatory native states.’<sup>22</sup>

“ The development of volunteer movement cannot, I fear, be arrived at by any further appeal to the military or patriotic feelings of the European and Eurasian population, but must be obtained by an expenditure of state funds. It must be remembered that the adoption of compulsory enrolment would entail, as a matter of course, the payment of the men while undergoing training, .....There are a certain number of Europeans and a much larger number of Eurasians, in poor circumstances who would be attracted to the volunteer force if they are guaranteed against all expense, and could obtain some *small pecuniary benefit* from their connection with it.”<sup>23</sup>



**"As we cannot do without a large Native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe."** <sup>24</sup>

**Martial, Non-martial:—**These invidious distinctions have been made by the Britisher, to suit his policy of disarming India and holding her with the sword. In India every Indian is a fighter though great pains were being taken to demartialize him. Japan's illustration is a point to understand the present distinction of martial and non-martial in India.

Captain Kennedy in his book *Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence* expresses:—"A great outcry was raised as the Samurai class who had hitherto held the monopoly in the supply of men and officers for Military service, considered it an infringement of their exclusive privilege, but that it was impossible to make soldiers out of ordinary civilians. Their gloomy forebodings with regard to the latter point, however, proved unfounded, and practical proof was soon forthcoming, that scientifically trained conscripts were more than a match for the ill-trained warriors of the Samurai class.

In making conscription apply to all classes of the people it is probable that the authorities had a political as well as a military object in view. For had it been confined to men of Samurai birth, as many contended that it should be, the old class distinction, which for social and political reasons the government was so anxious to abolish, would have been perpetuated."

If only the distinction of martial-non-martial, which is only a political necessity to a Britisher, be removed India would possess, as Meredith Townsend says, "A force with which, not only Asia, but the world might be subdued." <sup>25</sup>

## Short Service

"It would be politically inadvisable to adopt for India the short-service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the army, returned into the general population, and are kept by periodical training in a state of military efficiency." <sup>26</sup>

It is evident that the responsible Indian authorities have to approach this question from an entirely different point of view. A reserve of British troops available for service in India would, no doubt, be very useful but the Indian government cannot look upon its peace establishment mainly in the light of a school or training ground for the reserve. On the contrary, the first and most important feature in any military organisation suitable to the wants of India is that a relatively high peace establishment should be maintained in order to preserve internal order. We are unwilling to use the commonplace argument that India is held by the sword, because **although it is true**, we do not consider it as the whole truth; and, moreover, we disagree with many of the conclusions which are frequently drawn from this argument. There can, however, be no doubt that British rule in India rests on force, moral and physical, and as an inevitable consequence of this condition of things, such a question as that of short service in the Army with the attendant issue involved in the constitution of a reserve must be approached, when considering Indian requirements, from a point of view wholly different from that which would be adopted in considering the requirements of England. Under these circumstances, we do not see how **any partnership, properly so called, is possible.**" <sup>27</sup>

“There can be little doubt that the maintenance of army reserves in India would greatly increase the offensive and defensive power of the Indian Army. At the same time it must be remembered that our native army is a mercenary force, serving an alien government. Even if it were desirable it would not be possible to impose compulsory service in the army of reserve on any large section of the population.”<sup>28</sup>

“At the same time we recognise a distinct political danger in any indefinite increase of the number of trained soldiers passed annually into the population of India. We consider, however, that the provision of efficient reserves can well be combined with some revision of the pension rules.”<sup>29</sup>

“To create a reserve of the kind would, in my opinion, be to add to the insecurity of our position in India. Being opposed to a reserve on political grounds, I need not reply to the first portion of the question. I have already advocated the increase of the establishment of battalions of infantry from 600 to 800, with a corresponding decrease in the number of battalions.”<sup>30</sup>

### Finance

“It is, therefore, to the army of India we must look for the means we possess, not only of maintaining our power, but of preserving the great benefits we have already conferred, or may hereafter confer, upon the millions subject to our authority. No considerations, therefore, should ever induce us to forget for one moment the paramount and vital importance of our military power.”<sup>31</sup>

“But we feel that any such change would seriously disturb the military system of the parent country,

and would deprive a great part of the British Army of the valuable training which Indian service now furnishes." <sup>32</sup>

Looking at past history and the above quotations emanating from such high personages as Commander-in-Chiefs, Governors and Governor-Generals, we shall see that the policy of the Government of India was to keep India at the point of the bayonet. Any other country in the world but India would have given a fitting reply to such an openly avowed policy. It is instructive, however, to note how the Britisher expresses his views when talking in confidence. The above quotations in the chapter would disillusion any one, who, in his supreme folly, takes comfort in keeping faith in the Britisher or in his words which he uses as a softening cover to his inner inclinations and actual execution of them. No politician can afford to be blind to these facts, after he knows them.



PART II

**REPLACEMENT PLEA**



## CHAPTER VI

### PHYSICAL INEFFICIENCY

#### (Of the British Soldier)

This part is divided into three chapters for the sake of convenience. Herein we deal with the arguments in support of the need of replacement of the British soldiers in the Indian Army by Indians. We consider the arguments based on the physical and military inefficiency of British soldiers in chapters VI and VII. In chapter VIII we look at the question from the view-point of the huge Army cost which the British soldier in India entails.

The experience of the last 150 years is that the Indian climate is not agreeable to the British soldier. He cannot maintain his physique and health owing to the difference in the climatic conditions of England and India. Neither is there any chance of his being ever acclimatized to this climate. This has been observed so long, that now it does not require any more and further experiments to establish it.

The Britisher has even attempted to combat nature and natural conditions with a view to get the British soldier acclimatized to this country and climate. He has spared no pains nor money. But he has failed. The only point worth noting is that in all his attempts to keep up and maintain the British soldier's health in Indian climate and under Indian conditions, it was India's best money that he spent and still spends; the British soldier is maintained here not for the 'Defence of India',—either internal or external—as is



usually given out but for the Defence of the Empire, (*i. e.* England's defence itself)—in order that, the Britisher may guard his economic interest, which can only be done,—as is owned by him when he speaks in confidence—by 'holding India by sword.'

We shall see, why and how the British soldier cannot and is not physically fit in this climate. It is on this quality alone that his military effectiveness depends. And if he proves himself a military non-effective, then it only means that all the huge and best money spent on him is uselessly spent with no material and substantial advantage to India. In fact it may positively be proved that the cost incurred on his maintenance is an unproductive, unnecessary expenditure and a burden at the cost of India's advancement and progress. India cannot make any progress in other nation-building departments only because she has no finance for the same, as this large portion of the revenue is expended on these British troops alone. Even without these British troops, Indians\* can defend their country most economically—consistent with adequate efficiency and at a comparatively less cost.

The British Medical Department that is responsible to look after and maintain the physical condition of the British troops, in order to keep them always ready for war, has a very deplorable and discouraging report to make. Besides, the people of the country have to suffer and pay for the tremendous cost of the British troops' medical arrangements.

So far as health and physique go, we cannot find a more authoritative report than that of the best British medical men from England—brought to India specially to look after and guard the health of the

The question of physical efficiency of the British soldiers from the military point of view, has also to be considered along with the 'Morale' point of view, because these two important factors are very closely related and interdependent.

Napoleon has said that physique to morale is 1 to 3.

In order to balance the physical capacity the moral factor has also to be thought over and this means the factors of awe, prestige, respect, association and allied questions.

Similarly a few reports of the British commanders who led and commanded the British troops in India are also very valuable in giving an idea as to the condition of the health and consequential physical and military non-effectiveness of the British soldier of the Indian Army. We shall see some opinions and remarks of prominent British commanders like General Birch,—Secretary to the Government of India,—and other high Medical officers and others about the British soldier's physique and fitness.

Major-General Birch says, "These (Indian drivers—combatants—of batteries) appear necessary. They will help to do various duties which Europeans in this climate cannot perform." <sup>1</sup>

Sir John Strachy in his book '*India, its Administration and Progress*,' says, "They live in barracks, which in comfort and in all sanitary conditions except climate probably surpass any that can be found in another country. Every regiment, battery and depot has in its regimental institute a sort of reading and recreation room, and temperance associations." <sup>2</sup>

Again he says, "The army has had to produce its own milk and butter as there is no dairy trade that

produces butter and milk fit for Europeans on any scale at all." <sup>3</sup>

Dr. Surgeon-General Gibbons of British Force says, "...Hill stations fall very short in accomplishing all the good we should reasonably expect from them, if constituted and administered more as healthy schools of discipline and exercise than as ideal lounges for undisciplined boys and weakly, and I am afraid often lazy, soldiers. Card-playing is rife at hill stations; and when any *voluntary exercise* is taken, it is *too often in the pursuit of liquor*, about the khuds and secluded places." <sup>4</sup>

Dr. Surgeon-General Hewlett says, "Poona is considered one of our healthiest stations; and yet in it a British regiment lately arrived from home had 2279 'ineffectives through sickness.'" <sup>5</sup>

Surgeon-General Gordon, Principal Medical Officer of British Forces, Madras, says, "A large portion of young lads, such as now arrive in India are *physically unequal to the strain of active service*, and, consequently, while they continue so, are not only useless, but receive pay for work that they do not and cannot perform." <sup>6</sup>

Lord Ellenborough answered, "As sappers and miners are mostly at work at night, perhaps Europeans may be available to some extent; but obviously the natives must be more essential in this line than in any other, as hard work in the sun for many days together would prostrate the European." <sup>7</sup>

Brigadier Jacob says, "The whole of the artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and batteries, formed for special service in particular localities where European troops could not live, such as this frontier of Scinde." <sup>8</sup>

Sir T. Lawrence says, "Here, in the first place, a mountain-train is necessary, and an European mountain train in India is an anomaly. *The men (British soldiers) are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved; and they require an amount of carriage and supplies which render prompt or rapid movement impossible.*"<sup>9</sup>

Lord Clyde says, "These Indians appear necessary. They will help to do various duties which Europeans in this climate cannot perform."<sup>10</sup>

"It is indispensable, when our gunners are Europeans, that they shall be escorted by Europeans of the other arms. But I conceive that it will be necessary to keep up native drivers on the old footing. They will be required to do work that the Europeans cannot stand in this climate, and I think they would be powerless for mischief in the presence of the European, gunners."<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Freer says, "But the proportion would vary in the different arms. In the artillery, the backbone of the army, the advantage of having Europeans is from the paramount value and importance of the arm, the great utility of individual muscular power and many other reasons, comparatively greater and the drawbacks fewer, than in other arms and, therefore, in the Artillery Europeans should so far preponderate that there should always be at least sufficient to work every gun, save in very rare exceptional cases where (as on Sind frontier) it is altogether impossible to keep Europeans permanently stationed."<sup>12</sup>

Another set of reasons for Physical Inefficiency:—

The Adjutant General's letter of June 1905 says, "His Excellency (Lord Kitchner) directs me to observe

that he considers that *public opinion was quite justified in condemning a system under which prostitutes were maintained by Government for the use of the soldiers.*"<sup>13</sup> (of course for British soldiers).

"I specially commend the British troops in this country for the whole-hearted support they have given me in *my efforts to increase their physical efficiency, and to reduce preventable disease.*"<sup>14</sup>

"The soldier, for his first year in India, should be located in *as healthy a station as possible.*"<sup>15</sup>

"Many such have to be sent to hill stations, there to pass one or more years, that is, to all intents and purposes, to be *retained in nurseries until their physique develops sufficiently* to admit of their performing duties for which during the interval they have drawn pay."<sup>16</sup>

Surgeon-Major T. G. Hewlett, acting Deputy Surgeon-General, Sind Division, says, "Hill stations are invaluable for preservation of health. *Stations like Peshawar are most injurious to health;* and soldiers who have been quartered in them for any length of time are quite unfitted for taking the field. Their health becomes much impaired and they are liable to attacks of fever and other diseases from exposure. *Their physical powers are reduced.*"<sup>17</sup>

"The proper course to adopt is to send every British regiment on first landing in the country to the hills, and to keep it there in climates especially adapted to the European constitution, and only to allow it to come down into the plains when wanted."<sup>18</sup>

"The benefits of hill stations may be summed up under three heads: first, they confer a higher standard of health and strength on the young soldier, in addition of diminishing, if not averting, diseases incidental to

service in the plains, the debilitating effects of extreme heat, and the removal from the sources of fever; second, they benefit the older and more acclimatized soldier in the same direction; and third, regarded as sanatoria for invalids. In this respect the benefits are more limited." <sup>19</sup>

"With special reference to India, I would repeat what has already been observed in regard to non-efficiency occurring among troops beyond what is indicated by mere statistics of sickness, mortality, and invaliding. The circumstance is well known to officers of experience, and has been demonstrated in actual war, that young soldiers and those in their earlier years of residence in the country *are less able to bear up against the fatigues incidental to long marches and exposure than are the older men and those of longer residence.*" <sup>20</sup>

"We learn, then, that during this period of three years, the ratio of deaths per 1000 mean strength was 23·92, of invaliding 19·80, making a *total rate of non-efficiency equal to 43·72.*

"Amateur sanitary reformers, as they call themselves, were jubilant; hopes were expressed with a flourish that the ratio of non-efficiency was about to be reduced to a normal rate of 20 per 1,000.

"In this period, then, we learn that the rate of mortality was 22·3 (per mille,) of invaliding 46·11 or equal to a **total rate of non-efficiency of 68·41 per 1000** as against 66·40 in the period for 1815 to 17. The result seems to me humiliating. I naturally ask to myself: Whence comes the cause or causes of this neutralization of all the measures of hygiene that have at vast expense been brought into operation? And can only reply: To shortened periods of service in India and the constant

influx into the country of young men that thus becomes necessary. That a similar explanation is virtually accepted as correct and acted upon is, I venture to submit, shown to be the case by the very advocacy now so general of sending young soldiers to hill stations, in order that *for a time they may be there nurtured in the hope of some day becoming fit for military service*, for which, be it observed, they are engaged *and paid* during the very considerable time; in any instances they are, as it were, *in those nurseries*. " <sup>21</sup>

The above remarks at once reveal to us that the British soldier is quite unfit for work in the Indian climate. He is even physically unfit. He gets fatigued very soon. He cannot work for a long time. The heat of the sun is unbearable to him, he is prostrate before the sun. Calling themselves as military men they ought to have been able to suffer any kind of hardships. But how can they do so? They are physically unfit for any military work. All sorts of comforts and luxuries have to be provided for them, still they are of no avail. The Indian soldier, even though he is much less cared for than the British soldier is far superior to a British one. If one cares to see on the one hand the barracks that are built for Europeans and then on the other hand the barracks built for Indian soldiers, one will easily note the tremendous difference between the two. The barracks provided for European soldiers are far superior to the barracks for Indian soldiers. One will be more astonished and shocked to find that even such being the case and even though the British soldier is more cared for than an Indian one, in every respect—the place of residence, comforts, medical treatment, sanitary arrangement, wages etc., still the percentage of sickness in the case of British soldiers is far greater than that in

the case of Indians. The British army officers even are of opinion that British soldiers are unfit for Indian climate.

Yes, the theory of maintaining a 'white soldier' of the "ruling Nationality and class" is maintained and, therefore, is certainly worth taking into consideration, strategically and politically; so far as it is expected to create and inspire awe in the people of the country by the very presence and existence of the alien British soldier; besides the British troops are kept in India for "watching and overawing the armies of feudatory chiefs." <sup>22</sup>

But closer *association* of the Indian soldiers with the British soldiers during this Great War and the latter's contact with the civil population during the last 100 years has diminished the effect of 'Moral Fear' to such an extent, that to all practical purposes it could be assumed that the supposed 'Moral Fear' created in the minds of Indians in general does not exist to-day to any appreciable extent. Consequently the theory of maintaining the 'White Soldiers' for the effect of 'Moral Fear' also falls flat to the ground, as it does not secure to our rulers the same political advantages to-day as it once did.

This effect of 'moral fear' is a great point and one of the chief factors which a nation has to take seriously into consideration when the question of the strength of the army has to be solved. It is clearly seen in the solution which the Army Head-Quarters, Simla, has arrived at by Army organization of India. The solution is this:—To produce a certain resultant of moral fear, the strength of the British troops required will vary inversely as the prestige they command.



To increase this prestige, the British troops have to be barracked in separate quarters (from the Indian soldiers). If the prestige be increasing, the number of the British troops may decrease and *vice versa*.

Major-General Birch, Military Secretary, Govt. of India, says:—"The nearer the association such as is involved in the proposed system, the greater the detriment, in my opinion, to the prestige of the European Soldiery." <sup>23</sup>

General Sir Patrick Grant says:—"My opinion is strongly adverse to the permanent association in quarters of Natives with Europeans proposed in this question. Mixing Europeans and natives in just proportions on field service is very advisable and advantageous to both; but I think it most undesirable that the native soldier should have the opportunities which close and permanent association would give to him of seeing the European soldier in the degrading position and state in which, unhappily, the latter too often exhibits himself in the quarters." <sup>24</sup>

General Sir Henry Somerset says:—"I am averse to mixing Europeans with natives in any way. The European barracks should be entirely separate from the other lines."

The above extracts clearly indicate the amount of precautionary measures taken by the Military authorities in separating the quartering of British and Indian troops in cantonments, howsoever costly and undesirable the arrangement may be.

It is mainly designed to achieve other ends, that is, maintaining that "awe and moral fear" which is such an essential factor in compensating for the small strength of the Alien British troops. If the Indian troops were to see the British soldiers in the degrading position and

condition as is stated above, then it is but evident that the Indian soldier will hold the British soldier in a very low estimation, and in order to avoid all these defects and to compensate for the strength, the question of Indians' housing and quartering has to be so seriously considered and solved in a particular manner. Similarly other things—in the way of comforts and convenience, in fact amounting to luxuries—have to be provided to the British troops only to achieve the effect of establishing the British soldier's superiority.

In thus trying to establish the superiority of the British soldier the ultimate goal aimed at is to increase the morale of the British soldier or to decrease the morale and increase the "moral fear" factor of the Indian soldier. This is only meant to compensate the factor of the poor health and physique of the British soldier.

To increase the strength of the British soldier is neither so much possible nor desirable, not because it would mean extra addition of cost to the present exorbitant cost of the British troops in India, but because it is physically impossible to raise a British force, calculated to put down a huge Indian population. Indians may grumble and deny the Government the moral sanction for the extra cost of British troops; but, it matters not, because the **Army Budget is Non-votable**. Indian public opinion would be ruffled and perhaps the situation would not be a very pleasant one because the poor Indian Taxpayers have already been taxed to the full, mainly to maintain the Foreign British Army. The limit has been reached and any further stretch by way of increase in the number of British troops may perhaps result in disorganising even the

present structure and fabric of the Indian Army in general; and, therefore, the Government cannot think of increasing the strength of the British troops in India.

Physique and health count a great deal as far as the Rank and File of any army is concerned. We give below a statement of the incidence of diseases of both British and Indian troops which will speak for itself.

If a war be declared, and the Army be mobilised, and then, if the Army cannot muster strong on account of its sickness, bad physique and health, in spite of the huge sums spent annually on the medical care of the British soldier then all the good money—Crores and Crores—of the country spent on the maintenance of these British troops in peace time—as a sort of premium against danger—is to a certainty most uselessly spent.

An efficient Medical staff and department at such a tremendous and enormous cost over and above the other army expenditure, is maintained to look after and care for the physique and health of the British soldier. If in spite of these costly precautions and measures, the British troops show a fall in strength due to sickness, bad physique and heat, then the British troops are not worth being employed and maintained in India. It is, therefore, we say, that the British troops in India cannot ever be found efficient and useful in spite of the extra comfort, convenience, facilities, treatment, care etc., bestowed upon them. We emphasize their replacement in the interest of both. It would be proper, therefore, to reduce the British force in India and replace them by Indians immediately.

**Statement of the Incidence of Diseases (both British and Indian)  
Only 1, from 1 Command (viz. Bombay, Poona, C. P., Madras etc.)**

Year and Month District (Military) Madras	Malaria	Venereal	British Sick per Thousand				Admis- sion in Hospital	Treat- ment in Barracks	Total	S. C. Order 1925 Order Number
			Dysentery Diarrhoea and other digestive diseases	Respiratory diseases including Pneumonia and Pulmonary tuberculosis	Skin and Minor septic diseases	Admis- sion all cases				
February 1925	·38	24·91	5·75	3·07	8·05	6516				263
June "	4·51	11·78	9·27	2·26	11·53	65·16				
July "	5·12	12·80	5·12	·26	9·73	54·63	45·73	21·17	66·94	428
August "	2·35	14·38	8·10	2·09	3·92	48·33	43·71	16·64	60·35	487
September "	3·75	13·43	6·71	2·42	8·00	56·93	44·40	24·78	69·23	552
October "	3·13	14·79	5·40	2·56	11·09	63·69	46·91	30·47	77·38	
<b>Indian Sick per Thousand</b>										
February 1925	·14	3·10	3·10	3·10	1·55	21·04			11·65	134
June "	2·11	3·79	5·06	1·26	2·32	26·76			14·35	263
July "	·97	2·52	4·27	2·72	3·30	26·18	13·13	7·22	20·35	332
August "	1·54	2·11	7·87	2·88	4·61	32·64	15·11	7·46	22·56	428
September "	1·14	3·80	4·75	3·04	3·99	27·56	15·65	5·69	21·34	
October "	3·00	3·00	6·00	5·59	4·39	30·95	16·34	6·63	22·97	

The statistics in the following table show the rate per thousand of all cases of sick, divided in (1) Malaria, (2) Venereal diseases, (3) Digestive diseases,—such as Dysentery and Diarrhoea—, (4) Respiratory diseases including Pnumonia and Pulmonary tuberculosis, (5) Skin and minor septic diseases etc., of both British and Indian. Similarly, it states the rate per thousand in Hospital ( indoor patients ) as well as those treated in barracks ( outdoor patients ), both British and Indian. Now, we shall consider the kinds of sickness as given in the statement in column Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 only, and the non-effectives' result.

The above statistics would quite clearly show that the British troops in India are useless as a military force in India so far as military efficiency is concerned, on account of the percentage of the sick.

We shall now analyse the causes. In spite of the best, superior, comparatively profuse care bestowed upon the Britisher, he is useless as a soldier, while an Indian sepoy, though quite uncared for, as compared with his colleague the British tommy, as regards quarters, medical treatment, food, watering arrangements, sanitary and hygienic conditions, locality, pay, other comforts and conveniences etc., still proves himself incomparably superior to a British tommy, physically and hence militarily.

The quarters allotted to a British tommy are spacious, very airy, and nicely ventilated, having all arrangements of comfort and convenience. Usually these quarters are situated on a site which is a *commanding* ground from the military view-point.

The situation, sanitary and hygienic advantages, locality and ground is so enviable that Indians in the

higher grade service, drawing thousands are not even fortunate in having such a beautiful and healthy site for their private homes.

**Malaria**—The figures are:—

1925	Feb.	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.
British	·3	4·51	5·12	2·35	3·76	3·13
Indian	·14	2·11	·97	1·54	1·14	3·00

The infection of malaria is carried by a mosquito in its bite. The locality and hygienic conditions in which the British soldier lives being invariably on a high level are not susceptible to mosquito breeding to any appreciable extent, whereas in the case of the Indian troops their barracks are generally situated on low lying ground, where, due to low level, rain water does not trickle down easily and thus is a convenient site for the growth of Malaria (*Bacillæ*) germs.

The first best site from medical and military point of view is reserved and allotted to British troops. The Indian troops have for them only the second best, usually situated on a lower level with no adequate and preventive arrangements for mosquitoes and malaria.

**Anti-malarial Measures** :—In certain budgets we find grants of lakhs and lakhs for these anti-malarial measures. In fact the Indian troops require more of this expenditure owing to the inferior conditions of housing and watering arrangements, but very little money is spent on them, and the greater portion or more appropriately the whole sum in the budget on this head is spent on the Britishers' quarters etc. for anti-malarial measures.

But in spite of having all the advantages to his side the percentage of malaria cases among British troops is so great that the percentage in 'Non-effectives' is simply appalling, thus making the British soldier unfit and weak to serve in strength and numbers in any fighting force.

**Veneral Diseases :—**Many preventive measures are generally taken for the British soldier in order to keep him safe from the above-mentioned diseases. Of course, this entails a pretty good annual recurring cost in the medical budget—to maintain medical specialists in this particular disease, to purchase for distribution, patent medicine tubes for the prevention of this disease (calomel ointment tubes etc., as preventive measures). Similarly lectures are delivered in barracks to the British soldier to make him realize the great danger he incurs in neglecting certain precautions which are vital to his health. It is also common knowledge that special prophylactic treatment rooms are reserved for wash, douches etc., in connection with this disease.

A few years before, the matter had been under consideration of the medical faculty for technical opinion. One school opined that arranging for the prevention of this disease in the above manner was rather calculated to increase the number of cases of this disease instead of preventing its growth by such costly preventive measures. They thought that it would act more as a sort of encouragement. The other school differed and did not think so.

In spite of the care and preventive measures the percentage of veneral cases in the British troops is tremendously more than the Indian troops. It could be

seen, therefore, that the British soldier is physically as well as militarily most unfit for the Indian Army.

**Dysentery, Diarrhoea and other Digestive Diseases:**—It is but in the fitness of things that there should be a greater percentage of the secases in the British troops. The main causes of these diseases could be traced to abundance of food and drink. Non-vegetarian diet may also be responsible to some extent.

Dysentery, diarrhoea, dyspepsia etc. are usually the effect of over-feeding and gluttony in the case of a British soldier, whereas in the case of an Indian soldier he has for want of adequate provisions and monetary condition perhaps to feed himself scantily and with inferior food, in order to lay by something for the family needs. In the case of Indians the diseases are mainly due to bad food and poverty. This is all the result of the huge difference of pay and emoluments between British and Indian soldiers.

**Liver Diseases :**—More or less all liver diseases are said to originate from alcoholic excesses due to liquors and wine to an excess, resulting in hepatitis and the like. The British soldier who gets more than enough money can afford to squander his money in drink. But, for the after-effect *i. e.* for their medical treatment the poor Indian tax-payer has to suffer.

**Digestive Diseases :**—It is said that they are also due to infection. The conditions of living of the British soldier are very superior to those of an Indian. Still we cannot make out why the percentage in these cases should be greater. If the British soldier were to face the same conditions as those of an Indian soldier, the number of cases in these diseases would rise many times more.



**Respiratory Diseases:—**The real cause and origin of these diseases of the respiratory system are invariably found in persons who have low vitality as a result of ill-feeding and ill-clothing. In cases of the type of pneumonia the origin could be traced more to insufficient clothing resulting in an exposure to cold.

The British soldier generally is over-fed and over-clad. Similarly, he is so well cared for and so highly paid, that it is simply inconceivable to think of a British tommy ever being exposed to cold. Nevertheless, the British soldier stands on par with the Indian soldier in death mortality and disease, even though the Indian soldier is adversely handicapped for want of proper care, nourishment, clothing, adequate pay and emoluments etc. Had it been otherwise, *i. e.* the British soldier were to face the same conditions and handicaps as those of an Indian soldier, perhaps the victims of these diseases among British troops might have increased ten fold, even hundred-fold.

**Skin Diseases :—**It is simply surprising to read the high percentage of figures in skin and minor septic diseases. These diseases have their origin more generally in want of adequate sense of cleanliness, dirty living and dirty habits. It is, therefore, most surprising to see that a British tommy who is supposed and proclaimed to be high cultured, more civilized and of a high standard of living should be susceptible to these diseases in a greater degree as compared with an Indian soldier.

**Sanitary Squads :—**Expenditure on Sanitary Squads and preventive measures—cost for insanitary and unhygienic conditions—is also a factor that shows that British troops are costly for India. (Ref. S. C. O., No. 236 ; and Army-Inst. India No. 451 of 1925.)

"The oil allotted to the Southern Command for Anti-mosquito Work is re-allotted to districts as follows:-

Oil Fuel, 1st quality		3rd quality (Oil kerosine)	
Dist. C. P.	800 gallons	320 gallons	
" Poona	1400 "	960 "	
" Madras	400 "	160 "	
" Bombay	500 "	160 "	
	<hr/> 3100 "	<hr/> 1600 "	26

### Extermination of Bugs in Barracks :—

.....Systematic boiling of beds,.....to use cement to stop every crack or hole in plaster of walls,.....and to use putty to fill up cracks in timber etc.

" Requisitions for necessary expenses to be submitted to Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer .. these will be met from the Repair Grant....

" An N. C. O. of the Sanitary squad (is detailed) to receive instructions from M. E. Services to learn the work of stopping cracks in wood work, with putty and walls with lime plaster." 27

There is a lot of money that is spent like this, on such measures. All this is meant to preserve the health of British soldiers; such measures with such costs are not required for the Indian troops, even though the situation and type of quarters, its locality etc. are much inferior to the Britisher's. The British troops therefore, are very costly toys to India, and hence we say that they are useless in the long run. We suggest on technical and military grounds, that the British soldier who is militarily unfit for Indian climate—in spite of the huge money spent on him—should be replaced by an Indian.

The following extracts from the 'Report on the Health of the Army for the year 1928' will clearly show the truth of the statement that the British soldiers are looked after, treated and cared incomparably better than the poor Indian soldier.

The second part of the report deals with the health of the Army in the various Commands. The section on India will greatly interest the reader. 'The admissions to hospital were for officers 551 and for soldiers 586 to 1,000 of the strength. These figures are very appreciably higher than those for the Army ex-India, but not very much higher, if the climatic conditions be considered.

'The death rate in the Army in India from all causes was only 3009 per million, a most satisfactory figure.

'The admission rate for dysentery was 15·6 per mille of which quite two-thirds were of bacillary origin.

'Admissions for enteric fevers were 3·5 per mille. British troops in India are protected by inoculation.

'Approximately 99 per cent of the troops are protected by vaccination against small-pox.

'A general note states that whilst *British Military hospitals in India are much more satisfactory than the Indian Military hospitals*, at many stations, operating theatres have been improved, in others, modern accommodation for.....maternity work has been provided, isolation blocks have been provided in some....The treatment of all cases of.....disease by specialists in otology has led to a marked reduction in the amount to invaliding for this condition. The establishment of clinical rooms in hospitals has greatly improved clinical laboratory diagnosis, specially with regard to malaria.

Several different lines of treatment for.....malaria have been under trial. Quinine plus arsenic, quinine plus plasmocline etc., and the results have been published in the Journals. There was a steady improvement in the hygiene of barracks and in water supplies. A notable feature of the year was the opening of the new "model" cantonment at Milgaladon near Rangoon, the *barracks are supplied with electric light and punkhas*, the water supply is from deep wells, and sewage is waterborne. *Large numbers of married quarters have been reconstructed*, and other new ones built. *Anti-malarial measures have progressed steadily in scope and thoroughness during the last five years*, a great number of troops are sent to the hills each year, whilst *mosquito-proofing of barracks is being extended*.

'A scheme was introduced by which units were permitted to draw less than the full rations allowed and to draw the remainder at half cash values. Whilst primarily designed to prevent waste, it is noted that the unit which showed the greatest saving was considered on inspection to be the best food-unit in the Northern Command.'

It must have been quite clear from the various extracts of the best and highest medical authorities and highest commanders that the British soldier is handicapped and cannot be, therefore, said to possess that physical efficiency in this climate which is extremely necessary to every soldier to make himself an efficient army man and a soldier.

It is, therefore, but proper that British soldiers should be immediately replaced by the Indian soldiers.

## CHAPTER VII

### MILITARY INEFFICIENCY

We will show in this chapter how a British soldier is militarily inefficient as compared to an Indian one. High British officers have also agreed to this, although for their own political purposes, they do maintain British troops, though unnecessary.

(1) **Military Inefficiency:**—The Military efficiency depends on various factors. The questions of physique, training, morale, Army expenditure, the purpose, needs and such other factors are chiefly responsible in determining the strength of an Army—be it the Army for offence or the Army for defence. Therefore, the factors of physical and military inefficiency, Army expenditure, and the necessity or the nature of the Army, the purpose for which it is maintained, the resources of a country, the policy and the like, all these factors are interdependent. In addition to the above there are various other equally important factors which also are necessary in determining the strength of the Army and its military efficiency.

Compared with a defensive army an offensive army is much larger; besides it means an Army with greater military efficiency, and naturally more expenditure etc. But since, India requires only an Army for her defence purposes, there is absolutely no reason why the Army should be so greatly expensive and yet with inadequate military efficiency.

Such an Army cannot be expected to undertake the responsibilities and duties effectively, adequately

and economically for which it is primarily and solely maintained.

The military non-efficiency means greater number of 'military non-effectives,' and this military non-effectiveness may be due to various causes. Military non-effectiveness may be due to any one of the following causes *i. e.* physique, sickness, morale, climate, policy, resources, training, finance etc.

We have already seen in the last chapter how the British soldier is physically most unsuited and consequently unsuited for all military purposes and thus becomes a non-effective in India.

It does not require any further proof at all or any other argument again, since he has already been proved as Militarily non-effective.

But we may further see if he is fit at least from the military training point of view *i. e.* training, adaptability, previous record, capability, tendencies, chances, suitability etc.—apart from the disabilities of physique, climate etc. This question is mainly dependent on training. The British soldier may have the best training and perhaps the exclusive training of certain Arms which the Indian is denied. But the *natural training* of an Indian can never be reached by the British soldier. The natural training part lies in the *factor of the physical features of a country*.

The Britisher can never hope to compete with us in that art of mountain-warfare as it is bred in us, born in us. The Britisher only cultivates it. That is the fundamental difference. Field-Marshal Brownslow has admitted the truth of this important natural part of the training. It shows that the Britishers also realise their short-comings and our superiority.

*"The Boers, like Gurkhas and Afridis, are skirmishers by hereditary instinct as well as local conditions and modes of life. The two last-named races have for fifty years fought side by side with the British soldier...the secret is in their blood more than in their education."*<sup>1</sup>

In England the British soldier never gets an opportunity to know, study and practise that part of warfare, which is called the hill or mountain or savage warfare or more modernly styled by the Britisher as the "Frontier warfare."

And that is why we say that the Britisher is always bound to be inefficient so far as the Frontier warfare goes. It is also admitted that the British soldiers are inefficient for Frontier defence.

Sir J. Lawrence says, "The Peshawar mountain-train was originally manned by Europeans but the natives were substituted after the very first expedition in which they were engaged. Again, for similar reasons, the defence of the frontier requires native irregular Cavalry and Infantry."<sup>2</sup>

He again says, "Many officers would, for this reason, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives; but, in practice, it is not expedient to go to this extreme; the frontier must be excepted."<sup>3</sup>

It could still further be proved that, but for timely help which Indian troops always rendered, the British troops would not have been even saved-

Maj.-Gen. Sydney Cotton says,... "The newly raised troops of the Peshawar and Mooltan frontiers, and of the adjacent countries in and bordering on our territory *who have so well served us in our difficulties, and by adhering to or espousing our cause saved us at a most critical moment, are no more to be depended on.*

than any others...Already do they feel their importance as the saviours of our tottering Government. " 4

The frontier warfare is in fact a new part of the military training to a Britisher. But to us it is natural, on account of the situation, and physical features and terrain of our country. Even the British officers have to study this as an extra subject of frontier warfare which they never knew before. Some 15 to 20 years before the subject of '*frontier warfare*' was first made a special subject, and was introduced in the syllabus of the Military Academy at Sandhurst in England. We, on account of the situation of our country, and being naturally innured to the soil and mountain fighting and hill tracking are born Mountain Fighters. The Britisher in spite of all the Indian tax-payers's money that he spends in learning the *Art of Frontier fighting* can never hope to compete with us in that *art of frontier fighting*. That art is bred in us—born in us. The Britisher only cultivates it, but cannot master it. *That is the fundamental difference.*

Field-Marshal .Brownslow says:—"Our warlike neighbours act on us as a tonic—they keep us on the alert, and teach us to fight, as the Zulus taught the Boers. Moreover, their tribal feuds keep down their numbers, much to our advantage, and their own. " 5

"In India two-thirds of our troops are indigenous, its mountains are infinitely more difficult and the tribes on its Frontier quite as good fighters as the Riffs. " 6

**Language Disabilities :—**One of the other main factors for the efficiency or otherwise of a force also depends on the question of the knowledge of the language of the ( Border ) enemy people, against whom



the force has to fight—either for defence or for offence. A National Army alone of a country has got this natural advantage, because of their contact with the Frontier and the intercourse between the two countries. The Army men from the border, naturally more often and in majority know the language of the other (enemy) country on that side of the border. In war and peace times this knowledge is extremely useful and essential. You know the enemy's moves, his policy, and all the information necessary to win a war.

The natives of any country can do it with more ease, with less cost and less chances of risk whereas alien soldiers like the British soldiers for the Frontier of India, waste and spend a huge amount of money for Language Rewards, Regimental Munshis for Urdu—and yet in spite of all this *waste in money* and energy, they always have to depend on Indian interpreters, over whom again additional money is spent. But even then, there is yet always a chance of risk in this intermediary agency of Indian interpreter, because if the alien Britisher can by payment secure his services, the intermediary can as well be secured by an alien Afghan—the probable border enemy—and thus it means a defect in the military efficiency.

Secondly during a fight and during operations—in an enemy's country—it is essential for the force in general to know the language of the people and the country on the borders, against whom the force is operating. But the Britisher cannot do it, and he, therefore, has to rely entirely on the help of his Indian comrade. A small British Party or force or a detachment may lose its way in the hills and the country; again, suppose a party of the force meets and traps an Afghan soldier, but that Afghan prisoner cannot be used by the British

soldiers to extract any information, as both of them do not know the language of each other. This and the like are the various causes of the inability and the consequential military inefficiency of a British soldier. For all this he has always to depend on an Indian, because, without such information the war is a failure.

Therefore one of the main reasons why the Britisher cannot equal the military efficiency of an Indian, is to be traced to the fact that the British soldier does not know the languages of the enemy, whom he is going to fight; he has to be efficient all round, if he is to be in India for the defence of the country. The Britishers would also make an argument that the British soldier is now here for more than 150 years and, therefore, he is not new. The statement in general may be alright and correct, but from the practical view-point he is here only for a term of 6 years during his stay in India and then the next batch of British soldiers comes in his place. This does not mean that militarily he is conversant with the ground by his short stay in India for 6 years. Besides, due to the bad climate he stays very few weeks or months on a frontier post and, therefore, he has very few chances of knowing the mountains and studying the ground with a view to get used to the fighting etc. The Britisher's argument, therefore, does not stand.

**Hill and Mountain Warfare, Reconnaissance and Tracking:**—Again the British soldier, not having in his country hills and mountains of the nature that we have in India, is handicapped, so far as the important work of reconnaissance, tracking, and finding out one's way etc., is concerned. "Success in war depends on information" and information means reconnaissance and all other things.

General Maurice says, "We still also require the most expensive thing in Britain next to men, ground—*ground that shall enable us properly to manoeuvre and to train, and ground that shall make us an effective army organically kept together in the parts and in the functions that will be required for war.*"<sup>7</sup>

If the British soldier cannot do all this, because of his handicap of a terrain like that in India—and also on account of the Pustu and Urdu language handicap—he is certainly militarily inefficient. Thus the Indian naturally happens to be the Britisher's superior in military efficiency; that is of course not the fault of the British soldier.

#### **Campaigns on N. W. F.**

It was only on account of the above factors mentioned before and the consequential Military inefficiency of the British soldier that he was unable to be in the Frontier wars in proportion to his strength—we give below our study in a statement, of about 20 campaigns wherein it would be found that the approximate percentage of the British soldier is very small to the Indian, and if that is so, then it is inconceivable to understand the argument that the British soldier is a necessity for the defence of India,—from the figures we find that he has never helped or undertaken the defence of India to the extent he ought to have done.

#### **Campaigns considered in connection with the British Soldiers' Military Inefficiency**

- |                        |                           |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) 1851–52 Mohmands.  | (6) 1855 Mirkzais and     |
| (2) 1852 Ranizasis and | Kurrum etc.               |
| Utmankhel.             | (7) 1853–57 Deragazikhan. |
| (3) 1852 Waziris.      | (8) 1860 Waziris.         |
| (4) 1853 Shiranis.     | (9) 1860 Waziris.         |
| (5) 1855 Orakzais.     | (10) 1868 Black Mountain  |
|                        | Expedition.               |

- |                                 |                                    |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (11) 1868 Orakzais.             | (17) 1891 Miranzai 1st Expedition. |
| (12) 1872 Dawar.                | (18) 1891 Miranzai 2nd Expedition. |
| (13) 1877-78 Jowaki Expedition. | (19) 1894-95 Mahsud Expedition.    |
| (14) 1880.                      | (20) 1900-1902 Mahsud Blockade.    |
| (15) 1881 Mahsud.               |                                    |
| (16) 1890-91 Thob valley.       |                                    |

**Statement of the approximate percentage of Indian and British troops that took part in the Frontier Campaigns**

No. of Campaigns	Percentage of Indian troops	Percentage British troops	Ratio of British to Indian troops
3	84	16	1 : 6
2	85	15	1 : 6·7
2	88	12	1 : 8·3
1	90	10	1 : 10
1	92	8	1 : 12
1	94	6	1 : 16·8
2	95	5	1 : 20
2	96	4	1 : 25
2	98	2	1 : 50
4	100	0	0 : 100

This percentage is arrived at, after including the tribal levies etc., and the other troops that were with the expeditionary force. The British troops were more often in reserves and not much in actual fighting.

If the data of the strength actually engaged be available, it would be seen that the British percentage would be quite negligible.

**Note:—**

The figures are approximate only. Figures given by various writers differ; those of Lockheart and Neville Chamberlain are different from those given by

Younghusband and others. Hence it was very difficult to get separate figures.

The artillery used on the Frontier consisted more of the mountain batteries which are composed mainly of Indian personnel. The R. H. A., the R. F. A., and Heavy Artillery cannot be conveniently employed on the Frontier. There is a tactical reason for their not being employed. But it must be remembered that the latter *i. e.*, the R. H. A. and R. F. A., and the Heavy Artillery units consist mainly of British personnel.

As regards the other arms of Infantry and Cavalry also, it should be realized that Indian units were employed more than the British. The proportion of the employment of Indian and British units may be said to be 6 or 10 to 1, while the Infantry proportion in which the Indian Army is composed is about 3 Indian units to 1 British unit and as regards the Cavalry, the proportion was in the ratio of 3 to 1 formerly, but now they are in the ratio of 4 Indian units to 1 British unit.

Our calculation includes, moreover, the levies and some local troops of the adjoining states like Kashmir, Hunza, Chitral etc., which were many a time employed.

It must be remembered again that British troops were more often used as reserves *i. e.*, behind the fighting line in these campaigns.

The British soldier is militarily inefficient as a part of the Indian Army, not only physically, economically, militarily, and climatically, but also on the grounds of morale, terrain, physical features etc.

We have proved him as inefficient physically and militarily. We will give a few examples to show that

other factors of economy, climate, morale, ground etc. are also responsible in making him inefficient.

The following shows his military inefficiency. Surgeon-General C. A. Gordon, M. D., Honorary Physician to Her Majesty, says, "The principal sources of military non-efficiency are undoubtedly sickness, mortality, and invaliding. It by no means happens that all these bear a constant ratio to each other. But besides these, military non-efficiency may arise from incapacity on the part of individuals to undergo the fatigues incidental to service, and yet the fact not appear in statistics. Thus, *men may fall out on the march, in some instances have to be carried*, and so, to all intents and purposes be non-effective and a burthen to that active force; while at the same time, there may be nothing in their condition to justify or demand their admission into hospital. Still another point must be alluded to, namely, the insufficiency of mere statistics by themselves to convey a correct impression of what they are often intended to do. Indeed, this fallacy of averages is alluded to in the despatch of the Secretary of State for India."<sup>8</sup>

"The ratio of death per 1000 men strength was 23·92, of invaliding 19·80, making a total rate of non-efficiency equal to 43·72.

"*The total rate of non-efficiency was 68·41 per 1000 as against 66·40 in the period for 1815 to 1817. (It was 66·94 in the period of July 1925, 77·38 in the period of October 1925. Southern Command Orders, 1925).* The result seems to be humiliating. I naturally ask to myself: *Whence comes the cause or causes of this neutralization of all the measures of hygiene that have at vast expense been brought into operation? and can only reply:*

the shortened period of service in India and the constant influx into the country of young men that thus becomes necessary.”<sup>9</sup> (The bracket contents are ours.)

General Changarnier says, “Troops composed of such materials lose many more men by prolonged marches and bivouacs than by the fire of the enemy.” Well, therefore, does he put the query—“Are *these* the armies called economical?” He next quotes the distinction drawn by the first Napoleon between young and partially trained lads for purposes of national defence and those for aggressive war. “A country never is wanting in *men* to resist an invasion, or to support a great war but it is often wanting in *soldiers*. The contrast intended to be here drawn between the classes indicated by the words italicized is sufficiently apparent.”<sup>10</sup>

**The following shows him Physically Inefficient.**

General Trochu says, “With special reference to India, I would repeat what has already been observed in regard to non-efficiency occurring among troops beyond what is indicated by mere statistics of sickness, mortality and invaliding. The circumstance is well known to officers of experience, and has been demonstrated in actual war, that young soldiers and those in their earlier years of residence in the country are less able to *bear up against the fatigue incidental to long marches and exposure* than are the older men.”<sup>11</sup>

“The question of hill stations has gained increased importance since the short-service system has become established, and it is clear that a multiplication of mountain stations, mainly for the location of young and recently arrived soldiers, must directly diminish

the number of invalids yearly sent home, as well as the annual death rates from enteric fever and pulmonary consumption." <sup>12</sup>

Surgeon-Major McNalty says, "The soldier, for his first year in India, should be located in as healthy a station as possible." <sup>13</sup>

The following shows him climatically inefficient:— Surgeon-Major I. G. Hewlett, Acting Deputy Surgeon-General, Sind Division, says, "I am strongly of opinion that the proper course to adopt is to send every British regiment on first landing in the country to the hills, and to keep it there in climates especially adapted to the European constitution, and only to call on it to come down into the plains when wanted." <sup>14</sup>

Surgeon-General J. Ker Innes, British Medical Department, and principal Medical Officer, British Forces in India, says, "The benefits of hill stations may be summed up under three heads: first, they confer a higher standard of health and strength on the young soldier, in addition to diminishing, if not averting, diseases incidental to service in the plains, the debilitating effects of extreme heat, and the removal from the sources of fever; second, they benefit the older and more acclimatized soldier in the same direction; and third, regarded as sanatoria for invalids." <sup>15</sup>

### **Morale Factor**

Dr. J. Gibbons, Deputy Surgeon-General, British Forces, Meerut Circle, says, "I believe, as at present constituted, they often exert deteriorating influence on the morale of the soldier and consequently that their advantages as health resorts are much in abeyance. In most of them the amount of military exercise,—I do not mean parades and drill, but military exercises in



the broad sense in which the Romans understood the term—*is nil*. Soldiers, with their food cooked for them, cloths washed, water drawn, barracks cleaned, are left without employment.”<sup>16</sup>

General Jacob says, “The presence alone of a number of English gentlemen in India is attended with much advantage to the English Government, and these should have the means of living respectably....”<sup>17</sup>

“The nearer the association, such as is involved in proposed system, the greater the detriment, in my opinion, to the prestige of the European soldiery.”<sup>18</sup>

The conclusion is, that from the military point of view, the British soldier is most inefficient owing to reasons discussed above *viz.*, on the grounds of economic, military, physical, inefficiency and climate, morale, and terrain. Therefore, the British soldier's replacement should be carried out immediately.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Economic Inefficiency

We have seen in the foregoing chapters how British troops of the Indian Army are inefficient as compared with the Indian soldiers physically and militarily as well; and how it is necessary that they should be immediately replaced by Indian soldiers man for man. Besides the above reasons, there is a still more cogent reason for the replacement. A British soldier seems incapable of serving on the scale of pay, paid at present to an Indian soldier; his habits, his physique, his idea of life and the like, render him quite incompetent to work as a soldier on the Indian scale pay, which is all that poor India can afford to pay for his services hereafter. He is, therefore, in our opinion, economically inefficient. *This is what we want our readers to understand by the term "Economic inefficiency".* We have seen how a British soldier is provided with better housing, better feeding, better sanitation, better training, better arms, better clothing, better medical attendance, better pay, better allowances, etc., just to remedy the defects due to his physical and military inefficiency; in spite of all this, he has so far proved inefficient both physically and militarily. The present chapter will show (1) what a huge expenditure, which India can hardly afford, is required to be incurred for the retention of the British troops who are found to be inefficient both physically and militarily; (2) how a saving of about 28 to 32 crores will be effected only by the substitution of British by Indian troops; and (3) how, therefore, replacement of the British by Indian troops becomes

necessary even for this sole reason of the British soldier's "Economic inefficiency."

The figures taken in this statement are, it should always be remembered, only approximate averages. Unfortunately the military budgets of India are not prepared properly; nor is the same system followed in preparing any five successive budgets. A student like the present writer will find it a pleasure to study the successive budgets of the Army in England and will find it easy to say what amount England spends on any particular item in the English Army Expenditure. These budgets follow a particular system of presenting its figures. **Army budgets in India are a non-votable item**; only a very few members of the Legislature may be studying them. A still fewer number perhaps cares to study the details, and probably no one understands them clearly, as they are kept ignorant in army matters and in the technique of the army budget. The various heads in the budgets are not always separately shown, ( we have shown this by an illustration in chapter X ), and the figures shown against them have to be calculated from the rules contained in the army orders, pay and allowance regulations, finance regulations, army instructions etc. Every care has been, however, taken to present the figures as correctly as possible. ( It is only when the army budget becomes votable, that the Legislative Assembly Members can call for what figures and what information they may want. )

### **Economic Inefficiency**

We shall deal, in this chapter, with the various questions of policy such as pay, allowance, percentage of comparative defence cost, etc.

The statements will enable the reader to grasp the fact at a glance, of the unimaginable extravagance of the public money raised from the poor Indian taxpayer. The reader will also realise that though all this is alleged to be done for the purpose of doing good to the people, it is in fact intended to strengthen the British prestige, British influence and British hold on India 'by sword.'

An attempt is made in the present chapter to deal with a few of the important items of the Army Expenditure in which the difference and differentiation between the two parts of the Army—the British Army and the Indian—is very great in respect of the scale of expenditure.

The statements included in this chapter will illustrate the main details of the two scales and the savings which can be effected by the replacing of the Britishers by the Indians.

The reduction which is thus effected is based on the fact that the British Army in India (British soldiers, British non-commissioned officers etc.) comprising of about 60,000 regulars, is replaced by an Indian Army—number for number.

Firstly, the main difference between the two scales is that of pay and allowances, which, in the case of British soldiers, is approximately 4 to 5 times that of the Indian soldier, and in the case of N. C. O's even 8 to 10 times that of the Indian. (See statements attached).

Besides, there are certain allowances which are granted exclusively to British soldiers serving in India e. g. allowances numbered 2, 7, 8, 12, 13 etc. as shown in the statement below; viz., (a) Furniture allowance to married British soldier at the rate of Rs. 3-4 p. m.

per married British soldier; (b) Married soldier's allowance at the rate of Rs. 30. P. M. per British married soldier; (c) British soldier's children allowance, at the rate of Rs. 10 P. M. per child upto 4 children, *i. e.* Rs. 40 per month; (d) Hair cutting allowance at the rate of Rs. 3 per month per British soldier, ( this is now included in the consolidated kit and clothing allowance); (e) a lump sum of about seven lakhs is expended for the vocational training of British soldiers in India.

Thirdly, there are certain allowances, which are given to the British as well as Indian soldiers, but the rates of the British soldier are many times higher *e. g.* No. 1. Messing allowance to British soldier is about Rs. 6-13-6 per month; while it is only annas ten to a poor Indian soldier, *i. e.* roughly the allowance for the British soldier is 11 (eleven) times as much as that for the Indian soldier.

If we assume that British troops accept the same scale of pay, allowance etc., as that of the Indian troops, then the savings effected by the removal of this difference and the differentiation would be about 28 to 32 crores. (Given in statement as 33 crores.)

### Approximate Saving by Reduction and Replacement

			Crores.	Lakh.
1.	Messing allowance	...	...	42½
2.	Hair cutting	} Consolidated Kit and Clothing allowance	...	20½
3.	Kit clothing		...	20½
4.	Equipment allowance	...	...	25
5.	Educational proficiency	} 6d per diem per soldier	...	20½
6.	Military		...	20½
7.	Furniture allowance (soldiers)	...	...	5
8.	Vocational training cost	...	...	6 to 10
9.	Religious service	...	...	4½

10.	British soldiers savings after replacement	...	4	—	42
11.	British N. C. O's. " " "	...			21
12.	Married soldiers (allowance)	...			
13.	Soldier's children " "	...			6 to 8
14.	" " " Schools	...			4
15.	Officers marriage allowance	...			40
16.	" separation allowance	...			
17.	" lodging " "	...			0
18.	" " " (double)	...			0
19.	Indian Army allowance	...			50
20.	Engineer's pay ( Allowance )	...			3½
21.	R. A. M. C. ( " )	...			8
22.	Command and charge allowance	...			16 to 18
23.	Difference in British Unit and Indian } (Officers) Units pay }	...			50
24.	Transportation	...	2	—	50
25.	Payments made in England	...	13	—	22
26.	Administration charges	...	2	—	32
27.	Manu. Est. Factory	...			60
28.	Commands (A. H. Q. Dist. Bgde)	...			35
29.	Stores and Equipment	...	1	—	25
30.	M. Engineering service	...	2	—	50
31.	B. O. R. Clerks, Storekeeper etc...	...	1	—	15
32.	Extras	...			97½
Total ... 33 Crores					

The figures are approximate calculations. There are changes in the rules and regulations guiding the payment of allowances too often. Various and innumerable references such as Army orders, pay and allowances regulations, finance regulations, army instructions, and many other things have to be referred. For our calculations we have mainly depended on pay and allowances regulations, 1929, with correction, Army orders and instructions of 1925, and other sources like the Army budgets concerned etc. They

Note :—From No. 24 to 31 they are all possible reductions and savings. 31 and 1 to 13 also saving by replacement.

cannot be, therefore, quite accurate unless different strengths of various units, Arms and ranks, with different scales etc., are not totalled and then only a calculation could be made which may be somewhere nearer the accurate figure. Throughout the book, these above difficulties have to be remembered. The figures that we have calculated and given may be taken as approximately correct for purposes of considering the general question affecting the huge expenditure on the British troops and the possible approximate savings after replacement.

Out of the 32 items given in the statement, items from 1 to 14, and a major part of the expenditure of the items 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, is the expenditure that is mainly incurred on the British soldier. The figures show the probable saving by replacement. From items 15 to 23 and items 27, 28 are a possible saving by replacement and reduction both of the officers, and a part of the expenditure on items 24 to 30 is a saving by possible reduction in the expenditure.

This saving can be usefully employed for the other Nation-building programme such as Industrial, Agricultural, the Educational, and the like.

( In the statement some part is the soldier's and the other is the administrative expenditure ).

**1. Messing Allowance:**—It is an allowance which supplements the regular free rations given to the British as well as to the Indian soldiers. In Indian regiments this allowance is styled as spices (or Masala) allowance. When the Britishers are replaced by the Indians, 10 times of the Indian allowance per British soldier replaced will be saved, which comes to approximately Rs. 42½ lakhs.

**2. Hair-cutting and Washing Allowance:**—From an Indian soldier As. 5 are recovered, but at present perhaps it is said that annas seven are given to an Indian soldier on this account, while a British soldier is paid Rs. 3 per head. A probable saving of Rs. 20½ lakhs will accrue on this head in addition to a recovery which would amount to Rs. 2¼ lakhs making a total of Rs. 23¼ lakhs.

**3. Kit and Clothing:**—This is an allowance issued to British and Indian troops, but the rate of British allowance is as usual much more. The British rate is Rs. 5-15-0, while the Indian rate is Rs. 2-15-0. Thus a saving of Rs. 3 per head, will make a total saving under this head of Rs. 20½ lakhs. This allowance is granted in aid of the kit and clothing issued.

**4. Equipment Allowance:**—Allowance is granted in aid of equipment issued, such as Mills Equipment and personal equipment etc. The British allowance is Rs. 5-15 while the Indian allowance is only Rs. 2-15 per soldier. When the equipment issued to an Indian soldier is the same as that of a British soldier, we see no reason why there should be any difference in the rate of allowance in aid thereof. Saving in this head, therefore, would come to Rs. 25 lakhs nearly.

**5. Educational Proficiency:**—This is an allowance for the British soldier only, to increase the standard of his Educational qualifications. It is to be borne in mind that the percentages of literacy among the British and Indian people are about 85% and 4% respectively. In spite of this favourable percentage of the British soldier, more attention still is paid to raise his standard still higher at the cost of the Indian soldier who is neglected. In modern armies where operations are



carried on scientific bases, education is the basis of effecting intelligent understanding and intelligent action on the part of a soldier and this is the key-note of the efficiency of the Army.

**6. Military Proficiency :—**This is an allowance exclusively given to the British soldier to encourage him to become proficient and efficient in the discharge of his duties as a soldier, whereas the poor Indian soldier who deserves this all the more, —because he is illiterate and backward—is neglected. This allowance is Rs. 3 per month per British soldier and will make a total of Rs. 20½ lakhs as savings.

**7. Furniture:—**This is an allowance given to married British soldiers for furniture and its upkeep in their homes. It is surprising to note that a married soldier, who gets an allowance known as marriage allowance should also receive this additional allowance for the wife's home and furniture. The rate of this allowance is Rs. 3-4-0 per month. The Indian soldiers, although they are married, perhaps do not know the use of furniture (!!) and are, therefore, not burdened with this allowance ! There is also another reason and it is this, that on account of the poor quarters of the Indian soldiers as compared with the specious, airy, and roomy quarters of the British soldiers, it is not deemed desirable to give the Indians the furniture allowance as their quarters are unsuited for such furniture.

In making this calculation it is to be remembered that all the soldiers in the British Army are not married. Every arm and unit has got a different percentage list of the married soldiers, which is usually 4 per cent in all the units generally, and more percentage in the staff

and officer's personnel. This means that every married man on the married list gets this allowance. An Indian soldier although married is not entitled to this allowance. Thus it makes a saving of Rs. 5 lakhs and over if calculated on an average percentage at the rate of Rs. 3-4-0.

**8. Vocational Training Cost :—**The budgeted amount is about Rs. 6 to 10 lakhs, and this is spent in connection with the vocational or industrial training of the British soldiers of the Indian Army, in institutions in England such as Hounslow, Chiseldon and Catterick, and stations like Mahu, Nasirabad, Kirkee etc. in addition to the sum spent on him in India.

This facility is denied to the poor and low-paid Indian soldier, who is left without any resources in the eve of his life when pensioned. When the Indian soldier enlists in the huge Indian Army of one lakh and sixty thousands, his chances to get the officer's grade are more limited on account of the fact that there is a limited number of Indian commissions, roughly about 3300 (1931-32 budget figure is 3337, see page 29). Therefore, it was all the more necessary to give every facility to an Indian soldier to fit him up to earn his livelihood after he is pensioned.

This annual cost of Rs. 6 to 10 lakhs spent on the vocational training of the British soldier, would be automatically saved, if he is replaced by an Indian.

**9. Religious Service :—**The cost incurred on this head is Rs. 7½ lakhs annually, for British troops only. Religious service for Indian soldiers costs in all about one lakh, even though the Indian troops are nearly three times the British troops in number. Thus it could be said, therefore, that the British religious service

expenses as against the Indian religious service expenses are as 18 to 1. So a sum of about Rs. 4½ lakhs can be saved, under this head after replacement.

**10. British Soldier's Pay :—**There are sixty thousand British troops in India. If they are replaced by Indians a saving of Rs. 4 crores and 42 lakhs could be easily ensured owing to savings in Pay Cost.

**11. British N. C. Os. Pay :—**If they are replaced by Indian N. C. Os., it would make a saving of Rs. 21 lakhs and more excluding allowances.

**12. Married Soldier's Allowance :—**This is an allowance granted to a married British soldier. The saving on this head would be about Rs. 8 lakhs.

**13. Soldier's Children Allowance :—**This is an allowance only for British soldiers' children and is denied to the children of the Indian soldiers. The limit to draw this allowance is upto four children per soldier. On this head, a saving of about 6 to 8 lakhs will be effected by the replacement.

**14. British Soldier's Children Schooling Cost :—**It comprises the expenses incurred over British school masters and mistresses, pupil teachers and assistant pupil teachers, the maintenance and the running of the Regimental, Brigade, Divisional, District and Command Schools, established for the benefit of the British soldiers' children. It also includes money spent on their books and other appliances, school libraries and games of the boys and girls.

It should be noted that these schools require Britishers only as teachers and these teachers in their turn are entitled, if married, to draw all the above allowances for themselves, their wives and children.

**15. British Officers' Marriage Allowance:**—On an average it is Rs. 75, because there are various grades according to ranks in the rate of marriage allowance. A Lt. Col. draws Rs. 75; Major Rs. 90; Capt. Rs. 100; Lt. Rs. 65; and so on. This allowance is given to every officer. This would save about 40 lacs.

Budget year	Strength of British troops	Marriage allowance and allotment taken
1922-23	{ 70132 } (a) { 1571 }	84,90,000 (a)
1923-24	{ 70301 } (b) { 1657 }	118,80,000 (b)
1931-32	61881 (c)	.....

(a), (b) See budget, 1923-24, page 28.

(c) See budget 1931-32—No separate figure is given in this Budget. It is mixed up in pay and allowances, but considering the cost and strength of 22-23 and 23-24 the expenditure for 1931-32 would be something like 72 lacs and more.

But the total of our figures of 8 lacs (savings of British soldier's married allowance) and 40 lacs (officers) appears to be quite an under-estimate. If separate figures would have been given—as in the old budgets—this difficulty would not have been experienced.

**16. Officer's Separation Allowances:**—On an average it is Rs. 60/-. There are, however, various rates according to ranks: Lt. Col. gets Rs. 120/-; Major, Rs. 90/-; Capt., Rs. 60/-; Lt. Rs. 40/-. No married officer who is under 30 years of age is eligible to draw this allowance as well as the marriage allowance. Naturally Indian K. C.'s who usually marry before 30 are denied this advantage when they want it most.

**17. Married Officer's Lodging Allowance:—** Every married officer gets a lodging allowance in lieu of Govt. quarters. The allowance is given according to various rates as per their ranks, *i. e.* Lt. Col., Rs. 150/-; Major Rs. 110/-; Capt., 90/-; Lt., 50/-, 45 or 40.

The underlying principle in the allotment of Govt. quarters is as follows:—A Lieutenant is given 2 units, a Captain is given 3 units, a Major 4 units and Col. 7 units. A unit is equivalent to 250 sq. ft. area or adequate number of rooms—married officers getting one or two units extra, generally according to their rank.

If an officer is married and he has no quarters, he gets double the rate of the lodging allowance of his rank.

**19. Indian Army Allowance:—**On an average this is Rs. 120 to 140 per British officer: Lt. Col. gets Rs. 200, Major, Rs. 200; Capt., Rs. 150; Lt., Rs. 100 (one grade), Lt., Rs. 75 (another grade). In all, therefore, there would be a saving of 50 lacks, on this head.

**20. Engineers Pay Allowance:—**The average of an Engineer's pay allowance is Rs. 65, because a Col. gets Rs. 160; Major Rs. 115; Captain Rs. 70 and a Lieutenant Rs. 45. Only Engineer units and Sappers' battalions etc., get this Technical Engineer's pay allowance. Here a saving of Rs. 3½ lakhs could be made.

**21. R. A. M. C. Pay:—**This is another technical pay allowance of the medical branch of the Indian Army. The rate of pay is dependent on the ranks. A Lt. Colonel gets Rs. 300; Major Rs. 250-200; Captain Rs. 150-125; Lieutenant Rs. 125-100. The saving on this head would be about Rs. 38 lakhs, after making due allowance to the percentage of the non-R. A. M. C. personnel, in the Medical Service.

There is no such allowance for Indian officers who are married, in spite of the fact that usually all of them are married. Strictly speaking, the Indian officer more rightly deserves this allowance, on account of his scanty pay, which is only about  $\frac{1}{5}$  or  $\frac{1}{6}$  of his British brother officer. The higher British officer gets 10 to 20 times more pay, and in addition, is also given various allowances such as Indian army allowance, marriage allowance, lodging allowance and a double lodging allowance etc. Excluding the small number of lieutenants, who are more often unmarried, it would be seen, that an easy saving of Rs. 40 lacks is possible on this head.

**22. Command and Charge Allowance:**—So far as these allowances are concerned in units, only five officers of each unit are the recipients of the charge or command allowances. The Commandant gets Rs. 300; Second-in-Command Rs. 50; Adj. and Qr. Master Rs. 100 and 75 respectively, and the unit transport officer Rs. 40. On this head, there would be a saving of about Rs. 16 to 18 lakhs. Formerly the Commandant's allowance was Rs. 600 p. m. Each Company Commandant got Rs. 250 *i. e.* in all Rs. 1,000, Adj. Rs. 400 and Qr. Master Rs. 300.

**23. Difference in pay etc. of a British Officer in a British unit, and in an Indian unit**

		Pay of Rank	British unit Pay etc.	Indian unit Pay etc.
Lt. Colonel	...	1,225	1,750	1,950
Major	...	1,035	1,285	1,485
		915		
Captain	...	765	855	1,005
		655		
Lieutenant	...	435	510	610

(The pay is according to grades in these various Ranks. The grades are dependent on a settled number of years' service. We have taken only the approximate average. The other columns include allowances as well).

The comparative figures showing the emoluments of a British officer in a British unit and a British officer in an Indian unit, speak for themselves. This is one of the reasons why Indianization is urged. If this difference is removed, and the pay of the officer in the Indian unit is equalized with that of the British officer in the British unit, it would automatically save Rs. 50 lakhs or so.

**24. Transportation:**—The cost of transportation, conservancy, hot weather establishment and other miscellaneous charges amount to Rs. 3.25 crores in all. Out of this, 2.25 crores is the expenditure incurred in India, and one crore is incurred on this head in England. A saving of about 2.50 crores could be effected. (See chap. X ).

**25. Payments Made in England:**— Payments made in England amount to 13.22 crores. In fact this payment is made to England as a sort of hire money or maintenance money, for the British services in India. We will illustrate only one point by referring to an item, which amounts to 1.78 crores. The item is the capitation charges of the British troops serving in India, at the rate of about £25 per year per British soldier. There are roughly 60,000 British soldiers in India, and at the rate of £25 per head the amount will come to £15,00,000 i. e. 1.78 crores of rupees. The British soldiers in India are paid 4 times. Their allowances and their rates are even 2 to 3 times more than those of the

Indian soldiers. Besides they get the best medical help from the costly R. A. M. C. service. They also get the best and most expensive quarters. In short, the British soldier gets every thing best in India, and, over and above this, India pays to England a sort of rent or hire money of 1·78 crores as capitation charges, as stated above. It is usually argued that this money is spent on Recruiting etc. in England.

Secondly, in addition to the above, India pays about 15 to 20 lakhs, as "Unemployment Insurance" money, and also another sum for "National Health Insurance" to the extent of 5 to 7 lakhs. In short, the payment of the whole amount of 13·22 crores, made to England, is mostly of the nature shown above and hence this huge sum of 13·22 crores would be automatically saved, if only British troops agreed to serve under the same conditions, and the same rate of pay etc., as that of an Indian soldier. If the British soldier is not prepared to agree to this or is unwilling to serve under an Indian King's commissioned officer—as stated by Sir Samuel Hoare and others—then it is better that he should be allowed to go to England. A saving of 13·22 crores,—the payment of which is made in England for the British service—would be effected.

Payment made in England on the heads of Items 26 to 31, as shown in the statement, are included in the above mentioned sum of 13·22 crores.

But, on all these main heads, a sum of 21·37 crores is spent in India again.

**26 to 29. Other Charges :—**The money spent in India on the standing army, part A of the Budget is 36·56 crores. The following are the main heads.



- (1) Pay and allowances of the fighting services.
- (2) Administrative services.
- (3) Manufacturing establishment.
- (4) Army headquarters staff and commands etc.
- (5) Stores and equipment.
- (6) Special services.
- (7) Transportation, conservancy etc.

We have already written about the saving on the Main Head (1), above.

On the heads 2, 3, 4, 5, of the Budget, the following saving could be effected. On No. 2 head, 2·32 crores; on No. 3 head, about 60 lakhs; No. 4 head, about 35 lakhs; No. 5 head, 1·25 crores ; No. 7, about 2·50 crores.

**30. Military Engineering Service:—**A sum of 4·66 crores is spent on this head; out of which 2·50 crores could be saved.

**31. B. O. Ranks, as Clerks:—**There are more than a thousand British clerks, storekeepers etc. in the army service, whose replacement by Indian personnel would effect a saving of 1·15 crores and more.

To sum up, we shall be saving a sum of 28 to 32 crores, if only the British troops agreed to serve under Indian conditions and Indian rates of pay; or if the British troops are replaced by Indian troops.

**Table II, showing some samples of funny allowances**

A few allowances	P. & A. Vol. ii 1929		British	Indian	Re. mark
	Page	Para			
1 Seeds & soldiers garden's	70	80 IV	8000		P. & A. Vol. ii 1929
2 Language rewards	62	1138			..
3 Conservancy Allowance	149-50	252 B			..
4 P. S. C. allowance	161	238	Rs. 25 p.m.		..
5 Clothing compensation for loss of equipment etc.	44-46	101-9			..

6	Trademen's allowance	58	336	Rs. 25 p.m.		
7	Chaplain's horse allowance	188	308	Rs. 30 p.m.		
8	Nurse & Matron's ..	168	286	B Rs. 75 p.m.		
9	Cooking & crockery ..	91	203	Rs. 1 p.m.		
10	Stabling allowance			per boy		
11	Sycc ..					
12	Forage ..	184-87	303-6			
13	Horse ..	188-89	307-11			
14	Chiropodists ..					P.&A. 1929 Vol. ii
15	Army, educational corps allowance	88	201			
16	Library corps	88	201	8750		..
17	.. lighting allowance	89	201	4800		..
18	Munshis British units allowance	167	286.	20	nil	..
			XVIII			
19	Victualling agent allowance				nil	..
20	Tentage ..	182	302			..
21	Maternity ..	199	371			..
22	Chargers purchase allowance	172	294			..
23	Telegraph training allowance	56	136 IV			..
24	Shorthand pro. ..	56	136 IX			..
25	Furniture. ..	161	282			..
26	Ice ..	161	285	8 As. p.m.		..
27	BURMA, language ..	162	286	Rs. 105 p.m.		..
28	.. (Local) nurses ..	139	239			..
29	Band ..	101	209	60000		..
30	Orphans & widow ..	148	251			..
31	Funeral ..	155	264	130	20	..
32	Dismissed men's ..	118	298			..
33	Annuities for medals ..	58	137			..
34	Ration ..	175-77	206 D			..

The above statement is given as a sample, to show the kinds of allowances, that are given to the British troops from the cradle to the grave. We have only given a few in this statement. Note—The references are quoted from Pay and Allowance Regulations, 1929, in the remarks column, and those that are not quoted are from the older edition of Pay and Allowance Regulations. The page and para differ in the old and new editions, and in the case of some rates of allowances as well. But for all general purposes of information we can take any—the old or new—as the change is immaterial.

### Some Other Types of Allowances

We give below certain allowances, which could be called charities or luxuries. We would only enumerate

a few, just to impress our readers with the fact that the British Army in India is only a white elephant feeding on the Indian exchequer. To stop this harm, the best and simple remedy would be to replace the costly British troops by cheap and more efficient Indian troops.

**Soldiers' Garden Seeds :—**A considerable grant is given to every company, squadron or section of each British unit. Roughly, every British Battalion may have about 4 to 5 company gardens. There are forty-five Infantry Battalions, so, in all there are 180 to 225 gardens belonging to the British infantry regiments only. This grant is in the form of soldiers' gardening seeds' allowance, and is intended not only to encourage the British soldiers, but in fact to provide some of them with a vocation after they retire from service. The soldiers who look after the company or battalion gardens may afterwards be sent to vocational training courses at Hounslow and Catterick to undergo the course of a gardener, or an agriculturist, and all this is done at India's cost and expense to help the 'Imperial scheme.'

The same is the case with other British units also. We believe that invariably in all cases, where the British troops are stationed, adequate land for soldiers' gardens is acquired, when already not existing in the regimental premises.

Moreover, the upkeep and improvement of these gardens is carried on at government expense and their yield is sold at a cheap rate to the soldiers' and N. C. Os'messes.

**Language Rewards:—**A certain number of officers who study the languages of the adjacent countries, with a view to be useful in times of war as interpreters or to help the staff in the deciphering of certain captured documents and messages, help ultimately to achieve

success in war. So far as India is concerned, the officers of the Indian Army, both Indian and British, ought to study the frontier languages more, and gain greater knowledge of them; but very few facilities are given to Indians.

**Language:—**Referring to 1931-32 budget ( page 102 ) we find, that sums of 77000 and 28000 are spent on British and Indian troops. ( Both include men and officers for language rewards.)

The following (Table III) will show the per capita and percentage. ( Language reward cost )

Troops	Strength	Money spent on language rewards	Per capita (soldier)	Per- centage Ratio
British	60,000	77,000	8	88
Indian	1,60,000	28,000	1	12

The money spent on British soldiers and officers is about 8 times more than the Indians, and the percentage of the total money spent on language rewards is 88 on the British as against only 12 on the Indian.

The difference and the treatment speak for themselves.

**P. S. C. Allowance:—**This allowance is given to all those graduates of the staff college, ( Camberley or Quetta ) who are supernumerary to the list, and who do not serve anywhere on the staff in district, brigades or the A. H. Q. in its various branches. Really speaking, the staff college in Quetta which was established in 1905, was quite an unnecessary institution as the British officer was already being sent to Camberley. The annual cost of the school is roughly

8½ lacs. From 1905 till 1931 during a period of 26 years, they have spent about 3 crores and a quarter on this institution, with no gain to India. The institution by itself is a necessity—if only the Indian lads—returned from Sandhurst,—were allowed to take advantage of it. All the advantage is derived by the Britishers, by training British officers' superfluous number, at India's cost, with a view to benefit the British army in England.

Granting that the allowance is quite trivial *i. e.* Rs. 25 p. m. or Rs. 300 annually, still, it clearly shows the way in which best money is most lavishly spent. If the officers are not doing any staff duty, it is rather extravagant to give them these allowances.

**Band Compensation :—**Huge amounts are spent annually to maintain British bands and their personnel, and in buying English instruments of bands. Every British cavalry and infantry regiment, and invariably all Battery Brigades, have a band consisting of about 40 to 52 British musicians. These musicians roughly number 2750. They are no good as soldiers, but they are there, *only to give the British soldiers some delight and pleasure after their so-called hard work.*

If militarily it were a necessity to maintain bands, the 21 Indian cavalry regiments, which do not maintain any band, should be supposed to have no military efficiency. But so far as military efficiency goes, it is not that the Indian troops are less efficient, but perhaps they are even more efficient than their British colleagues Toms, Dicks and Harrys.

The 21 Indian cavalry regiments get only Rs. 100 as band allowance, while the 5 British cavalry regiments get Rs. 200 per month. (Indian cavalry was given no allowance 5 or 6 years before.)

The 45 British Infantry Battalions get each Rs. 200 per month as band allowance, while the (121) Indian Infantry Battalions get only Rs. 100 per month. The invidious distinction between the British Infantry and the Indian Infantry is too clear, and needs no explanation. The rank and file are British in one, and Indian in the other. In both, there are British officers.

This band allowance, roughly a sum of about 2 lacs, can be very easily saved; and if at all Indian units want a band it could be maintained very cheaply.

Besides, the pay and allowance of 2750 British musicians would amount to about half a crore. These musicians are not militarily a necessity. If we had to adjust the income to expenditure, we would certainly do away with these militarily unnecessary things.

**Table IV, showing comparative rates of pay of  
British Other Ranks (and junior officers) and  
Indian Other Ranks (including officers)**

British other Ranks		Indian other Ranks		Ratio between the British and Indian soldiers'	
British Ranks	Daily pay s. d.    Monthly pay Rs. a. p.	Indian Ranks	Monthly pay Rs. a. p.	months pay respectively	
				Br.	Ind.
Soldier I grade	2   9   55 0 0	Soldier	16 0 0	3 5	1
Soldier II grade after two years	3   6   71 0 0	Soldier	16 0 0	4 5	1
Soldier III grade		Soldier	16 0 0		
Lance Corporal	4   3   86 8 0	Lance Naik	18 0 0	4 75	1
Corporal	5   0   101 8 0	Naik	22 0 0	4 5	1
Lance Sergeant	5   6   111 8 0	Lance Havaldar	23 8 0	4 75	1
Sergeant	7   6   144 0 0	Havaldar	25 0 0	5 75	1
Company Quarter- Master Sergeant	9   6   193 0 0	Company Quarter- Master Havaldar	33 0 0	5 75	1

## Colour Sergeant

R. Q. M. Sergeant	12	0 244 0 0	R. Q. M. Havaldar	35	0 0	6'25.	1
Regt. Sgt. Major	14	0 284 8 0	Regimental Havaldar Major	40	0 0	7' 1:	1
2nd Lieutenant		435 0 0	Jamadar	75	0 0	6:	1
.. after 1 year		510 0 0	Jamadar after 1 year	80	0 0	6'25:	1
.. after 5 years		610 0 0	Jamadar after 5 years and above	100	0 0	6:	1
.. after 7 years			Subhedar	130			
			Subhedar	160			

## Note to the Statement

1. Various arms of service have various rates of pay.

2. Various rates are in force. They are dependent on ranks, qualifications, service and active performance of duty.

3. For general purposes, the average cost of a British soldier in the ranks has been taken for calculation.

4. Authority for pay of British soldiers is Pay and Allowance Regulations, Part I, 1929, para 43, table 1.

5. Authority for rates of Indian troops, is Pay and Allowance Regulations, Part I, 1929, para 53, table 1.

6. Shilling is calculated at the authorized rate of 1s. 6d. per rupee. For 31 days the British soldier's pay at this rate is equal to Rs. 72-5, and for 30 days it is Rs. 70, so a mean of Rs. 71 per month is taken, and the rate of the Other Ranks is calculated on the same basis.

7. If the ratio of the British and the Indian soldiers' pay is calculated after adding the allowances, then the ratio would be still higher.

8. The pay of Company Quarter-Master (Indian) Havaldar, Regimental Quarter-Master Havaldar, and Regimental Havaldar includes their allowances of rupees 8, 10 and 15 each respectively to their rank pay of Rs. 25 per month (for the allowances see p. 85, P. & A. Regulations, 1929, Part I). If at all there be any change in their pay, it is so slight and it would not materially affect the question concerned.

9. An annual increment is not admissible to an Indian officer as a matter of course, but is conditional on his commanding officer certifying as to the Indian officer's efficiency and good conduct. ( This good conduct may mean ' many more things.' )

**Table V—Comparison of certain allowances granted to British and Indian Soldiers**

Name of Allowance	Rate		Rate		Authority
	British	Indian	Taking 100 as the total for both		
1. Messing-allowance per diem	0-3-6	0-10-0	91	9	Para 287, P. & A. Regulations, Pt. ii A. Inst. ( India ) 282 of 1925
2. *Kit allowance quarterly	18-0-0	4-7-0	80	20	
3. *Clothing allowance quarterly	9-0-0	5-5-0	63	37	
4. Hair cutting allowance	3-0-0	0	100	0	
5. Equipment allowance for married soldier monthly	2-4-0	0			These, it is understood, are the rates allowed.
6. Educational prof. pay	0-0-3 d Per day	0	100	0	
7. Military prof. pay per month	7-6-0	2-8-0			P. & A. Regns. Pt. i, Para 48
8. Marriage allowance per month	50-0-0		100	0	P. & A. Regns. Para 248
9. Maternity benefit during the period p. m.	30-0-0		100	0	P. & A. Regns. Pt. ii, Para 313
10. Children's allowance upto 4 children	10-0-0		100	0	.. 371
For each addition per month	5-0-0				.. 313



11. School fees; children attending civil schools	Actual fees & Rs. 10 books				P. & A. Regns. Pt. ii, Para 313
		100			.. 241(vii)
12. Furniture allowance for married soldiers	3-4-0	100	0	It is understood this rate is allowed.	
13. Water (plains)	20 gallons	8 gallon	71	29	A Inst. (India) 376 of 1925
.. (hill)	15 gallons	5 gallons	75	25	
14. Rewards (meritorious services)	80				
Rewards		25	76	24	P. & A. Regns. Pt. ii, Para 157
Good conduct	50	25	67	33	
15. Funeral Allow.	130	20	86	14	264

\* *Note*.—It is understood that the kit and clothing allowances are now consolidated and instead of Rs. 27 & Rs. 9-12 for British and Indian per quarter, they are Rs. 23-10 and Rs. 9-3 respectively.

† This allowance, it is understood, is now included in kit and clothing allowance.

From the above, it will be apparent that wide diversity exists in the rates allowed to the British and Indian soldiers for the several items, and there can be no doubt that a great saving will result if the British soldier is replaced by an Indian soldier.

**Table VI—Comparative expenditure incurred on a British and Indian, cavalry and infantry units**

	Cavalry			Infantry		
	Indian	British	Ratio Approximate	Indian	British	Ratio Approximate
1. Strength each unit	494	600		742 (919) Gurkhas	883	
2. Prize money per unit	9571	15800	1:1.65	6466	11043	1:1.7
3. Incidental expenses per unit	1190	2400	1:2	1681	3304	1:1.95
4. Each British officer's average pay	13639	6859	2:1	10789	6800	1:1.6
5. Miscellaneous per unit				689	869	

In this statement we show the comparative amount spent on the British and Indian units under certain heads in the Army Budget (1931-32). It will be seen from the statement that though the purpose is the same, less money is spent on Indian units.

1. Prize money :—The money spent on prizes, for skill at arms etc., on a British trooper is 1·65 times more than his comrade the Indian. This is how we are trained and encouraged.

2. Incidental expenses :—The money spent on a British unit of cavalry and infantry is about twice that on the Indian unit.

3. British officer's pay :—It will also be seen from the figures in the Budget, that the British officer of the Indian establishment gets double of what the British officer of a British unit gets. This shows how the British officer in the Indian unit is costly. This is one of the many reasons why the immediate Indianization of the officers is urged.

4. The money spent on miscellaneous expenditure on a British unit is about 1½ times that of an Indian unit.

5. The above statement has been based on the figures shown under budget estimate 1930-31 in Army Budget 1931-32 (pp. 40, 41, 50 and 51).

**Table VII. Comparative allowances for infantry and cavalry units, both British and Indian.**

Serial No.	Name of allowance	Cavalry				Infantry				Per annum or Per month
		British		Indian		British		Indian		
		Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.	
1	Band allowance	200	0	100	0	200	0	100	0	
2	Bayonet fighting ..									
3	Bells and targets ..									P. A.
4	Lines contingent ..	12	0	11	4	9	0			Each Horse
5	Educational training grant	0	7	0	3	0	7	0	3	P. M.
6	Libraries	176	8	nil		176	8	nil		Each Man P. A.

7	Library lighting allowance	4 0	nil	6 0	nil	P. M.
8	Material for lance & sword	.	.	.	.	.
9	Marking equipment	90 0				P. M.
10	Office allowance Adjutant	90 0		105 0		P. M.
11	Office allee. Quartermaster	85 0		85 0		..
12	Officer mess allowance	150 0	125 0	150 0	125 0	..
13	Paint and brushes ..	.	.	.	.	..
14	Petty stores ..	18 0	nil	18 0	60 0	P. A.
15	Petty supplies ..	1050 0	..	1300 0		..
16	Petty supplies ..	670 0	..	850 0	140 0	..
17	Ranges & musk. appliances	.	.	.	.	..
18	Repairs of arms, accoutrement	240 0	Reserves	180 0	P.	Per Squadron.
19	Repairs of foils & gloves	20 0	nil	.	.	..
20	Riding schools and jumps initials	360 0	360 0			..
21	Stationery allowance	980 0	720 0	980 0	720 0	..
22	Upkeep of cycles	20 0	20 0	20 0	20 0	Per Cycle

(1) For British Cavalry allowances refer to Para 201, Page 89 of P. and A. R., Part ii, 1929.

(2) For Indian Cavalry allowances refer to Para 218, Page 110, P. and A. R., Part ii, 1929.

(3) For British Infantry allowances refer to Para 269, Page 102—Ditto.

(4) For Indian Infantry allowances refer to Para 236, Page 135—Ditto.

## Comparison of Allowances to British and Indian Units

The difference between the treatment and expenditure of a British and Indian unit is easily seen from the above table. The Indian cavalry had no band-allowance about 6 years before; but now they are given that band allowance. Instead of spending the money in the right way, it appears the money is spent on playing upon the Indian soldier's vanity and weaknesses.

It appears that Indian units do not require a library, therefore they have no allowances. This is how we are trained. **Repair of Arms :** If no money is required for Indian troops, why should an allowance be required for British units ?

The difference in the stationery allowance speaks for the mentality and ways. We are restricted by space and, therefore, we leave the rest to the reader.

**Statement ( comparative ) of England and India showing the cost of the Defence in its various branches; also the total cost.**

**Table VIII**

	Expenditure in CRORES on						Percentage of Total Defence Exp. to Income
	Army	Navy	Air	Other Budgets	Middle East	Total De- fence	
<b>England (a)</b>	41.56	58.00	15.35	2.03	3.54	120.69	14.75
<b>India (b)</b>	53.86	1.84	2.36	Nil	Nil	57.07	(c) 45.29

(a), (c) The figures in this statement are taken from Toynbee's book '*Survey of International Affairs*,' 1928, (p. 93) and he has taken these figures from the *Armament Year-Book for the League of Nations for the year 1927-28*.

(b) These figures are taken from *Army Budget India, 1929-30*.

**Statement showing the comparative percentages of  
army (Land forces) expenditure to net defence  
expenditure—of England and India**

**Table IX**

	Total Defence Expendi- ture	Defence Expendi- ture on army (Land forces)	Percentage of Army (Land forces) Expenditure to total Def. Expenditure
England	120.69	41.56	34.7
India	57.07	53.86	94.5

Table VIII shows the amount spent on different branches of defence both in England and India. England spends 41.56 crores of rupees on the army, out of her total defence expenditure which is 120.69 crores of rupees. Whereas India spends 53.86 crores on her army out of her total defence expenditure of 57.07 crores of rupees. This means England spends only 34.7 percent of her defence expenditure on the army (Land forces), while India alone spends 94.5 percent.

This difference could easily be avoided, if only the same systems of 'preparedness' for the defence are followed in India as in England. The methods of cheap defence system are national institutions like the rifle clubs, territorials, reserves, supernumerary reserves, county associations, junior O. T. Cs. in schools, senior O. T. Cs. in Colleges and Universities, subjects of military history and military science in the Universities for degree exams., and national defence leagues and associations in the country. If only the policy of mistrust disappears, India can very easily save

the amount that is at present so uselessly spent on her army (land forces), specially the British troops part.

It would be seen from the table below, that India by following the above system, adopted in England to maintain a cheap army (the land forces), will be enabled to reduce the expenditure to 30 crores and more, which will be a clear saving.

Table XI showing Probable Savings

	Defence Army's strength in thousands	Present Army cost in crores	Defence Army's cost in crores	Savings in crores
Assuming that India adopts Defence System (cheap) like England and spends only the same percentage of Def. Exp. at present 2.76 times.	144 220	53	23.5 35.9	30 18
Assuming that the British soldiers' cost is 3 times.	144 220	53	22.4 34.3	31 19
Assuming that the British soldiers' cost is 4 times.	144 220	53	19.1 26.3	34 27
Assuming that the British soldiers' cost is 5 times.	144 220	53	16.6 25.3	37 28

England maintains an army (Land forces) of 1,44,000 at the cost of roughly 41 crores, while India's

army consists of 60,000 British and 1,60,000 Indian, and the amount of her expenditure is 53·86 crores.

Looking to the ratio of 34 and 95 and bearing in mind the fact that a British soldier is three times costlier than an Indian, as shown below, we can say that instead of 60,000 British troops, we can maintain about thrice the number of Indian soldiers in the very same cost, i. e. the cost which we spend on these 60,000 British soldiers.

That means for 60,000 British and 1,60,000 Indians composing the Indian army, we can have 1,80,000 Indians (in place of the British) and 1,60,000 Indians that we already have to-day, at the same cost, that is, 53 crores. But since the Indian Army of defence maintains at present a strength of only 2,20,000, the proportionate expenditure on 2,20,000 Indian soldiers would be 34·3 crores only, and thus, a saving of nearly 19 crores is clearly made.

We maintain another view. We do not think that such a huge force of 2,20,000 (composed of 60,000 British and 1,60,000 Indians) is necessary for India's defence. The simple reason for this is, that up till now we fought 72 campaigns on our frontier, and the largest army that was ever brought in the field, was always within a lac, and hence we suggest—that a force of 1,44,000 similar to that of England will sufficiently serve the purpose of India's defence, both strategically and politically.

A greater portion of the Indian army is more for Imperial purposes than for purposes of Indian defence. Mr. F. G. Pratt, I. C. S. (Retired), in his paper which was published by the Indian Conciliation Group of Britain, says, "The Field Army of 40,000 men is organised so as to possess the fullest measure of

mobility and offensive power, with as high a standard as possible of technical equipment." He again says, "The Field Army is in fact an *expeditionary force for offensive purposes outside of India*. Compared with the organisations in India what is the state of things in the Dominions?" Mr. Pratt quotes Captain Siddell-Hart to show that "the *military forces of the Dominions in peace time are organised for self-defence, not as expeditionary forces*. The peace time force consists of a small permanent nucleus which provides the instructional cadre for the main armed body—a citizen militia. Why should there be this difference in the case of India?"<sup>1</sup>

It might also be argued, that a difficulty regarding reinforcements and reserves would arise, but the adoption of the cheap methods of defence suggested by us above, would most efficiently and adequately obviate all these difficulties. Therefore, really speaking, India does not require the present strength of the Army, for her Defence. It might be conveniently reduced and a still further saving may thus be effected.

II. Again looking to the appropriation accounts 1929 and '30 (p. 120), we find that the cost of maintaining an Indian soldier (Infantry) and a British soldier (Infantry) is 693 and 1839 respectively, or roughly one-third. Accepting that an army of 2,20,000 is necessary for the defence of India (60,000 British troops, if replaced, are equal to 180,000 Indians) the cost of 2,20,000 Indian troops would be 34·3 crores and the saving would be about 19 crores. But if 1,44,000 are accepted as sufficient, as suggested by us, the cost would be 22·4 crores and the saving would be about 31 crores.

III. Mr. Fenner Brockway, M. P., in his book '*Indian Crisis*' says (page 44), "*British soldier costs 4 times than an Indian*." Assuming this, the 60,000



British troops are equivalent to 2,40,000 Indian troops. Adding to this the 1,60,000 Indian troops, it can be said that with 53 crores that we spend on the land forces, we can maintain an army of 4,00,000 Indian troops. Assuming that the army of 2,20,000 is necessary for the defence of India, the cost of the same would be only 26.3 crores, thus making a total saving of 27 crores. In the other case, that is, accepting that 1,44,000 are sufficient for the defence of India, the total cost would be 19.1 crores and the net saving would be 34 crores.

IV. From Table IV, showing the comparative rates of pay of the British soldier and the Indian soldier, we find that the British soldier's cost is about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  times that of an Indian. Besides taking into consideration the difference in a British and an Indian soldier's allowances, the ratio would be much higher; in addition to this, if the huge expenditure on transportation, capitulation and non-effective charges, are also taken into consideration the ratio would be still higher *i. e.* somewhere between 5 to 7 times. Assuming then, that the British soldier costs 5 times more, we find that in the 1st case *i. e.* for an army of 2,20,000 the cost would be only 25.3 crores, and a net saving of 28 crores would occur; and in the 2nd case *i. e.* for an army of 1,44,000 the cost would be only 16.5 crores, and the saving would be 37 crores.

We indicate one more interesting point here. Canada possesses 97 lakhs of population of which about 11.97 lakhs are trained militarily, that is, over 12% of the people have received military training. If we exclude women and children under 15 from total population, (*i. e.* 70%) then it could be seen that nearly 30% of the manhood or the man-power of Canada is ready at any time at the beck and call of the nation. Canada

spends only 4.75% of her total income on this head. India having approximately 18 crores of male population (excluding women) hardly trains about  $\frac{1}{2}$  lakh of her manpower out of these 18 crores, i. e.  $\frac{1}{3600}$ th of her manpower; and spends approximately about 45% of the total income. Canada spends 4% of the income for the 30% of the manpower while India spends 45% for  $\frac{1}{3600}$  of her manpower. (Ref. for figures to Army Budgets and also Report on the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Committee for India; and Toynbee's Survey of International affairs 1928, for Canada). Now conversely taking the parallel of Canada, if 4% of the income of Canada is spent for 30% of her manpower, how many per cent of manpower in India should be trained for the 45% expenditure of her income? And this is only when we compare Canada's meagre expenses. Were we to have a parallel with England or France in this respect, what an amount of manpower could be trained and that too with far less expenditure than at present!

**Table XII showing the percentage of Defence Expenditure to the Income**

No.	Country	Population in Millions		Militarily trained population	Income	% of Defence expenditure to income
		Total	male			
1	England	45 M.	22	60 lakhs	Million £ 800	14.75
2	France	4.			Franks 4872	18.75
3	Canada	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	11 Lakhs	crores Dollars 455	4.75
4	India	350	175	less than 1 lakh	Millions 134 Rs. crores	45.29

( The above will give an idea of the Militarily trained manhood of each country ).

India is the only country, which is spending more than 45% of her income on defence; other countries, for instance, Canada, Newzealand, Australia spend only 4, 3, 5, 6, percent respectively. We do not quite agree with the figure of 45.29 because, if we want to find out the real figure, we shall have to include the partial cost of some other departments such as the Railway (Strategical), Post, Telegraph, P. W. D. Roads and Buildings etc. over and above the 12.30 crores that we spend on the police force for our Defence ( protection ) in addition to the internal defence troops.

The reasons for including these other heads are quite patent. They might not have been so obvious to the general reader. Let him, however, consider for a moment, why the government is so very anxious to maintain several railway lines, which are not paying in themselves. They are strategical railways, which are not used for the people's benefit, and are yet maintained at a very high cost ( about 2 crores' deficit annually ) purely for military purposes. We find that the Postal and Telegraphic departments are likewise supported at a very high incidence of taxation on the public; and are amalgamated only for reduction of cost. They are maintained at so prohibitive a cost, and a portion of that cost is purely for military purpose.

In England's Army Budget, a sum of £20,39,090 or Rs. 2 crores is spent under the head 'of " Expenditure charged to other budgets." Toynbee gives an explanation of this " other expenditure and budget." He says, the money is spent on " services such as Postal service, rendered free by other departments. " 2

The camping grounds, landing grounds and many other items are included in the districts civil budgets. Several other items which are tabulated under the P. W. D. and roads, buildings, and certain extra and double bridges, unused roads etc. which are not for the public's convenience, are none but military in their purpose. The grouping of all these heads as non-military, in the ordinary schedule is very cleverly done. But one cannot afford to be blind to the real purpose for which they are created and maintained.

Besides various other departments, such as the telegraph, Frontier watch and ward, etc., spend monies indirectly for the defence. By charging all the above cost to the Civil Budget, the defence expenditure is made to appear only 45·29 percent. If all the other items are added, we are sure that it will not be less than 66 percent or so.

Thus we believe, that India is made to spend about 66% of her revenue on her army alone,—which is maintained more for Imperial purposes than for her defence.

We can maintain an army of the same strength at a considerably less cost, if only the British troops are replaced.

We can also get a huge militarily trained population even with spending only  $\frac{1}{2}$  the money that we spend to-day on our defence, and yet we shall have the finest army of which any nation could be proud but to achieve this, the institutions necessary for cheap defence—like the Rifle clubs, territorials, O. T. Cs. etc.—have to be immediately started in the country.

We can thus save a sum somewhere between Rs. 28 crores to 38 crores and more.



**PART III**

**REPLACEMENT PLEA** *Contd.*

( Extravagant Expenditure )



## **PART III**

### **CHAPTER IX**

#### **ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION**

We deal in this Part with the general nature of extravagances. The causes for such extravagant expenditure have already been dealt with previously. They are to be found in the policies, which the Britishers adopt in the administration and organisation of the Army in its various phases, such as (1) The policy of creating distinctive units and corps; (2) The policy of preserving that distinctiveness; (3) Policy of divide et impera; (4) Policy of the question of proportion of British troops; (5) Policy of distribution of troops; (6) Policy of not giving out the details of expenditure—such as on the question of 'Internal Defence'; (7) Policy of keeping army budget non-votable; (8) Policy of disagreeing to the Indian proposal of a Defence Minister and the control of the Army; (9) Policy of class composition; (10) Policy of recruiting; (11) Martial and non-martial; (12) Policy of training; (13) Policy of 'No short service system' in India; (14) Policy of 'No large reserves in India'; (15) Policy of disarming; (16) Policy of concentration; distribution and localization of units; (17) Policy of maintaining bar to enter into all the arms of the Army.

The extravagant administration and organisation affects Indian taxpayers. We, therefore, try to give a few examples, from 6 main branches of the Army administration and organization, such as the (1) Administration and organisation; (2) Movements and quartering;



(3) Training; (4) Medical; (5) Provision and supplies; (6) Finance (Capitation). We deal with all these in this Part from chapters IX to XIV.

We do not necessarily restrict ourselves to the British soldiers alone. But we consider the general aspect, *i.e.*, the Economic aspect of the Army policy; its effects on the administration and organisation of the Army.

The previous study of the 28-32 crores reduction scheme is more of a financial nature and character. We wish to amplify some parts of it by illustrations in the following chapters.

All principles of adjusting finance are ignored in every branch of Defence Expenditure incurred on the British troops of the Indian Army.

"The Inchcape Committee in her report of 1923 has clearly stated that India cannot afford this expenditure." <sup>1</sup>

The *economic test* of the expenditure depends on the productiveness of economic welfare and if this is true and sound, then it shall have to be said, that the expenditure incurred on the Costly British troops in India is unjust, as it is unproductive of any economic welfare of the Indian tax-payer, who pays for it.

Civil appointments :—It has been suggested by the Eden Committee in 1879, "*that these civil appointments of military officers should be discontinued.*" But in spite of these recommendations, the policy is continuously and consistently followed.

"But supposing it to be admitted that the interests of individuals must give place to those of the state; that the efficiency of the native army is still to be of less consideration than that of the efficiency of the minor

branches of the civil administration, and that the nominations to the staff corps will keep pace with the demand, still I would submit for consideration **whether such civil requirements could not be adequately met by a much cheaper system.**"<sup>2</sup>

Sir J. Strachey says, "The officers of the Indian army hold the majority of the appointments in the political,—as we should call it in England, the diplomatic department—and many administrative and judicial offices in non-regulated provinces."<sup>3</sup>

(It is all the more so even to-day).

From the above, the policy of the government is made quite clear.

To make it more clear, it could be said that in every Department of the Administration, whether Civil Engineering, Political, Police, Judicial, even Educational, Survey, Railways, Post, Telegraphs, Forest, Irrigation, Roads and Buildings, Trade and Commerce, Prisons, Ports, Industries, Medical, Public Health, Agriculture, Scientific Departments and other miscellaneous Departments, officers have either been transferred permanently or temporarily, or they hold commissions in A. I. R. O. or such other forces.

If only one were to see the civil list and the army list one would be impressed with this policy.

The underlying idea in maintaining military officers with high rank and consequently high pay could only be based on one principle, and that is to help the British Internal Defence idea, by securing co-operation, co-ordination of efforts and policy for the achievement of the one objective, towards which the whole policy is directed, that is, to suppress an 'Internal Rising or an armed rebellion of the Native army, or rebellion by the

population.' It is not possible to get any appreciably large number of British troops from England, at any time they may be wanted.

These military officers in the civil departments are only meant for such emergencies. They are not meant to be utilized for service outside India, even on an occasion like the Great World War. This might be read from what Commander Wedgwood has to say.

He says, "At the time of the return put before us, probably July 1916, only 182 civilian officials, less than 1% of the available men, had been given leave to join the Indian army reserve, and then only, according to Sir Beauchamp Duff, for service in India itself. This, Sir Beauchamp attributed to the India Office in this country" (England).

This means then, that civil officials and others are meant for being used, only for 'internal service or defence' while every Indian available was needed in Europe.

This in a way gives an idea as to what is really meant by 'Internal Defence' or 'Internal Security.'

From the Indian point of view, this policy of maintaining the British officers (with military training) in almost all branches of the civil administration unnecessarily, is against India's interest.

### **The Administrative Extravagance**

Superfluous officers in the Army :—"The Innes Committee recommended that the authorised establishment of army head-quarters, excluding attached officers, be reduced from 153 to 108. The Commander-in-Chief has agreed that the number of officers should be reduced to 134." *"But we think further reductions possible."*<sup>5</sup>

### The figures of officers of A. H. Q. :—

Existent in 1923-24	Proposed by the Committee	Accepted by C. in C.	Existing in the years						
			1924-1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931-32
153	108	134	138	126	131	136	142	144	143

*Note:—*See Army Budgets of respective years for figures.

Even though the C-in-C agreed with the Inchcape Committee, to reduce the number of army head-quarters staff, yet it was not done. There was a slow rise and fall under a lame but technically dressed excuse—an excuse which cannot be refuted by the M. L. As or the people, to whom the Army Book is a closely guarded and sealed book; only because the intelligentsia is kept out of the army by a consistent policy. They are stamped as the 'agitator class' or the 'Babu shabu class.' They are also stamped as unfit for military service with 'their smattering of Algebra and cramming of John Stuart Mill.' It is said that, "those only who are of the political mind want the whole box of Indian toys to play with," (specially the army toy). The above remarks show, how the Englishman is disposed to consider the Indian demands, and favour Indian aspirations. Unnatural and invidious distinction as martial and non-martial is only made for a political purpose, and that is, to keep the educated classes or the intelligentsia out of the army.

To support the unwarranted change, and the consequential rise and fall in the number of officers, argument may be brought forth, and technical reasons may be assigned, but they could be passed unchallenged by people who are unfortunately kept ignorant in these matters. The brain of the country is not

allowed to get into the army, for reasons now too apparent to need any mention.

The army is divided into 4 branches: the G, A, Q, and the M. E. branch. These 4 branches have the following sub-branches.

The G. branch:—Plans and operations (internal and external schemes), Intelligence branch, Training; supervision and operation, Staff duties, Communications, Policy etc.

The A. branch:—Discipline, Law, Rules and Regulations, Medical and Sanitary, personal services, Ceremonial, pay, provisions, recruiting, mobilization, organization etc.

The Q. branch:—Maintenance of provision of food stuff, Forage, Fuel, Clothing, Arms and Armaments, Ammunition, Kit, Equipment, General stores and material, Transportation services, Movement and quartering of troops, I. A. S. C., Grass farms, Dairies, Remount, Vet. Service, Cantonments, Administration, Garrison and Regimental Institutes etc.

M. E. Services:—Accommodation, Buildings (Maintenance), Roads, Electricity, Defences, Fortifications, Water etc.

There are so many superfluous, unnecessary incompetent and inefficient officers in all these various services. They have not got much work and are quite unsuitable and some of them are even incompetent. General Macmunn says:—"But in India the recruiting of the Supply and Transport corps is from the regiments or from Sandhurst, while it got a lot of young men who played polo nicely and looked more like the rest of the army or who like any other regimental officer of parts,

made a good transport officer, *did not attract anything very much in the way of brains.* Coming on in the nineties, who has started under the old ways happened to be a brilliant crowd but the next layer was *pretty dull stuff* and thus was what bore brunt of the world war.

General MacMunn says, "So much was this the case that I did not find any one in 1920, after trying their much recommended next senior, fit to take the head of the corps." 6

Reasons for enhancing Departmental Pay in the Indian Army.

"Now the Commissariat service does not have its origin in those who seek the bubble reputation. From time immemorial since there has been a standing Army, you must get your commissariat establishment from civil life or from those who have entered the Army through the usual commissioned channels. You will, therefore, only get those of the latter category who for reasons of their pocket, or because they do not like regimental life, enter the departments. Now it does not necessarily follow that those who do not like regimental life are 'rotters'. There are many excellent natures and admirable brains for whom the not very intelligent life of a regimental mess, despite its delightful camaraderie, is anathema. They and those who have to assist in the education of their brothers and sisters—no rare thing in the family of an officer's widow—or who have contracted early matrimony on scanty resources, are the recruiting ground of all the Army departments, except the medical and veterinary services. *Incidentally this is the reason for enhancing departmental pay.*" 7

*From the above it will be quite clear, how our best money was and is ill spent in feeding officers—who only ‘played polo nicely,’ ‘who were a brilliant crowd’ and ‘who were dull stuff,’ but from amongst whom General Macmunn did not find a single officer to take the head of the corps, even ‘after trying their much recommended senior’ officer.*

*This was and is the kind of administrative policy. “We may not require very highly trained (British) Infantry to protect or police India, but we may require numbers, and of the Ruling Complexion.”* <sup>8</sup>

The above shows, that the policy is to create that feeling of ‘Awe’ and ‘moral fear’.

This only reveals in its true perspective, the irresponsible attitude of our so-called Army Technical Experts, whose words, opinions and decisions are supposed to be final in matters relating to Indian Army Administration. Could anything be more untrue?

### **B. O. R. Clerks in Various Army Branches**

The following statement of clerks including B. O. Rs, employed in 50 or more different branch offices, stores etc., shows the huge number.

Indians are not supposed to be fit, even for some of these administrative lines and even for such routine work of clerks, store-keepers, fitters, dairymen, conductors, chequers, and office clerks etc. or teachers in various Army schools (British), Regimental District and Garrison schools, and clerks etc. in all branches of A. H. Q. offices; in Clothing depots, Boot depots, Supply depots, Hospitals, Grass farms etc. Why could not the whole of this service be purely Indian?

**Table II, showing the comparative numbers of clerks, both British and Indian, in the Army Department from 1922 to 1931-32**

Army dept. branches	1922-23	1923-24	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931-32
1. Army Head-quarters. ( 645 )	512	609	682	686	697		769	753
2. Total Miscellaneous			12	8	10	12	4	4
3. Training establishment			53	54	64	64	63	67
4. Educational establishment.			232	245	259	259	296	301
5. Indian army service corps			1425	1396	1411	1444	1608	1326
6. Indian army ordnance corps			558	581	611	600	601	611
7. Medical services			0	78	56			
8. Veterinary service			54	54	51	54	56	56
9. Remount service			54	54	55	355	355	347
10. Miscellaneous establishment			5053	5110	5712	6920		
11. Auxiliary & territorial forces			12	12	12	12	12	12
12. Royal Air Force			397	401	329	340	381	378
13. Adm Staff			10					
14. Indian Army S. corps			39					
<b>Total</b>			8534	8702	9284	10786	11060	1056

*Note :—*Refer the various Army Budgets for the figures.

The table will give an idea of the number of clerks, employed in various branches of the Army offices. There are 10,000 and more clerks in Army offices etc. In addition to the above, in every unit of the Army *i. e.* roughly about 300 units of the Army, you will find soldier-clerks per company, squadron or section, and two or three per regimental or unit headquarters; if you count these also, the total of soldier-clerks alone would amount to another 1500 or so.

You can have an idea, how a small army of 2 lakhs and 20 thousand requires such a huge personnel of



clerks, roughly about  $\frac{1}{10}$  part of the whole strength of the army. This is an army by itself. It is simply ridiculous. The arrangement is extravagant and costly. It can certainly be arranged to work with a smaller clerical staff, if only the policy, or as General Macmunn puts it, the 'Roguary' of certain higher responsible officers does not intervene.

If the British soldier clerks and the other B. O. R. personnel are replaced by Indian clerks and others, it alone would effect a saving of about half a crore and more. But the policy of 'mistrust', perhaps, forbids the employment of Indian clerks in the higher offices of A. H. Q., and others, possibly with a view to guard the secrets of the A. H. Q., lest the Indian clerks divulge certain information, plans or measures, which are not desired to be known by Indians in general,—perhaps, it may be concerned with the 'internal security' or 'internal defence.'

We suggest, that Government immediately consider measures to replace British soldier clerks etc. by Indian personnel. We also suggest, that they reduce the superfluous clerical staff, which appears to be simply ridiculous, and thus reduce the cost of this Clerk-Army. We believe they certainly have not got this huge army of clerks and others in England.

Clerical staffs have increased enormously. Clerical staff rose from 512, 609 to 753 during the years of 1923-24, 1926, 1931 respectively. If you mark the rise from 1923 to 1931 you will find the steady rise in general, but at the same time you cannot fail to see the funny decrease shown in 1923 at once from 645 to 512. Once they are decreased and another year, for no apparent or important reason, the item, its number, its cost is increased. This principle is observed in the Budget in many items.

Secondly, the number of A. H. Q. officers in these corresponding years were 126 in 1926 and 143 in 1931; for 17 extra officers, who themselves were and are perhaps unnecessary, a posse of 144 clerks should have been increased, is a wonder. We ought to thank our Trustees really. Should not we?

These clerks constitute a corps by themselves. The corps is denominated as the Indian corps of clerks, for all other purposes, though not mentioned in that form or term in any Budget. The word Indian usually makes one believe that the Indian corps of clerks certainly contains all Indian clerks. But it is not that. The service is divided into two grades, the upper grade of I. C. C. and the lower grade of I. C. C. (Indian corps of clerks.)

Generally the upper grade is all ex-British soldiers and ex-British non-commissioned officers, or men about to retire. This grade has more pay, and it is called departmental pay. The lowest paid British soldier or non-commissioned officer clerk, with all his various allowances and other things, does not make generally, on an average, less than about Rs. 200 to 250, as a minimum, and the maximum is about 500 to 600. The number of these clerks and other personnel is pretty large, somewhere over 1400.

The lower grade (Indian clerks) have less pay scale, though they practically do all the major portion of the important work in all offices. In fact, it is they who work and run the offices, and yet, the British soldier clerk is said to be a necessity.

It is also possible for some to infer, that in times of 'Internal Rising or a rebellion' these British clerks—generally all retired Army men, soldiers—and Non-Commissioned officers from various units—may be usefully

employed in raising any new temporary 'Mercenary' force of Indians to be hurled against Indian rebels. If this be the idea, it may be in a way a correct solution of the British Military problem of Internal defence, but certainly no solution of the Indian Problem.

Looking at the question of B. O. R's from an Indian view point, it is only too apparent that it is detrimental to the interests of Indians economically and nationally. The replacement would result in a net saving of about 40-50 lakhs or half a crore of rupees approximately: if the number of B. O. Rs. is more than what we have estimated, then the savings effected by replacement would run even as high as one crore of rupees. It is very difficult to procure the correct number of B. O. R. clerks etc. and their cost. We deal with the question only so far as it affects the question of policy, of engaging British Other Ranks as clerks etc.

**Table III, showing B. O. Rs., Clerks etc.**

	British other ranks
Army head-quarters	44
India Army service corps	881
„ „ ordnance „	636
Veterinary services	4
Remount services	23
Miscellaneous establishment	188
Auxiliary and territorial forces ( other than clerks.)	409
Total	<u>2185</u>

Refer Budget, 1931-32, pages 14 to 19.

**Table IV, showing B. O. Rs. in the training est. etc.**

	British other ranks
Training establishment	161
Educational	159
Medical services ( Includes R. A. M. C. O. R. & others )	884
Royal air force ( R. A. F. Ranks )	1,953
Total	3,157

Refer Budget 1931-32, pages 14 to 19.

**Table V, showing B. O. Rs. as clerks in Schools**

	British other ranks as clerks	Pay and cost
Administrative Estb. Staff College, Quetta	6	21,190
.. .. Senior Officer School, Belgaum	7	15,600

*Note:*—There are many institutions where such B. O. Rs. clerks are engaged.

The above table is only an illustration.

Refer Budget 1931-32, pages 72 to 92.

**Some British Other Ranks personnel in I. A. S. C.**  
**Table VI**

No.	Minor head	I. A. S. C. Sections	British soldiers No.	Budget estimate, 1931-32 in lakhs
1	A	Supply companies and supply depots	348	14.19
2	B	I. A. S. C. record office	5	.19
3	C	Training establishment	1	.058
4	D	School of cookery	4	.145
5	E	Animal transport	46	2.145
6	F	Mechanical transport units	246	7.075
7	G	Mechanical transport depots	14	.72
8	H	Central mechanical store depots	32	1.37
9	I			
10	J	Mechanical transport workshop	121	4.31
11	K	M. T. vehicle reception depot	4	.18
			821	30.383
12	L	Regimental depot	25	1.33
13	M	Arsenal, ordnance depot and clothing depot	507	24.12
			532	25.45
			1353	55.833

**Refer 1931-32 Budget, Minor Head II, sub-head B, from pages 104 to 132.**

## ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION

Table III gives the total of a few B. O. R.s, that are engaged in various departments in the administrative services only *as clerks, checkers, fitters, store-keepers, etc.* This ordinary duty could be easily performed by the Indian personnel who are already working in the lower grade of such services.

Table IV shows such B. O. Rs, who are engaged in training establishments and similar other technical duties, but even these duties could be performed by the Indian personnel. Some Indian personnel is already working in these sections.

Total No. of B. O. Rs. working, as shown in Tables III and IV is 5342, of which 2185 B. O. R.s are working as clerks etc., and 3157 in the training and other duties.

The approximate and average cost of these 5342 B. O. R.s would be somewhere about 2 crores of rupees (this calculation is based on the figures from table VI where 821 B. O. Rs. cost 30-38 lacs.) As proved before in chapter VIII, that the cost of a British soldier is 4 or 5 times of an Indian, it could be easily seen that these B. O. Rs. clerks etc., if replaced by an Indian personnel, would cost only about 7 lakhs and thus effect a saving of one crore and a half.

Table VI gives the B. O. R. personnel sub-head B of Main Head II in the I. A. S. C. In Main Head II there are in all 16 sub-heads. In every sub-head there are as many as 16 and more minor heads, and under all these minor heads, there is the B. O. R. personnel, whose total has been already shown.

In this table we have only given one sub-head B and its details. It would be seen that the total of 821 B. O. R.s, who are engaged in non-technical duties such as the duties of clerks, store-keepers, fitters etc., cost about 30 lakhs and if these 821 B. O. Rs are replaced by

Indian personnel the nett saving would be somewhere about 22 to 23 lacs. (In addition to this above cost of 30 lakhs, some other cost in the form of money compensation in lieu of rations and kit and clothing etc. has to be added. The total figure then, might even reach to 32 to 33 lakhs instead of 30 lakhs.

Table V shows how B. O. R.s are engaged in administrative and clerical duties. For example, the officer schools at Quetta and Belgaum; schools which are meant only for senior officers and higher officers, and where there is no work which ordinary soldiers are supposed to do, excepting the jobbery of clerks, store-keepers etc. These duties could be easily performed by Indian personnel as well. They are also engaged in the Regiment, Garrison, District and Command schools. Their number is 157. This number is over and above the number of 110 pupil teachers and mistresses (British).

In short, if the policy is changed, the army budget on this head would be less by about 1½ crores, only by the replacement of the British soldier,—clerk, store-keeper etc., by the Indian, without in any way losing the efficiency of the service of the Army.

In the army budgets, no separate figure of B. O. R. clerks could be found. The figure given in the statement includes B. O. R. as clerks, store-keepers, fitters, chequers, office administrative staff in schools, regimental school teachers and so on. They are more for all this highly non-technical work, than for any real military work.

All Indians who have served and retired would realize the truth when I say, that they always must have felt; that they had to do the main and important work while the B. O. R.s their colleague—the superior service man (Upper grade), could not do much of the work, half

as well as he did. The basis and the structure of the whole frame of the A. H. Q. and other offices, is built upon the work done by the Indian clerks alone. But still the difference of upper and lower grades and the necessity of engaging a B. O. R. clerk etc. is maintained perhaps more for political reasons than for any real need.

The items are so manipulated, even in the latest Budget, that it is extremely difficult to find out the exact number of B. O. R.s working in various non-technical capacities.

Unfair ways of officials:—Commander Wedgwood says, "Danger to British rule in India from a rising of the people or from a mutiny has obviously become much less since the year 1857."<sup>7(a)</sup>

"But the attitude towards the Home Government did not change. It almost seems to have spread throughout the service, for we have the following amazing minute from the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, of October 17th, 1915. 'It is supposed by the chief that the force he has named should be assembled—for eventualities, but that *the Home Government should not be informed of this*. The Home Government are very anxious that Bagdad should be taken, and they will send us the required force if we hold out, but they will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find reinforcements is shown by us.' The Indian Government "held out" while Serbia was being overrun, and while our last man was being put in at Loos."<sup>7(b)</sup>

The above extract clearly shows the unconstitutional, irresponsible attitude and conduct of the highest officials of the state. They not only disobey their higher authorities in England, but in fact it may be said that they have even disobeyed the 'Orders and



Commands' of His Majesty the King Emperor. It may appear like high treason. It may appear even as deception. An Indian would have been perhaps hanged for this crime.

If such high administrators and officials are untrue to their own country—England—one can just imagine what their attitude could possibly be towards India, which the Britisher holds by sword, and yet he expects us to believe him, when he says that it is all done for our good and our interest.

### **Extra Strength both in Men and Animals**

General Macmunn says, "In India it is better than at home, 140 horses are good friends, while *at home the horse establishment too small*. The lines and the stables are usually attractive and your own to improve while the native establishment, of grooms and the fighting drivers are but an added interest." \*

Difference in the strength of British Units in England and in India:—It would be seen from the comparison of the Artillery strength in England and in India, that extra Artillery personnel, though superfluous and unnecessary, is being maintained in India, for absolutely no military or technical reasons but more probably for political purposes.

This difference in the Artillery strength of the personnel is seen in the number of (1) Extra Indian followers, (2) Extra British soldiers, (3) Extra Indian drivers (combatants), (4) Extra British officers and (5) Extra horses. This may be seen in other units too.

All this extra strength in men and animals necessarily means more cost both for men and animals, in Pay and Allowances, medical and veterinary expenses, passages, overseas expenditure, and to crown all, capitulation and Non-effective charges etc.

All this money spent could be saved and economies effected, if only the unnecessary and superfluous British personnel is reduced. No military or technical argument could be sound or valid in maintaining the extra personnel in men and animals.

Followers:—The following table gives the details of followers in the different artillery units. It is worth being considered from the military and economical point of view.

### Strength of followers in the Artillery Units

Table VII

Units	1926-27 (a)	1927-28 (a)	1928-29 (b)	1929-30 (b)	1930-31 (c)	1931-32 (c)
4 Royal Horse Artillery	469	469	469	464	439	396
44 Royal Field Artillery	3159	3153	3153	2791	2593	2433
26 Pack (Mountain) Artillery	685	750	753	747	740	771
8 Medium Artillery	284	294	297	340	282	204
Heavy Artillery	46	31	31	28	44	36
Frontier Brigade	49	209	212	210	209	211
Training and Depot Artillery	328					
	5020	4906	4915	4580	4307	4051

(a) Refer to 1927-28 budget, page 24.

(b) Refer to 1929-30 budget, page 28.

(c) Refer to 1931-32 budget, page 28.

**Statement showing R. F. A. total personnel  
(British, Indian, and also followers)**

**Table VIII**

	1926-27 (d)	1927-28 (d)	1928-29 (r)	1929-30 (e)	1930-31 (f)	1931-32 (f)	Increase or Decrease
British soldiers	6780	6770	<b>6770</b>	6810	6824	6824	+ 54
Indian other ranks	<b>2968</b>	2966	2966	2169	2191	<b>2000</b>	- 968
Followers (Indians)	<b>3159</b>	3153	3153	2791	2593	<b>2433</b>	- 726
							<hr/> 1694

(d) Refer to budgets of 1927-28, page 24.

(e) Refer to budgets of 1929-30, page 28.

(f) Refer to budgets of 1931-32, page 28.

This shows that there is a steady rise in the strength of the British soldiers in the Artillery (R. F. A.) from 1927 to 1931 and a gradual fall in the strength of Indians, drivers and followers both.

In the Budget, a reduction in the total strength has been shown, but in fact, they have increased the strength of the British personnel, at the cost of the Indian drivers and followers. Indian drivers and followers are reduced to the extent of 1694 or broadly 1700 men, and the British personnel is increased to the extent of 54 men.

The above tables give one an idea of the Manipulation of the Figures of a Technical Budget like that of the Army. Finance Staff and Finance Officers concerned with the Budget, are unfortunately such, who do not know why a particular item has been decreased or increased in the strength or in cost. If they are officious enough to make querries, they could be easily

silenced on the grounds of 'Technical Expediency and Necessity,' and thus they are easily put out.

The fact is that Indian intelligentsia is very carefully excluded and kept out of the Army. The Army Budget is a non-votable item and a reserved Budget; the finance staff is technically quite unqualified to judge whether a particular increase or decrease in expenditure, in strength of personnel, or other new items is sufficiently justified or not, as they have not received any military training in the territorials, reserves or supplementary reserves, as is done in England; there the future finance officers in their boyhood, while students in Schools, Colleges and Universities, already equip themselves with sufficient knowledge to understand the organisation, task and needs of an Army. Such knowledge would have helped our finance officers to understand a little of the Army organization, Army needs, Army finance and Army economics. Handicapped as they stand to-day, they are only good 'Baboo Shaboo Logs'—as the Britisher calls them—ready to be convinced with any flimsy and got up reason, if only it is dressed with the argument of 'technical expediency and necessity' or 'for the efficiency of the Indian Army for the defence of India.'

All such handicaps naturally contribute to the result, that the Indian superior finance officers and staff are easily taken in. Nothing could be more helpful to implement and support the British policy, than to keep Indians ignorant, in Army matters.

**How to meet the cry of retrenchment ?**—When a demand for retrenchment is made, it is so cleverly met, that in fact the retrenchment is considerably helpful in adding to the strength of the British troops in India, although a reduction is made and shown in the strength,

but only in the Indian personnel in general, and this is a political and military gain of the Britisher in order to have 'A Hold on India.'

For all practical purposes of economy, a little saving in money—how soever negligible it may be—is made, but only by reducing the Indian personnel, and in this, the Britishers have achieved and scored a success against the Indian outcry for retrenchment.

In fact, it was the Indian personnel, both drivers and followers of the R. F. A. Artillery, that suffered heavily by the reduction. Perhaps this reduction of the Indian personnel is meant as a sort of safety-valve for any future eventuality of a '*Native Army's rising probably due to the disaffection of the Indian soldiery.*'

Army Head-Quarter's ways of compiling the Army Budget:—It could be very easily understood, that unnecessary expenditure is incurred and when a cry of retrenchment or reduction of expenditure, is made, then manipulation of figures takes place, with the result that a still further addition is made to the existing number of British troops. General Macmunn clearly admits the necessity of such devices, in the questions of the reduction of the Army Budgets.

He says, "Soon after I had arrived, the C. G. S. sent me the post-war Q. M. G.'s estimate for Q. services for the post-war army, and asked me to try and cut it down. I knew very well that India was shouting for money for civil requirements of all kinds, and thought I saw my way to get what was wanted with less. So I reduced the demands by a crore and a half. *Now had I been the rouge I became after four years at Simla, I should have only produced a crore, which would have been just as well received and kept half a crore up my sleeve.*"

**Table IX, Followers' strength in 1926 in Artillery Units, both in England and India**

Some Artillery Units in India	India		England	
	Followers Total some Units (a)	Followers one Unit each	Lower Estb 1926 (b)	Higher Estb. 1926 (b)
4 R. H A.	469	117 25	Nil	Nil
44 R. F A	3153	71 8	..	..
8 Medium	284	35 5	..	..
Total	3906			

(a) Refer Budget 1927-28, P. 24.

(1) A A N Estimate, England, 1926 P 14.

Table IX clearly shows that in the Artillery ( R. H A., R. F. A. and the medium ), in England no such extra personnel as 'followers' is supposed to be necessary from a technical or military point of view, both in peace and in war. But in India, the very same is supposed to be necessary, though not on any technical or military grounds, but as General MacMunn puts it, only for 'the added interest.' This extra personnel costs India about 10 to 12 lakhs of rupees annually.

A great saving would be effected by reducing this superfluous strength. The saving effected would be as follows.

Statement showing the extra cost on account of the superfluous followers' establishment employed in Artillery units in India (approximate savings).

**Table X, Extra follower's cost**

	R. H. A.	R. F. A.	Med. Battery	Total
Followers' Art. units ...	469	3,153	284	3,906
Total Cost (a) ...	106,237	714,128	64,290	883,655

(a) There are 13 items, on which the cost is distributed. Refer to Table XII, pages 260 and 261 for details of items.

The above does not include the cost of accommodation.

Item 1—Rs. 200 approximately per follower based on figures in Budget for 1931-32, pages 42 etc.

2—Followers do not receive rations except certain class 1, followers. A money allowance of Rs. 4 p-d, is admissible to class 1, followers to whom rations are allowed. 1/10th of the strength taken for this purpose at Rs. 90 each per year.

3. Taken at an all-round rate of Rs. 15 per man per year.

4. Fractions of what an Indian Infantry man (about Rs. 4 per man) is provided for viz. Re. 1 per man.

9. Calculated on the same basis as in item 4. viz. Re. 1 per man.

10. Same as item 4. Infantry man is provided for at Rs. 2, half of this taken for follower.

( For details and numbers of items refer to table XII, page 260)

**British Personnel Compared:—**We will give below a statement giving the average strength of the different units of the Artillery both in England and India. As the latest Budget of England was not available to us, we had to content ourselves by comparing the facts and figures from England's Budget of 1926 which was available. But we may note that the figures of 1926 and 1931-32 do not differ to any appreciable extent, in point of strength and cost. In fact the British strength has increased in 1931-32 as against 1926.

From the statement one will be able to realize the vast, unnecessary difference in the different strengths of the different units of the Artillery in England and in India. This is just what General MacMunn, the Chief of the Artillery units in India, has clearly admitted.

Statement showing the comparative strength of the British personnel of the Artillery units in England and in India.

### Extra British Soldiers—

Table XI

Artillery units	Strength of each unit in 1926 & 1931-32				Extra British personnel each unit in India	Total extra, all units (Art. India)
	India (a) (b)		England			
	1926	1931-32	1926			
R. H. A.	190	206	113	153	77 or 37	338
R. F. A.	154	155		124	30	1320
Medium	1627	1533		118	44	352
						1920

(a) (b) Refer British, 1927-28 and 1931-32.

(d) Refer A. A. N. Estimate, England, 1926.

The above statement shows quite clearly that to work the same arm and gun of the same calibre, in the very same 4 gun organisation in England, the battery (R. H. A.) works with 113 or 153 men, while in India, the same unit requires 190 men i. e. 77 or 37 men more. Technically speaking any Gunner would admit the impropriety and policy behind this unnecessary greater strength in the same battery organisation, only in India. The same could be seen in R. F. A. Medium batteries, Pack and others.



All this extra strength means enormous extra cost. We attach herewith a statement of the extra cost incurred on this British personnel alone in India and show the extravagant expenditure incurred over them.

If only, therefore, this unnecessary extra cost is reduced, it would effect a saving of more than 36 lakhs. If you include the Pack battery's extra personnel also, the total savings might reach a figure of about 60 to 65 lakhs.

**Table XII, Statement showing the extra cost of the superfluous British strength of the Royal Artillery Establishment**

Items	Extra strength of R. H. A.	Extra strength of R. F. A.	Extra strength of Medium	Extra strength of all Batteries Total 1980
	308	1320	352	
1. Pay and Allowances	3,08,000	13,20,000	3,52,000	19,80,000
2. Provisions	36,960	1,58,400	42,240	2,37,600
3. Kit and Clothing	30,800	1,32,000	35,200	1,98,000
4. Water and Electricity	15,400	66,000	17,600	99,000
5. Coal and Firewood	2,464	10,560	2,816	15,840
6. National Insurance Health	3,080	13,200	3,520	19,800
7. National Insurance Unemployment	9,240	39,600	10,560	59,400
8. Capitation	1,07,800	4,62,000	1,23,200	6,93,000
9. Rail and Other Charges	3,696	15,840	4,224	23,760
10. Conservancy	1,540	6,600	1,760	9,900
11. Hot Weather Establishment	460	1,980	530	2,970
12. Oil for Fuel and Light	308	1,320	352	1,980
13. Ordnance Stores	42,600	1,98,000	52,800	2,97,000
Cost of Total Expenditure	5,65,948	24,25,500	6,46,802	36,38,250

*Note:—How the above calculation is made.*

1. Taken at Rs. 1,000 per man, Budget 1931-32. p. 44.

2. " " " 120 " (Items 5(a) 6(i) 10(a) 15(a) )  
Rs. 63, Rs. 25, Rs. 25, Rs. 30

of per capita statement. (See chapter XIII)

3.	Taken at Rs.	100	per man, Budget 1931-32, page 44.	
4.	.. .. .	50	.. .. . average see per capita statement. or App. Accts. in 1929-30, see chap. (XIII)	
5.	.. .. .	8	.. .. . items 5(d) & 10(d) statement	
6.	.. .. .	30	.. .. . 9	..
7.	.. .. .	10	.. .. . 8	..
8.	.. .. .	350	.. .. . 7	..
9.	.. .. .	12	.. .. . 2(b)	..
10.	.. .. .	5	.. .. . 3	..
11.	.. .. .	1 1/2	.. .. . 4	..
12.	.. .. .	Rs. 1	11 Item 5 (e) and 10 (e) ditto	
13.	.. .. .	15	( the rate of British country man Item 10 (i) .. .. .	

(Provision has not been made for accommodation). (See chap. XIII, statement).

The Tables XIII and XIV show that in the Battery units of R. H. A., R. F. A. and Medium in England, no such extra personnel as *driver combatants* is supposed to be necessary for the working of the guns. But this extra and superfluous personnel is maintained in India, and it costs the Indian exchequer somewhere near 22 lakhs of rupees annually.

**Table XIII showing Indian drivers cymbatants in respective batteries ; drivers stated as Combatants Drivers**

	Strength of drivers India		Strength of drivers England	Total drivers India	
	1930-31 (b)	1931-32 (b)		Extra for one unit 1926 (a)	Extra drivers for all units 1926 (a)
R. H. A.	407	280	Nil	112.7	451
R. F. A.	2191	2000	Nil	67.4	2968
Medium	690	442	Nil	80.8	647

(a) Refer to budget, 1927-28.

(b) Refer budget, 31-32.

(c) Refer A. A. N. estimate of England for 1926.

It should be noted that the strength of followers is in some units reduced in the years of 1930-31 and 1931-32. If they were quite necessary for the work then, how could they be reduced now? Who does their work?

In fact, it helps to minimise the labour and the work of the British soldier in the batteries. It is a great political safe-guard, as well as, it helps to maintain the dignity and the prestige of a British soldier—"a representative of the power" "member of the dominant race." It helps him to keep that sense of pride and vanity which is the outcome of the above.

It also saves the British soldier from lowering himself in the estimation of the Indian, by not being required to perform the low work connected with his duties, i.e. cleaning and dubbing the saddlery, harness and all other leather, and doing all sorts of low and menial work.

It also helps the British soldier in relieving himself of various regimental (battery) duties, such as regimental or battery line guard duties, stable duties, stack or gunji duties, hospital guard, office guard and such other duties; only the magazine and quarter guard duties are entirely entrusted to the British personnel of the Battery. This precaution, from the point of view of a Britisher, is a necessity only on account of his long continuous and settled policy of mistrust.

**Table XIV**

**Cost of the Extra Indian Drivers in R. A. (units)**

Total Extra Number Employed 4066 ( in 1926 )	Extra in R. H. A.	Extra in R. F. A.	Extra in Medium	Total cost
	451	2968	647	
Total cost of extra Indian drivers	246540	1623729	350742	2221011

( The total number of drivers is 4352 excluding the pack batteries in the Budget for 1931-32).

This sum of 22 lakhs and more, spent only on a part of the superfluous personnel, would be saved, if the extra Indian personnel is not maintained.

Not only is the personnel of the British soldier in excess to the real strength of the battery units, when compared to the strength in England, but in general, it may be said that the strength of the officers of the artillery even, is much in excess of the real need and requirement. The reason is the same, *i. e.* to use them in times of need—for the so-called 'Internal Defence'—these extra officers may be utilised to raise new units of artillery with the Indian personnel. The men and the guns could be easily found.

The following extract will clearly reveal the truth.

"It must be also stated that although the Government have fixed 106 batteries of artillery, as the force of that arm for all India, there are including the Royal Artillery Officers, sufficient for 131 batteries, and it should be remembered also, that each Royal Artillery Battery serving in India has a strength in men far exceeding that of the Indian Artillery." <sup>10</sup>

Before the great war, the artillery unit was a six gun organisation; but now, it is a four gun organisation. Though the number of guns is four, yet the strength of the Battery has been allowed to remain the same as before; in fact, there is no wonder, if it is increased still more.

### Extra Horses

The number of animals (horses) in the artillery, in India, are comparatively greater than that in England.

General Macmunn says:—"In India it is better than at Home, the 140 horses are good friends, *while at Home the horse establishment is too small.* The lines

and stables are usually attractive and your own to improve....." <sup>11</sup>

The extra cost incurred on all these horses of the artillery, would in all probability amount to about 10 to 15 lakhs or so. Because it also means syces and other followers and extra transport for grass, hay, bran etc. It also means additional stabling arrangements, charges for the training of the remount, expenses of the remount department, the shoeing of the animals, the veterinary personnel cost, the cost of medicines, cost of line gear and grooming kit etc. All this huge amount of money would be saved if only the number of these unnecessary horses is reduced.

#### Offices and Officers without work (Rmt. Dept.)

The following extract will show that certain departments and staff were maintained, when practically there was very little of work for the officers and the staff.

*"The Remount Department was peculiarly efficient but it also led a very happy if somewhat isolated life, and had most of the fun and little of the grind of the job."* <sup>12</sup>

This is an admission by the Quarter-master General in India, who controls the remount department. Fully well knowing that some of the remount department branches and centres had not enough work, *i. e.* *"had most of the fun and little of the grind of the job,"* he allowed the branches to work and did not care to make necessary economies. This shows something more than negligence. Not only were some of the remount depots maintained, but to crown all, the personnel of clerks was increased from 55,—which was constant in the years 1926, 1927 and 1928—to at once 355 and 347 in the years of 1929, 1930 and 1931.

It should also be noted that this increase in made in spite of the fact that some of the battery regiments are already mechanised.

There is division of work. The Indian should only pay the money—and the Britisher should spend and utilize it in any extravagant manner he likes; and still the Indian tax-payer can neither ask the reasons, nor can he stop the payment of the army cost, only because the Army Budget is Non-votable.

The unfitness of our so-called military experts is further to be seen in 'a penny wise and pound foolish policy.' General Macmunn, it appears, had a humane bent of mind. It would not be far from wrong, if one were to guess that he must have been the president of some society doing work of 'prevention of cruelty to animals.' He says, "I was very averse to destroy, but as a large number were heavy horses for which there was little need and clumsy at that, we decided to horse the ammunition columns with this type, to their chagrin."<sup>13</sup>

**Surplus Horses:**—The war surplus *horses which were unfit in many ways* either for light or heavy cavalry or for the artillery units, whether Horse, Field or others, *were kept on the strength of the Army.* In fact they ought to have been condemned and rejected or destroyed if need be, as is usually done in the Army. But General Macmunn, by his humane conduct and treatment, instead of condemning and destroying the horses had the courtesy to be inhuman to the Indian tax-payer, in trying to be human and kind to the animals. Taking an average expenditure for an animal at Rs. 50 to 60 per month, including stabling, feeding, line gear, shoeing, veterinary cost, training, syce etc., and taking the number of 1000 horses as the animals absorbed in the new

scheme of horsing ammunition columns, we will find that a continuous cost of about 1000 animals at the rate of Rs. 60 per month or Rs. 720 annually, or a total lost of Rs. 7,20,000 recurring, was wasted. All this could be done, because of the 'British interest of maintaining such irresponsible and inefficient men as top-liners.'

There will be a great amount of saving, if only such mistakes are not made.

### Another administrative inefficiency and incompetency

Methods and measures resulting in greater military efficiency in defence, with less expenditure, and therefore practised in England and all over the continent, are not adopted in India.

The veiled conscription system of *territorials* and *reserves*, adopted in England, is such as gives to any nation a large proportion of its nationals, militarily trained for three years. The Nation bottles them, as it were, for any future national emergency. Thus the militarily trained population accumulates, and is easily available whenever needed.

A fellow enlists in the territorials for three years only. After that he leaves the corps and may not take any further agreement even of a year. The annual number of those, who go out of these territorials in England, is about 40 thousand. Naturally the new enrolment in the territorial cadre is also nearly the same *viz.* 40 thousand. So, in fact, every year this process goes on. Within 20 years—not a very long time either in a young man's life or in the nation's life—the trained personnel amounts to about 8 lakhs.

A young man who gets into the territorials, say at 18 years of his age, is only 39 years old after 21 years,

and is still quite young to do some service for his country if the time comes.

Similarly within 20 years at the rate of 40 thousand a year there would be a strong national reserve of well trained military men of another 8 lakhs. Making due allowances for wastage in the form of deaths, medically and physically disabled unfits or others, a nation may still command about 7.50 lakhs of militarily trained men as reserves.

Both the systems are nearly the same, the only difference being that a fellow can enlist in the reserves after the age of 35, for a limited period like the territorials. So again from 39 to another 15 years *i.e.* till he attains his fifty-fourth year, he is a militarily trained man. The reserves also will be thus a large trained number, registering at the rate of 40 thousand a year again. This means another 6 lakhs.

This system which is militarily as well as economically sound, is not applied to India to reduce her standing army's heavy cost, only because such a system would throw a large number of militarily trained men in the villages, which would again infuse the martial spirit and, as Lord Roberts said, which perhaps may enable Indians 'to use the military knowledge against the Britishers'.

The fact then is, that politically, it does not suit the Britisher to adopt a sound and economical system in India though it may be less costly and even more efficient.

Neglecting this sound and economic principle and method, is the cause of the increased expenditure of our Army.

Suggestion for reductions :—The old suggestion stands good even to-day in some respects.



General Mansfield says, "If it be admitted that a serious economy in the military estimates of India is impossible without an administrative and a military concentration of the power now divided between three Governments and three Commanders-in-Chief the details of the reform would be somewhat after the following, with reference to administration. I allude to ordnance, cantonment, law and regulations, cantonment property, the commissariat, and the clothing department, the finance of the army, military public works, the barrack department, the medical department, education etc."<sup>14</sup>

The Northbrook Committee of 1870 stated that, "We have, however, arrived at the conclusion that a sound system of administration would be accompanied by very considerable reductions in the present establishments."<sup>15</sup>

Even though there are no three Governments to administer the army to-day, because the army is under the control of the Central Government, still, there is that costly method of 4 Commands' administration of the Army, entailing unnecessary increased expenditure on all the above mentioned heads.

Here is another feature of extravagant administration, or we might say irresponsible but interested administration of the Indian Army, by its alien military experts.

*Increase in Indian army expenditure is also due to increases in the Capitation rate.*

Wellby Commission reports, "Three causes have contributed to the increase of army expenditure in the second period—(1884-85 to 1895-96) upon the first head, charges in England.

They are:—

(1) Increase of the British army in India since 1884.

(2) Increase in the capitation rate per effective man paid to the Home government in respect of recruiting, training, and other depots. *The capitation charge has been raised from sterling £4-12-6 in 1875-76 to sterling £7-10-0 in 1896-97 and to-day it is £27-10-0.*

(3) Introduction of the deferred pay, amounting to more than sterling £20,0000." <sup>16</sup>

### Non-Indian Element

There is a lot of non-Indian element in the Indian army, not because there is any dearth of fighting classes or material in India, but it is a continuous policy to enlist Non-Indians intentionally. It was admitted by the Government of India authorities before the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917, that "India has 5 crores of fighting people out of her total population of 31 (or 35) crores."

The stretching of this policy too long and too hard, is rather a very dangerous sort of feat. Human nature is after all human nature, and one does not know when a subjugated race may get a nasty idea in their head. It is never safe to take such a risk.

This policy of enlisting the Non-Indian Element with a view to 'overawe' Indians by maintaining such alien and mercenary troops may perhaps create discontent and hatred.

These Non-Indian soldiers have not got a stake in the country just as the Indians have. They are not the Nationals, but are the 'mercenaries' of the Army in India.

"Recruitment is being confined more and more to frontier men; to the people of non-Indian areas, with the result that the army is approximately more and more completely reduced to a mercenary form." <sup>17</sup>

Lord Kitchner recommended to the Government of India, "a promise to the tribesmen (transborder tribes) of opportunities of future service in the army, militia, and levies, when the country had peacefully settled down." <sup>18</sup>

These Non-Indian soldiers are nothing but a menace, their presence in the army is a grave insult and dishonour to the Indian soldiery who fought by lakhs before and during the Great War. The Non-Indian element is more noted for its *treachery and faithlessness* than anything else. The following will reveal this character.

"In 1897 the Government of India had decided to substitute locally-recruited militia corps for Regulars in all posts held by our troops in the tribal country lying between the old administrative border and the Durand line. The custody of the Khibar was given to the Khibar Rifles and the Kuram and North and South Waziristan were to be guarded, each by its own Militia. It was judged prudent, however, in the Samana and Zhob valleys, to retain garrisons of Regulars as a support to the Militia. Kitchner agreed, both as to the general futility of locking up Regular troops in isolated advanced posts, and as to the exception of the Samana and the Zhob; deeming it most unwise to withdraw reliable soldiers from these valleys, or even from North and South Waziristan, at any rate *until the fitness and fidelity of the Militia had been thoroughly tested.*" <sup>19</sup>

"This point is well worth understanding because as the years rolled on we began to look upon the

militias as a part of our own forces and were annoyed that they failed us in 1919 when Amanullah landed his Afgan Army in India. The tribes excited by all the Islamic propaganda during the War and much stirred by the Afgan inroads *turned against us, and the militia they furnished turned too*; but Lord Curzon's policy never contemplated anything else. Lord Curzon was horrified at the situation." <sup>20</sup>

"The behaviour of the Waziri tribesmen had been the reverse of exemplary, and various acts of misconduct having culminated in a murderous attack by Sepoy Ghazis on their own British officers, it was found necessary to leaven the corps with Pathans of non-local tribes." <sup>21</sup>

In fact these non-Indian material who are trained in India by us go back again to their homes and engage in raids and wars against us.

Lord Kitchner says, "At present we train these tribesmen as soldiers, but instead of retaining a claim on their services as reservists—as we do in the case of regular troops—we allow them, *after a term of service which is usually short, to return to their villages in independent country, where we have no hold on them whatever*. It is evident that *we are thus forming a trained body of men among these tribes who would only want a capable and dashing leader to become a most dangerous factor in any acute trouble between Government and the tribes, or in any period of serious friction between ourselves and the Amir of Afghanistan, whose preponderating influence over the tribes is notorious*." <sup>22</sup>

And so we have to spend again for defence, fortifications, and frontier garrisons and strategical railways. On an average a sum of nearly 2 crores (one

crore and seventy three lakhs) per annum is incurred on strategic railways." <sup>23</sup>

We have also to pay for such war-costs and continue paying the heaped up war-debts as well. In reality the Indian tax-payers can in no way be held responsible for this contracted debt, as no war was carried on and no army is maintained by and with our consent and sanction as the army budget is a non-votable item. Frontier wars are deemed necessary perhaps to give 'training' in mountain warfare to the British soldier in India, at India's cost. These wars are waged more for the Empire than for India.

If this policy of enlisting Non-Indian element is stopped, the economy is immeasurable. We will not be required to spend more money on their pay. We increase our own militarily trained strength. The 'Awe and fear' factor is lessened, we get less trained enemies on our borders, and as such fewer enemies are created. We naturally and automatically then, have comparatively fewer chances of future wars—as the tribesman ceases to be militarily well equipped and trained at our cost, both in quality and quantity; and all this means fewer future war costs. It means, in short, that it is most economical and safe to remove the Non-Indian element from the Indian army, politically, financially, morally, educationally and nationally.

**Short Service System:**—The British soldier makes a tour of duty in India for six years. He serves for a limited period of 5 years with the colours and the rest with the reserves. This system is beneficial to England in every way. England has been getting all the militarily trained personnel in her reserve at our cost. It was only on that ground that the question of 'rebate,

was raised, but the capitation money, is increasing instead of decreasing. This very system of reserves which is helpful, desirable and necessary to England and all other countries in Europe, is supposed to be unnecessary for us in India, for the only reason, that it may then throw a lot of trained men in the villages.

“It would be politically inadvisable to adopt for India the short service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the army, returned into the general population, and are kept by periodical training in a state of military efficiency..... There might be much risk, in scattering hundreds of thousands of trained reservists over the several provinces of India.” <sup>25</sup>

“They would become a part of the great mercenary forces of India, which cannot safely be increased beyond certain limits; they (state armies) would cease to be a counterpoise to our own native soldiers, or to the troops of other states; and they might become a source of danger both to their own chiefs and to the British Government....every reasonable and possible pressure should be brought to bear on these Native Governments to induce them to reduce their armies. ....which are always a standing menace.....but the Government of India is compelled to maintain large garrisons to act as a check upon these men.....” <sup>26</sup>

.....The foregoing extracts have sufficiently illustrated the extravagance in almost all the functions of the administrative and organisation branches of the army such as (i) appointment of military officers in the civil departments, (ii) superfluous officers in the army, in its various branches, (iii) accommodating and recruiting incompetent and inefficient Britishers, resulting

in enhancing the departmental pay, (iv) recruiting officers for army departments who are unfits, and who can only 'play polo nicely' etc., (v) employing the ex-British soldiers and N. C. O.'s as mere clerks etc., in various Army offices, (vi) disobeying orders of Home Government, (vii) maintaining extra British soldiers, extra Indian drivers and extra Indian followers personnel in the artillery, (viii) extra British officers in the artillery, (ix) superfluous horses in the artillery units, (x) the policy of recruiting Non-Indian element for the Indian army, (xi) policy of restricted territorials and reserves, (xii) suggestion for reduction, (xiii) policy of maintaining the crippled, short service system not enabling India to increase her reserves.

There are dozens of similar extravagancies quoted above in various forms and in different offices of the army departments. If only proper and necessary economy is effected with a view to maintain greater efficiency, there would be a great saving in the cost of the administrative charges. This could only be done when Indian interests would likely be taken into consideration, and when the money spent on the army is not spent in the interests of England but for India herself. Then and then only would any real economy be effected.

## CHAPTER X

### MOVEMENTS AND QUARTERING

We deal in this chapter with the reasons of the necessity of movements, with its exorbitant cost; and also the quartering question.

#### Movements

Object of movements:—In every country, Army movements are necessary, only for training and strategical purposes. India requires defence arrangements, mainly in the N. W. Frontier and N. E. Frontier; troops have to be posted at every point of defence on those frontiers. Those troops will require to be relieved at intervals of every few years. Every unit of the Army will thus by rotation and turn be posted at these points, and will get acquainted with the country, where it may have to defend the country against foreign invasions, some day. Movements other than these,—that we find in case of British and Indian troops of the Indian army—are based upon considerations other than strategical *i. e.* political considerations. Money spent by the army department of India on all these movements is budgeted mainly under the head of (“Movement”) Transportation M. H. VII and generally under various other Heads as well. Army budgets of all other countries provide money only for strategical movements and not for political movements.

In a National Government, there is no necessity of movements for political purposes; but under an alien government, the movements of the army—the army



controlled by an alien government—must necessarily be political, if only the alien government wishes to stick on in the acquired country. This is the military strategy, that has essentially got to be observed. No alien government can afford to forget or ignore the fundamental principles and rules of strategy regarding the question of movements without danger to their object *i. e.* the occupation of the country.

“ A close study of the Army in India convinced the man charged with its efficiency (Lord Kitchner) that much in its existing condition cried aloud for reform ; that its disposition, organisation, and methods of training were out of date; and that ..... *public money was being lavished* on objects which were obsolete.

“ From the India Office itself came the suggestion that the distribution of troops—changed but little since the Mutiny—needed reconsideration. *Units were scattered throughout a large number of cantonments, many of which no longer had either strategic or political importance.* Regiments and Battalions were isolated in small stations, with no opportunity of exercise with other arms; while, even in the largest stations, troops were grouped together with scant regard for the exigencies either of combined training or of mobilisation.” <sup>1</sup>

Even to-day we have nearly the same condition. The portion of the money spent in India for non-strategical movements is a waste and has to be saved.

Movements alone cost India about Rs. 3·25 crores annually. This includes all the ‘Transportation charges *viz.*, the money spent in India and in England both, for British and Indian Troops.’ Movements may be necessary for larger training *i. e.* manœuvres, but that should not necessarily be an annual fixture of pro-

gramme, and that too, at such a huge annual cost. But here, these movements and reliefs are made not for purposes of larger training but more purely for political purposes. The underlying idea is 'to keep the Indian army safe', and thus 'to hold India by sword.'

The necessity for movements from the Britisher's point of view may be real, but they are against India's economic and other interests, and are carried out at the cost of the poor Indian, and as such, it is unjustified. The expenditure by itself is unnecessary from the Military or 'Defence of India' view-point, of an Indian.

The political reasons for movements and reliefs are, as would appear from extracts, to foster the loyalty of the "Native Mercenary Army", to keep them above discontentment and dissatisfaction, and thus 'to render the service safe,' and also to get the British troops to know the general lie of the ground and country, where they may have to fight in future, to keep down the 'Native Army's rising,' if there be any.

The following extract will show that movements were thought necessary to keep 'alien' (the Britishers style the Indian Army as alien) armies safe, and also to avoid 'the community of feeling' and 'the political activity and intrigue which is dangerous to government.'

" This (whether each corps should be recruited in a prescribed district only, or whether it should be recruited over a wide area) is a very important question, but after mature consideration and with reference to the events of the past year, we come decidedly to the conclusion that regiments of Native Infantry should be provincial in their composition and ordinary sphere of service. As we cannot do without a large Native

Army in India, **our object is to make that army safe;** and next to the *grand counterpoise of sufficient European force*, comes the **counterpoise of Natives against Natives.** At first sight it might be thought that the best way to secure this would be to mix up all the available military races of India, in each and every regiment, and to make them all general service corps. But excellent as this theory seems, it does not bear the test of practice. It is found that different races mixed together do not long preserve their distinctiveness..... which is so valuable, and which, while it lasts, makes the **Muhammadan of one country dispise, fear or dislike the Muhammadan of another province.** Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits.....Let all races, Hindu or Muhammadan of one province, be enlisted in one regiment, and no others, and having thus created distinctive regiments, **let us keep them so against the hour we need, by confining the circle of the ordinary service to the limits of their own province and only marching them on emergency into other parts of the Empire, with which they will then be found to have little sympathy.** By the system thus indicated, **two great evils are avoided, firstly, that community of feeling throughout the Native Army, and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces; and secondly, that thorough discontent and alienation from the service which has undoubtedly sprung up.....**" <sup>2</sup>

".....With a fair **balance of fighting power between the east and the west and the north and the south, and the great facilities we have now, not only in bringing reinforcements from England, but in moving troops about within Indian limits by railway whereby**

with our arms of precision we should be able to nip in the bud, with a regiment, an outbreak which in former days would have required an army to suppress."

It will be seen that political movements are made outside the area, from where the sepoy is recruited; because, it lessens the chances of his being influenced by the political propaganda in his area. Secondly, he is moved to the distant land or port of the country, where the local language of the place being different, and also in some parts, the manners, customs, traditions and shades of character also being slightly different, the 'mercenary' soldier can on account of this difference be made to act against the local population only because of that want of thorough community of feeling.

Ex-C-in-E., India, in his minute says:—"I am strongly averse to lessening in any degree the time passed by sepoy regiments outside of the country from which the men were recruited, say roughly, five out of fifteen years. I believe this is a most wholesome system both as regards the health and discipline of the army, as well as regards the safety of the empire and if for the purposes of command and control....." <sup>4</sup>

"I trust that *the system of interchange of regiments between the two districts may be maintained*. I entirely repudiate the grounds on which the Commission seek to effect the separation. *It is a wholesome thing that the Sikh should visit Calcutta and that the Bengali should rub shoulders with the Punjabi at Peshawar.* It is a good thing to show our distant, and for the matter of that our home population, the various races of which our armies are composed. *The appearance on the scene of fresh faces and of unaccustomed uniforms is not without its effect, and it is well that Punjabi regiments should*

see with their own eyes the power which contact with the sea confers upon us." <sup>5</sup>

General Tombs says, "The scheme also involves some reductions in the staff, with a corresponding reduction in the cost of the army, without, I believe, impairing in any way its efficiency. A very large item of expense would be cut down by reliefs only taking place within territorial limits, and I am not prepared to say that this should not be carried out with British troops also, who would *become more acclimatized* than they now do, *by being moved from one end of India to another*. As each army corps has hill sanatoria within its territory, there would appear to be no reason *why the above system of relief should not be carried out*." <sup>6</sup>

It shall also be seen that the political movements add to the loyalty of the mercenary troops.

Col. Durand says, "If, then, in future we keep our regiments moving ordinarily in a circle about their homes, we shall add greatly to their real happiness, and consequently their loyalty, and be able to get rid of all mischievous increases of pay." <sup>7</sup>

It will be seen that measures will have to be taken to keep the mercenary alien troops contented. In fact the contentment may even have to be purchased.

"Since extended conquest has carried our Hindustani soldiers so far from their homes in India proper. There can be no question that a contented servant is better than a discontented one. Unfortunately we have tried too much hitherto to purchase the contentment of our Native armies by increased pay, batta etc.; *this has not answered its purpose, and has produced many evils*. It has enriched the sepoys but not satisfied them.

The sepoys felt they were being coaxed into foreign service, and got both angry and insolent with a sense of power. We believe that what is called 'general service' has been prominent among the causes which undermined our once faithful Native Army. If, then, in future we keep our regiments moving ordinarily in a circle about their homes, we shall add greatly to their .....loyalty, and be able to get rid of all mischievous increases of pay. Fewer men will also suffice, for the furloughs will be shorter and, in fact, we believe that the service will thus be rendered more safe, more economical, and more popular." 8

If movements of Indian troops—which appear to be more for political purposes than for any military purposes—are stopped, a great saving will be effected in the movements budget. Similarly, if movements of British troops to hills and sanatoria are stopped, this also will greatly add to the savings.

If British reliefs to and from England and India are stopped, we automatically save about one crore and a half. If Indian unit reliefs, that are now carried more for political purposes and reasons than for military purposes, are discontinued, that also will give another saving to the extent of a crore and more. The money spent in England on overseas movements of British troops is a crore of rupees and it would automatically be a saving. If the British soldier is replaced by an Indian, the necessity of overseas movements of British troops is removed.

The transportation head in the Budget is not meant to secure any Military efficiency or training of the Indian army for the defence of India, but this money is, in fact, indirectly meant to "keep India by

sword" at Indian cost, by the maintenance of British troops in India.

Before comparing the expenditure incurred on transportation both in England and India, it will be advantageous to know something of the budget of 'Transportation' (movements) in England.

**Table I, showing Sub-heads under which this Vote 'Movements' is accounted for in the Budget of England 1926**

Movements.	£.	£. at usual rate of Rs. 10 for calculation.	
(1) Conveyance of troops and animals by rail and coast-wise	4,93,000	49,30,000	6,97,000 (cost by rail)
(2) Conveyance of stores by rail and coast-wise.	2,04,000	20,40,000	
(3) Conveyance by sea.	8,60,000	86,00,000	8,60,000 (cost by sea)
(4) War department vessels.	1,03,000	10,30,000	117000 (Inland cost)
(5) Railway Stores.	14,000	1,40,000	
<b>Cost Movements Total.</b>	<b>16,74,000</b>	<b>1,67,40,000</b>	<b>1674000</b>
<b>Deduct.</b>			
<b>Appropriation in aid connected with sub-heads 1 and 5</b>	<b>5,74,000</b>	<b>57,40,000</b>	
<b>Net Total Movements.</b>	<b>11,00,000</b>	<b>1,10,00,000</b>	

*Note:—For figures refer:—Army Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War, relating to the Army estimates for 1926, page 112.*

**Transportation Budget estimate of India; Main  
Head VII (Budget 1931-32) page 260**

**Table II**

India.	Gross expenditure Rs.
A. Transportation.	1,81,53,000
B. Hired transport and supply of well water.	15,00,000
C. Conservancy, hot-weather establishments and admini- stration of non-cantonment stations.	24,62,000
D. Miscellaneous.	4,03,000
<b>Total expenditure in India</b>	<b>2,25,18,000</b>
<b>Total expenditure in England</b>	<b>1,00,09,000</b>
<b>Exchange</b>	
<b>Total Main Head VII</b>	<b>3,25,27,000</b>

**Movements Budget Estimate from 1926 to 1932**  
**Table III**

	1926-27	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-32	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Total Head VII	3'05	3'68	3'35	3'88	3'34	3'25	
(Gross expendi- ture)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(f)	(g)	

*Not.*—(a) In 1926 there was not a separate Main-Head of Transportation. It appears separately in Budgets of 1927 to 1932. In 1926, Main Head VII contains the non-effective charges. The transportation charges appear to be distributed on all the 6 Main Heads of Part A, and also part B and C.

(a) Refer Rev. and Finance account of 1925-26-27.

(b), (c), (d), for figures see Main Head VII transportation etc., Budget estimate 1929-30, Page 246.

(f), (g) for figures see Main Head VII Budget estimate 1931-32, Page 260.



As the cost for any year between 1926 to 1932 is generally over 3 crores of rupees, therefore, for purposes of general calculation any figure will do. We, therefore, take the 1931-32 figure, of crores 3.25, which is nearly the same as that of 1926.

Out of the total cost of 3.25 crores on transportation in 1931-32, 1 crore is incurred in England and the remaining Rs. 2.25 crores is incurred in India. We had to take the 1931-32 figures, because the transportation items are spread over hundred different statements in the Finance and Revenue account (Army estimates) of 1925-26 etc.

The details of Rs. 2.25 crores incurred in India are as follows—in the following 5 Groups

**Table IV**                      **Group (A) M. H. vii.**

	Cost in lacs.  Rs.	Rate of cost.		(Proportionate) Expenditure.	
		Per British Rs. As.	Per Indian Rs. As.	British lacs. Rs.	Indian. Rs.
1 Travelling and out- station.	42.0 (a)	6 7	4 9	25.0	17.
2 Rail charges.	101.0 (b)	14 0	7 5	66.0	34.0
3 Sea and Inland.	7.0 (c)	5 6	1 5	5.5	1.5
4 Hired Transport.	10.0 (d)	5 6	1 5	8.25	1.75
Total	160.0			104.75	54.25

*Note :—(a) P. 264, (b) 266, (c) 268, (d) 270 of budget 1931-32.*

**Table V, showing the other cost which is purely for the British movements incurred in India.**

**Group B; M. H. vii.**

1. Embarkation	4,07,000	(f)
2. Railway Transportation Staff	80,000	(g)
3. Emergency rest camps	38,000	(h)
4. Indian Troop Service	1,23,000	} (i)
5. Sea passage money on account of off, and others to and from England and Colonies	3,10,000	
6. Leave passage concessions to Army and Warrant Officers	20,00,000	
7. Leave passage concessions to civilian officers	97,000	
Total	30,55,000	

**Group C; M. H. VII    Group D; M. H. VII    Group E; M. H. VII**

Under hired transport head	Cost	Conservancy and hot weather	Cost	Other miscellaneous items not mentioned here	Cost
Few other items	(4.59) lacs.	Non cantonment admini.	(25.18) lacs.		(6.8) lacs.
		Admi. Tech. and miscellaneous			

The total of all the expenditure incurred in India and shown in the Groups A, B, C, D, E, amounts to Rs. 2.25 crores.

Total expenditure incurred in India	A	160	lacs	Total expenditure incurred in England	1.00	crore
	B	30	..			
	C	4.59	..			
	D	25.18	..			
	E	6.8	..			
Total		2.25	crores	Total	1.00	crore
				Grand Total	3.25	crores

Out of Rs. 2.25 crores, cost incurred in India, Rs. 1.34 crores is spent on British soldiers, and Rs. 54 lacs on

**Indian soldiers.** We do not calculate the remaining cost of Rs. 37 lacs. The details are not available, but greater portion of this Rs. 37 lacs is spent again over British Personnel.

*Note :—(a) P. 264, (b) 266, (c) 268, (d) 270 of budget 1931-32, (e) Appropriation accounts 1929-30, page 119-120, (f) (g) 262, (h) 264, (i) 268 of budget 1931-32.*

( Refer the above for all other figures in Tables IV and V ).

**Table VI.** Cost per capita of British and Indian soldier on movements in India.

Strenght of Indian army	Cost on Transportation (lacs.)	Cost per capita.
British Troops. 60,000	1,34,00,000	Rs. 223
Indian Troops. 160,000	45,00,000	Rs. 34

If only the British soldiers are replaced and if naturally the heavy transportation charges incurred on them are stopped—the cost of transportation would only be about Rs. 20 lacs for an equal number (60000 Indian soldiers) as against the 134 lacs which the British soldiers require to-day. Thus a clear saving of about Rs. 115 lacs ( 1·15 crores ) is automatically effected.

In addition to this, another 100 lacs ( 1 crore ) is also a saving, as this cost is incurred in England on transportation of British personnel.

Thus, in fact a total sum of Rs. 2·15 crores (1·15+1 crore,) is a clean saving even after continuing the movements in India, of 2·20 lacs of Indian troops.

Besides this, there are other factors which also have to be taken into account in the above calculation.

(1) The Aux. Terri. permanent staff of U. T. C., R. A. F. and others are also included in the strength

as well as the cost of the transportation. Majority of these are Indians. If their number is added, the rate of capita per Indian naturally would fall much below Rs. 35.

**Table VII. Per capita on a British soldier in England and India ( movements )**

	Strength.	Cost	per capita.
ENGLAND	2,66,991	6970,000	23
INDIA	60,000	1,3400,000	223 (10 times more )

*Note* :—For figures refer A. A. N. Estimate 1926 and Army Budget, India.

**Table VIII. Per capita on British and Indian soldier—on oversea's cost of transportation**

Soldier	Strength for oversea's movement.	Cost.	per capita.
British (troops.)	60,000	1,34,00,000	223
Indian (troops.)	0	0	0

**Division of Indian budgets:—**The Indian money spent on movements of British troops can be divided under two heads, (1) Expenditure in England on the British troops' (oversea) movements, and (2) Expenditure in India on British troops' movements (inland). Regarding the former, it can be easily seen that replacement of British troops by Indian troops would automatically mean a saving in all that expenditure incurred in England on 'Transportation' Head.

Regarding the latter the movement of troops, both British and Indian units, is carried out for 'relief'

in India. It has already been seen from the policy that the expenditure is mainly for a political, rather than for any military reason, of training, manœuvres etc. Assuming that such small movements of troops and officers, for manœuvres, are necessary, still they will not be an annual fixture involving annual, recurring amounts for the whole of the army. They will only be periodical, and restricted to a small part of the army, such as small movements for training and manœuvres, ground study, reconnaissance, survey etc. to achieve a definite object and purpose of keeping the Indian troops prepared for the defence of their country. We may even make an allowance of half a crore of rupees or even a little more, for this military part of the expenditure, and still, out of the present transportation budget of Rs. three crores and a quarter we shall be able to save about rupees two crores and a half, or even a little more.

A study and comparison of the transportation cost of the Indian army in India with that of the British army in England, may help us greatly.

I cannot, however, avoid mentioning the difficulties one has to face in getting these items and figures. The methods employed in the preparation and compilation are very clever, ingenious and complicated.

In the English budget of 1926, the items of quartering and movements go together, both together being one of the Main Heads in the army budget, and as such these both have been written as a main item under 'Vote 5.' In the Indian budget these two items are very cleverly split up. The quartering item is included in the 'Military Engineering work' budget Main Head 50, and the 'movements' expenditure is written against

the Main Head VII of "transportation." The main item and word 'Movements' appears in various forms and expressions, and it is thus most misleading.

We fail to understand the significance, propriety or rather the importance, if any, of the splitting up of these two items 'Quartering and movements', and putting them in the Indian Army budget under various different Main Heads, sub-heads and minor heads. 'The British budget' system is much more convenient and easier; but since the splitting up method has been used in India, perhaps it has to be concluded that some definite advantage must have been achieved thereby. If it really be so, then we wish that the Indian Government or the Indian Army authorities recommend this novel, ingenious and advantageous method to the army authorities in England for adoption and imitation. It might mean a compliment to our army experts.

Whatever be the advantage of this method to the alien army authorities in India, to us the Indian taxpayers, it is decidedly disadvantageous, inasmuch as we have not got the easiest means of comparing both the British and the Indian expenditure on this head,— 'quartering and movements.' It does not enable us to study and find out whether our monies are spent judiciously or otherwise.

The transportation charges are not under one head in 1926, but they are put under various heads which are misleading such as (1) 'Indian troops service,' (2) Passage money on account of officers and others to and from England and the Colonies, (3) Leave passage concessions granted to army officers, (4) Rail charges connected with movements of troops, (5) Sea

and Inland water charges connected with movements of troops, (6) Other road charges, voyage rations for troops, (7) Miscellaneous, (8) Travelling charges, (10) Railway charges, (11) Inland charges, (12) Sea charges, (13) Conveyance charges, (14) Other road charges connected with the movement of troops, (15) Leave passages payment for railway sidings, etc. We do not say that the army authorities have done this intentionally to misguide us, but the result of putting the transportation charges under various and different heads is, that the reader is misled.

In later budgets *i. e.* from 1927 to 1932, though a separate head as Main Head VII is made for the transportation budget, still, it is surprizing to note that transportation figures have also been put under other Main Heads such as II, III, Part B, R. A. F., M. E. etc. What is the propriety then of making transportation a separate Main Head?

Extra transportation charges which are not included under the 'Transportation' Head VII of the Budget for 1931-32 are as follows.

**Table IX**

Transportation items.	Main head Budget.	Page.	Rupees.
Administration services	ii	144	22,000
		..	5,000
		..	324,000
		148	17,500
		150	18,000
		152	3,700
		170	
		171	

Manufacturing establishment	iii	177	
		178	219,000
		184	574,000
		192	37,000
			24,000
		200	150,000
		236	2,641,016
		244	
		250	
Auxilliary and Territorial	B	290	4,500
			5,600
			100
		291	8,120
			500
			300
			422,000
		292	261,000
Royal Air Force	R. A.F.	302	125,000
			83,000
			6,500
			37,120
			9,130
			36,000
		304	11,000
50 MES	50 MES		
		380	327,000

The accompanying table may enable one to have an idea, that there must be many more items, perhaps hidden behind some funny head, which we were unable to know as a transportation head item. The statement given makes about 50 to 60 lakhs more again, as transportation charges.

As a matter of fact, all this expenditure ought to have been included in Main Head VII of transportation, since a separate Main Head for transportation was made in the budget as Head VII.

It appears more a rule than an exception, to put an item anywhere but under its right Head.

We find such misleading figures and items again in the Transportation head under 'The hot weather charges.' You will also find the same in 'Store' item.

It does not speak well of the fitness and capability of our administrative and the finance staff.



**Table X, showing Comparative Expenditure on movements, in England and India for 1926**

	England	India
Movements Cost {	£ 1,100,000 (a) or Rs. 1,10,00,000	Rs. 3,05,40,266 (b)

(a) Refer A. A. N. estimate, England 1926.

(b) Refer Finance and Revenue accounts of Government of India, 1925-26, and 1926-27.

While comparing these figures of movements expenditure, it is to be borne in mind that the transportation charges in the respective budgets, as noted above both in England and in India, relate to armies with different strengths as given below.

The strength of armies on which the cost is expended is as follows:—

**Table XI. The strength of Armies (England & India).**

	England's strength 1926	India's strength 1926
Regular Army (inclusive in India)	1,42,432	2,23,841
Army reserve ... ..	96,000	35,265
Supplementary reserve including permanent staff ... ..	23,151	
O. T. C. Officers and permanent staff ... ..	1,245	4
Territorial army including permanent staff ... ..	1,86,093	35,000 Aux. 19,074 Terri.
Total	4,48,921	2,78,180

Examining the charges and the strengths, of both the countries, we can at once see that the average transportation cost per capita per year on the British soldier in England and India, is as follows:—

**Table XII, showing per capita on British soldier in England and British Soldier in India**

	Strength	Cost Rs.	Per Capita Rs.
			Rs. As. Pies.
England	4,48,931	11,000,000	24— 8—0
India	2,78,180	30,540,266	109—13—0

You can judge for yourselves from the above figures, the unwarranted and heavy expenditure incurred per British soldier in India.

In the above comparison one important consideration has been left out. It has to be remembered that England is required to maintain her British troops in various colonies, at a great distance from England, and therefore, the total distances made by reliefs, means extra cost for the movements. Larger strength is required for all these 14 foreign stations abroad. This is more or less responsible for this expenditure of one crore and ten lacs of England. India has no colonies nor any foreign stations abroad, but with all this advantage, India's transportation expenditure is already about three and half times that of England.

**Table XIII showing England's Colonial stations abroad where British troops are stationed at England's cost, and also their distances from England.**

Colony	Total Troops in colony	Distance from England	
1. Gibraltar	2,866	1,310	Miles
2. Malta	4,166	2,293	..
3. Bermuda	462	3,000	..
4. Jamaica	1,487	4,030	..
5. Sierra Leone	754	2,777	..
6. Mauritius	124	6,975	..
7. Ceylon	261	6,725	..
8. Malaya	1,430	8,305	..
9. Hong-Kong	2,999	9,745	..
10. North China	956	9,745	..
11. Rhine	9,086	200 miles-sea, 300 miles railway	
12. Egypt Sudan	11,364	3,113 Miles	
13. Iraq. (a)	938 (b)	3,815 ..	
14. Palestine	63 (b)	3,373	
Total—14 Colonies.	36,956		

*Note :—(a) Refer A. A. N. estimate 1926, Page 28-29.*

*(b) Excluding British personnel loaned to Air Ministry.*

The total number of British troops in all the 14 places (colonies and foreign stations abroad) or overseas possessions, is 36,956 or say roughly 37,000. It may be assumed that the number of the annual relief of British troops from England to India is approximately 10,000, since the British soldier is not required to stay in India for more than 6 years.

In England's Budget the 'Movements' Head (Vote), includes everything such as "the movement of troops, animals and stores by rail and sea, and the maintenance of vessels and crews of the War Department fleet, and certain War Department railways."

"The Vote (Movements or Transportation Budget) includes provision for the expenses of the transport service, carried out on behalf of the War Department by the Board of Trade for the conveyance of troops between home and foreign or colonial stations, including India." <sup>9</sup>

1. Regarding the cost of £4,93,000 on *movement by rail and coastwise* it should be noted that "this sub-head covers railway and other travelling expenses of the Regular Forces.....(including travelling allowances to cover the extra cost of subsistence incurred by officers and others when away from their stations on duty for short periods, billet money of officers, men and horses and conveyance of baggage) and the cost of travelling of Regular Army Reserves, Supplementary Reserves when attached to the Regular Army and Permanent Staff of the Territorial Army, and Officers' Training Corps." <sup>10</sup>

*Note:*—India has a very small number of Territorials Reserve, and with no supplementary Reserves, nor the O. T. Cs. (The U. T. C's are not the O. T. C's.)

2. Regarding the cost of £ 2,04,000 on *conveyance of stores by rail and coastwise*, it should be noted that "This Sub-head includes provision for the cost of distribution by rail of stores, etc., from Woolwich, Didcot, Pimplico, Deptford and other main depots to units and establishments, the conveyance of stores within Woolwich Arsenal by the Arsenal Railways (about £ 14,000 a year); and the lighterage and dock dues and charges on stores passing through ports." <sup>10a</sup>

(Note :—India has not got the war department Railways although a sum of about 2 crores and more is annually spent on the N. W. F. and other strategical Railways so long. This cost is never included in Army budget).

“Provision for the freight of stores to and from stations abroad is made under sub-head 4” as shown in the provisions table.

“War department vessels are used to a considerable extent for the conveyance of stores between military stations situated on or near the coast.” <sup>106</sup>

Note :—In India no such war department vessels are required to be maintained for transportation of stores and troops to port stations like Bombay, Karachi, Madras, Calcutta, Rangoon etc. although it might be cheaper.

**Conveyance by sea.**

“Imperial and Indian trooping is carried out as a combined service by the Board of Trade. The full cost of this service is repaid to the Board of Trade by the War Office, the necessary provision being made under this Subhead, except in so far as disbursements in India and and Packet passages to and from India are concerned, *which are borne by Indian Funds*. The estimated share of the joint expenditure recoverable from the Government of India is allowed for under sub-head 6. ( Appropriations in aid connected with Sub-heads I and V. ) ( See table given ).

“This sub-head covers the expenses of movements by sea of troops, animals and stores.

“Conveyance by sea of troops and animals is carried out in :—(i) Hired Transports (private vessels wholly taken up by the Government ) paid for at a rate per ton per month, the Government also paying for the special fittings required for the accommodation of the troops and for all coal consumed. An allowance, at

a rate per head for the number of troops for which the ship has been fitted, is made to the owners to cover the cost of the supply and maintenance of articles "necessaries" used by the troops on board. Bedding for troops is placed on board by the Government. ( This heading is under a different heading as a separate item in the Indian budget ). All incidental expenses incurred by the owners of transports during the time the vessel is employed on Army service ( such as pilotage charges, tug hire, etc. ) are reimbursed.

" The victualling of troops and messing of 1st and 2nd class passengers are undertaken by the owners of the transports, the Government paying a daily rate per head.

" In Freight Ships or Packets ( private vessels not as a rule exclusively used for Army purposes ), in which passages of troops are paid for at rates per head. These vessels are used for all minor services, such as the conveyance of drafts to and from Colonial stations when hired transports are not available." <sup>11</sup>

" The War Department boats and vessels, at home and abroad, number 211 and their crews number 425.

" This fleet is used for towing Artillery targets, and for the conveyance of personnel, stores and heavy guns." <sup>12</sup>

" The normal commercial vessel is not fitted with the special apparatus necessary for target towing or the transport of heavy guns.

" The vessels make voyages to Ireland and the Rhine as well as coastwise, and they effect a considerable saving in the cost of hiring." <sup>13</sup>

### 5. Railway stores

"Purchases under this head are almost entirely for works and stores required for the instructional railway at Woolmer, on which the Regular and Supplementary Reserve transportation units at the Railway Training Centre, Longmoor, are trained."

(Note:—We have nothing like 'Woolmer' an instructional railway in India.)

"In addition to the Woolmer line the War department owns and operates light railways at Larkhill and Tidworth, which are utilized for the conveyance of stores etc., between the military stations "served by them and the junctions with the main line railway." <sup>14</sup>

Note:—We have nothing like this War Departments Railways in India. It is worth finding out, whether such an arrangement would be possible, useful and economical.

### 6. Appropriations in aid connected with Sub-heads.

"The assessed cost £ 535,000 of the Indian troop-ing recovered from the Government of India forms the bulk of the receipts under this Sub-head. "

"The estimate also covers receipts from private traffic conveyed over the military railways and earning of War Department Vessels for conveyance of stores for Government Departments." <sup>15</sup>

Note:—We have nothing like that Source of Income in India. In England there is the 'Cheap Trains Act of 1883'. We must have an act like that.

"Under the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, military parties travelling on duty in Great Britain are conveyed at three-quarters of the ordinary fare charged to the public for the first 150, and at half-rate for the rest of the party. In Ireland full public fares are payable.

"When proceeding on leave, officers and other ranks are allowed to travel on railways in Great Britain, the double journey on payment of the single fare and one-third on production of the appropriate vouchers. This is a railway concessions, and no cost falls on Army Funds." <sup>16</sup>

*Note:*—Because we have not got this advantage we have to pay these Railways about 25 to 35 lacs annually as compensation for the Army Concessions. Otherwise this sum would be a clear saving.

Table XIV, shows only a few of the items which are only for British soldiers. After replacement, all this sum and more would be a saving.

	Budget estimate.	1931-32 Budget Page
(a) Embarkation staff	407,000	262
(b) Railway transport staff	80,000	..
(c) Emergency rest camps and special attached sections	38,000	264
(g) Indian troop service	123,200	268
(h) Sea passage money on account of officers, and colonies (including stations overseas)	316,114	..
(i) Leave passage concessions to Army officers and warrant officers.	2000,190	..
(j) Leave passage concessions to civilian officers	97,000	..
	30,61,503	

(There are many more items of this nature.)

Again, there are some items which are spent mostly for British troops. We give a few only.

(b) Hot weather Establishments	1,40,000
(a) Conservancy	19,31,605

**Total** 20,71,605



The 'hot weather' cost is shown as 1,40,000 only, but if the cost for fans, fittings, repairs, electricity charges etc. were included, it would be somewhere near 6 lacs and more.

		1931-32 Budget Page
(d) Travelling and outstation allowances	42,38,000	264
(e) Rail charges	1,01,01,000	266
(f) Sea and inland water charges	75,000	268
(b) Hired transport	10,31,000	270
(c) Road warrants	3,19,000	
Total		1,64,41,000

As the items and figures do not give separate cost of British and Indian troops, it is difficult to find out the exact figures for both; but taking into consideration the rate per capita of 35, to 223, we can say that about 1.34 crores of Rs. and more would be a saving, even after meeting the cost on transportation of the 60,000 more Indian troops that would replace the British troops. Other transportation items such as 'Indian troops service' and cost of sea transport not charged to troops service or Royal Air service is given as Rs. 75,88,000. This would also be a saving after replacement.

If the Cheap Trains Act were enacted, it would save about 25 to 35 lacs annually. If movements made on political grounds are stopped, it would give another great saving.

It will be found that a large portion of the Budget is on the overseas expenditure in England, and all the other savings of about two crores, if added, would make a total saving of 2½ crores of rupees.

### Quartering

The Major portion of the M. E. S. Budget is spent on quartering.

**Table XV; M. E. S. Budget for 1929-30 and 1931-32.**

Main head;	M. E. S. Budget Gross expenditure 1929-30.	M. E. S. Budget Gross expenditure 1931-32.
	Crores lacs.	Crores lacs.
(A) Works.	2·27	2·07
(B) Maintenance Buildings, communications etc.	1·06	1·12
(C) Maintenance, and Operation of Installation.	·49	·50
(D) General Charges.	·20	·23
(E) Establishment.	·61	·64
(F) Tools and Plant.	·03	·03
(G) Suspense.	·02	·007
Total India.	4·64	4·61
England.	·04	·04
Exchange.	Extra.	Extra.
M. E. S. Head (50) ; Total	4·69	4·66

The M. E. S. Head 50 is a separate Head in the English Budget. A part of such charges are included under 'Vote 5' in 'Movements and Quartering.

Major portion of the Indian Budget of 50 M. E. S. i. e. about 3½ crores of rupees is spent on buildings etc. alone. About 23 to 25 lacs are spent on roads. About 12 to 18 lacs are spent on furniture, 57 lacs on electricity, and 25 lacs for extra items. Thus it makes a total of 4 crores and 66 lacs of rupees.

## INDIAN DEFENCE PROBLEM

**The Budget could be more conveniently grouped for purposes of study as follows**

**Table XVI**

	1931-32
	Crores, Laks,
Buildings etc.,	3 — 50
Roads (cantonments)	... 23 to 25
Furniture	... 12 to 18
Electricity charges	... 57
Extras	... 25 to 16
Total	4 - 66

Huge amounts are spent on roomy, spacious, luxurious and costly barracks and other buildings, mainly constructed for British troops; such as Hospitals, Stores, depots and cooking houses etc., quite unmindful of the important question of national income and expenditure.

It is futile to enter into the 'field' of statistics, after all that we have said before, regarding movement Budget's figures. Money is wasted in undertaking the construction of new buildings, which are not necessary for any purpose, military or otherwise, while hundreds of old cantonments with their buildings, of arsenals, depots, workshops, magazines, officers' bungalows, and officers' quarters remain vacant, and the stations are changed from place to place involving waste of money again, over and above the money already spent on old cantonments. It also adds to the movements' cost.

General Warre, C-in-C, Bombay Army, says:—The present single storied barracks are very substan-

tially built, and are excellent in their designs; but I think their cost is out of proportion to the requirements of British soldiers, who are not accustomed to and do not appreciate so much cubic space." <sup>17</sup>

Sir R. Temple, Governor of Bombay, says:—  
"Barracks are certainly more comfortable." <sup>18</sup>

The Governor of the Punjab says:— " If the entire control of the funds now expended by the Military Works Branch was vested in the Military Department of the Government of India, that Department would have a stronger interest in making the money go further; and doubtless many superfluities and excrescences would be lopped off the accommodation now given to British regiment." <sup>19</sup>

He again says:— " That barrack constructions can be made cheaper by reducing the space allowed to each soldier, according to the climate. For troops in the hills, the hut barracks are undoubtedly more economical, whilst they fulfil all the essential requirements." <sup>20</sup>

From what high British commanders and statesmen have said, it would be seen, that the barracks are most luxuriously built, and it is to be noted that even Britishers think that the British soldier who is not accustomed to that much more space in England cannot appreciate so much cubic space in India.

It is quite possible to reduce the huge cost on buildings by 2 to 2½ crores of rupees, out of the huge amount of crores 3·25, spent on buildings etc. alone.

**Roads:**—Money spent on roads in cantonments and ex-cantonments is another item worth consideration. Total money spent on roads is about 23 lacs.

**Table XVII. Budget Estimates for roads**

Cost on Military Roads	P. 357		P. 378	
	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-3
Present Cant. Roads	9.21	9.23	12.26	13.12
Ex.     ..     ..	12.89	11.99	11.66	11.66
Total cost.	22.10	21.22	23.92	24.78

In the year 1929-30, the ridiculous part of the expenditure is, that more money is spent on ex-cantonment roads, that are never used by troops for military movements, than the money spent on cantonments occupied by troops.

The same may be found to be the case with regard to the expenditure incurred on the maintenance of buildings in the ex-cantonments, which have been vacated for various reasons. The reasons are not strategical but political. It is perhaps for "Internal Defence"?

Similarly if one looks at the new works programme, one will find majority of the items to be British Barracks, British officers' quarters, Married quarters for British W. Os. and N. C. Os., British Military Hospitals, or their extension or re-construction, new married quarters for British personnel etc.....for British troops only.

In short, having discussed before the policy of compiling the Budget, I would rather give up putting figures together. No money spent for British troops and barracks is too great, nor any cost greater for buildings etc. in connection with the British troops. The foregoing extracts will only prove to the full its veracity, as regards the policy. Some just British Officers have condemned such actions.

The real necessity for constructing new buildings for units, is due perhaps to a policy of locating and cantoning the British troops. This results in condemning certain existing cantonments, with its buildings and roads. The effect of all this is a heavy budget of the Military Engineering works over new buildings etc. in new cantonments. The following extracts show the policy.

The Governor of Punjab says: "(His Honour thinks) that...more especially the **British Troops should be stationed in those places**, where the intelligent and wealthy portions are collected, and where the greatest commercial activity and life exists. He is averse to a system which divides our British strength into small detachments, or which scatters these troops over many parts of the country. He would not place one British soldier across the border, but would rather concentrate them in our own provinces, both in order to impress our own subjects, with an idea of our strength, and also as a power ready to move forward in cases of emergency. Our native troops are fully fitted both in physique and in bravery to cope with any of the tribes on our border to whom they are also by a long course of national tradition hostile; and, His Honour thinks there are many reasons which should induce the Government to concentrate rather than scatter our British Troops." <sup>21</sup>

#### **Policy in selecting Cantonments**

Field-Marshal Brownslow says:— "Without seeking to amplify your wisely guarded observations, may I remind you that one of the most valuable lessons taught us in 1857 and abundantly recorded and insisted on at the time, was the future necessity of a judicious location and segregation of our Native troops, especially those of the most warlike nationalities? Has the lesson been forgotten ?

"The massing of our best fighting regiments in brigades of the same class, and on their own soil, is politically a mistake, and conducive to troubles, such as fill every page of the past history of the Punjab.

"The latest Russian scare, and the prevailing passion for administrative reform might account for this possible mistake, but the internal peace and safety of India are of more importance than either the danger of invasion or the perfection of our parade accomplishments. It is always easier to reinforce a tainted area with reliable troops than to withdraw its disaffected or suspected garrison, without provoking a crisis." <sup>22</sup>

It would also be seen that more often money is spent on buildings, in a most extravagant and luxurious fashion, unmindful of the heavy drain it would impose on the Indian revenue.

*The Bombay Reclamation works and the like* is an illustration in point. General Macmunn says, "I came in this way. The scheme in brief would give the army 200 solid acres of new ground, out at Colaba, on which we could build decent officers' flats instead of the disgraceful old Colaba bungalows; the men are well barracked already. There would be a fine parade ground;...and the General and all his staff should have new modern quarters." <sup>23</sup>

**Furniture:**—The following table will show the huge cost of Furniture alone.

**Table XVIII. Budget Estimate :—Furniture.**

	1928-29	29-30	1930-31	1931-32
Furniture	(a) 12.29	12.24	(c) 12.35	12.07
"	(b) 5.	5.33	(d) 5.30	5.32
	17.29	17.57	17.65	17.93

(a) (b) Refer 1929-30 budget, pages 354 and 357. (c) (d) Refer budget 1931-32, pages 374, 378.

The expenditure incurred on furniture is 17.93 or approximately about 18 lacs annually.

It should be noted that the major portion of the cost is spent on furniture for the British soldier.

The British soldier of the married establishment gets Rs. 3-4 each, as furniture allowance, while the Indian married soldier gets no furniture allowance. The Indian is more generally in kaccha quarters, no furniture is needed and sanctioned. Scale for furniture for British schools for children, quarter guard, and other buildings etc., is different from the scale of furniture for Indian units. To sum up, it could be said that the major portion of the cost of furniture item would be saved if the British troops are replaced.

**Electricity:—**The last item in the M. E. S. budget is electric installation and operations; the money spent on this item is about 57 lacs in all. Since electric installation is made only in the British barracks, the major portion of the cost is for the British soldier alone. If the British soldier's replacement takes place, naturally the cost would be a saving.

In short, it might be said that an approximate saving of about 2 to 2½ crores of rupees, could be easily effected only by the replacement, in the 50 M. E. S. Budget.



## CHAPTER XI

### TRAINING

#### Military Training denied to Indians

It has been a consistent policy to withhold from the Indian all chances of Military training in general, either relating to the modern scientific weapons and dangerous arms, or of the higher art of war *i. e.* fitting him up with knowledge of leading and powers of control.

Lord Ellenborough says—"...It does not appear to be judicious to introduce to the knowledge and practice of our Native Indian soldiery, all the scientific and professional improvements of European armies. These we should use and employ to maintain, in the hands of our national troops, our national superiority. The mistake committed hitherto has been in supposing that it was judicious to instruct in every respect alike the British and the Indian soldier." <sup>1</sup>

The above will clearly show the policy behind the question of giving training to Indians. The same policy is continued to-day. It can be very easily seen from the fact, that Indians are not allowed to enlist in the important branches of the service *i. e.* the Artillery (R. H. A., R. F. A. Heavy and Medium—excepting the Pack or the Mountain Batteries), Tank corps, Engineers service, Aircrafts etc.

It would be simply foolish and futile, to attempt to defend this policy of refusing entry to Indians in these

reserved arms, by anything in the name of reason and argument.

Refusing entrance in the Important Arms is not the only policy of withholding the training from Indians, but there are also more ingenious methods still. A second method is to make a show of having given an entry to some Indians, but of the most unfit and wrong type, and thus, still achieve the object of withholding the real training from Indians.

General Mansfield says, "In the Royal Artillery, the drivers though enlisted as gunners and drivers are *not even taught how to work a gun.*"<sup>2</sup>

This policy was practised not only before, but we see it continued in another form even to-day. For instance, a show has been made to impress the point, that an entry has been given to some Indians in the other Artillery Arms such as the R. H. A. R. F. A., Heavy and Medium. The entry is given only to such as are those, who are not only incapable and unfit but are positively of the wrong type, to receive any higher training. To all intents and purposes they are Artillery men, but only *as drivers*. These drivers are not taught the only important part of the Artillery Arm training such as Gunnery, Gunlaying, Directing, Ranging etc.

The only work which is given to these **Indian drivers**—called the **combatant drivers**—(a most novel and peculiarly misleading term) is to drive the Gun and the ammunition column carriages, groom the horses like syces, clean the harness and keep it in condition, by dubbing and greasing it, do all stable duty, water the horses etc. and perhaps mount guard on horse lines and stables. In fact excepting the real work of Guns,

*every other supplementary work of a most non-technical and common nature is given to these Indian Artillery personnel. If this could be called training, then certainly this training alone is given to Indians.*

Besides the above, another training was given to the Indian, and that was only to obey implicitly his ruler-masters, who, it is said, 'pay him.'

This is well expressed by Lord Ellenborough and many others who say:—

"The native should be well instructed in that discipline and in those things which it is considered necessary for him to know, but in these alone."<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the Artillery, the Tank corps, the Air force and other arms were and are kept as the reserved services for the British troops only, with the object, that these long range and the modern arms of precision may perhaps at some time be used against the Indians, if at all they ever again were to commit the 'folly of a 57.' No doubt great actions were achieved by native troops alone, but it was laid down 'that hereafter European troops were to be at hand, wherever native troops were employed.'

To be brief, Lord Roberts again clearly emphasised the same old policy, which was conducted by Lord Ellenborough.

This policy was adopted, as a result of the fear, that Indians thus trained 'would use the same knowledge against them' (Britishers), if ever they (Indians) took it in their heads to do so. "Roberts (Field Marshal) strongly dissented, and, reciting again the old lesson of the Mutiny, dangled before the eyes of the Government the possibility of highly trained native commanders, using their knowledge against, rather than

for ourselves. 'I would resist the beginnings on however a small scale.' "

Two principles in this policy have been very strictly adhered to by the Britishers till to-day. One of them affects the soldier, and the other affects the officer. But the end all and be all of all this was and is, to keep the soldiery and the intelligentsia ignorant in matters related to this art or science.

Empires are built on the strength of this knowledge, which fits men to mould and shape a machinery requisite for that purpose. It was a bit quite natural, therefore, that like all other men, the Englishmen also entertained, and perhaps entertain even to-day doubts and fears of 'Indians using this knowledge against them'. To guard against this fear—be it imaginary or real—they have laid down a policy with the main and primary object in view, to demartialize and denationalize Indians, and secondly, with the aim of suppressing their tendencies to combine, and so far as possible never allow them to raise their level and condition. Similar attempts were made and all necessary care and steps were taken to demoralize them and keep them as separate, as separate could be.

The policy of denying training to Indians could be seen from the following:—General Sir S. Cotton touches upon the subject as follows:—"It is scarcely necessary to make any allusion to the artillery branch of the service, which requires perhaps no organisation, excepting that in no way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted with British Artillery nor should any native of India be instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons." <sup>5</sup>

General Grant says, "I would never have again a native artilleryman in India."<sup>6</sup>

It could be very easily found out now, why certain services and arms, such as the Artillery, Engineers, Aircraft, Tank corps, and Armoured cars etc. have been exclusively reserved for the British soldier. A systematic, consistent and continuous policy is being scrupulously followed by the Britishers to keep us strangers to these Arms. Lord Ellenborough says, "that after the experience of the past year (1857) it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of the Natives to those of European Gunners. *We cannot commit the mistake once committed.*"<sup>7</sup>

It cannot be said, that Indians are unfit militarily to receive army training. It is the misgiving and mistrust of the Britisher, who is afraid of the possible or probable results, if Indians are trained in the use of these excellent Arms. He perhaps thinks that the Native Army, thus trained, might use the very same guns and weapons against them.

This has been sufficiently made clear by the above ; but perhaps the Britisher could not in his own interest give out the truth, and possibly he had to take recourse to various ingenious and political methods of expression. He began by saying that Indians were unfit for these Arms (Artillery) etc . The inconsistency in this statement was apparent, owing to the fact that the Pack batteries, or the Mountain Artillery, were and are even to-day manned by Indians alone. If Indians can man and work the Mountain (Pack) guns, it goes without saying that they can handle other types of guns, such as R. F. A., R. H. A., Medium and Heavys, as well as the Howitzers etc.

It is interesting and instructive to note, why the Pack or Mountain batteries only were open for Indian enlistment. It was in the first place safer for Englishmen to allot those batteries to Indians, because, owing to the short range of the Guns, there was greater possibility and surety of the gun-personnel being nearer and in the danger zone during war, than as regards the other long range batteries of R. F. A., R. H. A., the Heavy artillery etc. In the second place, it was safer, because, there was no likelihood of Indians in possession of these inferior guns of the Pack, with its short range, ever to entertain any idea with the hope of success, of turning these guns against the British soldiers, who, it was thought, could easily overawe and suppress the refractory Indian personnel, in such a contingency, with the aid of their superior Artillery of long range guns. Lord Ellenborough says, "It being understood that the arms of the Europeans are to be of a very superior description to those of the native " 8

Besides, the British had and have to make a virtue of necessity, in manning the Mountain guns by the Indian personnel. The reason is so very *convenient and suitable* for them ; because Europeans cannot live and work on the frontier. Brigadier J. Jacob says, "The whole of the artillery in India should be European, with the exception of few troops and batteries, formed for special service in particular localities where European troops could not live, such as this Frontier of Sciende. " 9

" I think a close and intimate association of natives with the European soldiery, except in the field, should be avoided as much as possible ; the closer the association with the lower class of our countrymen, the less respect is inspired by the latter ; the closer the associ-

ation with officers and educated Englishmen, on the contrary, the greater is the respect secured." <sup>10</sup>

"Profiting by the experience of the past year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of native to those of European Gunners. The value of artillery is perhaps greater in Asia than in any other part of the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and, for that reason, become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian Gunner. A small European force, with a powerful artillery, should be irresistible; and no mutiny of a native army without guns could hope to be successful. Many officers would, for this reason, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives.

"But in practice, it is not expedient to go to this extreme; the frontier must be excepted. Here, in the first place, a mountain train is necessary, and an European mountain train in India is an anomaly. The men (British Soldiers) are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved ( in the frontier ). <sup>11</sup>

Again, General Sir Outram says, "I am of opinion with the Governor General, that all the native artillery of the Bengal Army should be abolished, with the exception of few guns required at certain frontier posts and in positions where Europeans could not live." <sup>12</sup>

These British opinions clearly explain how and why the Indian gunner was and is maintained in the Mountain Artillery or Pack Artillery ( with short range Guns ) only, and not in the long range Gun batteries. The reasons behind the policy are too self-evident and apparent. I believe they do not require any further explanation.

Volumes may be written on the British policy in connection with training of the Indians in the Indian Army. But the little details that we have already given above would suffice for the present.

We shall see how and why the Arm 'Tank corps' has been reserved for Britishers alone.

**Tank Corps :—**This service is very important in modern warfare ; the reason being that it is invulnerable against small arms fire ; and it is an important feature of the main attack in any big and decisive engagement. It is a great demoralising factor, and hence its necessity, importance and usefulness against guerillas, not possessing the modern breech-loading guns, aircrafts, tanks etc. It is simply incalculable in its immense destructive effect. It is but in the fitness of things, therefore, that the Indian should be excluded from this service also.

Our readers must know, what a tank corps or an armoured car is. Tank corps, technically, only means that it is an armoured motor, fitted with two or four automatic guns, Hotchkiss or Lewis. Both these duties, *i. e.* driving a motor car and using an automatic Gun are already being performed by Indians, the first in motor mechanical transport service, and the second in each Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery service etc.

Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to realize the significance of shutting off Indians from enlistment in this Arm. There is no wonder if one were to infer that Indians are kept out, only on account of the policy of mistrust. The real nightmare is the apprehension that Indians, sometimes and some day, may use the Tanks against their rulers.



The Aircraft also, as a superior arm, has therefore to be controlled, and naturally, Indians are not allowed in this Arm as well. The Air force is also barred on the very same grounds. Indian civil aviators can acquire the A and B certificates and fly 500 hours, still the bar is maintained. After all that we have said, the reason is not far to seek.

As a matter of fact, the strength in which the Aircraft arm is maintained, appears to be quite unnecessary so far as our real defence requirements go.

General Macmunn, speaking on the dangers of foreign aggression on the Frontier, says, "One is the age-old one of the protection of India, which really includes Afghanistan, from outside, from the rollers of the north, in modern times Russia, the intermediate and accessary problem of a hostile Afghanistan either alone or leagued with Russia; the other the entirely separate one of the tribes themselves."

"The other, the daily one, the insistent lesser problem of the tribes, has been considerably illumined in these pages. One of the disappointments of modern times is the uselessness of the Air Force in handling the problem. It was hoped that solution might have been found. But it was soon realised that bombing has no material effect against tribal skirmishers and sharpshooters. Even Machine-gunning hits no one amid rock and crag. The Air Force pilots on the North-west frontier have been the admiration of the world in their rescue of the Europeans in Kabul during the late usurpation." <sup>13</sup>

The Air Arm then, is not such a necessary factor at present in the Indian 'Army of Defence.'

From the above, it would be gathered why the Aircraft Arm has been entirely reserved for the British soldier. It can be also seen how the Aeroplane is not at all a very helpful factor in our frontier defence, against our probable enemies on the N. W. F. and other places. It might be a helpful factor against the Afghans or the tribes, only when the Afghans take to a civilized kind of warfare, instead of methods of warfare which are mainly uncivilized. They have a peculiar mode and manner of conducting and carrying on the fight by individual and uncontrolled skirmishing. Till the time this method of warfare is not changed, the Aeroplane as an Arm for defence, against our probable enemies on our N. W. Frontiers, is not likely to be very helpful.

The only use and the only best service that it could render, was for purposes mentioned by General Macmunn himself *i. e.* transferring the ladies of the British legation to India from Kabul.

The long range guns of the R. H. A., R. F. A. Medium and Heavy artillery are reserved for the use of the Britishers to be used against Indians in case of an internal rising. Similarly the Aircraft in India may have been perhaps maintained more for this purpose than for any real solid defence work. They are in short meant for the defence of the British Interest in India. It was for this reason that Lord Ellenborough said that ‘...the arms of the Europeans are to be of a very superior description to those of the natives....’<sup>11</sup>

In short, then, the Arms of which the training is to be given to Indians and the Arms in which they could be enlisted, without any bar to enlistment, is, as has been shown by the extracts, purely and entirely guided

by political considerations. All other excuses and reasons, such as the 'Martial and Non-Martial' 'incapacity of Indians,' educational unfitness and many others, are merely flimsy and got up excuses, intended for nothing else but to cover and guard the real and only reason, of the eventuality of a "Native Army's rising" or "the rebellion of the Indian people."

One can easily judge from the above facts, why and how the Indians only are armed with inferior weapons, or why they are not enlisted in certain important Arms or how and why they are not given the higher training in the "scientific and professional improvements of the European Armies." There is that political policy indicated above, behind the administration, so far as the military training of Indians is concerned.

The reason why the educated Indian class is dubbed as non-martial or a 'Baboo class' has been clearly expressed by General Robinson who says, "A fallacy in native regiments. It is far better that *we should not have an English-instructed native army; attempting it is politically injudicious and a waste of Government money; all that is really required is that the men (the Indian soldiers) should be able to read and write sufficiently in the vernacular (Persian character, Nagri, or Goormukhi, etc. according to a man's nationality), orders received and reports to be sent.....*" <sup>15</sup>

Lt.-General Grant says, "In point of professional intelligence and efficiency the general run of European Serjeants and corporals are, in my opinion, immeasurably superior to the general run of native Commissioned Officers." <sup>16</sup>

Field-Marshal Roberts had also carried on this policy, and so has it been carried still even to-day, by allowing 50% vacancies at Dehradun (Indian Sandhurst), to soldiers selected from the ranks in the Army. Only these so-called martial classes are enrolled in the Army. Others with education and intellect have been long dubbed as non-martial. Therefore they naturally cannot get into the ranks—howsoever they may want to. To enable the illiterate and incapable men to be in the officers' grade, 50% vacancies have been reserved for them and thus the old and sound principle and policy (from the British view-point) of not allowing the educated and intelligent classes in the army is still carried on. All other excuses of scarcity of candidates and want of 'Right kind of boy' with physique, character, leadership ect. are all untenable excuses.

"Roberts strongly dissented, and, reciting again the old lesson of the Mutiny, dangled before the eyes of the Government the possibility of highly trained native commanders using their knowledge against, rather than for, ourselves.

"Roberts warmly protested, 'I would resist the beginnings on however small a scale'." <sup>17</sup>

In short, the substance of all the above is, that the policy of the Britisher is to keep Indians away from the real and higher part of military training. The superficial excuse, usually put forth, is the inability and the incapacity of the Indian to receive the training. It needs no explanation to prove that an Indian who can be an efficient civil engineer, with a Cambridge degree, could not be a military engineer, when both civil and military engineers have to get the same Cambridge degree to become qualified engineers.

It passes all comprehension to find that many Indians, who have got the A and B certificates in flying, are supposed to be ineligible to hold commissions in the Royal Air Force. The British lads alone, holding the same certificates only, are thought to be eligible to hold commissions in the R. A. F.

The policy underlying this may be to guard against the possible danger of the training of Indians, in the more advanced and scientific parts of the military training, as has been pointed out by Lord Roberts and others.

It is feared that if, Indians were given the higher military training, they would use the knowledge against Europeans.

As the scientific and advanced training requires education and intelligence, it was in the best interest of the Britisher to be consistent with the time-honoured principle and policy of denying the higher knowledge of war to the educated and the intelligent classes, and in order to achieve this, that mischievous and most unnatural, but politically sound principle of creating distinctions had to be made, by stamping the educated class or the intelligentsia of the country as 'Baboos', 'the agitator class,' or 'the non-martial classes.'

The soldier class, ignorant and illiterate as it was, and is, had to be bought and in order to do this, the Britisher took advantage of the poor Indian 'soldiers' human weaknesses.

General Warre says, 'he was guided moreover by another maxim, that "Natives give only that amount of allegiance we pay for and that amount of service we buy."'<sup>18</sup>

Various methods and means were employed 'to purchase the Indian soldiers' contentment.' Some of these are as follows:—(1) Grant of lands was made to the Indian soldiers as a special favour, for the so-called meritorious services, and resulted in 'purchasing their contentment' and 'fostering their loyalty'. "Grants of waste land would not meet the approval of native officers and soldiers in lieu of pension. This system was tried and failed, because the land was barren, and the want of capital prevented its being brought into proper cultivation." <sup>19</sup>

Even to-day, we see the same practice carried further. We hear that Land annuities in the form of Rs. 50 a month or so for 3 generations, are given to those officers who are recommended as very loyal and are supposed to have 'rendered good and meritorious service.' No special military service is needed to earn this distinction, and be a recipient of this honour and annuity, excepting perhaps the good opinion of the commanding officer, and that too chiefly regarding the man's loyalty.

The ex-service army men are encouraged to form themselves and settle into a colony of their own, and grants of land are made for this purpose. This can be evidenced in the Punjab and in many other places. The policy behind this is to keep the ex-army men away from villages and thus to root out any possibility of the martial spirit being revived amongst the villagers. Secondly, the ex-army men could be easily watched and kept aloof from the 'political agitators.'

(2) Commissions (V. Cs.) to Indian Soldiers.

Another method employed in 'purchasing the contentment of the army is to maintain a high paid Indian soldier with the dignified and bogus commission of a

Jamadar and a Subhedar, but without any adequate and efficient training. He has been even compared to a British soldier and a corporal and has been stamped by all military commanders as inferior to him in every way. To a British officer, he does not stand any comparison at all. He is kept contented, and the result is, that he can be used as a medium or catspaw to control the "mercenary" "native army", perhaps with a view to stop any attempts "of a rising" of the native army.

Even today, it has been said by Commanders-in-Chief in India, such as Field-Marshal Rawlinson, Field-Marshal Birdwood and others, that the Indian officer is educationally unfit to hold king's commissions. But still, the educated material of the University Training Corps and universities in general, is not thought to be 'Desirables', to replace the present inefficient and uneducated Indian officers. The U. T. C. boys and others are certainly not going to remain satisfied with the same Indian or native commission, nor with the same training, as is given to an Indian soldier and an officer today. In England, out of 600 annual commissions, 100 commissions are given to O. T. C. boys of the universities.

(3) Pensioners (Loyal). It was not thought desirable to add any more to the number, then existing of the older pensioners (loyal), because the policy of mistrust was still continued, as will be seen by the following: "It must always be borne in mind, that the Native army in India is purely an army of 'mercenaries', animated by no feelings of love for British rule, but by religion and by tradition hateful of our presence and antagonistic to our Government. Natives give only that amount of allegiance we pay for

and that amount of service we buy.....I do not, therefore, see that any further reserve is necessary than that now formed by the older pensioners who, I am informed, were called out in this presidency during the mutiny, and did good garrison duty." <sup>20</sup>

The reserve system for the native army ( rank and file), Commander Wedgewood says, "seems to have been well adapted to foster the loyalty of political pensioners, but the old men who returned to the colours were unsuitable as soldiers; a reserve scheme should be concerned principally with military efficiency." <sup>21</sup>

We hope that the honours and rewards given to these pensioners are not meant 'to purchase their contentment' and through them that of the Indian Army.

( 4 ) Honorary King's Commissions.

Another method resulting in pumpering the vanity and purchasing the loyalty of the Indian soldier, is by giving him an honorary King's Commission even for his so-called meritorious and distinguished services only, though educationally unfit and incapable.

Doubts were evinced whether this move and practice, if followed, will give the desired result. The desired result was "the loyalty" of the Indian.

"I misjudge the native character altogether if the opening out of such a road to distinction will not tend to buy the loyalty of the native Army." <sup>22</sup>

The following quotations will reveal the truth. "We adopted the existing designations ( Jamadars, Subhedars etc. ) from the Natives, and until the time comes, when the Native officers are fit to take the place of British officers, I think it preferable that the present distinction should exist. I am, however, strongly in favour of making native officers of very meritorious



or highly distinguished service eligible for the grant of the rank of Lieutenant, Captain, or Major, etc. I confess my inability to propose a measure which shall fulfil these conditions. Proposals of the kind have come to my notice; but it appears to me that none of them are suitable to the nature of the people, or to our position in India; and that while they must prove costly, they would be unreliable. I do not consider that they could be adopted.”<sup>23</sup>

During and after the war about 300 Indian officers were given this Honorary Commission. Let us hope, it was not done ‘to buy the Indian Officer’s contentment,’ and through him the Indian Army’s, in general.

(6) **Titles and Authority in Villages:**—The Indian officers, (v. c.) are given honorary ‘titles and also authority’ in their villages, as honorary magistrates or as a Darbary of the Collector’s or Commissioner’s Durbar, or as an invited guest for some ceremonial function.

The following reveals the methods conceived and adopted:—“The services and achievements of some of them have been splendid enough for the pages of Froissart, and they have not always been rewarded as they deserved; but except in very rare cases such men ..... would be more *safely and suitably recompensed by unstinted and progressive additions of pay or pension, by civil titles and personal distinctions and authorities in their villages and districts.*”<sup>24</sup>

We do not know, whether the present practice of giving titles such as Bahadur, Sardar Bahadur, I. D. S. M. etc. to the Indian Viceroy’s commissioned officers in the army and the practice of appointing the illiterate, unqualified Indian Officers as honorary magistrates in their villages etc., is again even to-day meant to pur-

chase his contentment, foster his loyalty and make him vain and insolent by pampering his vanity.

None of the above methods are practised in England, nor in any Armies on the continent. Where is the necessity then, in India alone?

**Military Training:**—The Army Training Education Budget is given under Main Head II, under Administrative Services in the budget. The total cost is 66·92 lacs. It is divided into two parts. (I) Educational and Instructional establishments, and (II) Army education. The cost of the first *i. e.* Edu. and Inst. establishment, is Rs. 31·60 lacs, and that of the other is Rs. 35·32 lacs. The first is the military training part of the soldier, and the second is the educational training part of the soldiers' children.

The first part of the Educational Establishment Budget of Rs. 31·60 lacs, can be arranged as follows:—

**Table I, Educational Est. Cost**

Items	Rs.
1 Supervising staff and Officers' schools and classes etc. ( like Quetta, Belgaum etc ).	9,75,240
2 Military Training schools, ( weapon training, physical signalling, etc., for both British and Indian soldiers	19,64,175
3 Tank School ( British soldiers only )	2,20,585
Total	31,60,000

It should be noted, that practically the amount of Rs. 9 lacs (or more accurately 8·98 lacs) out of the first item of 9·75 lacs is spent only for officers' schools like the Staff College, Quetta, and S. O. S., Belgaum; and the few remaining thousands are spent on the supervising staff etc.

The second item of Rs. 19.64 lacs only, is spent on the soldier's real training, such as the weapon training etc. The schools for these at Panchmari, Ahmednagar Kakul, Ambala, Poona etc. are common to both British and Indian soldiers. It should be remembered, however, that the British and Indian soldiers do not work in common, they have different and separate arrangements in the schools; a separate British wing is instituted for the British soldiers.

Again, it has also to be remembered, that taking the strength of British and Indian units into consideration, the proportion of British soldier students is much higher than the Indian. It will be quite enough if we only give one illustration and figure, to convince the reader.

**Table II British and Indian students compared.**

Sagar equation school	Units	B. O.	I. O.	B. O. R.	I. O. R.	Percentage
British cavalry	5	62		39		
Indian cavalry	21				71 ( This includes ) I. Os. also	

It would be seen that, the total number of Indian students (I. Os. and I. O. Rs.) ought to have been in the strength of 424 (260 officers and 164 N. C. Os.); but instead of that we have only 71 Indian officers and Indian other ranks; this shows the amount of money that is spent on the British and Indian soldier's military training.

*Note:—Refer figures to 1931-32 budget, page 79.*

We do not understand why separate figures of Indian students (officers and N. C. Os. ) are not given like the figures of British students.

**Table III, showing the number of British and Indian Students and their percentages  
1931-32 Army Budget Main Hd. II**

	Officer	Other	B. O. & I. O. Percentage Ratio	B. O. R.	I O.R.	B. O. R. and I. O. R. Percentage Ratio	1921-1932 Budget Page
Physical Ambala Kassauli	59	44	57.3:42.7	147	414	24:76	71
S. A. S. Pachamari	411	0	100:0	280	946	22.8:77.2	73*
.. Ahmednagar							
Sagar	62	0	100:0	39	71	35.6:64.4	79*
Kakul	93	0	100:0	100	63	61.35:38.5	81*
Signal, Poona	84	0	100:0	102	215	32.17:63.83	83
R. T. C. Ahmednagar	66	0	100:0	162	0	100:0	83
Quetta	32	0	100:0	—	—	—	73
Belgaum	72	0	100:0	Nil	Nil	—	81
Range finding	45	0	100:0	—	—	—	

\* Refer old Budget figures include Indian Officer and Indian Other Ranks.

Taking into consideration the proportion of the number of Indian and British units, which is about 3 times in the case of infantry, and 4 times and more in the case of cavalry, it would be found that the percentage of the British students is proportionately much higher. It can be said that the major portion of the cost *i. e.* Rs. 19.64 lacs, which is spent on the military training part of the soldier, is spent on the British soldier personnel alone.

The education of the British soldier :— Various precautions are taken for the education and general welfare of the British soldier.

Firstly, we deal with the *educational proficiency pay*. The British recruit is required to carry on the educational part of the training along with the professional Military part, in the Depots maintained in England, at Indian cost. With all this previous care, behind the British soldier, he is again given an allowance in India to develop his education still further, by acquiring the A and B certificates, equivalent to the Indian Vernacular 4th and 5th standards. The allowance given is Rs. 5 Ans. 8 per month. The Indian is given no such allowance, even though the general Indian standard of literacy is so low as 10 or 11% (in the army it is hardly 2 to 4%), as compared with the Britishers' 88%.

**Libraries:**—Another method is to maintain libraries in every British unit. Allowances are given for the maintenance of libraries and lights in the library, only in the British units and not in the Indian units.

**Table IV. Libraries and Light allowances**

Unit	Allowances in Rs. for libraries and lights				Total 5 Cav.	Total 45 Inf.
	Cavalry		Infantry			
British	Rs. 176, P. Annum	Rs. 43, P. A.	Rs. 176, P. A.	Rs. 72, P. A.	Rs. 1120	Rs. 11,160
Indian	0	0	0		0	0

Taking the total number of British units—such as the Artillery, Tank crops, and Armoured cars etc.—into consideration the total cost in this case would be about Rs.  $\frac{1}{2}$  lac excluding the sum of Rs. 16,000, given to officer's libraries in Dists. etc.

The injustice is all the more glaringly evident, when it is remembered that the Indian is extremely below the educational standard of the British soldier.

Another thing, in which the Indian soldier is handicapped is the training part *i. e.* by supplementing the training by regimental supplemental magazine.

**Regimental Magazines :—** Every British unit editing its own Regimental magazine for the benefit of Education, Military training and general knowledge of its British Rank and File. An Indian Unit had uptill now not even a single regimental magazine, in spite of the fact, to that the Indian Units are about 3 to 4 times more than the British units.

It was only quite recently, after some criticism was launched in newspapers, that a show has been made of starting regimental magazines in a Roman Urdu script in some 8 to 10 Indian units. The poor Indian soldier, illiterate and ignorant as he is, is silently and meekly suffering his miserable lot, being naturally voiceless in the matter, owing to the fear of losing his service and perhaps standing a courtmartial. The Roman Urdu language and script itself is a curious and ingenious invention. It results in keeping the Indian soldier as far away and isolated as possible from his own language and culture. Moreover a good knowledge of Roman Urdu have been made a preliminary condition for the promotion of an Indian soldier to the rank of a lance or a L/Naik, which means only an increase of a rupee or two in his pay. But he is one amongst the huge dumb driven cattle, and is without a grudge or murmur facing the lot that has befallen him.

There are tremendous difficulties in learning Roman Urdu script and language. We can only say that the

**Indian Sepoy, perhaps within 1<sup>st</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> of the time and cost, spent on his Roman Urdu Education, could be somewhere upto the Vernacular 4<sup>th</sup> or the 5<sup>th</sup> standard, if only he were allowed to learn his own script and language as a medium of instruction.**

But to earn a rupee or two more, he has to learn even that, howsoever difficult it may be, and as such, he may even learn Chinese or Russian, if that was demanded of him, in return for a pittance, in the way of a rupee or so as a promotion.

Another handicap is the fewer facilities, which are given to him by not giving him adequate military efficiency pay like the British soldier.

Let us now look at the Military training part of the British and the Indian soldier.

The allowance which a British and Indian soldier gets, to increase his military efficiency, speaks for the results to be expected and achieved. It also speaks for the policy of 'not giving Military training to Indians' so that, they may not perhaps have a chance of 'using the knowledge against the Britisher.'

**Table V, showing the Rate of allowance per British and Indian soldier for Military training**

Soldier	Allowance per month	Rate per capita
British soldier	Rs. 7-8	75
Indian soldier	Rs. 2-8	25

( As a matter of fact Rs. 2-8 of the Indian soldier also includes his educational allowance. So, for calculation purposes, we include it in this head. )

Another thing to note is, that certain schools and their branches are not open to Indians, because they are not enlisted in those Arms or the service, such as the Tanks Corps, Air Craft, Artillery ( excepting Pack ). The greater part of the money, therefore, is entirely spent on the British soldier. It only enriches England by swelling the number of her militarily trained personne at our cost. The policy of mistrust alone is responsible for all this. Certain schools are meant for British Officers alone, and not for the Indian officers; such as Staff College, Quetta, Royal Tank Corps School, Ahmednagar, Kakul Artillery school, Royal Air force centres etc.

**Language :—**It is remarkable to note that more money is spent on language education and instruction of the British soldier than that of the Indian.

**Urdu Training:—**British service officers have been reported to be very indifferent in learning the local vernaculars, so that a large amount of money has to be spent in arranging Urdu classes. The Southern Command order records that " H. E. the Commander-in-Chief was impressed, on his recent tour, by the lack of knowledge of Urdu among British Service Officers. The standard in this respect appeared to him to be considerably below that prevailing before the War; so much so, that in some cases units containing Indian personnel were without a single officer capable of holding direct communication with their men.

" Both for directly military purposes and for the proper enjoyment of sport, in India a knowledge of the vernacular is necessary. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, therefore, directs that in each District the experiment be tried immediately, in



one or more selected stations of instituting garrison classes, to be taken by qualified regimental munshis, under the supervision of the District or Area Educational officer; classes to be held in the evenings four days a week." <sup>25</sup>

Such an arrangement means the appointment of a Munshi plus "Rs. 50 per month per class as aid .." <sup>26</sup> Now the Indian taxpayer has to pay all these expenses, simply because of the incapability and incompetency of the British officers in holding direct communication, and of the necessary qualification for their proper enjoyment of sport in India.

**Vocational Training**—A part of educational training, which is given only to a British soldier, for the benefit of the Britisher in his Imperial immigration scheme, costs India about Rs. 35 lakhs and more, *i. e.* about  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the total cost of Rs. 66 lakhs of the Army Education Budget.

Elaborate arrangements are made for the vocational training of the British troops, although the facilities are not utilised properly. We naturally begin to ask if there is any arrangement made for the vocational training of the Indian soldier? None. Regular information about openings in certain trades and unemployment in particular trades in England, is broadcasted through the Command orders in India. The Indian soldiers wish that something should be done for themselves with a view to vocational education, so that they could earn an honest living when they leave the army. While the Indian taxpayer contributes to the maintenance of the vocational training schools for the British soldier, his countrymen who were patriotic enough to join the army, who had fought bravely in several fields,

returns home after being discharged to lead a life of starvation and misery. Such an unhappy state of affairs should not continued and necessary arrangements should be made for the vocational training of the Indian soldiers. It includes the training in a number of trades and professions, such as the agriculturist, electrician, welder, tinman, smith, carpenter, dairy-farm, woodwork and fruit growing, all sorts of manual training, joiner, fitter, mechanic and all other technical education.'

India spends on the vocational training of these British soldiers for no gain and advantage to her, but only to help the Britisher to increase and swell the militarily trained British population, armed to the teeth.

Prior to the sending of these British soldiers to England for vocational training at Catterick and Hounslow etc., they are given every facility in India for all preliminary training of the trade, in which they wish to specialise. The Imperial scheme of immigration is vigorously carried on, to consolidate the British majority in the Dominions.

The details of the number of men trained annually by the Districts in one Command are:—

"Central Province...71, Poona District...86, Madras ...40, Bombay...17 (plus 4 men from other Districts). Total  $214 + 4 = 218$ ." <sup>27</sup>

Assuming then that roughly 218 and more British soldiers are annually sent from one command, it may be understood that from all the four commands, India sends approximately 900 to 1000 British soldiers annually, for this vocational training in England at India's cost.

It is worth noting that they are also trained for this trade in their regiments, in the districts and provincial factories and workshops etc. in India, before going to Catterick. During all this period the Indian exchequer suffers for all their pay, their allowances, their family allowances, their kit and clothing money, their provision cost, their insurance money, their capitation etc. India suffers for all these charges; of the British soldiers, numbering about 900 to 1000 during this training period of a year to two, both in India and in England. Militarily speaking the British soldier, during this period of a year or two, is a militarily "dead non-effective" to India.

It is to be understood that in addition to the above number of 1000, there are other soldiers, who are being trained in their Regiments etc. for some trades and professions, but they are not included in this figure of 218.

When progress reports were received, it was found that a certain number of these men have been withdrawn at their own request, because they found the work uncongenial. In most cases men had little or no previous training in any trade. In the case of the more skilled trades, e. g. radio, the men were recovering and improving their previous knowledge.

"Several cases have lately occurred in which 6478 G applications for Vocational training have been submitted only to be withdrawn when, after much trouble the vacancies asked for have been secured." <sup>28</sup> This is nothing but sheer waste and extravagance.

**Table VI. Cost of vocational training centres, in England, at Catterick and Hounslow.**

	Cost in 1926	Cost in 1925
Catterick	£ 14,200	£ 13,250
Hounslow	£ 12,930	£ 12,420

**Table VII. British soldiers' vocational training cost.**

	1926-27	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-32
1. Pay and allowance of British soldiers attending vocational courses		2,80,000 (P. 54)	6,00,000 (P. 54)	4,40,000 (P. 58)	3,96,000 (P. 58)
2. Pay and allowances of 2 officers in the General branch			28,920 (P. 162)	28,920 (P. 165)	28,920 (P. 166)
3. Kit and clothing allowances.					480 (P. 166)
4. Incidental and miscellaneous expenses			1,080 (P. 162)	1,080 (P. 168)	1,080 (P. 166)
5. Staff Captain vocational training		14,460 (P. 200)	13,980 (P. 200)	13,080 (P. 208)	14,460 (P. 208)
Total			6,44,780		4,40,940
6. Money spent on pay and allowances etc. while the British soldiers are trained in India at Rs. 125 P.M. (both in regimental shops and in factories).					15,00,000
7. Transportation charges for soldiers Rs. 1000 at 1000 over.					10,00,000
8. To War office £ 25					2,50,000
9. National health insurance					..
10. Unemployment ..					
Total					31,50,000

The 30 or 35 lacs, which are spent over the vocational training of the British soldier, both in India and in England, would have been more than sufficient to conduct and work even ten or more Cattericks and Hounslogs in India. But if sound, sane and economical measures of starting a 'Catterick and a Hounslog' in India, would have been adopted, it would not have been then possible for British soldiers and their families to have the advantage of having to stay in England near their homes at India's cost.

The proceeds of sale of products turned out by soldier students are debitted to the Army Budget in England. In 1926 it was £6490, but it does not appear to be included in the Indian Budget.

The second part, Sub-Head A. of M. Hd. II, Army Education Budget is Rs. 35.32 lacs It could be arranged as follows :—

**Table VII. Army Education cost.**

	Strength of troops	Cost in current	per capita
(1) Supervising staff	60,000	585,100	
(2) British soldiers' children (all schools)		2083,950	12.93
(3) Indian soldier's children		433,040	
(4) .. Boys ( Dehradun )	160,000	240,000	1
(5) Military training (Nowgaon)		1,88000	
Total Army Education		35.32	

It will be seen from the above Table, that the per capita on the Indian and the British soldier, (over their children) is 1 to 12.93.

Taking the cost of the supervising staff, and taking into account the money spent on the British and Indian soldiers' children, it could be said that the money spent over supervising staff may be adjusted over the British and Indian soldiers expenses as 4:1. Therefore, we may say, that roughly Rs. 25 lacs and 5 lacs are spent for British and Indian soldiers' children respectively.

**Table VIII. Cost, Soldiers' Children.**

	Lacs Rs.	Out of 100
Total Cost, Army Education.	31	100
Cost, British soldiers' children.	25.75	83.4
Cost, Indian soldiers' children.	5.25	16.6

Regarding the Item No. 4 in Table VII, it has to be noted, that this item ought to go in the civil budget; it has no connection with the army budget.

With regard to the last item *i. e.* No. 5 item the Kitchner's School at Nowgaon, it should be understood, that this item ought to have been included in the military training budget, *i. e.* the first part of the budget; because this is a school for tactical training of the Indian N. C. O.'s etc. *We have, therefore, excluded the cost of this last item in the total cost of the army education.* We calculate the total cost as 31 lacs. The above table shows that 83.4 % of the total cost, therefore, on army education is spent on the British soldiers' children, while only 16.6% is spent on the Indian.

It has to be remembered that amongst British soldiers, the married percentage is about 4, and amongst Indians, it is more than 50 to 60%. If this fact be taken

into account, it will be found that the money spent on the Indian children is even much less than 16% of that spent on the British children. If the number of children were available, it would be found that the total of the money spent on the Indian children would not be more than 2 to 3 percent of the total cost.

**Other useless institutions for Indian soldiers' children:**—A part of the money is unnecessarily and uselessly spent on institutions in India, like those of Jalandar, Ajmer, Aurangabad, Sarai etc. which are in no way concerned with the real military training part of the soldier.

The money spent on all the institutions mentioned above, is unnecessarily and uselessly spent in the Army Budget. It cannot be said that this expenditure is spent over Military Training. It is really spent on the primary training of the soldier's children, and hence cannot be soundly accounted for as having been spent on the item of Military Training and the preparation of an Indian Army of defence. The negligible amount that is spent on Indian soldier's children is perhaps spent to humour the pampered dignity of the ignorant and illiterate Indian soldier. We do not know if, according to the old policy, it is spent to buy the 'contentment' of the 'mercenary' Indian soldier, by making him believe that the Government is guarding his interests and caring for 'him and his children.' The authorities are strictly speaking camouflaging the real issue and importance of military education and training.

This policy would as well be seen in the adoption of certain other methods and devices of 'buying his contentment and loyalty' such as giving (1) titles, (2) honorary commissions, (3) making them honorary magistrates, (4) buying the loyalty of pensioners,

(5) honorary king's commissions, (6) lands and inams to Indian Ranks, and in other similar ways, which we have previously dealt with. It could be seen from the statements given that the expenditure incurred on the British personnel is many times more than that on the Indian.

We attach herewith two statements giving the expenditure incurred on the personnel trained, under this head, both British and Indian.

Statement showing comparative cost of British and Indian soldiers' children's education:—

**Table IX.**

Schools for British.	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-32
	Rs. lacs.	Rs. lacs.	Rs. lacs.	Rs. lacs.	Rs. lacs.
1. Garrison, Regimental & Departmental schools.	10-80	11-56	11-68	12-15	11-51
2. Staff at A. H. Q.	}	}	}	}	}
3. Staff at Commands.					
4. Staff at Districts.					
Total ..	13-58	14-23	14-34	14-78	14-14

  

Schools for Indian.					
1. Garrison, Regimental & Departmental schools	1-04	1-10	-95	-90	-86
2. Staff at A. H. Q.					
3. Staff at Commands.					
4. Staff at Districts.	nil.	nil.	nil.	nil.	nil.



**Table X. Garrison Schools for Soldiers' Children.**

	Strength of troops.	Cost of each item	Per capita.	Percent age of the cost
Supervising staff.		2.63	38.36	94.8
British soldiers.	60,000	11.51		
Indian soldiers.	1,60,000	.80	1	5.2

Page 86 to 88 of 1931-32 Budget

**Table XI. Army education; Sub-Head (A) M. H. ii. Miscellaneous Rs. 6.02 lacs**

1	British officers.		2.11	34.57	95.3
2	British soldiers.	60,000	3.63		
3	Indian soldiers.	1,60,000	.28	1	4.7

Item 1st, includes language rewards, examiners etc. for officers studying languages.

Item 2nd —Regimental Munshies, Donations to Educational Institutions  
Language rewards item is not included in this item, as it is already included in the officers item No. 1, it is a combined figure.

Item 3rd —language reward to Indian soldiers.

(Refer to page 102 of 1931-32 Budget.)

**Table XII. Belgaum Schools; for British and Indian soldiers ( Army education )**

	Strength of troops	Cost of each item	Cost per capita on each soldier.	Percent- age of the cost.
British soldiers.	60,000	2.44	5.2	
Indian soldiers.	1,60,000	1.02	1	

(Refer to pages) 90 to 92 of 1931-32 Budget.

In short, it would be quite apparent from all the details given in this chapter that about 80% and more of the cost is spent on the British personnel of the Indian Army, and hardly 20% is spent on the Indian personnel. In fact, there is ample scope for reduction in the expenditure, if only the British troops are replaced.

## CHAPTER XII

### ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The Medical Budget is shown under Main Head II—sub-head (h). The Budget estimate is 1·48 crores of rupees ( Refer Budget 1931–32, pp. 138 to 143 ).

The Medical Services' Budget is split up, and thus it looks small, but in fact, the Medical cost is really much more than the figure of Rs. 1·48 crores, as shown under (h) H under the heading ' Medical Services.'

If all other cost, not included in this Rs. 1·48 crore be put together, the ' Medical Services ' Expenditure would come to about 2·30 crores of rupees and more. This would be seen from the attached statement. In addition to the figures, given in the statement, there may be many more items, that we have not found. Thus the total medical cost may be found to be still higher.

**Table I, showing ' Medical Services ' cost (estimate) for 1931–32, ( under Main Head II and Sub Head: H, and also other Medical services cost, not entered under Sub-Head (H) but entered in other Main Heads such as III, IV etc. )**  
**Sub-Head H, ( and others ) Medical Service**

Main Head	Sub-Head	Minor Head	Item	Cost Rs.	Page
II	H	(i) A	Hospitals	73,97,209	140
		B	Indian Military Hospitals	47,78,680	141
		C	Station Staff Dispensaries	55,580	142
		D	Military Food Laboratory	48,210	142
		E	Indian Hospital Corps	25,53,321	143
		(ii) A	Convalescent Homes for Officers	16,000	143
	H		Medical Services Total	1,48,49,000	143

	F		Cost of Education of Military pupils at Medical Colleges and Schools	2,97,000	136
	M	C	Hill Sanitaria and Dep. depots	1,84,180	162
		F	Anti-Malarial measures	85,000	166
		H	Rest Camps	29,110	166
			England: Item 11	2,000	170
			.. 12 }		
			.. 13 }	15,50,000	
III	(A)		Medical Store Depots and Workshops	21,47,290	
			England Stores, Medical	28,00,700	178
			England: Medical Stores Depot and Workshop, furlough Allowances	13,40,000	192
			Medical Stores Depot sterling overseas pay	15,000	192
				10,000	192
IV	A	E(ii)	A. H. Q. Staff of Commands	41,65,700	
			Medical directorate 11 offices and 1 supervisor	2,90,690	208
		A	Depot at Summer Hill for Clerks	(540)	210
			Miscellaneous Medical Establish.	20,000	210
		(4-ii)	Medical Directoriat Incidental	40,400	210
			Total	3,51,090	
VII	A	D (6)	Medical Services (except for medical store depots)	4,10,400	264
..	A	E (8)	Medical Services (except for medical store depots)	1,50,040	266
..	B	A (3)	Medical Services (personnel) except for medical store depots		270
Part C	B	C	Hospitals	2,13,460	310
..	D	H	Medical Stores	10,000	324
..	E	7	Expenditure on antimalarial measures in respect of R. A. F. units and formations	5,000	326
				7,88,900	
			Grand Total	2,23,01,980	

\* In this item an aggregate item of 15,94,000 is written against the head and about 9 other items are included in it. The cost cannot be therefore given.

**Table II. Medical Budget for the years 1922 to 32**

Medical Services	1922-23	1923-24	1925-26	27-28	29-30	30-31	31-32
			Crores and lacs				
	3-24	2-43		1-47	1-46	1-46	1-48
							2-23

It would appear to all superficial observers, from the above statement, that the 'Medical Services' Budget is comparatively reduced, by about 50%, but the truth is exactly opposite. The splitting up of the real 'Medical Services Cost' is most misleading. In every Budget, one will come across such queer methods.

The appearance of a reduced 'Medical Services' Budget, from 27 to 32, is only due to this clever splitting and shifting of the real Medical Services Cost, and transferring some items under various other Main Heads such as III, IV and VII, etc., in different years, and under still varied denominations. In fact it could be seen that it is more than Rs. 2 crores and 23 lacs in 1931 and 32, if other items are also added. ( See Table I ).

**Table III. 'Med. Ser. Cost in England and in India**

	Items	England 1926	India 1926	India 1931-32
(A)	Pay etc. of officers, W. O. s & Men (R.A. M. C.)	(a) 80,87,000	(b) 1.31 crores	(c) 1.37 crores
	Army Dental Corps.			
(B)	Pay of Civilian			
	Medical practitioners etc.	6,00,000		
(C)	Pay etc. of the army nursing service.	6,27,000		10.88 lacs
(D)	Royal Army Medical College etc.	2,85,000	Nil	Nil
(E)	Wages, Civilian Subordinates at Hospital etc.	2,08,000		
(F)	Medicines, instruments & miscellaneous charges.	4,76,000	54.5 lacs	13.40 P. 192 lacs
	Total	1,02,83,000		
(G)	Other items, India		28.20 lacs	74.53 lacs
	Deduct—			
	Appropriation in aid	5,33,000	nil	nil
	Total cost	97,50,000	2,22,83,443	2,23,02,520

*Note :—*( The references are (a) A. A. N. estimates for 1926, Page 67, 77 England; (b) Finance and Revenue accounts of Government of India 1925-26, Page 478; (c) 1931-32 Army Budget, Page 136, 143. )

*Note.*—( We wanted to compare the Medical Budget of England and India of 1931-32, but as England's latest Estimate was not available, except the one of 1926, we had to content ourselves by comparing the 1926 budget of both, instead of the latest. The figures in thousands are not taken into account in some places. It is only a general calculation, designed to give an idea as to the relative costs in England and in India).

( It is just to show, how replacement of 60,000 British soldiers by an equal number of Indians would nearly save Rs. 90 to 95 lacs and more of this Budget. Correct and accurate calculations cannot be made only from the data in the present Indian budget, which is so misleading, as it does not affect the general principle to be established. We can, as well, for all practical and general purposes of calculation assume, that it is nearly a correct figure of economics that could be effected by replacement or the 'Soldiers' Indianization').

The cost of sub-head A in 1931-32 and 1926 is nearly equal. In 1931-32 it is 1.38 crores, and in 26 it is 1.31 crores. In 31-32 budget, it is under a separate heading of British medical hospitals, the cost is shown as 73 lacs; therefore, we may as well take this as the cost in 1926; separate figures are not given in the budget in 1926.

The cost of the British units (medical cost) in England and India is very interesting for comparison. For about 144000 British troops in England, the cost on sub head A is Rs. 80 lacs only. The cost for 60,000 British troops in India is Rs. 73 lacs.

It would appear from the table IV showing the *Per Capita in England* and India on a British soldier, that, India would save 40 lacs of rupees if the British medical cost in India were to be equal to the cost in England.

**Table IV, showing Medical Cost Per Capita, ( British Soldier in England and in India ).**

Country	Strength troos	Annual cost Rs.	Med. cost Per Capita in Rs.
India	60,000	73 lacs	121
England	144,000	80 ..	55

Since the cost of pay etc., of British medical officers and R. A. M. C. men, both for 1931-32 and 1926 is nearly the same *viz.* 1 crore and 38 lacs, and Rs. 1 crore and 31 lacs, ( excluding pay of Nurses ) and since the Budget of the British military hospitals in 1931-32 is about 73 lacs, the very same figure can be safely taken for purposes of calculation, as the Budget of a figure in 1926 is nearly the same, and, therefore, for general purposes of calculation, we take the figure as Rs. 73 lacs for 1926. The exact figure of this is not given. ( See Finance and Revenue accounts of 1926 of Government of India ).

**Table V. The Indian and British soldiers' cost**

Soldier	Strength Total	Cost medical in Rs.	Per capita
Indian soldier	160000	47 lacs	29 Rs.
British soldier	60000	73 lacs	121 Rs.

4½ times

If the replacement of (60,000) British soldiers by an equal number of Indians, were to take place, it could automatically save about Rs. 55 lacs alone, on this single minor head (a) of the ' Medical Services.'

To employ extra Civilian Medical Practitioners would be a very cheap method. It should be introduced here, as is done in England.

**Sub Head C—'Nursing Services'** in England in the year 1926, contains only 367 Nurses, Matrons, etc. They cost only Rs. 6,27,000, while in India (1926 and 1931-32 figures being nearly the same) the cost is Rs. 10,88,485.

**Table VI :—**showing the average Pay of Nurses in England and India.

Average pay and allowances of each nurse.	in England.	in India.
	Rs. 1708	Rs. 3349

**Table VII. Nurses' cost and savings.**

Nurses and Matrons in units and Hospitals (in India)		Nurses and Matrons number.	1931-32 Nurses cost.	Total cost Nurses & Matrons,	Saving after Re-placement.
British.	60000 troops.	265 (a)	9,19,185(a)	10,88,485	
Indian.	1,60000 troops.	60 (b)	1,69,300(b)		
By replacement Process.	60000	22½	73,778		845407

*Note.*—(a) (b) Refer 1931-32 Budget, pages 140 and 141.

If the British soldier is replaced by an Indian, one the saving on this head would be roughly 845407.

**Royal Army Medical College:**—This college at Millbank supervises the studies of officers of the R. A. M. C. and provides advanced courses for specialists. It also trains soldiers in Radiography, Electro-therapy and

as laboratory assistants. The Vaccine Department of the school provides Vaccines and Sera for the Army and carries out research work in Vaccine Therapy.

The cost of the school is only Rs. 2 lacs and 85 thousand, and it turns out specialists for the Army, and also trains Other Ranks (soldiers).

Instead of starting such good institutions for the Indian Army I. M. S. Service, scholarships to Medical pupils in Medical schools are given, on which Rs. 2,97,000 are spent annually, when thousands of Doctors are facing the question of unemployment. We are glad to note that the Rangachariar Committee has suggested a cut on this item of medical pupils' expenditure; whether the Government agrees to it or not, is quite a different matter. Since the Army Budget is a Non-votable Item, we can only write and say things, but cannot get any thing altered. That is exactly why The Army Budget should be a votable item.

*Sub-head E. Civilian Subordinate Personnel :—* In England, this head includes Civilian Employees at hospitals and Medical Stores Depots.

This expenditure is not included in Head ii of the Indian Budget. It is included in some other forms and also under some other Main Heads, like so many other Medical Items.

*Sub-head F :—*(Medicines, Instruments and Miscellaneous):—In England, only a small sum of Rs. 4,76,000 is supposed to be enough, but in India a very huge sum is required. Heads F and G, in table III show a very high figure such as Rs. 82 lacs in 1926 and Rs. 87 lacs in 31-32.

The separate items, such as Diet, instruments, medicines, drugs etc., are not to be found separately in



the 1931-32 Budget. But in the 1926 Budget, Table II shows Drugs, clothing, provisions, dressing instruments, vaccine sera, wines, spirits, water, electricity charges and all others, as separate Items. They are to be included, we presume, in Medicine, instruments, *viz.* Sub Head F. The cost of all these in 1926 is about 53 or 54 lacs. Besides, the Drugs and all other things, in British Hospitals, are, it is said, fresh, superior, and up-to-date. Even the number of hospitals for the British troops are proportionately more, and in addition, there are hill station hospitals too.

**Table VIII. Classification of Hospitals, Br. & Indian**

Hospitals.	Class					Total Hos- pitals	Hospitals Accord- ing to Propor- tions	Hospitals in excess
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th			
( Whole year ) British troops	6	3	25	15	12	61		
( Partial ) British troops			2	8	4	14		
Total for British troops	6	3	27	23	16	75	34	41
Total for Indian troops	14	19	17	18	23	91	91	
Total	20	22	44	41	39	166	125	

( Page 1075-1049 of Army Inst., India App., No. 485 of 1925)

Taking the British and Indian strengths of 60 and 160 thousand into consideration, it can be seen that the proportion of British hospitals is exceedingly higher. It ought to have been at the most about 34 hospitals. India has to waste her money on 41 extra Hospitals, *i. e.* about 57 or 58 per cent of the total cost on British Hospitals. Thus it would be seen, that Rs. 40 lacs and more, would be a saving by replacement.

**Table IX. Classification, Bt. Hospitals.**

Refer 31-32 Budget p. 139.

	Hospital class	31-32	29-30	27-28	25-26
The adjoining table shows the number of hospitals from the 25-26 to 31-32; though No. of hospitals appear to be less, still it should be noted that British 1st class hospitals have increased, perhaps the 5th class Indian hospitals have decreased and even then the cost is the same. ( Refer respective Budgets )	1st ..	23	24	23	20
	2nd ..	20	21	25	22
	3rd ..	43	51	47	44
	4th ..	38	37	36	41
	5th ..	30	27	39	39
Total Hospitals		154	160	170	166

From the above; it could be gathered, that out of the cost of Rs. 54 lacs about 35 to 40 lacs alone are perhaps required for British Hospitals; and the remaining for Indian Hospitals. If the British units are replaced by Indian units, a net saving of about Rs.35 to 40 lacs may be effected.

Over and above these Headings from A to F, various other charges such as convalescent Homes for officers, Hill Sanitation Department, Rest Camps, Depots at Summer Hill for clerks, and such other similar charges, would be a saving, as all these items are only required for British soldiers and British clerks and not for Indians.

Even Soldiers' families and soldiers' children are sent to the hills in batches by reliefs; childrens' schools also have to be transferred to the hills during Summer.

In addition to the above, there are so many other expenses which are not shown in Main Head ii, medical Services ( sub-head h ) of the Budget. To illustrate only one Item, we shall take the Item of, Punkha pulling or only Fans out of many other Items, such as Diets, Wines, Spirits, Provisions, Drugs, Travelling, Mechanical transport etc.

**Hill Stations:**—An item of expenditure, which consumes an amount of money is the Hill accommodation in Hill Sanitariums. Innumerable hill stations are being

maintained to accommodate whole families of young soldiers and convalescents during hot weather. Surgeon-General Gibbons says, "that hill stations fall very short in accomplishing all the good we should reasonably expect from them." The Army has had to produce its own milk and butter, lest enteric ensue, amongst the soldiers.

By transferring such items, as shown above, to other heads, the Budget in later years is made to look small; in fact, certain Items which were given in the old Budgets, say 1922-23, under the 'Med. Service' Budget have been now put under various other Main Heads in later Budgets. This accounts for the reduced figures.

Punkha pulling cost in 1923-24, for Medical Service alone, was lacs 1.37. The Electric installation is made in British Barracks and Hospitals. The change is not shown in 'Medical Services' proper, and still this item continues as before, the only difference being that it is shown in electric installations under 50 M. E. S. Budget.

This sort of arrangement of the Budget is rather most worrying. Try as you may, you cannot get the real figures for Hot Weather total charges, unless one happens to know the fact, that almost all the British Barracks and British Hospitals are fitted with electricity.

The heading of 'Punkha Pulling and Tatties' in the old Budgets was very glaring and conspicuous. But now, that is changed to the new heading of 'Hot Weather charges' in later Budgets.

To make it still more difficult, the 'Hot weather charges' are further split up by transferring the water and electricity charges from the real Hot weather charges to the 50 M. E. S. head, in electricity charges.

The 'Hot weather charge,' Item though not included under its proper heading as punkha pulling and tatties, etc. is still an item in the Medical Service Budget.

Hot weather charges are shown in Main Head VII. The cost shown on this is only lakh 1.47 in 1931-32 Budget (page 272). The total cost would amount to more than Rs. 6 to 10 lacs.

**Table X, showing rise and fall in Medical personnel from 1922 to 32**

	1922-23		1923-24	1926-27	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-32
1 R. A. M. C. Officers.	293	294	*	243	*	252	*		248
2 I. M. S. Officers.	454	448	*	352	*	344	*		359
3 Dental Officers.	18	18	18	18	*	23	*		35
4 Extra.	32	16							.
Officers' total	797	776	508	508	515	514	526		537
5 Other Ranks (R. A. M. C.)	450 29 1	*	450	414	*	419	462		422
6 Other Ranks Dental.	*	*	36	36	*	46	*		51
Total	*	*	*	450	467	467	*		473
8 Other Ranks Nurses.	267 9	266 9	*	267	*	278	*		282
9 Matrons.	45	54	*	40	*	41	*		43
Total	321	329	310	307	317	319	323		325
11 I. H. Corps.	12065 190 76	6916 190 76	*	9326	*	9048	13348		13461 9161
12 Reservists.	*	728	728 (p. 86 note 87)	1400	*	3100	*		4300
13 Followers.	5378 246	5379 266	5266 (p. 115)	4911 (p. 15)	*	*	*		*
14 Clerks.	700			76 (p. 15)	*	*	*		*
15 Motor driver etc.				117	*	203	*		203

\* In the Budget, in some places the total is given, but the details are not given and vice versa.

**(Medical) Officers :—**In England, only a small number of 687 Regular Army Doctors and 40 civilian practitioners are found to be sufficient, for the whole of the British Army. But in India, the number of K. C. Officers (given in page 13 of 1931-32 Budget) is 1006; the total number does not tally with the total of details.

The R. A. M. C.'s work only with the British units serving in India. The I. M. S. officers are usually meant to be in charge of only the Indian hospitals. Perhaps, because, the Britisher in India does not feel like being treated by an Indian Doctor, howsoever competent and even superior he may be to an ordinary R. A. M. C.

It is worth remembering, that the ordinary average Britisher in England always shows a great faith in an Indian Doctor. It is common knowledge, that only on account of the fact, many an Indian Doctor is practising in England, and has actually settled there. But the fact, that, that is England, and this is India, makes all the world of difference. There perhaps they may be equals; but here in India an Englishman is a different person; he is a Member of the Ruler class, and not the Englishman you meet in England. This is only the result of that British mentality of 'Inferiority complex' and the result of the policy of 'mistrust'.

**R. A. M. C. Officers :—**The number of the R. A. M. C. Officers is quite superfluous; taking into consideration the British units (almost  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Indian army) and even believing, for the sake of argument, that the British units are not replaced and stay in India as an army of occupation, still, it could be seen, that, more than half the number of these R. A. M. C. Officers are simply superfluous. If the British army is replaced by

Indian soldiers, practically the whole of the R. A. M. C. cost is a saving. There would be a clear saving of  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the cost of the British Hospitals i. e. about 50 lakhs and more.

**(Medical officers) Assistant Surgeons :—**

Besides, there is another point worth noting, i. e. that 334 assistant surgeons etc. are working as assistants to the 264 R. A. M. Cs in the British Hospitals. We hear, that in England, only one R. A. M. C. officer, without the help of an assistant, manages the Hospital work of a unit. If it be so, we fail to see any propriety in such a costly and unnecessary assistant surgeon in India. It could only be inferred, that this is only done with a view to minimise the work of a British R. A. M. C. of a British Hospital; thus allowing him greater time for sport, comfort and luxury, which are perhaps essential to an Englishman in India. In short these assistant surgeons with their salaries are superfluous. This item and may be a saving, if the British units are replaced.

In this connection we cannot quote a better authority than Lt. Col. Osburne, a Britisher who served in India for about 21 years and has written his memoirs of his experiences of Indian Medical Service. To quote only one fact he says that within the first three years of service he went twice to England on 11 months' leave. The following is a review of his book in the Manchester Guardian. ( quoted from *Hindu Chronicle* etc. )

Lieut. Col. Arthur Osburne, D. S. O., late of the R. A. M. C., writes an interesting article in the 'Manchester Guardian' to-day giving his experiences as a junior officer in India. Though a man without means, he was able to live most comfortably while on duty in India, on a rate of pay which he received and which

still continues in India. *They grumbled not because the pay was small, but because the senior officers were getting still more.*

**Regular Member of the Cocktail Bar:—**While in India he had seven servants, one pony, sometimes two. He was a regular member of the cocktail bar, was able to pay old debts in London, and in addition toured the country collecting curios.

**11 Months' leave in 3 years:—**During the first three years he obtained eleven months' leave on full pay, besides many uncounted spells of short leave. He worked only every third day; usually not more than three hours, often much less and in the afternoon was free for sports, shooting antelopes.

This, the Colonel says, is due to the fact that the Indian peasants were compelled to pay the salaries of a large and arrogant staff of footmen, who force them to go without a portion of their meal each day to make up for the salaries, pension and frequent trips to England of the English officials. If he were in India to-day, the Colonel thinks, he would be drawing a salary of Rs. 2,000 a month and besides various allowances *which India cannot afford any more to pay to the English officials.*

**Dental Officers:—**The British Tommy keeps his teeth quite unclean. Even after his long stay in this country and his association with his Indian colleague, he has not yet learnt and improved to take care of his teeth. This does not speak well of the British Tommy. He certainly is a loser so far as he loses his teeth only, but we lose heavily, and that is the heavy cost that India has to pay in maintaining these 35 Dental Experts and their whole paraphernalia for which we have to pay perhaps about 15 to 20 lacs.

This is again a saving when the replacement of the British soldier or Indianization takes place. The Indian troops even to-day do not very much require the services of these Dental Experts.

**Sub-Assistant Surgeons:**—There are 681 Sub-Assistant Surgeons. They are not required in England.

If only one R. A. M. C. officer alone can manage a unit hospital in England, why then should the same unit in India require 2 or 3 assistants such as Assistant and Sub-Assistant Surgeons in addition ?

**The Indian Hospital Corps:**—There is no such corps or its equivalent in England, excepting the R. A. M. C. Regimental establishment, which appears to be somewhat similar to the I H. C. in India, yet there are no such divisions and categories as 'Other Ranks,' 'Followers' and 'Reservists'. In England only 3,579 R. A. M. C. Other Ranks are sufficient. But in India the O. R.'s of I. H. C. alone are 4250; in addition to this, there are 4892 followers and 4300 reservists.

**Followers 4892:**—The number of followers is extra and quite unnecessary. The Medical Service in England works without these followers. Where is the necessity of these here ?

**Note:**—If you look at table IX you will see that the personnel in columns 12, 13, 14, 15 is not to be found in the English Budget. The number, of the items 12, 13, 15 personnel is 203, 4892, 4300, *i. e.* ( 9395 ) The motor drivers, Ayahs, and Ray mechanists are necessarily with a higher rate. The followers and reservists are of course at the usual Indian rates.

The cost of 13,461 I. H. C. men, is about 21 lacs (1931 Budget, page 143). These extra 9395 men may cost about Rs. 15 to 16 lakhs.



This extra personnel should immediately be reduced and a saving of almost 15 to 16 lacs and more should be made. If this personnel is not required in England, there is hardly any 'medical ground' to believe that it is needed here. This extra personnel is maintained in spite of the fact, that the percentage of sick in Indian and British soldiers is 1:3 on an average.

Reservists 4300 :—There is no such personnel in England. It is therefore unnecessary in India.

Other staff 203 :—Motor drivers, Ayahs and Female sweepers :—Such personnel or fantastic requirements do not appear to have been found necessary in England. What is the necessity of these here ? Perhaps for the comforts of British soldiers and their families !

In short, if all these unnecessary costs are cut down, a huge saving would be effected. The savings have already been given before.

The statement clearly shows the increase and decrease, which cannot be supported conveniently and on any technical military grounds, because firstly the strength of the troops is the same. No new or separate departments have been created or if created they were superfluous and unnecessary for purely an Indian army of defence. For an army of offence a few items like these may be perhaps necessary. We do not know, if these have been included with a view to support the 'Imperial policy'

Medical Officers (K. Cs) :—The total was a very large number in 1922 and 1923, but from 1925 to 1932, there is a sudden fall in the number, which is more marked. Again, one cannot fail to see the steady rise from 508 in 1927, to 537, in 1932; and this is in spite of

the fact, that many Indian Regiments have been disbanded. The number of the officers ought to have decreased, but instead, it appears to be on the increase.

**Other Ranks ( Dental ) :—**You will see the steady rise in the other ranks, from 36 in 1927-28 to 51 in 1931-32. No adequate grounds appear to support this rise. It is also to be noted that even to-day the Department can be worked with 18 Assistants only, because the percentage and the number of Dental Cases among British troops has not increased to any appreciable extent. This also would mean a saving.

In short, the steady rise and change should be noted in every item in the statement.

Surgeon-General Gordon says, " Still another point must be alluded to, namely, the insufficiency of mere statistics by themselves to convey a correct impression of what they are often intended to do. Indeed this fallacy of averages is alluded to in the despatch of the Secretary of State for India.

" To illustrate my meaning: I observe that, if we suppose a certain number of soldiers to die or be invalided, say at the end of two years' service in India, an equal number at the end of ten years, we strike an average and find it to give the residence in the country as six, a conclusion really at variance alike with the facts on the one side and those on the other. " <sup>3</sup>

In his appeal, he gave no statistics of sickness, mortality, or invaliding; he preferred the logic of facts to figures. " Boys serve but to strew the roadsides and, fill the hospitals. " <sup>4</sup>

Surgeon-Gen. C. A. Gordon says:—" A large proportion of young lads, such as now arrive in India, are *physically unequal to the strain of active service*

*and, consequently, while they continue so, are not only useless, but receive pay for work that they do not and cannot perform. Many such have to be sent to hill stations, there to pass one or more years, that is to all intents and purposes, to be retained in nurseries until their physique develops sufficiently to admit of their performing duties for which during the interval they have drawn pay."* <sup>5</sup>

**Khus-Khus Tatties:**—Sir Neville Chamberlain says, "In this presidency Khus-Khus tatties are only used in barracks and hospitals at Kamptee and Trichinopoly, and in hospitals only at Bellary. As it is intended to withdraw British troops from Trichinopoly, Kamptee will be the only station where there can be any question as to their continuance. I think the decision during each hot season should rest with the General Officer in command, in communication with the medical authorities. At the same time *I consider that the habits of soldiers make it very difficult to turn khus-khus tatties to their proper account."* <sup>6</sup>

Governor of Punjab says, "Tatties, as worked in European barracks, are, His Honour believes, a delusion. His Honour would stop all tatties in the bedrooms as a *useless expence*...He feels convinced that this curtailment of expense would not affect the comfort or health of the troops." <sup>7</sup>

"In the Bombay presidency the climate does not necessitate any great amount of *expenditure on punkha-pulling*, which is required at very few stations." <sup>8</sup>

**British health cost:**—We pay the British Government in England (to the War Office,) a sum in this connection *i. e.* 'the National health insurance' etc. and 'unemployment insurance payments' through the fat pay and allowances etc. of the British soldier.

The sum that we pay to England for Non-effective charges for British Forces is Rs. 4·96 crores apart from the non-effective sum spent in India which is Rs. 3·96 crores. Total non-effective cost is Rs. 8·43 crores.

The following will give an idea as to how much saving could automatically be effected from the payments made to England over the British troops. Statement showing a part of the payment made to England:—

15,58,992	National Health Insurance for British soldiers.
5,32,267	Unemployment Insurance.
1,86,66,667	Payment made to War Office for employment of British troops (over and above the pay and allowance given them here in India.) (Capitation)
22,77,92,567	Total
48,67,50,000	Total payment made to England. (Remaining amount of this is spent for all other non-effective charges, such as pensions, gratuities, educational establishments, military services, rewards etc.)

( Refer Appropriation account Budget. ) or Chapter XIV, Table I.

Over and above the payments made to England for the British soldiers' health, more money is again spent on his health in India.

British troops are inefficient and costly because they cannot work and perform the various duties on the Frontier, or perform their military duties due to the 'Climate', heat, and fatigue. It entails "severe hardships" on them and therefore to maintain them here "uselessly on the strength with full pay" with no health and capacity and physique to work on the Indian Frontier, is most un-economical and ridiculous.

#### Non-effectives...

Looking to the percentage of Non-effectives and sickness, ( of British 77 and Indian 11 ) the British sol-

dier is more or less a "Burden" as he is "soft on occasions of fatigues and privation." He cannot bear "fatigue and strain incidental to exposure and long marches during military service."

The 'rate of mortality' is very heavy, therefore, it is simply criminal to waste good money of the poor Indian taxpayer on the British troops.

Again, to counteract all the above disabilities and difficulties, huge expenditure—even 6 to 12 times more than is incurred on an Indian under similar conditions—is incurred, in maintaining a top-heavy and luxuriously equipped medical department, in the army with its innumerable, unnecessary and costly items such as Nurses, Matrons, R. A. M., Cs. and assistant surgeons, Medical comforts, Medical aids, Hill stations, convalescent homes, special dairy farms, Bakeries, Khus Tatties, Anti-malarial measures, and to crown all even Anti-Bug measures. The Indian Exchequer is thus very heavily and unnecessarily charged for the British soldier.

It may be granted, that a limited extra money may not count with nations, where their own national soldiers' health is concerned. But it is their money they spend with the sanction of their own, National Government. But here, it is an Alien Government that spends India's best money for the health and comfort not of the Indian troops but of the British soldier, and that too without the sanction of Indians.

Selection and location of cantonments is made to suit the British health even in an unsuitable and unhealthy cantonment of India. Here again, cost is no concern. Nature is too tough an enemy to fight against, but the British brains can bring to bear all their scientific resources and apply them to improve the worst or most

unhealthy cantonments by turning a barren and hot land into a gay one. Electricity, water arrangements, roads, spacious, luxurious, airy and ventilated buildings, bathing tanks and gardens, ice arrangements, dairy farms, clothing stores and provisions etc. of the I. A. S. C., such as tinned food and fruit, canteens, soldiers' clubs, soldiers' libraries, and a train of Indian followers of both public and private men and women to act as servants, and to help them in keeping up their health and physique by lessening the burden of work and physical inconvenience etc., all these have to be done for the British soldiers' health.

In fact no inconvenience of any sort is allowed to stand. so far as a British soldier goes, say from his cradle to the grave.

All this means a most heavy and useless burden on the Indian taxpayer, and that too, for no adequate return. An Indian soldier does even that work, which the British soldier is incapable of doing on the Frontier, and yet, he is passed over, and dubbed as unfit for the Defence ( General ) of his own country. Could there be anything more unreasonable and illogical ?

In short, the British soldier in India can be easily, and conveniently replaced by an Indian not only without losing any efficiency but in fact, adding something more to the present efficiency.

If the replacement of the British Soldier alone takes place, it saves India on this medical Head something like Rs. 90 to 95 lacs or so, roughly 1 crore of rupees. It is but in the best interest of both the parties concerned *viz.* the Britisher as well as the Indian, who each in his turn and each in his own way would be benefitted, only if the British soldier is replaced by the Indian.

## CHAPTER XIII

### PROVISIONS AND SUPPLIES

It would be very interesting to study the provisioning and supply system of the Indian Army. The present system is a very costly one. It has been mainly designed and brought into force to enable the Indian administration, to avert any danger of being found unprepared for an Imperial campaign. In fact, it could be said, that the supply system of the Indian Army has been set up only to suit an expeditionary Indian Army, for a campaign outside India, and this is necessarily a campaign for Imperial defence and not for India's defence. To suit this arrangement, cheap systems and methods of supply which existed before and which were adequate for an Indian Army—purely for the defence of India—were abolished, and costly methods and systems of supply were adopted to suit Imperial plans or concerns, or rather England's concern and safety. And for this, India is made to suffer.

This arrangement entails upon the Indian exchequer an unnecessarily heavy cost and with no advantage. Gen. Macmunn says, "The ancient Mogul system of *supplying* an army had prevailed in India upto 1917; and the Indian portion of the Army had fed itself, clothed itself, horsed itself, small stored itself on a *contract basis*. As we had pointed out in Lord Kitchener's time, such a system had only the merit of **cheapness**, and in no way provided for war, and in modern times had broken down on every possible

occasion, to the shame and chagrin of the military commanders, and heavy cost to the Government of the day. We know, too, that the Indian soldier came to us too illnurtured to stand a central Asian campaign."

**Ration:**—They also asserted, that they must clothe, equip and barrack their Indian, Army and intended, during war, to do so when peace had come again. It was due to this settled policy, that the Indian Army started rationing her own troops, at Government's expense; the result of which was, that on provisions and supplies alone (including rations) of the Indian Army, an approximate amount of about 2½ to 3 crores is spent. A part of the money is spent in the form of compensation in lieu of rations. All this is done, not for an Indian Army of defence, but for an Imperial Army, that was always to be kept ready and equipped for any future eventuality in Imperial designs. It cannot be said, that there is any validity or any moral justification either, for an action and policy like that; but all this could be done, because of the fact, that the army budget is a non-votable item; and as it is not dependent on the sanction of the legislature, this exploitation for the carrying out of Imperial policy can be taken to any extent.

This rationing method may also result in 'buying and purchasing' the contentment of the Indian soldier in general. There is no wonder, if it were to act on the soldier's vanity and weaknesses,—qualities which are common to all human beings, but more so with a conquered race. It is only a matter of degree. In old days, this method of buying the contentment of the Indian soldier by paying him extra bhatta or pay was adopted. It was also thought of, as a measure, helpful in fostering their loyalty. We hope the present policy of rationing the



troops, does not tend to secure similar results, which are denationalising factors, in the building up of any real National Army. All this could be easily avoided, if only the standing army is reduced to  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the present strength, to enable the country to get any number of militarily trained personnel and manpower, by those cheap and economic systems of defence, such as the systems of extra territorial and reserve organisations, practised in all the foreign countries, and especially in England.

“ When Sir Charles Munro had come to India, bringing some knowledge of the world at war into the secluded Indian atmosphere, he set things moving handsomely, and among many things the Government of India decided that it must *feed* its recruit soldiers in India from the day they were caught, if they were to be fit to face prolonged war.” <sup>2</sup>

Now the war is over, of what good is the Ration system in India? The Indian conditions are peculiarly India's own. They are in no way similar to conditions in Europe. As given out by the Army authorities in India, in evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission (1917), India has a fighting class population of 5 crores and more. In fact there is no use of maintaining such a large standing Army at such an enormous expenditure. To add to the huge cost of the standing Army, this ration expenditure of about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  crores and, more is an extra added drain. We should, however, like to know, whether the effect of this cost stops only there. We hope, it does not act upon the soldier as a force ‘to foster his Loyalty and buy his contentment’ as already suggested before, by advocating and practising the various methods, such as the ‘grant

of lands', Ranks to Indians, 'title and authority in villages', and the like. If Ration is to be given to Indian troops a corresponding cut in the sepoys' pay may be necessary. This is absolutely essential, to neutralise the baneful effect of pampering his vanity, created by the payment of Ration money.

Brownslow says, "And to think, that proclamations and promises will appease the so-called unrest or that *another rupee per month will ensure the loyalty of the Sepoy*, unless these mild measures are supplemented by the moral effect, throughout India, of the arrival of 4 or 5 ship-loads of *White Soldiers* at our two most seditious seaports....." 3

The Rationing of Indian troops may have been perhaps a necessity during the great world war. But now in peace times, where and what is the propriety or necessity of still continuing that practice of Rationing the troops? Perhaps the inherent weakness arising out of the poverty of the soldier is considered to be worth being exploited. Field-Marshal Brownslow has expressed and evinced grave doubts as to whether 'another rupee/per month will ensure the loyalty of the sepoy.' 6 rupees of ration money are perhaps, therefore, supposed to be enough to make the soldier more loyal.

The Royal Commission on Army organization in 1879, had fully realised the necessity of a reduction in Army Expenditure, and consequently they had even framed a question to that effect. The question runs as follows :—"Recognizing the fact that India cannot afford to maintain the most perfect army, which could be devised in which economy did not enter, and that large reductions of Army expenditure are absolutely essential." 4

In 1878, when the Army Budget was Rs. 18·22 crores only, the Royal Commission thought that reduction in Army Expenditure was absolutely essential. What should be said to-day, when the Army Budget is more than 3 times that of 1878, *i. e.* 57·07 crores? All this rise in expenditure is due to the costlier systems of provisions and supplies (Rations) and equipping the Indian Army—not for the sake of India's Defence, but to help the Imperial policy and designs.

Another result of the increase of provision and supply charges could be found in the fact, that much of the stores required for the British troops are bought from England. If only Indian goods and Indian stores alone were to be used for the Indian army, it would save a pretty large amount, that is spent over other stores and supplies. For instance all clothing, equipment and accoutrement. The following from the Eden Commission Report will bear out the above.

“Are the warlike stores (and small arms ammunition) now procured and maintained in a manner most economical and consistent with efficiency?”

(Sir Richard Temple, C-in-C., Bombay, says) “To this question I may reply on the whole in the affirmative although certain suggestions may be made here for the more economical working of the ordnance department and other departments of supply of India. The orders lately issued, by which the ordnance department is enabled to purchase locally or by private arrangement stores which were formerly obtained from England, will, we hope, reduce expenditure considerably.”<sup>5</sup>

Another reason which is responsible in increasing the Army expenditure is to be traced to the fact that our Rifle and ammunition factories at Ishapore and Kirkee

which are run at a cost of crores 1·19 and 2·04, (App. Accts. P. 148 of 1929-30), are not run on business, national and economic lines, neither could they be expected to be worked on the above lines, till the Britishers give up their policy of mistrust. The mistrust could be seen in the fact, that while a ·303 service rifle (Geffreys' 30·3 sporting ) could be bought in England for sports and other purposes, it cannot be bought in India. There is a rigid restriction. If only such restrictions were to be removed, there would be a greater demand and a greater production of these ·303, rifles and mass production of this rifle and its ammunition in the factories would be paying, instead of running the factories at a loss as they do to-day. This very same suggestion has been made by the Eden Commission in 1879, as follows—

“ The cost of our gun-powder and small arms ammunition might be reduced by increasing our area of supply and consequently the outturn.

“ But I would also remark that in these days of improved armament and when that armament is constantly changing, a large accumulation of stores of a particular kind is frequently a dead loss to the State, because they become obsolete on the change of one description of gun for another.

“ It appears to me that if reductions of expenditure can be *made in all these departments of supply*, so as to meet our actual requirements without retaining a large surplus, subject to deterioration, it will be a far better economy.” <sup>6</sup>

Considering the above, it is clear that the cost of some of the stores ( warlike ) would certainly be reduced, if the Arms Act were not only slackened, but absolutely repealed. Millions of people would care to

buy the Service Rifle for purposes of sport etc. But this is just what appears to be least desirable to the Britisher.

The rifles and S. A. Ammunition would not only be cheap, but the rifle factories, instead of running at a loss, would thrive and be earning many times more their present working cost.

But this cannot be done, as in all likelihood this would revive the martial ardour and other qualities and tendencies in the people again, to eradicate which, such a consistent and systematic programme of policy is adopted, with a view to completely demartialize the people.

Besides, if these rifles were to be sold so cheap in India, say for Rs. 10 a rifle or so, as suggested by Field-Marshal Brownslow, and which is just possible if mass production is carried, who then would buy a foreign barrel? But the fear of these rifles being used against the Britishers, necessitates the running of these factories even at a loss.

The reasons of the policy are not far to seek.

Field-Marshal Brownslow, the Commander-in-Chief of India, has very truly said, "If we are ready to send a fully trained Army corps to Bombay at a week's notice, (*of white soldiers even without any the least military training*) we shall hold our own, even against the '303 rifle which will soon be in the hands of every man who has 10 rupees to buy one, and the spirit to use it, either as a rebel or a patriot.'" <sup>7</sup> (*Italics in bracket is ours.*)

One will clearly see from all the data given in the following statement, how costly the British soldier is in every way.

*Clothing to British Troops.* " On the whole I believe the British soldiers to be better supplied than any other fighting man in Europe. Recent experiences in Persia and Abyssinia, the expedition to Malta, and the campaign in Afaganistan, all tend to confirm this opinion regarding the great department of supply. " <sup>8</sup>

The above will illustrate how the British soldier is extravagantly supplied and provided at the poor Indian taxpayers' cost.

The Commission recommended reduction of expenditure only in the supply department, and also special instructions have been given in the reduction of the clothing, medical and miscellaneous departments. Clothing the British army extravagantly and profusely, was and is done even to-day. The imperialists in the War Office must have only laughed in their sleeves at the philanthropic and judicially minded British personnel of the Commission. We are sure, that great economies would be effected, if only the 'kit and clothing' difference between the British and the Indian soldier be removed by the British soldiers' replacement.

The following Table shows some of the items of provisions and supplies, their huge cost and the tremendous and remarkably glaring difference in the British and Indian rates. We also note the approximate savings of some Items, that would be effected, if only the British soldiers' replacement were to take place.

**Table I:—Cost per capita of some Items of provision and supplies of a British and Indian soldier of a Cavalry and Infantry unit only.**

	Rate per Capita				Total cost on each Head. lacs	Saving after Replacement.
	Cavalry		Infantry			
	British	Indian	British	Indian		
4. Hot weather establishment	1 8 0	0 5 5	1 3 2	0 1 11	07'10	7'10
5. Local purchases for direct delivery to units						
(a) Provisions	57 11 2	2 9 11	68 1 7	6 8 0	60'10	48 to 56½
6. Bonus paid on sliding scale of rations						
(a) Provisions	2 0 0	0 2 11	2 6 5	0 3 2	01'57	
10. Value of issues (less receipts) from supply store depots for use or consumption						
(a) Provisions	23 4 10	0 10 11			135'00	
(b) Forage	175 0 0	166 0 0	7 11 2	6 1 7	83'00	
(c) Petrol and Lubricants	0 4 4	. . .	. . .	. . .	07'00	
(i) Animals (remounts)	114 0 0	93 0 0			33'46	
(j) Ordnance stores	158.0	112.8	113.9	59.10	254'00	34 mix
(15) (a) Bakeries	25 0 0	. . .	30 8 0	0 2 1	16'00	1800
(b) Butcheries					02'00	
(d) Dairy farms						
(e) Medical stores depots & workshops	0 10 7	For British 0 3 10	Troops 0 7 20	Only 0 3 2	16'00	
17. Cost of repairs to deposit stores received from units in Arsenal and Heavy repair shops	0 15 6	0 8 0	0 4 10	0 9 10	12'00	
19. Cost of water and electricity supplied by Military services, Engineer services	75 0 0	7 12 10	43 12 10	3 12 10	62'00	46
1. Pay and other allowances and expenditure compiled under the Sub-Heads or Minor Heads concerned.						

2. Transportation charges:—														
(a) Travelling and out-station allowances							6	11	2	4	14	5		47.50
(b) Rail charges	11	14	5	4	12	9	14	0	0	7	8	0	122.00	
(c) Sea and Inland water charges							5	9	7	1	8	0	08.50	
(d) Hired Transport charges	4	0	0	1	12	9	5	7	2	1	8	0	18.25	
3. Conservancy charges							6	3	2	1	14	5	19.75	
7. Payments to War Office for British forces serving in India	358	0	0	.	.	.	346	0	0	.	.	.	186.00	186.00
8. National Health Insurance Army	10.	1	7	.	.	.	10	0	0	.	.	.	06.00	6.00
9. Unemployment Insurance	29	12	10	.	.	.	29	1	7	.	.	.	15.00	15.00
12. Losses due to fluctuation in price of stores in charge of store depots	11	14	5	10	12	9	4	0	0	3	14	5	06.00	
11. Losses of stores in supply and store depots	4	11	2	11	4	9	1	8	0	1	8	0		
13. Losses due to sale of surplus and obsolete stores	6	4	9	4	1	7	4	6	5	2	4	9	11.00	

Refer App. Accounts, Army 1929-30 Page 119-120.

Note :—Refer Chapter VIII also, Eco. Inefficiency.

**Transportation:—**If you see the cost on sub-heads C' and 'D' of 'Transportation' in the statement, you will find, that the British cost per capita is about four times greater than the Indian. The result is, that out of the budget of Rs. 3.25 crores on Head VII transporation, about Rs. 2.60 crores would be a clear saving, if the British soldier is replaced. (For details see 'Movements,' chap. X.)

**Conservancy charges:—**The sanitary and hygienic precautions are so costly, that the cost per British soldier is roughly about four times that of the Indian. In spite of this heavy cost for precaution, his rate of sickness, in general, is 77 per thousand, as against 21,



per thousand, of the Indian, on whom only about one fourth of the money is spent.

**Hot weather establishment:—**The cost under this Head in 1931-32 is only Rs. 1.40 lacs. If the whole cost be totalled, it would be somewhere between Rs. 6 to 10 lacs of rupees.

In this connection, the charges for water and electricity are not included. These charges ought to have been in fact entered under M. Head VII, but they are put under 50 M. E. S. Head, in budget, separately; and this is most misleading.

This heading and its cost is mainly for the British personnel ( British soldiers and officers ).

Mostly the British Barracks only are fitted with electricity; if the electricity cost, which is entered under Main Head 50 M. E. S. (see page 275 1931-32 Army Budget ), and water and other charges be added, the whole cost on this Head would amount to somewhere between Rs. 6 to 10 lacs and more; the cost in 1922-23 etc., is as follows.

**Table II. Statement of ' Budget estimate ' of Hot weather estab. charges, i. e. punkha pulling and water for tatties etc.**

Year	1922 23	27	27-28	28-29	29-30	30-31	31-32
Hot weather establishment etc., Cost in lacs Rs.	7.24		4.50	2.54	2.03	1.74	1.40

Refer Budget 1927-28, pages 153; 1929-30, pp. 258-59; 1931-32, pp. 272-73.

You will clearly see from the following table showing the cost per capita on the Provisions Head, that the British cost is about 11 times, and even 22 times more as compared with the Indian.

**Table III, 5. Local Purchase (a) Provisions**

	Cost per Capita	
	British	Indian
Cavalry or the mounted men	Rs. 57-11-2 about 22	2-9-4 times
Infantry or the dismounted men	68-1-9 about 11	6-8-0 times

(a) The total cost on this Head is Rs. 69.69 lacs. (App. Accts.). If the rate of capita is taken at the 'Cavalry rate,' the *savings would be Rs. 55½ lacs*; and if the rate of capita is taken at the 'Infantry rate' the savings would be Rs. 48 lacs.

From Table I, it would be found that two different rates of capita are given, one for the mounted men and the other for the dismounted men, both for British and Indian. In our calculations to arrive at the general figure of savings, we calculate by both the rates, and in the explanation, give both the figures wherever they occur.

**6. Bonus paid on sliding scale-(a) Provisions:—**  
The sum spent on this Head is about 1 lac and 57 thousand rupees. Taking the rate per capita and the cost of British soldiers into account in the replacement scheme, we shall be able to save about 1 lac and 21 thousand rupees.

If the supplies and provisions are extra, superfluous or unnecessary, where is the necessity of giving this money as Bonus or 'Compensation, in lieu of provisions?' As usual, the Indian is getting so little. *The British soldier gets about 12 times and more.*

**10. (J)-Value of issues ordnance stores:—**  
Considering the cavalry rate only, in the cavalry

replacement programme, it would be seen that a net saving of about Rs. 1 lac and 50 thousand would occur only by replacement. Replacing the British infantry would alone effect a saving of Rs. 22,50,000 lacs. Taking into account all other Heads, Arms and services, we might assume that we may get a net saving of roughly more than Rs. 34 to 40 lacs.

Total cost on this Head is Rs. 2 crores and 54 lacs. Considering the difference in the rate of *capitas* of the Indian and British personnel, it may be safely said, that comparatively larger savings than 34 to 40 lacs would be effected.

The difference in the rate is due to many reasons. The British soldier is equipped with arms, accoutrements equipment, weapons and other details and implements superior in quality and also in quantity; the rate per capita is consequently larger. Besides, the difference in various Arms and their armaments, is also another factor, which is responsible for the difference.

15:—(a) *Bakeries*. Total cost 16·67 lacs.

The total cost of issues on this head is 16 lacs and more. This supply is not required by Indians, and neither is it necessary for them; so a *clear saving of Rs. 16 lacs* and more occurs, only if the British soldiers' replacement takes place.

**Bakeries:**—It would be noted in connection with this head, that since the Bakeries and butcheries are wholly and solely for the British troops in India, the whole of the cost on this head can be a saving. In the Budget estimate for 1931-32 it is stated as Rs. 2·36 lacs. In the budget of 1929-30 the budget estimate is 2·18 lacs. But in the year 1929-30, (in the 1931-32 budget, page 182, column 1) the accounts cost is stated at 1·90 lacs.

In the appropriation accounts in 1928-29 (page 150-51) the total cost of the maintenance of the department is stated as Rs. 18.18 lacs, Bakeries and 2.42, lacs Butcheries. In the appropriation accounts for the year 1929-30 (page 120) the cost of maintenance of the departments is shown as Rs. 16.67 lacs, under the head of 15 A (Bakeries); and Rs. 2.09 lacs, in Butcheries (15 B). One cannot understand why the Bakeries budget is shown in 1931-32 as Rs. 2.36 lacs only, when the cost appears to be Rs. 16 lacs and more.

**Butcheries—Total cost 2.10 lacs :—**

The total cost incurred on this head, both for British and Indian, is about Rs. 2.10 lacs, taking into account the cost per head, both British and Indian, the replacement would give a saving of Rs. 1.80 lacs as savings.

19:—Water and Electricity :—The total cost on this head is about Rs. 62 lacs and a quarter. There are two rates; taking into account the cost by the first rate, which is Rs. 75 and Rs. 7-12-10 per capita per year, both British and Indian, and by the second rate Rs. 43-12-10 for the British and Rs. 3-12-10 for the Indian, one finds that by the first and the second calculation, in the replacement process, a saving of Rs. 46 lacs or 24 lacs or so would be effected.

Take the item of 'water and electricity' alone, and think for yourselves. The British soldier requires Rs. 6 As. 8 per month or Rs. 75 per year, only for his water and electricity charges. This cost alone is nearly one and three fourth times or about twice the average annual earnings of an Indian. We may take 1 Anna 6 pies as the daily average income of an Indian, say or

Rs. 3-14 per month. The water scale for an Indian and a Britisher is a most interesting study. The Indian's rate is 8 gallons per day and a Britisher gets 20 gallons per day. (Army Instructions India 1925).

Allowance to British soldiers :—(Refer P. 219, Table V) :—Hair-cutting and washing Allowance is now included in "consolidated kit and clothing Allowance." Formerly, it was Rs. 3 p. m. (See P. & A. Regulations, old edition. Now according to Army Instructions, India 1925, para 1012, No. 1 of 1925, it is included in "consolidated kit and clothing allowance to cover the cost of Hair cutting....."). This, in fact, is a provision for the barber and the washerman of a British Soldier.

The Indian soldier does not receive any allowance, but on the contrary, a recovery of a few annas is made from his pay per month for barber and washerman (probably Annas 7 for barber and a few Annas for washerman; this rate varies in groups of different regiments, and according to local conditions).

For comparison of some other Allowances of the British and Indian soldier (over and above their pay) Refer chapter VIII, Economic Inefficiency.

To sum up, the Replacement of the British soldier would effect a huge savings of Rs. 2 to 3 crores only in provisions and supplies alone.

## CHAPTER VIV

### CAPITATION, NON-EFFECTIVES AND SAFEGUARDS

*(Army Budget, Finance Considerations and three Safeguards—Army, Finance and Foreign Relations—Capitation, Non-Effective etc.)*

Stephen Kinghall says, :—“ A nation's foreign policy is the mirror in which its conception of its national interests are reflected, and hence the study of foreign affairs is a very important branch of national defence.”<sup>1</sup>

He again says :—“...But in practice the term ‘National interests’ is of an elastic nature and one nation's meat often seems poison to another. In peace time it is necessary to gauge what interpretation each nation gives to the expression ‘national interests,’ and then consider whether what we consider to be our own national interests conflicts with this interpretation.”<sup>2</sup>

**British troops' cost in India**—The Army Budget for 1931-32 is Rs. 57·07 crores, out of which 43·84 crores is spent in India, and 13·22 crores is spent in England.

In chapter VIII, we have shown how a saving of Rs. 33 crores or 28 to 32 crores, could be effected by the replacement of the British soldier. It also includes a few items of savings by reduction.

Out of 43·84 crores spent in India, a sum of about 22 to 28 crores could be saved by replacement, as well as by necessary reduction; and in the 13·22 crores spent in England, almost all of it could be saved, excepting the little portion of Rs. 1 crore or so, that is spent on stores etc.

**The following shows Expenditure in England**

<b>Main Head</b>	<b>... Crores</b>
VIII Non-effective charges	...4·86
VII Transportation	...1·00
IV A. H. Q. staff and commands	·12
II Administrative services	... ·43
I Pay and allowance	...3·50
Pt. C. Royal Air Force	...1·15
50 Military Engineering service...	·04
V Stores, etc., (III) Man; Est.—	...1·83

Replacement means saving in further Annual additional charges on Heads VIII, VII, IV, II, I, Part C and 50 M. E. S. The sum of 3·50 crores spent in England on head I, includes mainly Capitation charges amounting to approximately Rs. 1·78 crores. In this chapter, we deal mainly with this point, and show how the 3 safeguards of Army, Finance and Foreign relations, are interlinked and cannot be separated.

History and origin of capitation:—After the Mutiny, the administration of the Indian army, specially with regard to its British personnel, was the concern of the Army authorities in England. The old Company's army was transformed into a part of the British Army. And, Since then, India has been required to pay to England the cost or the hire money, for raising the British recruits, for the British troops in India.

The necessity of British troops is not for Indian defence, but for the occupation of India. England was not raising these British troops for Indian needs; in fact, India was never willing to have them. They are forced on her. They are meant "to maintain England's hold on India with the sword."

Mr. Arbuthnot says:—"The native Army of India is the only large Army in the world, which is entirely composed of mercenary troops, alien in race, to the rulers of the country."<sup>3</sup>

The Britishers are the rulers and we, the children of the soil, are aliens! Of course our troops may be 'Mercenary' because they are made so.

India, like any other country, was never willing, nor would ever be willing, to saddle herself with the cost of British troops in India, not only from the financial point of view, but even from the most vital *i. e.* national, moral and, political point of view as well. India has no voice, and, therefore, the British troops, in spite of all its fantastic cost, have been saddled on India. They are neither for India's good and interest; nor with her consent, but in reality, they are here to maintain the British hold on India, which is the food and bread ground of England.

There is no moral justification, therefore, in saddling India with such heavy unparalleled and monstrous charges and cost of capitation, and all such other charges, resulting in heavy Taxation and the Exploitation of the poor Indian tax-payer.

India and Canada are supposed to be partners in the so-called Empire. But India is a partner without those rights, which Canada enjoy the right of controlling her own Army, Foreign relations and Finance. The condition in India and the colonies such as Canada, Australia etc., were and are quite different. The majority of the population in Canada etc. is of British nationality; and as such, the interests of the Canadian majority are identical with the Britishers on account of their British Nationality,



but that can never be the case with India. Therefore, the Indian conditions, inasmuch as they affect the question of the maintenance of the British troops in India are bound to differ.

Sir George Aston says:—"The last British troops did not leave the country (Canada) until 1905. There was never, to my knowledge, any serious attempt by the British Government to compel Canadians to pay for these troops, although large sums (coming from the pockets of British taxpayers) were expended by British soldiers in Canada; similar conditions and a similar sequence of events followed in Australia, in New Zealand and in South Africa." <sup>4</sup>

England has been paying for the Army cost of all these colonies for about a hundred years and more.

So long as the British policy of fleecing the poor Indian taxpayer continues, and so long as the right of self-determination of Indians is not recognized in right earnest, not only in words but in actions, till then it is rather too much to expect the evacuation of the British Army of occupation from India.

He again says:—"In those days Britain provided soldiers for local defence, and also paid local forces such as the Canadian Rifles and the Cape Mounted Rifles, to defend their own countries and to keep order therein." <sup>5</sup>

In India, not only have we to pay for the Indian Army, unlike Canada, but in addition, we have been made to pay against our consent and sanction, the monstrous cost of the British Army. Gen. Smutts, the Defence Minister, in a speech which he delivered to an

assembly of British officers said, "South Africa must not have a Boer Army or an English army but a South African Army. If you succeed, as I hope that you will, you will not only produce an army but a nation".<sup>6</sup>

Control of Foreign relations and its effect on policy:—If only we were to have the control and lay down our own Foreign policy, we would not have been required to submit to these British Army costs. In the first place, we would not have maintained the British troops at all, as, equally efficient and economical Army of Indian soldiers is easily available. Assuming that we did engage British troops, still we would never have consented to such heavy, unnecessary and unreasonable charges for them.

### **Military Expenditure and Capitation**

Total expenditure in England, for British Troops in India from 1861 to 1932:—India has spent on her army approximately a sum of Rs. 2312 crores, out of which the expenditure incurred in England alone, for British troops and British services is approximately 525 to 600 crores. The capitation charges alone, were approximately somewhere between 62.45 and 82.27 crores. We have not only wasted this good money, but in fact we have trained huge military reserves for England, all along to our disadvantage.

**Table II. Shows approximately, the capitation charges from 1861-1932.**

Year	Average strength in thousands British troops	Average rate of capitation	Total cost in £ s.	Total cost in Rupees	
				@ Rs. 10, a £ crores	@ Rs. 13/8, a £ crores
(a)	(b)	(c)			
1661-70	64	£ 10		6.40	8.54
1871-82	62	„		7.44	9.40
1883-86	61	„		2.44	3.29
1887-90	72	„		2.88	3.89
1891-95	72	£ 7 s. 10		2.70	4.86
1896-06	73	£ 11 s. 4		8.99	10.84
1907-20	73	„		11.45	12.80
1921	73	£ 25 s. 10		2.08	2.80
1922-32	68	£ 25 s. 10		19.07	25.85
				63.45	82.27

Refer Welby Commission (1897) Report, Page 304-6, for (a) (b) (c), and book page 76.

Variation in the rates has no moral grounds and basis. We give below a statement, showing capitation charges levied for the Air Force personnel. This rate of capitation is nearly double *i. e.* about £ 52 to 54 per year per man.

**Table II. Capitation Statement, showing Aircraft personnel payment in England**

Year.	Strength Air force personnel	Payment to England for personnel	Rs. per head	£ @ Rs. 10	£ @ Rs. 13-8
		Rs.			
(a) { 1928	1933	13,75000	711·3	£ 71·13	£ 52·7
1929	2176	14,40000	661·7	£ 66·17	£ 49·
(b) { 1930	2198	14,17000	644·7	£ 64·47	£ 47·7
1931	2209	14,67009	664·1	£ 66·41	£ 49·1

Note —(a) Refer Budget 1929-30 Page 316; (b) Refer Budget 1931-32, Page 336.

**Capitation rates, services included :—** “(1) The enlisting and temporary training of the recruit for the Arm of the force to which he will belong. These include the cost of officers and N. C. Os, who train the recruit and a charge for those recruits who desert or die in the first year of the service.....that is, a charge of waste in the production of soldiers required to keep up the established strength of the British force in India.

(2) The pay of young officers appointed to vacancies in the force and waiting orders to sail, and of young officers appointed to the Royal Engineers stationed in India, who undergo a training of two or three years at Chatham.

(3) The training of Veterinary surgeons for India.

(4) The examination of candidates for the Indian Medical Service.

(5) Educational establishments *viz.* Royal Military College, the Royal Military Academy, Staff College,



(10) Advance of 25 days' pay to men embarked as drafts for India (for voyage)	11,563
(11) Expenses of men awaiting discharge (including period of passage home.)	33,259
(12) Share of cost of staff, &c., of hospitals and discharge depots and expenses of invalids (calculated on actual numbers received.)	45,441
Total	677,074
Deduct other expenses	156,065
	521,009
Add costs	213,192
Total	£ 734,201

The capitation rate in 1889-90 was £10 and at present this rate is about 3 times more. We can assume therefore that the general cost on every item has increased by 3 times and more.

Contributions to certain heads have increased enormously. They are out of all proportions. The following shows the nature of our contributions to some educational institutions.

Capitation and the other details:—The actual amount contributed by the Indian Government to the upkeep of Sandhurst, Woolwich, Chatham and other educational establishments, connected with the provision of officers of the army is as follows:—

**Table IV:—Showing approximate cost of contributions given by Indian Government to some of the educational institutions in England.**

Institution	Indian Contribution in 1898-90	Indian Contribution to-day	Increase to-day
Sandhurst	£ 11,228	£ 80,000	£ 68,772
	Rs. 1,51,578	Rs. 10,80,000	Rs. 9,28,422
Woolwich	£ 7,582	£ 30,000	£ 22,411
	Rs. 1,02,357	Rs. 4,05,000	Rs. 3,02,643
Chatham	£ 2,319	£ 15,000	£ 12,681
	Rs. 31,306	Rs. 2,02,500	Rs. 1,69,194

In fact, all this money (to-day Rs. 1·78 crores ) is spent mostly on military training. Could not we do it here with advantage ? It would be still so cheap.

In this very sum, we can have our own training Institutions in India. In England, Sandhurst entertains 500 to 600 boys Woolwich ( Artillery college ) about 220 boys. But in India, our Sandhurst and Woolwich—the Dehradun—can accommodate only 60 boys instead of 800 and more, and that too at such a high cost.

Different Commissions were appointed, to inquire into the accounts and to review the rates etc., of this capitation item. The British process of appointing committees after committees, was adopted as usual. It is never a binding on the Government to accept the recommendations of these committees. We see it from the fate of the recommendations of the Rawlinson-Mac-Munn-committee (the Military Requirements Committee of 1921 ), the Shea Committee, and the Skeen Committee. The recommendations were neatly and gently shelved. Similarly, in connection with the capitation enquiry, various committees from time to time were appointed, such as the Tulloch Committee of 1860-61, Northbrook Committee, the Welby Commission and various other Committees. The fate of the recommendations of these committees was also similar, more or less they also were shelved as usual.

Different rates without basis:—It would be seen that the capitation rates were decided without any basis. Sometimes they were £7, and at times, they were increased to £10 10 s., £11. 11 s, £28, £25 etc. We do not think that this rise and fall has any legal or moral justification or any basis at all. In the first place, we cannot recognize the moral and the legitimate right

of the Britisher to charge this capitation cost at all. It is not for our needs that the British Army is maintained in India and yet we have to pay the capitation cost, against our will, only because of the forced safeguards of foreign relations and control of army.

Sir C. W. Dilke says, "The payment of this sum (money spent in England) by India to England is remarkable, for the amount is the largest item in the whole of the Indian accounts. It exceeds the total cost of the British force in India, together with the expense of its command and administration. It far exceeds the total cost of the native force." <sup>7</sup>

"This is the price that India pays for its British recruits, in addition to the cost of their sea-voyage out and home, and of their pay while on passage. It is a monstrous price to pay." <sup>8</sup>

"The £ 750,000 (to-day Rs 1·78 crores) is simply a tribute paid by India to the War Office, for the privilege of receiving British regiments on loan (at India's expense from the moment they leave England until the day when they are safely landed back again. If the tribute were remitted, the Indian Government could afford for a fraction of it to keep recruiting offices in the United Kingdom and in Canada, which would be able to supply all the men required." <sup>9</sup>

"The £ 7 10 s. is represented as the price of the recruiting and training of the British soldier at the time he is sent out to India, and India is made to hire British soldiers at that price." <sup>10</sup> *The charge has no parallel elsewhere in the Empire.*

"Rebate was based upon the assumption that an infantry soldier receives in England a training of 6 months, for which the Indian Government pays. When,



therefore, a soldier returned to England after service in India, and served for four years in the Reserve, (of England) India claimed a rebate on the enlistment and training charge which she had paid for that man because a part of his service would be given at home."<sup>11</sup> But even this was refused.

India is a partner in expenditure but not in Rights or Profits; Mr. Buchanan says, "In order to justify the charges, various (and sometimes conflicting) theories are brought forward of the supposed relation of India to the Home Government. Sometimes she is treated as an independent power, at other times, as in a position of strict administrative and legislative dependence. Sometimes she is spoken of as a partner, in a joint concern, at other times as a more or less unwilling purchaser in a limited market." <sup>12</sup>

Our partnership is really funny. We are only to pay and serve, and the Britisher is to draw all the profits. Is it not really a novel and ingenious partnership?

The Indian cost alone means the Empire:—Mr. Buchanan, in his note of dissent, says, "The military strength of India is the main factor in the strength of our Empire in the East. In virtue of that strength Great Britain is a great Asiatic power." <sup>13</sup>

But that is not the cost in India alone. "The British army is the army of the Empire. Of the British Army 74,000 men are permanently stationed in India and are the symbol of British rule in that country. If India pays all their expenses whilst in her service, and all other charges for the military defence of India, she does everything that can be expected of her, and far more than is demanded from any other part of the

Empire." <sup>14</sup> This is again the result of the control of Foreign policy and the control of her Army *i. e.* the enforced safe-guards.

**Imperial cost borne by India alone:—**" While the Indian revenue has provided regularly for all effective charges of all troops of the line employed in India and £ 60,000 sterling (to-day many times more) for non-effective charges, *no British colony or dependency has fully provided even for effective charges of the force employed.*" This is, again, because of the British interests and the control of Foreign policy and the Army.

**Partner in Imperial cost alone, but no rights:—**" If the *division of expenditure* between India and England is to be regulated on a purely arithmetical basis, and is to proceed on the assumption, that the two countries are partners, having equal interests in respect of their joint undertaking, the *Indian authorities should have an equal voice* in respect to the desirability or otherwise of *carrying any proposed reform* into effect. At present, the Indian authorities are so far from having an equal voice in the decision on such matters that it may be said, without exaggeration, that *they have scarcely any voice at all.* It has rarely, if ever, happened that the Government of India has been consulted before any reforms in the organisation of the British Army have been effected, even though the execution of those reforms may have resulted in considerable burthen being thrown on Indian revenues." <sup>16</sup>

To have any voice means the control of Foreign relations and the Army. "The cost of the military works is defrayed, not from the military budget but from the public works budget."<sup>17</sup> Even to-day some items which ought to be included in the Army Budget, are included

in the civil Budget, such as strategical Railways and such other times. This means the control of the Army and finance. "We have attempted to introduce *short service* and have enormously increased the expenditure of India." This also means again the control of Foreign policy and the control of the Army.

**Non-effective and extra General expenditure: —**

"The revenues of India have been charged with the cost of *many changes* in the organization *not specially necessary* for the efficiency of the army in this country, and with the cost of troops employed on **Imperial service** beyond the limits of India. Millions of money have been spent on increasing the Army of India, on armaments and fortifications to provide for the security of India not against domestic enemies, or to prevent the incursions of the warlike people of adjoining countries, but to maintain the supremacy of British power in the east. The scope of all these great and costly measures reaches far beyond Indian limits, the policy which dictates them is an Imperial policy therefore, in the maintenance of the British forces in this country, a just and even liberal view should be taken of the charges which should legitimately be made against Indian revenues."<sup>18</sup> This is only due to that Control of Foreign Policy and the Army.

**Increase of British troops after 1857:—**The British troops' strength rose from 30,000 to 71,000 after 1857. This was done to consolidate British power in India under the Pretext of Internal defence. The Internal defence is nothing but the occupation of India. British troops in India naturally result in the increased total capitation cost, not only on account of the increase in the strength of the British troops, but also because in the tremendous difference in the every-day increasing

capitation rate. Side by side with the increase of the British troops, the Indian troops had to be decreased for safety. All the savings effected from this reduction of the Indian Army was spent on the increased strength of the British Army, a part of this being spent on capitation and non-effectives.

Canada had never to face this difficulty, since it never paid for the British troops even. The capitation charges or the increased rate was a thing that least affected Canada, and this is the subtle difference between the Canadian's and the Indian's position.

"Sir Auckland Colvin has indicated the year 1885 as the time, when a definite change took place in the *frontier policy* of the Government of India. This change was at once followed by an increase of 10,000 Europeans necessitating an annual increase of about Rs. 16,00,000 in the expenditure of the country."<sup>19</sup> It is again the result of the control of Foreign policy and Control of Army.

Ramsay Macdonald says, "A large part of the army in India, certainly one half, is an Imperial Army, which we require for other than purely Indian purposes, and its cost, therefore, should be met from Imperial and not from Indian funds."<sup>20</sup>

Cost in General :—"The expenditure which has been incurred in the past may have been inevitable, but the question is whether India can afford to maintain military expenditure on the present scale as an insurance against future eventualities. *In our opinion India cannot afford this expenditure.*"<sup>21</sup>

All these factors mean the control of Foreign policy and the Army.

We entirely agree with the Mesopotamian Report, which says, "Our investigations show that what is in

default is not the fighting capacity and efficiency of the combatant forces of the Indian Army, but the system of military administration in control of that army." <sup>22</sup>

The control of Foreign relations means in fact the control of the Army, and the control of the Army means the necessity of the control of finance. If only, we were to conduct our own Foreign relations or international policy, we would never have agreed to the maintenance of a British Army in India or, rather we would never have maintained the British Army in India. There would not have been an occasion for us to tolerate the lame and the false excuse of the necessity of British troops for the defence of India.

Thus, India would not have been burdened with an heavy army cost, both in India and in England. The financial stringency, that we are undergoing to-day would never have arisen or been felt, if only we had the control of the Army, Finance, and Foreign relations.

It is on account of this control of Foreign Policy and Army, that we are burdened with huge cost, in addition to all the huge War debts. No Indian therefore, would ever agree to any constitution, that does not include the control of these three vital and all important questions. Without these, the constitution is lifeless, it is a shadow, a mirage. But as nothing much in the way of an advance could possibly be done,—for some time to come at least, it is but in the interests of India, if she were to mobilize her energies in getting something even out of this trash. This may be more discreet; but opinions may differ. The difference in the Indian ranks may mean obstacles and delays. Let us try to avoid them, if we can.

## CHAPTER XV

### SOME BRITISH PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSIONS

We consider in this chapter a few latest arguments, devices and suggestions etc., used and given, to put off the vital and all important question of Army control and other safeguards.

It can be seen from the discussion, that in fact, there is no real reason and difficulty, either in solving the Indianization question or the question of conceding the principle of making the Army budget votable, excepting the self-interest and the consequential unwillingness of the Britisher to part with his hold on India, *i. e.* the vital questions of the three safe-guards—the Foreign relations, Army control etc.

One can understand the British angle of vision, if one were to follow the last speech made by Sir Samuel to the last R. T. C.. A number of imaginary difficulties, which do not exist at all, have been raked up ; some assumptions are made, which have no basis and data, but they had to be made only to guard the British interests. That speech has been so cleverly dressed as to make one believe, that it is all for India's interest. Technical Military difficulties which do not in reality exist nor arise have been thrown out to silence the non-technical civil personnel of the R. T. C.. The real military personnel was nil. The few members—Army men with ranks and titles—who unfortunately never had any higher Army education on account of their educational shortcomings, are not the persons who could possibly venture to pass any technical opinion.

It is no fault of theirs of course, but unfortunately it is the result and effect of the circumstances to which they were easy victims, and through which they had to pass.

We consider only a few of these British difficulties, assumptions, reasons and problems to enable us to judge the British outlook and mentality.

Coming events cast their shadows. We may therefore think of them in that light.

(1) Feeling of Extravagance:—Sir Samuel expressed that, 'from speeches it appeared that there was a feeling that there was extravagance in the Defence Expenditure of India'. Opinions on the question like extravagance may differ—and specially opinions of those who have their own interests to guard, and their own axe to grind; are all the more so, when it is not their money that they spend. India's money can be squandered extravagantly by anybody, and still, they may have the courtesy and cool audacity with assumed unreasonableness, to deny the extravagance. The extravagance has been sufficiently shown and proved in this book. We cannot afford the huge expenditure. We assure British statesmen, that it is not only a feeling, but a positive fact, which requires no extra proof. They know it, as well as we do. But they are perhaps compelled to deny the extravagance inasmuch as it does not suit their interests.

(2) It was also said, that Figures of Defence Expenditure cannot be given:—Sir Samuel perhaps did not want to say what he said. He says:—"No one could possibly give to the Conference, or India or the world outside, a definite figure upon which the Expenditure of Defence could be estimated". But he slipped, and now in all probability, attempts may be made to show, that he said what he meant.

All nations maintain armies for a definite purpose, and all nations estimate and settle the cost of the armies maintained, before hand; so does England, and so does India too. Why could not the figure of Army cost be given, when we know definitely that the Army in India is more for the Defence of India than any thing else? If the army is maintained for the Imperial defence, then the Empire has to pay for its needs. This is as plain as plain could be. When we know our needs, our probable enemies, our frontiers, our resources, our manpower, systems of creating militarily trained reserve personnel, our objective of defence, and all that, we certainly can estimate and find out the strength and organization of our Defence Army, and then, it is so easy to get the figures of the cost of defence. Every year, the British Government gets the Army vote sanctioned. Do they sanction it without exactly knowing the cost?

The Indian Army Budget ( cost ) is expended annually without the Legislature's sanction. Is the money spent without any figure for guidance? Sir Samuel meant something, but said something which perhaps no reasonable man would ever think of saying, except in politics.

The Indian Army Estimates and Budgets presented to the legislatures, disprove Sir Samuel's statement. Are the figures only theoretical?

( > ) Sir Samuel's assumption, that the responsibility of the Indian Defence should rest with the Viceroy, is militarily erroneous. It could only be said, that these British suggestions may be agreed upon by the civil personnel of R. T. C. who perhaps naturally could not fully realize and balance its technical difficulties and



its military implications. We know that the personnel of the R. T. C. included even military men. But with regard to that personnel, we only note and express, what Field-Marshal Rawlinson and Birdwood have expressed in the Assemblies at the time of the Indianization question; they said that these old rankers with V. Cs, though gazetted as King's Commissioned Officers are not educationally fitted for King's Commissions, therefore the experiment had to be given up. Consequently, the opinions of such military experts of the R. T. C. naturally carry no technical value. They may be very brave soldiers, but unfortunately they are not the persons qualified to solve such higher military questions—they are handicapped. They may be favourable to the Britishers' view point, but their opinions cannot be said to be correct and true on the military problems. In short, the responsibility of the Viceroy for the Defence is fundamentally wrong.

There cannot be two opinions on the question, that the defence expenditure must depend on the needs and conditions of the times. But the general conditions or the general state of affairs on the borders of India, being nearly the same for the last hundred years and more, we should not worry about any special set of circumstances, that may occur in future. And if at all, such an occasion were to arise, there is plenty of time to arrange and meet them. Either, we can anticipate such a set of circumstances, from the general nature of our international relations with adjoining states, and be able to meet them, as our defence arrangements might be so elastic as to enable us to meet any such eventuality, with adequately sufficient preparedness. What did England do at the time of the Great War? Had they anticipated the Great War? In any case, England had

got the solution then, the same could be done by us on any future occasion.

(4) Sir Samuel's latest theory is the invention that 'India's defence is best carried outside India.' This is said only to guard against the possibilities of Indian Troops being not available for Imperial purposes. Indian troops may be required outside, only when the Empire's battles have to be fought. We have always fought for our defence on our borders and on our coasts. Field-Marshal Kitchener, when discussing the capitation rate, writes, "Perish India" 'may mean "Perish the British Empire."' The above clearly shows the British necessity of interpreting Defence of India outside India. This untenable and lame excuse of 'India's defence outside India' has been launched forth only to assure the help of India under the garb of Imperial purposes, but in fact for the very existence of England, because without India the Empire does not exist. In short, to-day, there can be no question of the defence of India being outside India.

(5) Sir Samuel recommended the members to await the decision of the Tribunal:—There is no reason, justification or propriety in this recommendation, but the idea to shelve the main issues of the question, of the 'responsibility of the Viceroy,' 'the use of Indian troops outside India' for Indian defence etc. Sir Samuel, therefore, advises Indians to await the decision of the Tribunal. This Tribunal meets to discuss the question of capitation charges only, and is not concerned with the two above questions of 'Responsibility of the Viceroy' etc. The suggestion to wait was given only to set aside the main issue with a view to gain time. He again says, that "Indian Sandhurst cannot be dependent on the vote."

We maintain, that the whole Army Budget should be a votable item and be sanctioned by the legislatures, just as the Army Vote is sanctioned by the Houses in England. The Indian demand, that the Indian Sandhurst should not only be discussed but should also be dependent on the 'Vote' was in fact only a plea to urge the principle of making the Army budget votable, whether it be in part or in full. In order to evade this all important question of principle, Sir Samuel replies, that the question of the Sandhurst vote should be met by a Managing Committee. The indirect method adopted by our R. T. C. knights has failed, but now, we boldly give out, that it is not only a paltry cost of 20 lacs of Indian Sandhurst, that should depend on the vote of the legislatures, but in reality, what we aim at, is the Army Vote of Rs. 57.07 crores itself; in short, the Army budget should be a votable item.

(7) Another point which was touched by Sir Samuel was "The difficulties of Army Indianization." The difficulties which are put forth are only imaginary and concocted ones. Sir Samuel says, that "with the best will" the period of Indianization cannot be fixed. We only refer him to the British experts, Field-Marshal Rawlinson and General MacMunn, who evolved a scheme of Indianization of 28 years. The Britishers' own experts had fixed that period. To go a bit further, we say, that according to the very scheme, the remaining period of Indianization to-day, is only 16 or 18 years, as the process of Indianization had already begun in 1922.

There is also another view. Indianization has got to be defined. Indianization does not mean the replacement of British officers alone, but it also means the replacement of the British soldiers. So long, the

question of officers' Indianization was mainly urged. But now, we maintain and point out, that the question of British soldiers' replacement is of a primary nature and the officers' question is a secondary one. We have already made practical and technical suggestions in this direction in the book. No technical and valid argument could ever be even attempted on physical and military grounds to disprove the above suggestion of the replacement of British soldier by Indian soldier.

(8) Sir Samuel puts forth difficulties in the scheme of the Indianization of the officers. Sir Samuel suggested, that the Indianization was only an experiment. He also suggests that during this experimental process, the expenditure would be much higher, and he also thinks, that the overriding question of military efficiency is affected thereby. Sir Samuel may call it an experiment, but we cannot. So, we take it to be a fact and no more a matter for experiments. Secondly, regarding the observations on the question of higher expenditure during the process of Indianization, we suggest to Sir Samuel that it would be better if he were to be guided by his and Finance military experts on this matter. It would be seen from the book that if the British soldiers replacement is carried out, there would be a tremendous saving in the general army Budget. If the other phrase *i. e.* the officers' Indianization is taken into account, it might also be proved that, that again will achieve no small savings. Supposing that the I. B. Os. are paid at the same rate as British officers, still, certain allowances given and money spent over the British officers of the Indian Army, may not be spent over the I. B. Os. Thus, some unnecessary cost will be saved. For instance the Capitation charges, the overseas transportation charges etc. It would not be

necessary to spend this sum on the I. B. Os. Even this phrase then, does not show any higher or increased expenditure, but in fact, it shows an amount of savings. It appears Sir Samuel had wrong and incorrect information on this point.

Thirdly, Sir Samuel evinces doubts regarding the probable inefficiency of the I. B. Os., who have returned from Sandhurst. The efficiency test of an officer is the promotion examination test. Neither can Sir Samuel nor can any British commander prove that Indians are incapable to stand these tests; because, they have actually passed these tests. The promotion tests for higher rank, consists of the same subjects, which, the young Indian subaltern has been taught at Sandhurst, such as the subjects of Tactics, Military History, Strategy, Politics, Administration, Organization, Economics, Military Geography, Military engineering, Science,—Chemistry, Electricity, Mechanics, Weapon training, sports etc. The promotion tests in this examination are only a little bit higher and elaborate ones; barring that, there is hardly any difference. So the apprehension of Sir Samuel and the like on this account is quite unfounded and misleading. Volumes may be written over this point, but we are restricted by time and space.

Assuming for the sake of argument that some of our I. B. Os. prove inefficient, we can only say, that the inefficiency is due to that erroneous system of 'nomination' instead of the sound system of 'competition.' being adopted in selection for Sandhurst. This is due to that policy of creating divisions and differences, as the invidious distinction of martial and non-martial, and methods resulting in pampering the vanity of the so-

called martial races with a view to lodge a breach in any united stand of Indians. It is the outcome of that accursed policy of 'Divide et Impera,' on which alone the Britishers can more or less rely for the occupation of the country.

Lastly, I cannot refrain from the temptation of making a brotherly suggestion to my young brother officers—junior sub-alterns to-day, and Commanders and Generals to-morrow—from Sandhurst, that the very hint of probable inefficiency of our I. B. Os is a slur on the Indian youth. We know, that they are handicapped in many things and in many ways. We also know, that some of them come from the classes, but at the same time we feel sure that, now at least, after the Sandhurst education, and their stay in England for about two years, have opened their eyes to the fact, that the harping of the Britisher on the same old melancholy tune of 'Martial and non-martial' is nothing else but a political device, which our rulers are compelled to adopt. We only refer them to the past glories of India, her old history, and we remind them that, on them—the present I. B. Os,—lies the responsibility of condemning or raising the name of Indians in general. We hope, they see through the attitude of doubts, put in as a plea by the Britishers.

(9) Defence—The hackneyed phrase of 'our policy is a policy of Indianization in as large a measure as is consistent with the amount of efficiency,' is to my mind meaningless. The wording of the phrase is dressed in the most complete diplomatic language and style. There is no wonder, if one were to infer, that the real meaning behind it is the unwillingness to give up the 'control of the Army.' We can only

say, that complete Indianization is not only possible, but it is a fact and a certainty, which cannot be disproved by any British Commander, or any militarist worth the name in the world. Given certain conditions, Indianization and complete Indianization is bound to be a success, without any the least iota of a doubt. There is no plausible and reasonable argument, which the Britishers may put forth against it, excepting unreasonableness and force. We wish we had an equally convincing and strong argument; and who knows, we may yet find one.

The Indianization programme of only one division is nothing but a political move of postponing the main issue. It is a form of the indication of British unwillingness to part with the control of the Army.

(10) Sir Samuel again touches upon certain questions of constitutional usages and enactments. He does not mention the constitutional or semi-constitutional questions, and without mentioning them, still suggests the remedies of dealing with these questions. The difficulty of a constitutional nature which was raised, and the two methods suggested—the method of constitutional usages and the other of statutory enactment—is another piece of diplomatic feat. It again amounts to the British unwillingness, alluded above.

Granting that the constitutional usages method is preferred individually by a certain school of British statesmen, there is apparently no reason why the general Indian opinion, which is more inclined towards statutory enactments, should not only be considered but even agreed upon.

(11) Defence member :—Sir Samuel's advice, to await the decision of the Committee in the settlement

of the question of the Defence Members' roll, *i. e.* whether the Defence Member should be a member of the legislature or otherwise, is not only most inappropriate and irrelevant, but in fact, it is another method of avoiding the question and main issue of 'Army Control.' It is surprising to note the ridiculous part of the inconsistency in his own statement. In certain constitutional and semi-constitutional questions, he prefers to depend on the constitutional usage method, as against the statutory enactment method, suggested by the Indian members of the R. T. C. personnel. Other countries have got a defence minister or a Secretary of State for War with the defence portfolio, responsible to the Houses. We would like to question Sir Samuel, why he would not like to respect in our case the very same principle adopted in other countries and England. The gist of all these manipulating methods cannot be hidden. It is the question of safe-guards *i. e.* the Army and the Army control etc. We fail to understand the significance and reason about this argument of Sir Samuel, excepting the idea of withholding the 'Control of the Army.'

(12) Another suggestion, which the Indian personnel of the R. T. C. had made, was the appointment of a Defence Committee, similar to the (Imperial) Defence Committee in England. The suggestion was not only most reasonable but most appropriate, being the only correct solution of the problem of Defence and defence arrangements. How could a beginning be made without taking any action? If a beginning has to be made, it must be made at the right moment without losing time, and it was only to secure this, that the statutory enactment method was suggested. Here again, in pleading the plea of constitutional usage,



Sir Samuel is again inconsistent. All this inconsistency is indirectly an indication of that British unwillingness to let go the 'Control of the Army.'

We believe, that in India, a Defence Committee or its equivalent already does exist, in the Army Headquarters, though it may be composed only of the A. H. Q. officials. What the Indian members meant by that suggestion, was only a little change in the personnel, by the inclusion of a few non-official and elected Indian members of the legislature etc. It is a wonder, how Sir Samuel should not have only this information of the existing defence arrangement when in fact, information of every smallest detail is always handy and available to him. This again, appears to be the result of that mood to evade the main and vital question of 'Army control.' The other Toy Committee, as suggested by Sir Samuel, would have no powers of control, since it was expressed by him, that a 'committee of such a nature may be thought of by the legislatures and that the existing relation between the Governor General and the legislature may be improved.' This above explanation of Sir Samuel, which is beside the point and quite evasive, is a further indication of that British unwillingness to part with the 'Control of the Army.'

Again, Sir Samuel tries to give sympathy. He says:—  
“Having said all about their different conceptions of methods of co-operation, there was no wish to end on a negative line or appear unsympathetic, to what was very near the heart of various members of the Conference. They would look very sympathetically into the suggestions made of bringing somewhere into the frame-work of the Act, the kind of expressions of opinions suggested.

"Firstly, that they did associate more and more Indians in the defence of India;

Secondly, that they did wish the Governor General to use every opportunity of bringing all members of the Federal Cabinet into discussions on questions of defence, and conversely bringing the Defence Minister into general questions outside the usual field of defence." <sup>2</sup>

The British lip-sympathy may also be seen in the suggestion of issuing instructions to provincial Governors. But this method and suggestion, of 'Associating more and more Indians' 'Discussion on defence' and 'instructions to Provincial Governments', carries us no further in the vital and all important question of the 'Army Control.' Merely looking at the suggestions sympathetically is not enough, just as looking at a dish would not satisfy the craving of hunger and even though there was a difference of fundamental principle, Sir Samuel still indulges in saying that 'there was no difference in principle but only in methods.' These expressions again are indications of that British unwillingness to part with the 'Army Control.'

We hope that the British statesmen would show more statesmanship, and the least that they could do is to agree to the proposal made by the British Indian Liberal Hindu Delegates, asking for a declaration that the Defence Minister should be appointed from the legislatures and the minister should be a member of the cabinet.

All the flimsy and lame excuses given by Britishers are only to hold back the three questions, which are most vital to any constitution *i. e.* 'Control of Foreign relations, Army, and Finance.'

'The Morning Post' reviews Sir Samuel's speech. It says, "With the biggest political party in prison and

with the Indian Army and services maintained as reserved subjects, the British ministers pretend that they are entrusting India with self-government, where as, what they are actually doing is to attempt a compromise which has hypocrisy stamped on its brow. It is bound to fail as it deserves to fail." <sup>3</sup>

Mr. Pratt in his paper says, "East and West the whole world is now politically conscious, and the old methods of imperial aggrandizement by invasion and conquest belong to an olden dispensation which has passed away." <sup>4</sup>

To sum up, we can confidently say, that the difficulties which have been presented by the British statesmen are no more the real difficulties in the solution of the question of Indian Defence, but in fact they are the real difficulties in the vital question of parting with the Control of the Army. It means the question of the occupation of India by Briton at the point of the British bayonet for British exploitation and interests.

### CONCLUSIONS

(1) India is physically and militarily fit to defend herself, without the aid of British soldiers.

(2) All arguments usually put forth, to stamp Indians as unfit, are nothing but the outcome of British selfish interest, and greed for self-aggrandizement.

(3) No constitution would be ever complete without a National Army, *i. e.* the Solution of the Problem of Indianization.

(4) To run any constitution effectively, Control of Finance, Foreign Policy and Army are the main considerations.

(5) India wants an economic, and, therefore, a National Army, that will give her the needed financial.

relief to the extent of about Rs. 28 to 32 crores.

(6) To say that India will be required to fight for her Defence outside India, is a white lie.

(7) India is willing to be a partner in the Empire, if only she has the same rights and prerogatives like other Dominions, of Canada and others, and has likewise the Control of the Army, Foreign Policy and Finance.

(8) The three safeguards must immediately vanish.

(9) India is not suited to be a member of the existing Empire, because she has not got that British nationality.

(10) The Army policy has to be immediately changed.

(11) The Army Budget should be immediately made votable.

(12) The subject of Defence cannot under a new constitution be managed without an Indian Defence Minister, responsible to the legislatures. If a British civilian Governor General can possess that common sense and wield those powers, there is absolutely no reason to believe why the Indian Defence Member should not be able to do so.

(13) The Army should be thrown open to all Indians, irrespective of caste, class, creed etc.

(14) All Arms should be at once thrown open and all bars be instantly removed. And to achieve all these, the first essential thing is the British soldiers' replacement by Indian personnel.

Unless and until the Defence Minister is made responsible to the legislatures, or the Army Budget is made a votable item, the extravagance in the expenditure, on the Indian defence, in Army administration and organisation, in movements and quartering, in training, in medical, in provisions and supplies, and in money

spent in England etc., would not be stopped; nor would the Indian Army be in a position to attain a high standard of efficiency, and thus be capable of adequately shouldering the responsibilities of the Defence of India. The British soldier is physically and militarily unfit in India, for the defence of India, and, therefore, he should be at once replaced by an Indian. The Defence of any country is best done only by the Nationals of that country and not by 'mercenaries.' It is necessary to split up the issue of Indianization, clearly and squarely, and as such, we at present only urge the immediate replacement of the British soldier, as this question involves no technical difficulties whatsoever.

### **An Appeal to British Politicians and Militarists**

We feel, the people are complaining, and rightly so, that the British Government in England and in this country is devoting its activity to matters of secondary importance, while the most vital and all-important problem of the 'Army', consisting of the three safeguards of Foreign relations, Finance, and Army Control are being postponed or ignored.

We deplore and strongly condemn the most meagre lip-sympathising and face-saving solutions of the Army problem.

We cannot help feeling that nothing but lip-service is paid to the fundamental principles of any constitution *i. e.* the Army or the power to defend oneself.

We warn the Britishers that it is in their interest to give up that complacency and self-satisfaction.

We feel that enemies and friends alike of the British rule in India have begun to feel strongly, that the testing time is come, and they are watching to see if the test reveals bankruptcy in British statesmanship

or a weakness, which may perhaps mean decline of the power or even ultimate separation of India from the Empire. Britishers should not forget, that India's great moral and physical force is necessary to strengthen the solidarity of the Empire, and with a view to assure the healthy and vigorous growth of the Empire ideal, it is necessary to keep India contented. Without India, the Empire cannot be conceived. Let Britishers not deceive themselves.

All attempts to prove to the contrary—the national renaissance in India—will, we are afraid, be nothing but futile in the long run, and in fact, may even add to greater discontent and greater hatred. We hope, therefore, that the British statesmen see the moral justification of the legitimate and national Indian demands and aspirations and help the peace of the world. On their decision hangs the 'peace' in the country and perhaps the Peace in the world.

**A Suggestion to Indian Politicians:**—Since 'the Defence of India', to a larger extent and in a greater measure, is to be the concern of Indians' we suggest that in order to enable Indians, to shoulder their responsibility, it is in the interests of the people to establish an "All India National Defence League" with its 'Provincial National Defence League Branches.' This league should undertake a vigorous propaganda to create a liking in the youths of the country, with a view to prepare themselves for the defence of their country, and in order to achieve this, vigorous attempts should be made to establish and institute 'rifle clubs,' 'District Associations,' equivalent to County association in England, 'Volunteer Associations' similar to 'territorial forces' and the 'reserve'. Attempts should be made to get our 'U. T. Cs. transformed into

**O. T. Cs'** so that the Junior or senior O. T. C. boys may be enabled to be officers in our Regular, Territorial, reserves or voluntary forces. Attempts should be made to get the subjects of 'Military History and Science introduced in the Universities,' as in England, to equip our future politicians with the necessary and essential qualification of understanding the defence questions and interests of our contry. Attempts should be made to organize volunteers' professional units such as the engineering-electrical mechanical, civil,—veterinary, medical, and all other tradesmans' units etc. In short, an all-India and provicial programme should be vigorously carried with a view to prepare ourselves to shoulder our Defence responsibility and thus keep ourselves in readiness to help the Country and the Government in any sudden emergency and eventuality—an eventuality for which we are spending a high sum of Rs. 57 crores annually. All these methods will in a way greatly help us in evolving a National Army, in getting our Army expenditure reduced, in solving the question of financial stringency, and in fulfilling our moral duty and obligations to the country and the Government.

The Legislatures, the Politicians, the National Congress as well the various political bodies of different shades and opinions, should launch a vigorous campaign and use all their energy and resources to carry on a propaganda, to get the Army Budget made votable, and when this is achieved, the British soldiers' replacement will follow. In fact, many awkward and acute corners would be tided over. Let us thus strive in right earnest to strengthen the World peace by strengthening our Defences.







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